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    题名: 台灣上市櫃公司揭露檢舉人保護條款因素之探討
    Whistleblower protection clause disclosure factors in Taiwan listed companies
    作者: 莊博智
    贡献者: 戚務君
    莊博智
    关键词: 公司治理
    保護條款
    內部檢舉人
    吹哨者
    日期: 2016
    上传时间: 2016-07-11 16:54:17 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 近年來台灣欲立法建立內部檢舉人保護條款，使內部檢舉人能夠在有充分的保護下檢舉管理階層之不法行為而不致遭受報復。
    目前台灣上市櫃企業編製吹哨者保護條款屬自願性揭露，管理階層可藉由揭露吹哨者保護條款做為資訊傳達的管道，本文旨在探討公司編製吹哨者保護條款對於企業特性之關聯性。本研究發現，公司在法人持股比例、負債比率及資訊揭露等級對編製吹哨者保護條款之公司有關。在字數部分，僅有成立年數對編製誠信經營守則字數有關。而本研究增額探討企業編製動因時並無得到顯著之結論。
    　　本研究對於國內企業在編製吹哨者保護條款的行為上並沒有得到一致的結果，其原因可能為國內對於吹哨者保護觀念尚為薄弱，編製吹哨者保護條款大多為符合證交所之期待，並無公司治理之特性。未來主管機關在訂定關於強化內部檢舉人制度之法規時應多加考慮其對公司治理特性的適切性，本研究並建議在後續研究中則可以繼續深入探討企業編製之動因，使主管機管能夠針對動因擬定適切妥當之規範。
    參考文獻: 第一節 中文期刊
    林欣美、郭麗華、蘇迺惠，2008，國際化程度、董事會結構、精練法人監督對盈餘管理之影響：以台灣資訊電子業為例，臺大管理論叢，第 19 卷第 1 期：157-186。
    林嬋娟與張哲嘉，2009，董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯性，會計評論，第 48 期：1-33。
    邵慶平，2005， 論企業道德行為準則-移植模式的分析與檢討，律師雜誌，第310期：50-63。
    陳文智，2007，試論「吹哨者保護法制」之引進，全國律師，11 卷6期：81-96。
    傅澤偉、林曼莉、羅竹君、邱彥毅，2002，資訊揭露評比變動對於權益資金成本的影響，臺灣銀行季刊，第63卷第4期。
    鄭桂蕙、余俊憲、王蘭芬，2012，內部控制缺失與應計品質-獨立董監之調節效果，東吳經濟學報，第79期：81-120。
    顧慕晴，2009，我國公務人員貪污檢舉制度之研究—增強途徑之分析，文官制度季刊，第1期：139-159。
    許崇源、戚務君、林宛瑩， 2006，盈餘模糊度，控制權偏離，經營效率，財務經理異動，資訊揭露與財務危機警訊，行政院國家科學委員會。
    黃朝盟，2012，建立「吹哨者」保護，促進廉能政府，國政分析。

    第二節 英文期刊
    Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. (1972). "Production, information costs, and economic organization." . The American economic review 62(5), 777-795.
    Baucus, Melissa S., and Janet P. Near. (1991). "Can illegal corporate behavior be predicted? An event history analysis.". Academy of Management Journal 34(1), 9-36.
    Becker, C. L., DeFond, M. L., Jiambalvo, J., & Subramanyam, K. R. (1998). The effect of audit quality on earnings management*. Contemporary accounting research, 15(1), 1-24.
    Booth, J. R., Cornett, M. M., & Tehranian, H. (2002). Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation. Journal of Banking & Finance, 26(10), 1973-1996.
    Bowen, R. M., Call, A. C., & Rajgopal, S. (2010). Whistle-blowing: Target firm characteristics and economic consequences. The Accounting Review, 85(4), 1239-1271.
    Bowman, J. S., Anderson, R. M., Elliston, F. A., Ewing, D. W., Mitchell, G., Westin, A. F., ... & Salisbury, S. (1983). Whistle blowing: Literature and resource materials.
    Brickley, J. A., & James, C. M. (1987). The takeover market, corporate board composition, and ownership structure: The case of banking. The Journal of Law & Economics, 30(1), 161-180.
    Dechow, P. M., Ge, W., Larson, C. R., & Sloan, R. G. (2011). Predicting Material Accounting Misstatements*. Contemporary accounting research, 28(1), 17-82.
    DeFond, M. L., & Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of accounting and economics, 17(1), 145-176.
    Dworkin, T. M. (2007). SOX and Whistleblowing. Michigan Law Review, 1757-1780.
    DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Skinner, D. J. (1994). Accounting choice in troubled companies. Journal of accounting and economics, 17(1), 113-143.
    Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
    Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. The journal of law & Economics, 26(2), 327-349.
    Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of accounting and economics, 40(1), 3-73.
    Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of accounting and economics, 31(1), 405-440.
    Heyes, A., & Kapur, S. (2009). An economic model of whistle-blower policy. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 25(1), 157-182.
    Luthans, B. C., & Sommer, S. M. (1999). The impact of downsizing on workplace attitudes differing reactions of managers and staff in a health care organization. Group & Organization Management, 24(1), 46-70.
    McLaughlin, R., Safieddine, A., & Vasudevan, G. K. (1998). The information content of corporate offerings of seasoned securities: An empirical analysis. Financial Management, 31-45.
    Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1985). Characteristics of organizational climate and perceived wrongdoing associated with whistle‐blowing decisions. Personnel Psychology, 38(3), 525-544.
    Miller, G. S. (2006). The press as a watchdog for accounting fraud. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(5), 1001-1033.
    Ruhnka, J. C., & Boerstler, H. (1998). Governmental incentives for corporate self regulation. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(3), 309-326.
    Salancik, G. R., & Pfeffer, J. (1980). Effects of ownership and performance on executive tenure in US corporations. Academy of Management journal, 23(4), 653-664.
    Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1992). The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of financial Economics, 32(3), 263-292.
    Velury, U., & Jenkins, D. S. (2006). Institutional ownership and the quality of earnings. Journal of Business Research, 59(9), 1043-1051.
    Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1978). Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. Accounting review, 112-134.
    Welker, M. (1995). Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity Markets*. Contemporary accounting research, 11(2), 801-827.
    Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of financial economics, 40(2), 185-211.
    Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1994). The costs and benefits of managerial incentives and monitoring in large US corporations: When is more not better?. Strategic management journal, 15(S1), 121-142.

    第三節 英文書目
    Barrett, G. (Ed.). (2004). Hatchet Jobs and Hardball: The Oxford Dictionary of American Political Slang. Oxford University Press.
    Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents: Living with high risk systems.
    Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1986). Positive accounting theory.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    103353037
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103353037
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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