

行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫 成果報告

台灣民主治理機制鞏固之研究--權力轉換與文官中立：態
度、可信承諾、與政務/事務人員關係(第2年)
研究成果報告(完整版)

計畫類別：個別型
計畫編號：NSC 96-2414-H-004-037-SS2
執行期間：97年08月01日至98年07月31日
執行單位：國立政治大學公共行政學系

計畫主持人：陳敦源
共同主持人：黃東益
計畫參與人員：碩士級-專任助理人員：呂季蓉

報告附件：出席國際會議研究心得報告及發表論文

處理方式：本計畫涉及專利或其他智慧財產權，1年後可公開查詢

中華民國 98 年 12 月 17 日

行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫成果報告

權力轉換與文官中立：態度、可信承諾、與政務/事務人員關係

Power Transfer and Bureaucratic Neutrality:

Attitudes, Credible Commitment, and Political/Career Relationships

計畫類別：個別型計畫 整合型計畫

計畫編號：NSC-96-2414-H-004-037-SS2

執行期間：2007年08月01日至2009年07月31日

計畫主持人：陳敦源 國立政治大學公共行政學系副教授

共同主持人：黃東益 國立政治大學公共行政學系副教授

本成果報告包括以下應繳交之附件：

- 赴國外出差或研習心得報告一份
- 赴大陸地區出差或研習心得報告一份
- 出席國際學術會議心得報告及發表之論文各一份
- 國際合作研究計畫國外研究報告書一份

執行單位：國立政治大學公共行政學系

中華民國 98 年 12 月 15 日

一、中英文摘要

公共行政理論與實務常久以來面對政治與行政價值間的交互影響，在理論上被稱為「政治行政二分」、「價值衝突(或競逐)」甚至是「認同問題」，這是公共行政學門的核心關懷；然而，實務上從文官的行為面來看，這些價值衝突卻被簡化成爲單一的「中立」概念，彷彿政治行政價值衝突可用中立倫理取代，事實上，就從理論上來看，中立倫理有強烈的「政治行政二分傾向」，與主流理論的「調和」論調有相當大的距離，到底在文官的認知與行動之間，能否有符合理論與實務預期的聯接，還是行政理論與實務在這個問題上，是完全脫鉤的？

本文藉由 2008 年台灣政府文官調查 (TGBS) 中，同時收集來的包括認知與行為面的資料，來回答這樣一個問題。認知面的資料主要是以 Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981) 所發展出來的關於「方案承諾」以及「政治容忍」兩個量表，展現文官在行政責任以及政治回應性的價值認知，另外一方面，行為面的資料，作者統整近年對於文官中立性的經驗研究文獻，詢問台灣文官與政治菁英的接觸頻率，以及他們在遇見包括順服、無名、黨派等政治行政介面的問題時的行為反應。

本研究的結論如下：其一、影響中立行為最關鍵的認知是對民眾的回應性，專業責任與政治人物回應性次之，課責任知殿後；其二，人民的民主回應與政治人物的民主回應對中立行為是相衝突的認知；其三，專業責任的認知，協助文官在與政治人物接觸中保持中立行為；其四，順服行為是文官中立行為中的「負向」條件，但受到人民民主回應的制約。

關鍵字：政治行政二分、價值競逐、方案承諾、政治容忍、文官中立性、台灣政府文官調查

Abstract

The research in PA has long been troubled by its “value-conflicting” background. From the beginning, the idea of “politics/administration dichotomy” is a good example of this conflict. Recently, the idea of neutrality has been raised in promoting administrative ethics within the democratic society. There is a strong connotation of “politics/administration dichotomy” behind the idea. This renewing interest with neutrality is obviously conflicting with the mainstream perception about the reconciliation between democracy and administration. In this research, we use 2008 TGBS to regress bureaucrats’ perception with their behavior in order to explore the way and the direction of this reconciliation occurred in the bureaucracy in Taiwan. The result shows that the value of responsiveness is splitting between responding to ordinary citizen and to political masters. And, the more a bureaucrat believes in professional responsibility the more he or she behaves neutrally. Last, obedience to political master has a negative impact on bureaucrat’s neutral behavior, however, this negativity is conditioned by bureaucrat’s belief in responsiveness to the general public.

