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    Title: 意識如何緣取不存在的對象? 以經量部上座的理論與說一切有部眾賢的批評為中心
    How Does the Mental Consciousness Cognize Nonexistent Objects?--Focusing on the Theory of the Sautrāntika Master Śrīlāta and the Criticism Thereof from the Sarvāstivāda Master Saṃghabhadra 
    Authors: 耿晴
    Keng, Ching
    Contributors: 哲學系
    Keywords: 意識 ;不存在的對象 ;上座 ; 眾賢 ;說一切有部 ;經量部 
    Mental consciousness ;Non-existent objects; Śrīlāta;Saṃghabhadra ; Sarvāstivāda;Sautrāntika
    Date: 2019-06
    Issue Date: 2020-06-22 14:30:35 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文旨在檢討佛教阿毘達磨哲學之經量部論師上座關於「意識如何緣取不存在的對象」的理論,以及來自於說一切有部論師眾賢的批評。不同於有部三世實有的形上學立場,在經量部剎那滅的形上學前提下,上座必須面對不存在的對象如何能夠引生意識的困難。本文集中探討意識耴如何緣取不存在的對象的三種案例:(1)緊接眼識後生起的意識如何緣取已經不存在的外在對象?(2)意識如何回憶?
    The article investigates the theory held by the Sautrāntika Master Srilata about how the mental consciousness cognizes non-existent objects and the criticism thereof from the Sarastivada Master Samghabhadra. Different from the ontological scheme of〝all dharmas are real in the past,present and future,〞 Srilata starts from the ontological scheme of momentariness and has to face the difficulty of how non-existent objects can cause the mental consciousness to arise. The article explores the issue in question by driving it into three cases: (1)How does the mental consciousness that succeeds a sensory consciousness cognize an external object that does not exist when the mental consciousness arises? (2)How does the mental consciousness memorize, i.e.,cognize a long-past object that one has experienced? (3)How does the mental consciousness cognize a past object that one has not experienced or future object? Under these three cases, this article explores the various strategies proposed by Srilata for resolving the difficulties, and the criticism thereof from Samghabhadra. This article sides with Samghabhadra`s criticism, but suggests that the irresolvable difficulties actually motivate further development of Buddhist epistemology. After Srilata Dignanga`s idea that cognition there is a mental image of the object, can successfully defends itself against Samghabhadra`s criticism.
    Relation: 正觀, Vol.89, pp.31-69
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Philosophy] Periodical Articles

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