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第二節 英文期刊 Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. (1972). "Production, information costs, and economic organization." . The American economic review 62(5), 777-795. Baucus, Melissa S., and Janet P. Near. (1991). "Can illegal corporate behavior be predicted? An event history analysis.". Academy of Management Journal 34(1), 9-36. Becker, C. L., DeFond, M. L., Jiambalvo, J., & Subramanyam, K. R. (1998). The effect of audit quality on earnings management*. Contemporary accounting research, 15(1), 1-24. Booth, J. R., Cornett, M. M., & Tehranian, H. (2002). Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation. Journal of Banking & Finance, 26(10), 1973-1996. Bowen, R. M., Call, A. C., & Rajgopal, S. (2010). Whistle-blowing: Target firm characteristics and economic consequences. The Accounting Review, 85(4), 1239-1271. Bowman, J. S., Anderson, R. M., Elliston, F. A., Ewing, D. W., Mitchell, G., Westin, A. F., ... & Salisbury, S. (1983). Whistle blowing: Literature and resource materials. Brickley, J. A., & James, C. M. (1987). The takeover market, corporate board composition, and ownership structure: The case of banking. The Journal of Law & Economics, 30(1), 161-180. Dechow, P. M., Ge, W., Larson, C. R., & Sloan, R. G. (2011). Predicting Material Accounting Misstatements*. Contemporary accounting research, 28(1), 17-82. DeFond, M. L., & Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of accounting and economics, 17(1), 145-176. Dworkin, T. M. (2007). SOX and Whistleblowing. Michigan Law Review, 1757-1780. DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Skinner, D. J. (1994). Accounting choice in troubled companies. Journal of accounting and economics, 17(1), 113-143. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 301-325. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. The journal of law & Economics, 26(2), 327-349. Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of accounting and economics, 40(1), 3-73. Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of accounting and economics, 31(1), 405-440. Heyes, A., & Kapur, S. (2009). An economic model of whistle-blower policy. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 25(1), 157-182. Luthans, B. C., & Sommer, S. M. (1999). The impact of downsizing on workplace attitudes differing reactions of managers and staff in a health care organization. Group & Organization Management, 24(1), 46-70. McLaughlin, R., Safieddine, A., & Vasudevan, G. K. (1998). The information content of corporate offerings of seasoned securities: An empirical analysis. Financial Management, 31-45. Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1985). Characteristics of organizational climate and perceived wrongdoing associated with whistle‐blowing decisions. Personnel Psychology, 38(3), 525-544. Miller, G. S. (2006). The press as a watchdog for accounting fraud. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(5), 1001-1033. Ruhnka, J. C., & Boerstler, H. (1998). Governmental incentives for corporate self regulation. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(3), 309-326. Salancik, G. R., & Pfeffer, J. (1980). Effects of ownership and performance on executive tenure in US corporations. Academy of Management journal, 23(4), 653-664. Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1992). The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of financial Economics, 32(3), 263-292. Velury, U., & Jenkins, D. S. (2006). Institutional ownership and the quality of earnings. Journal of Business Research, 59(9), 1043-1051. Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1978). Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. Accounting review, 112-134. Welker, M. (1995). Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity Markets*. Contemporary accounting research, 11(2), 801-827. Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of financial economics, 40(2), 185-211. Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1994). The costs and benefits of managerial incentives and monitoring in large US corporations: When is more not better?. Strategic management journal, 15(S1), 121-142.
第三節 英文書目 Barrett, G. (Ed.). (2004). Hatchet Jobs and Hardball: The Oxford Dictionary of American Political Slang. Oxford University Press. Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents: Living with high risk systems. Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1986). Positive accounting theory. |