Keywords: Politics/Administration Dichotomy; Competing Values; Programmatic Commitment; Political Tolerance; Bureaucratic Neutrality; Taiwan Government Bureaucratic Survey (TGBS)

二、研究緣起

公共行政理論與實務長久以來面對政治與行政價值間的交互影響，在理論上被稱為「政治行政二分」、「價值衝突」甚

至是「認同問題」，這是公共行政學們的核心關懷；然而從文官的行為面來看，這些價值衝突卻往往被簡化成爲單一的「中立」或是「中立能力」的概念，彷彿政治行政價值衝突可以用法律或是團體行為所導引的中立倫理所解決，事實上，論者往往忽略公共行政的中立行為的改革，主要是官僚複雜環境中的行動選擇，也就是處在價值競逐的環境中官僚的認知行動，這種由認知導引的中立行動，是從官僚個人的價值認知，加上環境與個人特質等因素共同影響的結果，到底官僚的認知與行動之間，能否有符合理論與實務預期的連接，還是行政理論與實務在這個問題上，是完全脫鉤的？本文意圖藉由 2008 年台灣文官調查的資料，第一手來觀察價值競逐環境下的官僚中立行為的影響圖象，作爲實務上未來教育訓練與行政改革的「循證基礎」(evidence based)。

(一) 研究目的

台灣公共行政學界在第一次政黨輪替的研究，多是從制度改革的規範性的觀點出發¹，尙未從政務官以及事務官對應的角度，以經驗研究來捕捉台灣政黨輪替前後，治理結構變動的真實內涵，事實上，對身處行政部門內部的政務或是事務人員而言，他們最想了解的是台灣民主政治權力轉換到底對於工作環境產生什麼策略性的意義？而這種全新的情勢對於政務與事務人員目標達成，可能的機會與限制又何在？兩者間在這個過程中所可能產生的摩擦以及行動規範又是什麼，因此，本研究所要經營的重點，是權力轉換與「文官中立」(bureaucratic neutrality)之間關係對於台灣民主治理機制鞏固(the consolidation of democratic governing mechanism; 本整合研究總計劃的主題)的意義，台灣個案給予研究者一個重要的機

¹ 考試院於民 89 年 9 月初所舉辦的「政治變遷與文官體制」研討會，就有台灣八位學者針對政黨輪替之後的文官體制提出相關論文，計有江岷欽(2000)、蔡良文(2000)、江明修(2000)、江大樹(2000)、紀俊臣(2000)、施正峰(2000)、張世賢(2000)、高永光(2000)。

會，觀察民主治理鞏固的過程中，具有古老官僚文明並行政獨大傳統的轉型國家，如何區辨並重構民主政治與公共行政最重要的環節--「政務與事務人員關係」，本研究將先從兩者間互動本質的認識出發，從過去的研究以及理論中萃取可以作爲經驗研究的內容，再藉由政務與事務人員個別面訪調查資料的蒐集，逐一回答文官中立的理論與實務問題。

(二) 文獻回顧

學者Herbert Kaufman在觀察美國歷年行政改革，統整提出三個文官制度改革的競逐價值，包括代表性

(representativeness)、中立能力(neutral competence)、以及行政領導(executive leadership)，成爲我們尋找行政改革的起點，我們可以規約成下面四點。

首先，行政改革最重要的價值衝突是來自於由民眾意見而來的代表性價值，以及從文官而來的專業價值，這兩個衝突的價值，以政務領導價值從中連結。再者，民主價值在這個競逐模型中，是被放在從上到下逐層課責的方式，達到自己的目的；接著，官僚體系在民主政體當中最主要的價值，就是其中立能力，也就是其專業的發揮，平衡民主決策中政策資訊的不充足；最後，這個價值競逐的模型中，三種制度機制是運作的關鍵，代表性價值從偏好聚合的制度形成，藉由政務系統，以層級節制的命令系統，遂行政務領導價值，而最後，文官體系的中立能力價值，在政務領導的價值統馭之下，必須受到相關法令的保護，也就是所謂的文官制度，以取得民主與專業的平衡。

