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    Title: 財政分權對社會福利支出規模之影響-跨國實證分析
    The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Social Expenditure
    Authors: 王雅婷
    Contributors: 陳香梅
    王雅婷
    Keywords: 財政分權
    社會福利支出
    跨國實證分析
    Date: 2009
    Issue Date: 2011-10-11 17:02:59 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 2009年完成的內政部升格改制審查會議將台北縣、台中縣市、台南縣市、與高雄縣市升格或合併升格為直轄市，這次的直轄市升格可說是我國邁向地方財政分權的重要里程碑。不過，地方財政分權後，地方的財源增加，能否因為提升地方資源分配效率而創造更大的整體利益與人民福祉，仍有待驗證。而截至目前為止，大部份關於財政分權影響公共服務提供的實證文獻都集中研究焦點於公共支出的總規模上，探討財政分權對公共支出組成項目之影響文獻是有限的，且該類文獻也多集中於基礎建設支出、教育與醫療支出，唯有一篇Oates於1999年提出相關理論：由於低所得和高所得的家計單位皆具有流動性，地方政府若重視社會福利支出，將更容易吸引窮人移入而使富人離開，所以財政分權下的政策將促使救助低所得之社會福利支出提供不足。因此，基於過去的學術文獻並未實證探討財政分權對社會福利支出(social spending)規模的影響；而且國家的財政分權程度可能會因政治組織形式的不同而有所差異。本文將選樣國家區分成單一制和聯邦制，利用1996-2004年12個單一制國家和5個聯邦制國家的資料，並使用追蹤資料的分析方法和相關檢定，期望能分析財政分權與福利國家是否為衝突的政策目標。
    本文的結論主要為當國家以不同的政治組織形式-單一制與聯邦制區分時，其財政分權程度會對於該國的社會福利支出規模有不同的影響。由於，單一制國家相對聯邦制國家在政治體制上的財政分權程度較低，地方政府的有效職能均由中央政府掌握，並且社會福利支出往往也是中央政府進行所得分配功能的工具之一，在此條件之下，地方政府的地方支出占總支出的比例自然提高；另外，當地方政府的財政能力不足，甚至較大比例是由中央政府移轉來支持的情況下，社會福利支出往往就被排擠，而被經濟導向的支出所取代。在聯邦制的國家中，由於地方政府在某些領域擁有獨有的權力，地方之間競爭的壓力自然增強，為了吸引有錢人或外資移入，對經濟發展影響較小的社會福利支出很容易成為犧牲的目標，因而形成聯邦制國家的地方政府在支出分權和收入分權上，和社會福利支出規模呈現顯著的負向關係。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    97255006
    98
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097255006
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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