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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/145875


    Title: 獨立董事財務背景與成本僵固性之關聯
    The Association Between Financial Background of Independent Directors and Cost Stickiness
    Authors: 葉芮甄
    Yeh, Jui-Chen
    Contributors: 潘健民
    Pan, Chien-Min
    葉芮甄
    Yeh, Jui-Chen
    Keywords: 成本僵固性
    獨立董事
    獨立董事財務背景
    Cost stickiness
    Independent director
    Financial background of independent director
    Date: 2023
    Issue Date: 2023-07-06 16:49:54 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究以東京證券交易所上市企業作為研究對象，探究日本企業在不強制聘任獨立董事之制度下，獨立董事之聘任及獨立董事產業背景與成本僵固性間之關聯性。成本僵固性係反映管理階層有意識之管理決策，代表企業於銷貨收入下降時，會傾向暫時保留先前之資源投入，而不貿然刪減成本。而獨立董事係為一專業且獨立之角色，能跳脫企業內部人角度，提供有用之觀點與建議。
    從本研究之實證結果可知，日本企業普遍存有成本僵固之現象。當聘有獨立董事時，會加深企業之成本僵固性。本研究亦發現獨立董事之產業背景除主要往來銀行外，與成本僵固之現象並無顯著關聯。綜上實證結果可知，聘任獨立董事會改變企業成本刪減的幅度，而獨立董事之產業背景為何對成本僵固性無顯著影響。
    Taking the advantage of the unique setting in Japan where the appointment of independent directors are not mandatory, this study investigates the association between independent director appointments and cost stickiness using data from firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Cost stickiness reflects conscious management decisions, indicating that firms tend to temporarily retain resources rather than abruptly cutting costs when sales declines. In this study, while independent directors play a role in enhancing corporate governance, we further expected independent directors to provide insights from outside the firm.
    The empirical results show that cost of Japanese firms are generally sticky. When independent directors are appointed, it amplifies the cost stickiness. The results also show that the industry background of independent directors, except for those who are connected with firms’ main banks, are not associated with cost stickiness. In summary, the appointment of independent directors influences the magnitude of cost reduction within firms, while the industry background of independent directors does not have significant impact on cost stickiness.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    110353026
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353026
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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