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| Title: | 投資銀行購併顧問費用取決因素
The Factors Affecting M&A Advisory Fee |
| Authors: | 許孝銘
Syu, Shao Ming |
| Contributors: | 吳啟銘
許孝銘
Syu, Shao Ming |
| Keywords: | 購併費用
財務顧問
購併顧問價值 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| Issue Date: | 2016-07-01 14:58:34 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究探討購併費用是否反映投資銀行在購併案中提供的價值,與過去研究不同的是,過去研究大多從主併公司的角度進行探討,本研究分別研究主併公司及被併公司購併顧問費用。
因為購併過程中主併方及被併方都會聘請投資銀行擔任財務顧問,同時對兩端進行分析可以比對投資銀行在擔任不同角色時購併顧問費用取決因素是否不同,並且可以對投資銀行提供給主併公司及被併公司的價值進行推論。
本研究以美國購併案為研究對象,主併與被併公司皆為美國公司,研究期間為 2000 年至 2015 年。由 885 筆被併顧問費用購併交易樣本及 229 筆主併顧問費用購併交易樣本進行研究,實證結果發現:(1) 被併公司股價 CAR 越高,被併公司顧問費用越高,(2) 購併案所花時間越短,被併公司顧問費用越高。對於主併公司購併顧問費用而言,(1) 投資銀行排名上升,主併公司顧問費用越低。
原先我們認為購併溢價會影響購併顧問費用,但透過實證研究發現,不論對主併公司或被併公司投資銀行而言,購併溢價與購併顧問費用統計上均無顯著影響。
This paper investigates the relationship between M&A advisory fee and the advisory value which investment bank provides in M&A transaction. Most of papers studied M&A issues related to acquirer, different with previous studies, we not only focus on target fee but also acquirer advisory fee.
Both of target and acquirer firm hire financial advisors to help them deal with the M&A transaction, to check if the factors affecting M&A advisory fee are different, we divided the model into two parts, one focus on target advisory fee, and the other focus on acquirer advisory fee.
Evidence from 885 M&A transactions focus on target and 229 M&A transactions focus on acquirer between 2000 and 2015 supports that (1) Higher target company CAR, higher target M&A advisory fee, (2) Faster deal closing, higher the target M&A advisory fee. For acquirer investment bank, the evidence shows that (1) As the ranking move up, the advisory fee should be lower.
One of the hypothesis is that higher premium, higher target and acquirer advisory fee, according to the result, we found that the premium is not statistically significant to target and acquirer advisory fee. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
103357006 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103357006 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財務管理學系] 學位論文
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