從以上價值競逐模型中，可了解到文官的三個非常重要的價值，「回應性」(responsiveness)、「課責」(accountability)以及「責任」(responsibility)。這也是文官在中立能力上必須要平衡的三個面向。但是在三個面向之下，必須討論的是此三面向中，文官在公共利益與專業主義的價值衝突問題。這也是文官所面臨到最困難的工作習題。

一、 公共利益與專業主義的價值衝突問題

從學術的角度來看，要直接定義公共利益並不容易，經濟學者最常使用的巴瑞多最適的觀點(Pareto optimality)，是「如果不能找到更好的，就是現狀」的保守觀點，然而，我們不能假設公共利益存在，再來要求事務人員遵行之，事實上，公共利益在政策決定上的複雜程度，常常超乎想像，學者 Herring(1936)在六十年前就指出官僚決策必須面臨複雜的「平衡政經勢力」的工作，而公共利益就是作這樣決定時的一些標準，至於哪種標準在什麼時刻應該強過另一種標準，則是不折不扣的「價值困境」(value dilemma)，在這樣的困境之下，學者 Cooper(1998)的「個人倫理決策模型」(individual ethical decision-making model)就顯得十分重要，這種決策常常是在官僚擁有「裁量權」(discretion; Schubert, 1957)的時刻發生的，這也是行政倫理從「內部控制」的角度，來防止公共利益受到傷害；然而，在真實的公共政策決策當中，如果我們深入官僚政治的核心，可以發現以多元主義(pluralism)為基礎的「利害關係人參與」(stakeholder participation; Leach, Pelkey and Sabatier, 2002)才是最主要的決策模型，公共利益在實務上是 Herring 口中的社會政經勢力的均衡結果。

我們假設公共利益與政治上司的利益是一致的，政治上司選擇官僚的議題就會成為單純專業能力的要求，也就是說，專業能力越強，就越能協助政治上司達成任務，一方面幫助政治上司成功地延續政治生命，一方面也完成公共利益；然而，這並非真實的運作狀況，真實的情況是，文官的專業與政治上司政治生命延續的目的之間，通常都會產生大小不等的衝突，簡單而言，一個在專業上為「全民服務」的文官，與一個在政治上必須運用執政資源鞏固自己政治勢力的政治上司，常常可能在政策議題上出現重大歧異，這個時候，政治上司對於文官的選擇，就不只是專業能力而已，因為即便文官有專業能力，也可能因為政治上司所要的與文官心中的公

共利益衝突，而得不到文官全心的推動。

反過來說，所謂的「中立能力」(neutral competence)，事實上是一種為著維繫公共利益而努力的文官專業能力，它不單單包括在專業上「使命必達」的能力，還包括為維繫公共利益而存在的整體政策判斷能力，也就是說，中立能力意指文官能夠判斷政治上司的命令是否違反某些實質或是程序上的公共利益要求。這樣看來，政治上司在選擇政治任命人員的時候，就會面臨選擇「專業的人還是政治忠誠之人」的困境，也就是所謂「忠誠-能力」取捨(Loyalty-competence trade-off; Edward, 2001)。

學者 Hugh Hecl(1975)認為，政治上司應該要儘量尋找具有專業能力的政治任命人員，才能讓官僚體系產生「中立能力」，這樣做的好處，一方面可以讓民選政治人物與官僚之間的關係緩和，也讓民選政治人物處理政策議題的能力增加，另一方面，從專業上延續官僚體系的知識體系，同時讓國家不因政黨輪替而失去連續性；然而，學者 Terry Moe(1993)則有不同的看法，他認為，官僚體系有自主性，會抗拒變革，更會與許多利益團體長期掛勾，總統必須使用人事任命權任命越多對自己忠誠的人越好，並且將決策權力集中在白宮政治任命人員的手上，總統才有可能做事，這樣的看法在美國人事官員 Robert Maranto(1998)的眼中並非什麼「邪惡」的事，因為民選政治人物本來就負有改造政府的任務，不然前一任的人怎麼會被換掉？

