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| Title: | 雇主間針對勞動市場所為之禁止僱用協議——以美國競爭法為中心
Non-hiring agreements between employers in the labor market —From the perspective of U.S. antitrust law |
| Authors: | 陳俞靜
Chen, Yu-Ching |
| Contributors: | 王立達
Wang, Li-Dar
陳俞靜
Chen,Yu-Ching |
| Keywords: | 互不挖角協議
禁止招攬協議
禁止僱用條款
操縱薪資協議
買方獨占
勞動市場
相關市場界定
敏感資訊交換
美國競爭法
Non-solicitation agreements
No poaching agreements
No hiring agreements
Price fixing agreements
Monopsony
relevant market
exchange of sensitive information
U.S. Competition Law
labor market |
| Date: | 2024 |
| Issue Date: | 2024-09-04 14:31:00 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本文聚焦在過往鮮少被重視的法規範模糊地帶——發生於競爭雇主間（尤其是於該產業之勞動市場中具買方獨占力量（monopsony power）之「明星」企業）針對勞工薪資及待遇、自由流動等所達成之不競爭協議（noncompetition covenants），通過借鑑目前發展相對領先之美國經驗，整理、剖析相關文獻資料以其執法經驗，試圖歸納出能適用於我國競爭法之最適解，提供予我國競爭主管機關、法院、事業（於勞動市場中具競爭人才關係之雇主）。
此類僅由競爭雇主所達成之「默契」，在2010年發生著名的矽谷高科技案（In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation）後逐漸受到重視，而美國競爭執法機關更在2016年頒布《人力資源專業人員之反托拉斯指引》，明確表示「赤裸的（naked）」操縱薪資協議、禁止僱用協議視同操縱價格協議、瓜分市場協議落入當然違法原則之射程範圍，並於2023年撤回原本設有敏感資訊交換行為安全區之1996年《醫療照護領域之反托拉斯政策執法聲明》，更於最新版的2023年《結合處理原則》第10條首次明確提及買方獨占（monopsony）且明文將勞動市場競爭亦納入結合案審查因素，以展現其嚴格打擊此類協議之決心。惟，現階段尚欠缺明文之法規範且對於涉及競爭法之勞動領域案件不甚熟悉，當今美國法院仍傾向較保守之立場。
將目光移回我國，2021年台灣花旗密約案乃我國首例涉及禁止僱用條款協議之案件，曾有立委提出增訂民法第489-1條、第489-2條草案，希冀杜絕此類協議之私法上效力以為嚇阻；而於競爭法部分，有論者主張應逕移植美國競爭主管機關嚴格之執法立場於我國，惟本文認為，此作法似過於速斷且不一定能與我國現行法制相容。此外，現行競爭法分析工具多為針對產品市場之特性所建構而成，縱然美國2023年《結合處理原則》第10條簡略提及可以將分析產品市場工具套用於相似之勞動市場，然勞動市場具有高度屬人性（重視勞資雙方匹配度、搜索摩擦、較高轉換成本等），相對於產品市場更為複雜且較難以統一之標準進行客觀評估，而就現今尚處於發展階段之勞動市場，本文認為，以「通勤區」（CZs）與「職業」為界定相關市場之工具，更能貼合真實之勞動市場，而Christopher S. Fowler教授提供之參數數據庫以及2023年《結合處理原則》或可成為我國未來勞動領域競爭法案件處理之重要借鏡。
This article focuses on the ambiguity of antitrust law that has rarely been taken seriously in the past - - the non-competition agreements between competing employers (especially so-called "star companies" with monopsony power in the labor market of their respective industries) regarding labor’s wages, benefits, mobility and the freedom of change their employment. By referencing the relatively advanced development of US antitrust law, this article compiles and analyzes relevant literature and enforcement experiences to derive the optimal solution applicable to Taiwan's competition law, providing guidance for our competition authorities, courts, and businesses (employers competing for talent in the labor market).
After the most famous case Silicon Valley High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation case (2010) happened, this legal problem gradually attracted public’s attention. In 2016, the U.S. DOJ & FTC promulgated "Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals", explicitly stating that "naked" wage-fixing agreements and no-poaching agreements fall within the scope of per se illegality, equivalent to price-fixing and market allocation agreements. In 2023, the agency revoked three antitrust enforcement policy statement, which had previously established a safe harbor for the exchange of sensitive information. Furthermore, the latest 2023 "Horizontal Merger Guidelines" explicitly mentioned monopsony for the first time in Section 10, and expressly included labor market competition as a factor in merger case reviews. Simply, those demonstrated the strict attitude of antitrust enforcement agencies to actively combat these types of anti-competitive conducts. However, in the absence of clear legal regulations and with limited experience in labor-related competition law cases, US courts still tend to adopt a more conservative stance.
Turning our attention back to Taiwan, in 2021, Citibank case was the first case involving no hiring clause. Some legislators once proposed to add draft the Article 489-1, 489-2 of the Civil Code in the hope of making those unfair restraints void the validity. Turn to the competition law side, some argue that Taiwan should directly adopt the strict enforcement stance of US antitrust authorities. However, this article believes that such an approach is too hasty and may not be compatible with Taiwan's current legal system. Moreover, existing competition law analysis tools are primarily designed for the characteristics of product markets.
Even though U.S. Merger Guidelines (2023) § 10 briefly mentions that the analysis tools of product market could apply in labor markets, however, in my opinion, most of the current competition analysis tools are constructed based on the characteristics of the product market, without considering labor market is more complex and difficult to unify certain standards for evaluation because of its personalized (which emphasis on the matching between employees and employers, search frictions, highly switching costs, etc.). In general speaking, the selection of suitable analysis tools for the labor market is still in the development phase, this article suggests that using "commuting zones" (CZs) and "occupations" to define relevant markets might be more suitable for the real labor market. |
| Reference: | 參考文獻
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2. 外文文獻
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2.5 未正式發表論文(working paper)
Autor, David, David Dorn, Lawrence Katz, Christina Patterson & John Van Reenen, The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms, NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 23396 (May. 2017), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w23396.
Azar, José, Steven Berry & Ioana Marinescu, Estimating Labor Market Power, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 30365 (Aug. 2022), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456277.
Grullon, Gustavo, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated?, SWISS FINANCE INSTITUTE RESEARCH PAPER NO. 19-41 (Oct. 2018), available at https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=022074007112127072114068017066067096052038021023029087122003065125112018077028007099058031037055107005101000082116079003077025010070031064016121118027021089096068067062019090001009027084117080124105102006121085007031119085018113103002089124104092003&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE.
Guerriero, Marta, The Labor Share of Income around the World: Evidence from a Panel Dataset Publication, ADBI WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 920 (2019), available at https://www.adb.org/publications/labor-share-income-around-world-evidence-panel-dataset.
Gutiérrez, Germán, Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S., NBER WORKING PAPER No. 23583 (July. 2017), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w23583.
Krueger, Alan, Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector, NBER WORKING PAPER No. 24831 (2018), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w24831.
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
法律學系
109651012 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109651012 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [法律學系] 學位論文
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