政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/135928
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 113648/144635 (79%)
造访人次 : 51693123      在线人数 : 587
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧：
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据
    •  进阶搜寻
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/135928


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/135928


    题名: 核心代理問題與股價崩跌風險
    Core Agency Problem and Stock Price Crash Risk
    作者: 林子柔
    Lin, Zi-Rou
    贡献者: 翁嘉祥
    Weng, Chia-Hsiang
    林子柔
    Lin, Zi-Rou
    关键词: 核心代理問題
    型II代理問題
    控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度
    股價崩跌風險
    公司治理
    Core agency problem
    Type II agency problem
    Separation of control ownership and cash flow rights
    Stock price crash risk
    Corporate governance
    日期: 2021
    上传时间: 2021-07-01 17:25:37 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文採用2000年至2020年上市(櫃)公司作為研究對象，旨在探討核心代理問題與未來股價崩跌風險之關聯性。核心代理問題是以企業之控制權與現金流量請求權之偏離程度作為衡量；以負偏態係數與股價漲跌波動率衡量未來之股價崩跌風險。本文實證結果發現，控制權與現金流量請求權之偏離程度越大，股價崩跌之風險越高，控制股東透過金字塔結構及交叉持股強化支配能力並從事自利行為使小股東權益遭受剝奪仍不自知，導致核心代理問題越嚴重，未來的股價崩跌風險將大幅增加。
    過去亦有許多針對核心代理問題與企業經營表現與盈餘管理間之研究，惟未能從資本市場觀點探討核心代理問題所產生之影響。故本研究欲採用控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度觀察核心代理問題如何影響未來股價崩跌風險，提供股價崩跌風險不同面向的解釋。我國法治機關也扮演平衡雙方利害衝突的調停者，故本研究採用我國公司治理藍圖2.0之相關措施，從法規角度探討現行法律環境是否能有效保護外部投資者並降低核心代理問題及資訊不對稱所引發的股價崩跌風險。
    This study use the domestic listed firms in Taiwan for the period 2000 to 2020 as the research object. The main purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the core agency problem and future stock price crash risk. To evaluate the core agency problem, we use the separation of control ownership and cash flow rights, and calculate the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns(NCSKW) and down-to-up volatility(DUVOL) to measure the stock price crash risk.
    The empirical results of this study find that the larger separation of control ownership and cash flow rights, the higher the future stock price crash risk. Controlling shareholders enhance control by pyramidal shareholding structure and cross-shareholdings, engage in self-interested behavior, and jeopardize the interests of unknowing minority shareholders. Core agency problems become more serious, significantly increase the risk of future stock price crash. The implementation of corporate governance is also dedicated to reducing agency conflicts between the two parties.
    There have been many studies on core agency issues and business performance and management in the past, but they have not explored the impact of core agency issues from the perspective of capital markets. Therefore, this study intends to use the separation of control ownership and cash flow rights to observe how core agency issues affect future stock price crash risk, and to provide different explanations for stock price crash risk. The competent authority acts as a mediator to resolve the conflicts of interest between the two parties. Therefore, this study use the specific regulations of Corporate Governance Roadmap 2.0 to explore whether the current legal environment can effectively protect external investors and reduce core agency problems and the risk of future stock price crash.
    參考文獻: 一、中文參考文獻
    王元章、張椿柏. (2011). 從核心代理問題的角度探討股權結構, 董事會特性對公司價值之影響. 證券市場發展季刊, 23(2), 131-174.
    林宛瑩、許崇源. (2008). 台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議. 交大管理學報, 1, 269-312.
    葉銀華. (1999). 家族控股集團, 核心金業與報酬互動之研究-台灣與香港證券市場之比較. 管理評論, 18(2), 59-86.
    蔡家龍. (2019). 公司治理與股價保護效果之研究-以公司治理評鑑報告發布為例. 逢甲大學金融博士學位學程學位論文, 1-66.