Maranto 甚至從各個角度為「分贓制」提出辯解，認為這才是好的民主與官僚的運作體制。但是，Maranto 的論述可能忘記了，「分贓制度」常常會成為政府績效不彰的代罪羔羊，這也就是政黨可能輪替的根本原因，輪替之後，新上來的政黨會以分贓制度為改革對象，如此才會有官僚自主改革的產生。而已下將談論本研究中的主題-「行政中立」，這也是台灣行政學界回應民主化最核心的概念，也是過去十餘年人事行政實務界推動最積極的一個概念。

二、 行政中立的意義

學界對於行政中立的問題，大多聚焦在其定義、內涵、及法制化問題，而理論上也是著重在行政倫理、公法、以及比較行政的角度(請參許濱松,1996; 施能傑, 1992; 林文益, 1992; 邱華君, 1994; 陳德禹, 1992; 蔡良文, 1996 等), 主要探討民主化變遷之下, 台灣官僚體系改革的議題, 而國外對於民主轉型與官僚體系的研究, 有針對行政中立的概念進行探討(Asmerom and Peis, 1996; Baker, 2001; Wiatr, 1995), 也有從行政改革的角度探討政務與事務人員的關係(Peters and Pierre, 2001), 當然, 研究美國民主行政的學者, 也從「中立能力」(neutral competence)的角度, 討論官僚體系在政治環境中的角色變遷(Hecl, 1975; Kaufman, 1992; Miller, 1994; Moe, 1985a; Rourke, 1992; Vinzant, 1993; West and Durant, 2000)。

然而, 行政中立的意義在學界有不同的說法。如果從公務人員行政中立法草案第三條「公務人員應嚴守行政中立, 依據法令執行職務, 忠實推行政府政策, 服務人民」當中了解行政中立的意義, 我們會陷入一個套套邏輯(tautology)。如果再檢視草案當中的內容, 可以發現草案主要規範了公務人員的「人」與政黨活動的界限, 但是對於政策上政治上司執意推動討好自家選民的政策, 公務人員如何做到為公共利益服務、客觀、公正, 似乎並未給予重視, 換句話說, 即便該法通過, 面對政治上司違背公共利益的作為, 公務人員有何「誘因」(incentive)去獨自堅守行政中立?

「行政中立」從規範性的層面討論, 離不開將前一節當中所謂「價值抉擇」的問題交給每一個官僚, 然而, 如果從政策的角度的角度, 對行政中立作制度性的詮釋, 我們可以將之視為一種: 「官僚體系在政策空間(policy space)中向政務系統『說不』(say not)的誘因結構」。

也就是說, 官僚體系從民主的角度必須服膺政治上司的領導, 完成向上級負責(accountability)的要求, 另一方面又必須謹守公共利益的原則, 負起責任

(responsibility; Levine, Peters, and Thomson, 1990), 也就是說, 當向上級負責與責任之間沒有政策衝突, 政務與事務關係單純, 但是, 當兩者發生衝突, 官僚必須有「勇於任事」的誘因結構, 才能真正落實行政中立²。

綜合以上所言, 如果我們套用 Levine, Peters and Thompson (1990: 188-190) 對於行政與民主之間問題的三個面向來比較, 代表性價值就是「回應性」(responsiveness)的面向, 政務領導就是「課責」(accountability)的面向, 而中立能力則是屬於「責任」(responsibility)的面向。這三者之間的糾葛, 正可以具體描繪 Kaufman 價值競逐模型的內涵, 事實上, 這個價值競逐的模型, 與 Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 的態度問卷中的三個面向也有所連結。

