政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/147743

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题名:	獨立董監事對董監事股權質押之影響：以台灣法規變化為例 The Impact of Independent Directors on Insiders’ Share Pledging: Evidence from Regulatory Changes in Taiwan
作者:	許富凱 Hsu, Fu-Kai
贡献者:	鄭士卿 Jeng, Shih-Ching 許富凱 Hsu, Fu-Kai
关键词:	獨立董監事獨立董監事之董事會出席率董監事股權質押 board independence independent directors and supervisors’ board meeting attendance insiders’ share pledging
日期:	2023
上传时间:	2023-10-03 10:48:19 (UTC+8)
摘要:	獨立董監事身為強化公司治理的重要角色，可以藉由其專業知識及歷練協助董事會進行決策並提升公司經營表現。至於獨立董監事在董事會的出席率，則被視為是衡量其勤奮程度的象徵，能對董事會監督效率有正面影響。然而我國主管機關近年針對不少公司治理相關法令進行修訂，期望透過強制性的規範，達成減少公司代理及董監事股權質押問題之目的。故本研究使用2008年至2021年台灣上市櫃公司資料，探討當公司聘用獨立董監事或獨立董監事積極參與董事會時，於2011年質押法案通過及2017年所有上市櫃公司完成設置獨立董事此兩個事件後，是否會降低公司董監事股權質押情況，而獨立董監事的監督效果又是否會因此發生變化。本研究採用二元固定效果模型，控制年度及產業效果，並以傾向分數配對法(Propensity Score Matching, PSM)解決內生性問題。實證結果發現，於質押法案通過前，公司設置獨立董監事席次及獨立董監事積極出席董事會皆能改善董監事股權質押情況。而即使質押法案通過後，獨立董監事對質押情況的監督效果稍微減弱，但出席率之監督效果並無發生變化，表示獨立董監事比率越高及獨立董監事越積極出席董事會，越能減少董監事股權質押行為。至於當全數的上市櫃公司皆完成設置獨立董事後，獨立董監事之董事會出席率則較獨立董監事比率，對董監事股權質押行為具有更明顯的抑制效果，說明在公司廣設獨立董事的環境下，獨立董監事的積極參與度對強化公司治理及減少董監事股權質押情形上更有幫助。 Independent directors and supervisors can assist the board of directors in making decisions through their professional experience. Independent directors and supervisors’ board meeting attendance is also considered a symbol of their dedication, which can positively influence the supervisory efficiency of the board. However, Taiwanese authorities have revised some relevant regulations to mitigate the agency problems and the negative impacts on insiders’ share pledging in recent years. Therefore, we applied the two-way fixed effect model for companies listed in Taiwan between 2008 and 2021 to examine whether the employment of independent directors and supervisors or their attendance in board meetings will lead to a decrease in insiders’ share pledging after two significant regulatory changes—the passage of Article 197-1 of the Company Act in 2011, which restricts the exercise of voting rights, and the completion of independent director establishment for all listed Taiwanese companies in 2017. After considering the endogeneity problem, the empirical results show that no matter before or after the passage of Article 197-1 of the Company Act, board independence and independent directors and supervisors’ board meeting attendance can both reduce insiders’ willingness to share pledges. Furthermore, when all listed Taiwanese companies have completed the establishment of independent directors, the attendance of independent directors and supervisors in board meetings exhibits a more inhibitory effect on insiders’ share pledging behavior compared to the board independence. Which means diligent independent directors and supervisors are more helpful to strengthen corporate governance and reduce the incentives for insiders’ share pledging when independent directors are widely established.
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描述:	碩士國立政治大學風險管理與保險學系 110358006
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