政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/135914

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/135914

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题名:	CEO股權與薪酬對目標公司採取反併購措施與績效之關聯性 Are CEO Compensation and Ownership Associated with Antitakeover Defenses?
作者:	施榮甫 Shih, Rong-Fu
贡献者:	翁嘉祥 Weng, CHia-Hsiang 施榮甫 Shih, Rong-Fu
关键词:	CEO薪酬與股權管理防禦反併購措施目標公司 CEO compensation and ownership Entrenchment Antitakeover measures Target companies
日期:	2021
上传时间:	2021-07-01 16:54:39 (UTC+8)
摘要:	本研究透過SDC資料庫蒐集美國上市的目標公司於1990-2014年間發生的併購事件為樣本，將目標公司分類為有採取反併購措施及沒有採取反併購措施，於Execucomp中搜尋目標公司CEO的薪酬資料與持股比例，再從Compustat蒐集目標公司的財務資訊，最後使用CRSP的事件研究法蒐集目標公司在併購宣告前後之不同期間持有股票的異常報酬。本研究實證結果發現:目標公司CEO薪資報酬與股權報酬佔總薪酬比例較高時，面對主併公司併購時，較不願採取反併購措施，獎金佔總報酬高的CEO則傾向進行反併購措施，但結果並不顯著。有持股的CEO較不願意進行反併購措施，而持股的比例並無顯著影響CEO是否進行反併購措施。反併購措施在2日與30日及180日對於目標公司之併購績效有顯著的正面影響，雖於60日與90日有正面影響，但效果並不顯著，顯示反併購措施在短期及長期效果較大。 In this study, the SDC database was used to collect a sample of M&A events of U.S.-listed target companies from 1990-2014, the target companies were categorized into those with and without anti-merger measures, searched the compensation information and shareholding ratio of CEOs of target companies in Execucomp, collected financial information of target companies from Compustat.Finally, used CRSP`s event study method to collect the abnormal returns of the target company`s stock holdings between the pre- and post-merger announcement periods. The empirical results of this study revealed that: CEOs with a higher ratio of salary to total compensation are more reluctant to take antitakeover measures in the face of a merger with the acquiring company, while those with a higher ratio of bonus to total compensation tend to take antitakeover measures, but the results are not significant. CEOs with shareholdings are less likely to engage in antitakeover measures, and the percentage of shareholdings do not significantly affect whether CEOs engaged in antitakeover measures. Antitakeover measures have a significant positive effect on the performance of target companies at 2 days, 30 days and 180 days, but not at 60 days and 90 days, indicating that antitakeover measures have a greater effect in the short and long term.
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描述:	碩士國立政治大學會計學系 108353021
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353021
数据类型:	thesis
DOI:	10.6814/NCCU202100607
显示于类别:	[會計學系] 學位論文

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