三、 對於政治菁英政治態度調查

而根據以上的討論後, 本文將以上重要理論概念落實在本次的研究調查中, 是依循 Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman (1981) 等對於政治菁英政治態度調查的一系列研究, 他們的研究有一個基本的假定, 就是菁英們(政治與行政菁英)的政治態度、價值與認知, 對於國家回應社會變遷需求的方案選擇, 有重大的影響, 因此, 收集一國菁英們的集體政治態度, 可以讓研究者從中得知政府決策過程、菁英們如何分析政策、與他們主觀認知對於國家發展願景的塑造等的訊息, 這個研究架構, 也被行政學界引用, 來研究行政菁英政治認知與行政改革的關係(Gregory, 1991); 然而, 這個架構在民主鞏固的議題上應用的能量, 卻未見開

²我國公務人員保障法當中, 有這樣的一個內容, 頗能展現官僚與其政治上司間這樣的一種互動關係: <公務人員保障法第十七條> 公務人員對於長官監督範圍內所發之命令有服從義務, 如認為該命令違法, 應負報告之義務; 該管長官如認其命令並未違法, 而以書面下達時, 公務人員即應服從; 其因此所生之責任, 由該長官負之。但其命令有違反刑事法律者, 公務人員無服從之義務。前項情形, 該管長官非以書面下達命令者, 公務人員得請求其以書面為之, 該管長官拒絕時, 視為撤回其命令。

發，雖然有學者從行政文化的角度來研究政權轉型與行政菁英的政治態度間的關係（Schroter and Rober, 1997），更早也有測量官僚人員對民主政治的看法（Wynia, 1974）。

雖然 Aberbach 等人對於價值到行動到結果之間的關係仍然持保留態度（1981: 24-45），但是，這些資料仍然有助於我們了解包括民主機制建構的問題，尤其是行政改革這種目標是自己的政策作為，從菁英自我的認知中可以更直接了解改革的過程與成效，著名的民調學者 Philip Converse（1964: 255）曾經說，菁英決策的長河可以用一種「理念歷史」（the history of ideas）的方式來探索，這種探索的內涵，就是對以認知與態度調查，找出社會心理集體存在的某種「信念系統」（belief system）。

本研究將 Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 研究中態度調查的部份為基礎，包括政治容忍（Tolerance of Politics, TP）、方案承諾（Programmatic Commitment, PC）、以及菁英統治（Elitism Index, EI）為主，這個研究政治菁英的態度的調查，進行了許多美國以及跨國的研究，包括美國國內（Aberbach, 1990; Aberbach and Rockman, 1976, 1978; Aberbach, Derlien, Mayntz, and Rockman, 1990; Aberbach, Rockman, and Copeland, 1990）英國、德國與義大利（Putnam, 1973）；德國與美國（Aberbach, Derlien, Mayntz and Rockman, 1990）；日本與美國（Aberbach, Krauss, Muramatsu and Rockman, 1990）；以及澳洲與紐西蘭（Gregory, 1991）等。

這些研究主要的結論有下面三端：其一，官僚體系在不同價值的層面所展現出來的跨國差異，可以顯現該國在民主與行政發展上的不同階段；其二，政策的起源官僚體系的確扮演重要的角色，然而政治人物在進行利益匯集以及利益衝突管理上，扮演較為重要的角色；其三，政治人物的回應性與官僚體系的專業性都是決策體系所需的元素，良好的政治人物與官僚體系關係，Aberbach 等稱為「有創造力的對話」（creative dialogue, 1981: 260），有

助於民主治理的績效。

三、結果與討論

本文是來自國科會 2008-2009 所補助的「台灣民主治理機制鞏固之研究之子計劃一：權力轉換與文官中立：態度、可信承諾、與政務/事務人員關係」一案，以下將簡述執行過程，並從其台灣首次全國性文官調查的執行經驗中，作為未來更廣泛研究的參考。

一、文官意見調查的執行過程

本文為台灣公共行政研究史上第一次全國性官僚體系的面訪問卷調查，在調查議題上採取開放的跨域處理方式，將多位學者對於文官議題所關切的面向放入本次的文官意見調查中，並非是僅單一題的全國意見調查³，並且問卷包含了許多不同的變項⁴。

