政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/51393

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/51393

English | 正體中文 | 简体中文 | Post-Print筆數 : 27 | Items with full text/Total items : 113318/144297 (79%)
Visitors : 51000814 Online Users : 905

RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.

Scope

please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results

please goto advance search for comprehansive author search

Adv. Search

Home ‧ Login ‧ Upload ‧ Help ‧ About ‧ Administer

Goto mobile version

政大典藏 > College of Social Science > Department of Public Finance > Theses > Item 140.119/51393

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/51393

Title:	資本稅對地方環境政策之影響 The effect of capital taxation on local environmental policy
Authors:	廖于瑩 Liao, Yu Ying
Contributors:	賴育邦 Lai, Yu Bong 廖于瑩 Liao, Yu Ying
Keywords:	環境政策資本稅租稅競爭 environment policy capital tax tax competition
Date:	2010
Issue Date:	2011-10-05 14:52:35 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	隨著人類的經濟活動發展造成環境的污染，近年來，人們開始注重環境的保護，並試著在經濟發展和環境保護之間取得平衡，本文便以此想法結合地區之間的租稅競爭，進而研究地方政府之間在環境政策的競爭是否會造成環境品質的向下沉淪 (race to the bottom)。本文中的地方政府利用對製造污染的廠商課徵資本稅(本文以從量稅和從價稅為例，但資本稅稅率為外生條件)以做為公共財的財源，同時管制廠商所排放的污染量。本文主要得到了三個結論：(1) 地方政府之間競爭的結果將會造成環境政策的向下沉淪；(2) 在單位稅額相同的情況下，地方政府選擇以從量稅或從價稅課徵資本稅，並不影響環境政策向下沉淪的程度，以及 (3) 影響環境政策向下沉淪的因素主要取決於該地方政府面臨的競爭對手數量，競爭的轄區愈多，環境政策向下沉淪的程度愈甚。 As the development of economy, the environment becomes much polluted. In recent years, environment protection has become an important issue, and people have tried to strike a balance between the development of economy and environment protection. In this thesis, we combine this idea and tax competition among jurisdictions, and discuss the issue that whether the tax competition among jurisdictions leads to “the race of bottom.” In this environmental quality, the local governments levy tax on the capital of polluting industries, with either unit tax or ad valorem tax and with fixed tax rate, and use the tax revenues to finance public goods. Each government also imposes a cap on firms’ emissions. I obtain three main results: (1) The competition between local governments will lead to the race to the bottom in environment policy. (2) Given the same revenue per unit of tax, both the unit tax and the ad valorem tax lead to the same environmental policy. (3) The level of race to the bottom in environment policy depends on the number of the competitors to the local government. As the number of jurisdictions increases, the more the level of race to the bottom in the environment policy. Key words: environment policy, capital tax, tax competition
Reference:	Hoyt, William H. (1991), “Property Taxation, Nash Equilibrium, and Market Power,” Journal of Urban Economics, 30, 123-31 Kunce, Mitch and Jason F. Shogren (2005), “On Interjurisdictional Competition and Environmental Federalism” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50, 212-24. Kunce, Mitch; Jason F. Shogren (2008), “Efficient Decentralized Fiscal and Environmental Policy: A Dual Purpose Henry George Tax,” Ecological Economics, 65, 569-73. Lockwood Ben (2004), “Competition in Unit vs. Ad Valorem Tax,” International Tax and Public Finance, 11, 763-72. Markusen, James R., Edward R. Morey and Nancy Olewiler (1995), “Competition in Regional Environmental Policies When Plant Locations Are Endogenous,” Journal of Public Economics, 56, 55-77. Oates, Wallance E. and Robert. M. Schwab (1988), “Economic Competition among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?,” Journal of Public Economics, 35, 333-54. Rauscher, Michael (1995), “Environmental Regulation and the Location of Polluting Industries,” International Tax and Public Finance, 2, 229-44. Tiebout Charles. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure,” Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-24 Woods, Neal D. (2006) ,“Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis,” Social Science Quarterly, 87, 174-89. Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszowski (1986), “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods,” Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 296¬¬-315
Description:	碩士國立政治大學財政研究所 98255001 99
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098255001
Data Type:	thesis
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Public Finance] Theses

Files in This Item:

File	Size	Format
500101.pdf	993Kb	Adobe PDF2	854	View/Open

All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

社群 sharing

著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement

1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.

DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004 MIT & Hewlett-Packard / Enhanced by NTU Library IR team Copyright © - Feedback