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題名: | 不完全契約下外國供給者的研發行為 Foreign supplier`s R&D activities under incomplete contracts |
作者: | 褚泓毅 Chu, Hong Yi |
貢獻者: | 徐則謙 Hsu, Tse-Chien 褚泓毅 Chu, Hong Yi |
關鍵詞: | 跨國外包 財產權理論 研發行為 Foreign Outsourcing Property-right Theory R&D |
日期: | 2010 |
上傳時間: | 2013-09-05 16:53:35 (UTC+8) |
摘要: | 過去的文獻成功地運用不完全契約,解釋低資本密集的產業偏向採用外包合作而非垂直整合。然而,不完全契約理論卻忽略外包接單廠商自身的研發行為,尤其是在接單競爭被強化時。因此,我們延伸不完全契約模型,發現若接單廠商身處越資本密集的產業,越能從上游廠商奪取利潤,因此有更強的誘因從事研發活動。當接單競爭強化時,我們發現低資本密集的產業較不願意從事研發活動,甚至被市場淘汰,所以可以看到生產活動逐漸高資本密集的廠商或產業集中。另外我們利用計量模型驗證文章中的結論,並得到一致的結果。 Previous study utilizes incomplete contracts theory to explains why industries with lower capital intensity adopt outsourcing policy instead of vertical integration. However, incomplete contracts is silent in explaining foreign supplier`s R&D activities, especially when the competition is intensified. We extend the incomplete-contracting model, and discover that foreign supplier of higher capital intensity producer has a higher profit extracted from final-good producers. Such excess profit gives foreign supplier more incentive to engage in R&D activities. When competition is intensified, we also show that suppliers of less capital intensive producer spend less in R&D or may leave the market; therefore within an industry, factors are reallocated to suppliers of capital-intensive producers or toward suppliers in capital intensive industries. Econometric evidence we provide supports the prediction of the model. |
參考文獻: | Acs, Z. J., and D. B. Audretsch (1987): “Innovation, Market Structure, and Firm Size,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(4), pp. 567–574. Antras, P. (2003): “Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1375–1418. Antras, P., and E. Helpman (2004): “Global Sourcing,” Journal of Political Economy, 112. Bound, J., C. Cummins, Z. Griliches, B. H. Hall, and A. B. Jaffe (1982): “Who Does R&D and Who Patents?,” Working Paper 908, National Bureau of Economic Research. Bustos, P. (February 2011): “Trade Liberalization, Exports, and Technology Upgrading: Evidence on the Impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinian Firms,” The American Economic Review, 101, 304–340(37). Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart (1986): “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” The Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), pp. 691–719. Liu, M.-C., and S.-H. Chen (2003): “International R&D Deployment and Locational Advantage: A Case Study of Taiwan,” Working Paper 10169, National Bureau of Economic Research. Piga, C. A., and M. Vivarelli (2004): “Internal and External RD: A Sample Selection Approach” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 66(4), 457–482. Veugelers, R., and B. Cassiman (1999): “Make and buy in innovation strategies: evidence from Belgian manufacturing firms,” Research Policy, 28(1), 63–80. Williamson, O. E. (1971): “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations,” The American Economic Review, 61(2), pp. 112–123. |
描述: | 碩士 國立政治大學 國際經營與貿易研究所 98351017 99 |
資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0983510171 |
資料類型: | thesis |
顯示於類別: | [國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文
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