問卷的規劃由該計劃主持人陳敦源副教授，協同主持人黃東益副教授，以及詹中原教授、蕭乃沂助理教授，東吳大學政治系蔡秀涓副教授及研究案的助理群們共同規劃而成，問卷規劃總共歷經 4 個半月，為 20070701 開始規劃到 20080115 才宣告完成⁵。

二、調查抽樣設計

本研究以全國的政府文官為母體，採用面訪受訪者的方式進行問卷。以下說明

³ 意見調查的內容主要在瞭解我國一般行政機關的正式編制文官，在文官個人的基本背景與內心價值中，在政府行政運作上的組織人際信任、專業責任與資訊網路化，與政治場域上的政治回應與中立及倫理認知等方面主題的認知、態度、與行為。

⁴ 問卷構面包括個人基本價值、個人基本資料、專業導向認知、民營化政策與電子化政府、倫理認知與行為、組織信任、政治中立、政治回應認知，以及政府績效產出。

⁵ 在整個研究過程中，關於訪員及督導的招募培訓上，共有來自全各地的大學生及研究生共 82 位擔任訪員，並由政大公行系碩博班研究生 18 位擔任督導。

母群定義及訪問範圍與抽樣方式：

1. 母體定義及訪問範圍

以台灣地區各縣市政府層級中經過國家考試而成爲公務人員者爲本次大型調查的母體⁶。本研究的主要訪問對象爲中央政府機關各部會、各縣市政府，及各鄉鎮市區公所公務人員。

2. 抽樣設計

本調查的抽樣設計將「全國公務人力資料庫」中之四大類政府機關爲：(1)行政機關（不含軍職人員）、(2)公營事業（生產、交通、金融）機構、(3)衛生醫療機構、與(4)公立學校（不含教師）之公務人力共計 335,274 人，其中編制於第一大類行政機關之公務人力共有 216,422 人，本研究以一般行政機關並去除警察機關（因考量其特殊的任務屬性與大量人數）之 130,559 位具備簡任、簡派、薦任、薦派、委任、委派官等之公務人員（即所謂正式編制文官）爲研究母體，依據政府層級（中央、地方政府）與官等（簡任簡派、薦任薦派、委任委派，以下簡稱簡任、薦任、委任）等兩個分層，採分層隨機抽樣方式分配受訪樣本。

並考量訪問失敗的可能，參考洪永泰（2004）所提出的膨脹樣本（或擴充樣本）的概念，事先將總抽樣人數按比例膨脹爲預定有效樣本數 2,000 人的 4 倍（8,000 人），並以其比例⁷於各層次中抽出對應樣本數而組成所有受訪樣本。

⁶ 不過，本研究的文官範圍並不包括國軍、國營事業、公立醫院、及公立學校人員。

⁷ 以中央政府簡任簡派層爲例，先將總數 6,843 位中央政府簡任簡派人員以隨機亂數抽出 419 位即爲膨脹樣本，此 419 位受訪者中的前 105 位即爲原始樣本，當原始樣本受訪者在調查過程中：(1)經訪員三次電話聯絡失敗、(2)電話聯絡訪問時明確拒絕受訪、(3)訪問當場拒絕或因故完成填答、或(4)訪問結束後經查核填答內容判定爲無效問卷時，則由隨機流水號中的次一位受訪者替補，並交由對應地理轄區督導通知其訪員進行訪問。

三、 意見調查的問卷回收率

經過上述抽樣設計與訪問流程後，自 2008 年 1 月 24 日至同年 3 月 14 日（特意於總統大選前一週結束），所有經過本研究訪員接觸的受訪者共 3,042 位，經資料登錄與過濾整理後共有 1,962 份成功樣本，有效回收率爲 64.5%，其餘 1,080 份則爲失敗樣本。

四、 依變項的三個模型架構與回歸分析的探討

從以上分析，本研究的依變項爲文官中立行爲面上的「順服行爲」、「無名行爲」與「非黨派行爲」。自變項爲文官態度認知面上的「民主回應(政治人物)」、「民主回應(人民)」、「專業責任」、「課責認知」、「政治人物接觸」，以及個人基本變項（區域別、官等別、主管別、政黨認同傾向、年齡、性別）。並且將個人變項中的（區域別、主管別、政黨認同傾向、性別）進行虛擬變項的處理⁸。