    二、英文參考文獻
    Agrawal, A., and Chadha, S. (2005). Corporate governance and accounting scandals. The Journal of Law and Economics, 48(2), 371-406.
    An, H., and Zhang, T. (2013). Stock price synchronicity, crash risk, and institutional investors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 21, 1-15.
    Anderson, R. C., and Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding‐family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the SandP 500. The journal of finance, 58(3), 1301-1328.
    Andreou, P. C., Antoniou, C., Horton, J., and Louca, C. (2016). Corporate governance and firm‐specific stock price crashes. European Financial Management, 22(5), 916-956.
    Ashbaugh‐Skaife, H., Collins, D. W., Kinney Jr, W. R., and LaFond, R. (2009). The effect of SOX internal control deficiencies on firm risk and cost of equity. Journal of Accounting research, 47(1), 1-43.
    Bagnoli, M., and Watts, S. G. (2010). Oligopoly, disclosure, and earnings management. The Accounting Review, 85(4), 1191-1214.
    Beatty, A., Liao, S., and Yu, J. J. (2013). The spillover effect of fraudulent financial reporting on peer firms` investments. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55(2-3), 183-205.
    Bebchuk, L. A., Kraakman, R., and Triantis, G. (2000). Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity: the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights. In Concentrated corporate ownership (pp. 295-318): University of Chicago Press.
    Bedard, J., Chtourou, S. M., and Courteau, L. (2004). The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 23(2), 13-35.
    Benmelech, E., Kandel, E., and Veronesi, P. (2010). Stock-based compensation and CEO (dis) incentives. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(4), 1769-1820.
    Berle, A. A., and Means, G. C. (1932). The modern corporation and private property.
    Boyd, B. K. (1995). CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. Strategic management journal, 16(4), 301-312.
    Chen, J., Hong, H., and Stein, J. C. (2001). Forecasting crashes: Trading volume, past returns, and conditional skewness in stock prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 61(3), 345-381.
    Chiang, R., and Venkatesh, P. (1988). Insider holdings and perceptions of information asymmetry: A note. The journal of finance, 43(4), 1041-1048.
    Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., and Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The journal of finance, 57(6), 2741-2771.
    Claessens, S., Djankov, S., and Lang, L. H. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 81-112.
    Denis, D. K., and McConnell, J. J. (2003). International corporate governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1-36.
    Dimson, E. (1979). Risk measurement when shares are subject to infrequent trading. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(2), 197-226.
    Doyle, J. T., Ge, W., and McVay, S. (2007). Accruals quality and internal control over financial reporting. The Accounting Review, 82(5), 1141-1170.
    Du, J., and Dai, Y. (2005). Ultimate corporate ownership structures and capital structures: Evidence from East Asian economies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(1), 60-71.
    Enriques, L., and Volpin, P. (2007). Corporate governance reforms in continental Europe. Journal of economic perspectives, 21(1), 117-140.
    Ertugrul, M., Lei, J., Qiu, J., and Wan, C. (2017). Annual report readability, tone ambiguity, and the cost of borrowing. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(2), 811-836.
    Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of political economy, 88(2), 288-307.
    Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
    Fan, J. P., and Wong, T. J. (2002). Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 401-425.
    Feng, M., Li, C., and McVay, S. (2009). Internal control and management guidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(2-3), 190-209.
    Francis, B., Hasan, I., and Li, L. (2016). Abnormal real operations, real earnings management, and subsequent crashes in stock prices. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 46(2), 217-260.
    Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Larraza-Kintana, M., and Makri, M. (2003). The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations. Academy of management journal, 46(2), 226-237.
    Haw, I. M., Hu, B., Hwang, L. S., and Wu, W. (2004). Ultimate ownership, income management, and legal and extra‐legal institutions. Journal of Accounting research, 42(2), 423-462.
    He, G. (2015). The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality. Review of Accounting Studies, 20(1), 501-536.
    Healy, P. M., and Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1-3), 405-440.
    Hutton, A. P., Marcus, A. J., and Tehranian, H. (2009). Opaque financial reports, R2, and crash risk. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(1), 67-86.
    James, and Harvey, S. (1999). Owner as manager, extended horizons and the family firm. International journal of the economics of business, 6(1), 41-55.
    Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
    Jensen, M. C., and Ruback, R. S. (1983). The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4), 5-50.
    Jin, L., and Myers, S. C. (2006). R2 around the world: New theory and new tests. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2), 257-292.
    Jung, K., and Kwon, S. Y. (2002). Ownership structure and earnings informativeness: Evidence from Korea. The International Journal of Accounting, 37(3), 301-325.
    Kim, J.-B., Li, L., Lu, L. Y., and Yu, Y. (2016). Financial statement comparability and expected crash risk. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 61(2-3), 294-312.
    Kim, J.-B., Li, Y., and Zhang, L. (2011). Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(3), 639-662.
    Kim, J. B., and Zhang, L. (2014). Financial reporting opacity and expected crash risk: Evidence from implied volatility smirks. Contemporary Accounting Research, 31(3), 851-875.
    Kim, Y., Li, H., and Li, S. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and stock price crash risk. Journal of Banking and Finance, 43, 1-13.
    Kirschenheiter, M., and Melumad, N. D. (2002). Can “big bath” and earnings smoothing co‐exist as equilibrium financial reporting strategies? Journal of Accounting research, 40(3), 761-796.
    Kothari, S. P., Shu, S., and Wysocki, P. D. (2009). Do managers withhold bad news? Journal of Accounting research, 47(1), 241-276.
    La Porta, R., and Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F. (2002). Investor protection and corporate valuation. The journal of finance, 57(3), 1147-1170.
    La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517.
    La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (2002). Investor protection and corporate valuation. The journal of finance, 57(3), 1147-1170.
    Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of political economy, 94(3, Part 1), 461-488.
    Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52(2), 737-783.
    Tjondro, E., and Olivia, V. (2018). Role of Audit Committee in Tax Avoidance of Family and Non-Family Firms: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Economics and Business, 1(3), 368-380.
    Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N., and DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(3), 295-316.
    Yeh, Y.-H., and Woidtke, T. (2005). Commitment or entrenchment?: Controlling shareholders and board composition. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29(7), 1857-1885.
    Yeh, Y. h., Lee, T. s., and Woidtke, T. (2001). Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan. International Review of finance, 2(1‐2), 21-48.
    Zhu, W. (2016). Accruals and price crashes. Review of Accounting Studies, 21(2), 349-399.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    108353116
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353116
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202100619
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 大小格式浏览次数
    311601.pdf1769KbAdobe PDF20检视/开启


    在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回馈