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| Title: | 核心代理問題與股價崩跌風險
Core Agency Problem and Stock Price Crash Risk |
| Authors: | 林子柔
Lin, Zi-Rou |
| Contributors: | 翁嘉祥
Weng, Chia-Hsiang
林子柔
Lin, Zi-Rou |
| Keywords: | 核心代理問題
型II代理問題
控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度
股價崩跌風險
公司治理
Core agency problem
Type II agency problem
Separation of control ownership and cash flow rights
Stock price crash risk
Corporate governance |
| Date: | 2021 |
| Issue Date: | 2021-07-01 17:25:37 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本文採用2000年至2020年上市(櫃)公司作為研究對象，旨在探討核心代理問題與未來股價崩跌風險之關聯性。核心代理問題是以企業之控制權與現金流量請求權之偏離程度作為衡量；以負偏態係數與股價漲跌波動率衡量未來之股價崩跌風險。本文實證結果發現，控制權與現金流量請求權之偏離程度越大，股價崩跌之風險越高，控制股東透過金字塔結構及交叉持股強化支配能力並從事自利行為使小股東權益遭受剝奪仍不自知，導致核心代理問題越嚴重，未來的股價崩跌風險將大幅增加。
過去亦有許多針對核心代理問題與企業經營表現與盈餘管理間之研究，惟未能從資本市場觀點探討核心代理問題所產生之影響。故本研究欲採用控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度觀察核心代理問題如何影響未來股價崩跌風險，提供股價崩跌風險不同面向的解釋。我國法治機關也扮演平衡雙方利害衝突的調停者，故本研究採用我國公司治理藍圖2.0之相關措施，從法規角度探討現行法律環境是否能有效保護外部投資者並降低核心代理問題及資訊不對稱所引發的股價崩跌風險。
This study use the domestic listed firms in Taiwan for the period 2000 to 2020 as the research object. The main purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the core agency problem and future stock price crash risk. To evaluate the core agency problem, we use the separation of control ownership and cash flow rights, and calculate the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns(NCSKW) and down-to-up volatility(DUVOL) to measure the stock price crash risk.
The empirical results of this study find that the larger separation of control ownership and cash flow rights, the higher the future stock price crash risk. Controlling shareholders enhance control by pyramidal shareholding structure and cross-shareholdings, engage in self-interested behavior, and jeopardize the interests of unknowing minority shareholders. Core agency problems become more serious, significantly increase the risk of future stock price crash. The implementation of corporate governance is also dedicated to reducing agency conflicts between the two parties.
There have been many studies on core agency issues and business performance and management in the past, but they have not explored the impact of core agency issues from the perspective of capital markets. Therefore, this study intends to use the separation of control ownership and cash flow rights to observe how core agency issues affect future stock price crash risk, and to provide different explanations for stock price crash risk. The competent authority acts as a mediator to resolve the conflicts of interest between the two parties. Therefore, this study use the specific regulations of Corporate Governance Roadmap 2.0 to explore whether the current legal environment can effectively protect external investors and reduce core agency problems and the risk of future stock price crash. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
108353116 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353116 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU202100619 |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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