分別將三個不同的依變項跟自變項間進行敘述統計⁹、相關分析以及單一迴歸以及多元迴歸分析（包含中介變項的確立¹⁰）等檢測。

最後的結論有下面四項：其一、影響中立行爲最關鍵的認知是對民衆的回應性，專業責任與政治人物回應性次之，課責任知殿後；統計上來看由於對於民衆的回應性三個模型都是顯著的狀態，代表公務人員中立行爲，事實上與民主回應(人民)的關係是最爲強烈的。

⁸ 區域別(0 代表中央、1 代表地方)、主管別(0 代表主管、1 代表非主管)、政黨認同傾向(0 代表泛綠、1 代表泛藍)、性別(0 代表男性、1 代表女性)。

⁹ 可參見附錄。

¹⁰ 爲了確定模型中的中介效果是否存在，藉由中介變項比須滿足三個條件加以確立，(1)在自變項對中介變項的迴歸模式中，自變項對中介變項有顯著影響；(2)在自變項對依變項的迴歸模式中，自變項對依變項有顯著影響；(3)當把中介變項加入自變項與依變項的迴歸模式中後，中介變項對依變項有顯著影響，並且如果原本自變項的顯著效果變成不顯著，就可確立爲「完全中介效果」，如果原本自變項的顯著效果仍顯著，但其標準化迴歸細數下降了，就可確定「部分中介效果」的成立。將組織權力視爲依變項，性別視爲自變項，做簡單迴歸分析，而分析結果爲在 95%信心水準下， $P=0.045<0.05$ ，有其顯著影響；條件通過。

其二，人民的民主回應與政治人物的民主回應對中立行為是相衝突的認知：在「非黨派」與「無名」兩種中立行為上，這兩種回應性本質上應該是衝突的，雖然兩者均屬於中立性的表現。但是我們可以從模型中看出，文官在專業責任與民主回應(人民)，卻在此兩個不同本質的中立行為表現是同方向的（事實上在三種文官中立行為中都是同方向的），因此在整個政治/行政互動的介面中，運用專業責任及民主回應性，維持政治/行政天秤上的平衡，文官在理念上可將公共利益的回應當作是專業責任的一環，並藉以維持住中立的行為表現。

其三，專業責任的認知，協助文官在與政治人物接觸中保持中立行為：「政治人物接觸」的頻率對黨派與無名都有負面影響，意指與政治人物接觸越頻繁，中立行為就越不容易出現；但是，這兩項的影響都必須經由「專業責任」的中介，也就是說，如果文官與政治人物的接觸中，能夠維繫文官在政策上的專業認知，就能夠減弱接觸中對中立行為的上的負面影響，因此，文官的專業責任的認知，是其與政治人物交往但能維繫中立行為的重要中介因素。

其四，順服行為是文官中立行為中的「負向」條件，但受到人民民主回應的制約：人民的民主回應在文官的中立行為上，只有與順服行為相衝突，表示文官在順服的行政中立作為上，需要將民眾的期待放在價值思想中，另一方面來說，文官順服行為與人民的民主回應間的相反影響，代表回應人民的需要是不能從消極的順服中獲得，因此中立不能是隨風飄流，必需對人民的需要主動的精神。

四、計畫成果自評

(一)本研究對國內學界有下列三方面的助益：

其一，本研究進行國內第一次面訪文官調查，有助於往後台灣公共行政學門研究政策發展的資料分析。

其二，本研究對於台灣環境中政治與行政

關係的分析，做出貢獻，況且本研究計畫的執行結果，由於理論的可跨國比較性，可以利用來與國際學界接軌。。

其三，本研究對於行政改革的實務性議題，將可以提供具有證據基礎的政策資訊。且文官中立與政治環境的關係，一直為國內的學界所忽視，本研究可彌補國內學界對於此一研究領域的缺憾。。

(二) 未來後續研究內容：

其一，強化文官調查問卷的信度與效度，繼續尋找台灣個案下的各種可能研究的標的。

其二，思考如何將組織因素納入研究範圍，以文官個人行為作為分析單位的研究，解釋力需要組織因素的加強。

其三，更多的研究經費應該投入量化分析的資料庫建立，包括政見資料、立法院審議內容資料、以及報紙公共政策報導資料，作為綜合判斷台灣官僚體系在民主治理環境中演化的基本資料。

五、參考文獻

(一)中文方面

1. 林文益。1991。〈公務人員行政中立之研究〉，台北：政治大學公共行政學系碩士論文。
2. 邱華君。1994。〈從考試權獨立觀點論我國公務人員保障制度〉，台北：中國文化大學中山學術研究所博士論文。
3. 許濱松。1996。〈英美公務人員政治中立之研究：兼論我國公務人員政治中立應有的作法〉。《文官體制之比較研究》，彭錦鵬主編。台北：中央研究院。
4. 施能傑。1992。〈落實文官中立的理想：人事管理政策的觀點〉，紀念張金鑑教授九秩誕辰行政學術研討會，台北：政大公企中心。
5. 陳德禹。1992。〈文官行政中立的理論與實際〉，紀念張金鑑教授九秩誕辰行政學術研討會，台北：政大公企中心。

6. 蔡良文。1996。〈我國公務人員行政中立法制之研究〉，台北：政治大學中山社科所博士論文。

(二) 英文方面：

1. Aberbach, Joel D. (1990) *Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight*. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institute.
2. Aberbach, Joel D. and Bert A. Rockman. (1976) "Clashing Beliefs within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy." *American Political Science Review* 71: 456-468.
3. Aberbach, Joel D. and Bert A. Rockman. (1978) "Administratives' Beliefs about the Role of the Public: The Case of American Federal Executives." *Western Political Quarterly* 31: 502-522.
4. Aberbach, Joel D. and Bert A. Rockman. (1988) "Mandates or Mandarins? Control and Discretion in the Modern Administrative State." *Public Administration Review* 48(2): 606-612.
5. Aberbach, Joel D., James D. Chesney, and Bert A. Rockman. (1975) "Exploring Elite Political Attitudes: Some Methodological Lessons." *Political Methodology* 2: 1-27.
6. Aberbach, Joel D., Hans-Ulrich Derlien, Renate Mayntz and Bert A. Rockman. (1990) "American and German Federal Executives – Technocratic and Political Attitudes." *International Social Science Journal* 123: 3-18.
7. Aberbach, Joel D., Ellis S. Krauss, Michio Muramatsu and Bert A. Rockman. (1990) "Comparing Japanese and American Administrative Elites." *British Journal of Political Science* 20 (4): 461-488.
8. Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam and Bert Rockman. (1981) *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
9. Aberbach, Joel D., Bert A. Rockman, and Robert M. Copeland. (1990) "From Nixon's Problem to Reagan's Achievement: The Federal Executive Reexamined." In *Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency*, Larry Berman, ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
10. Asmerom, H. K. and E. P. Reis, eds. (1996) *Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality*. MacMillan Press.
11. Baker, R. ed. (2001). *Transitions from Authoritarianism: The Role of the Bureaucracy*. Greenwood Publishing Group.
12. Gregory, R. J. (1991) "The Attitudes of Senior Public Servants in Australia and New Zealand: Administrative Reform and Technocratic Consequence?" *Governance*. 4(3): 295-331.
13. Haidar, Ali, Lin Hong Hai and Len Pullin. 2004. "An Impoverished Neutrality? Public Manager Values in Local Government, Penang, Malaysia." *Local Government Studies* 30(1): 88-107.
14. Heclo, H. (1975) "OMB and the Presidency – the Problem of 'Neutral Competence.'" *Public Interest*, 38(Winter): 80-89.
15. Herring, P. (1936) *Public Administration and the Public Interest*. New York: Russell & Russell.
16. J. D. Aberbach、R. D. Putnam、B. A. Rockman(1981), *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*. Harvard University Press.
17. Kaufman, Herbert. (1956) "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration." *The American Political Science Review*, 50(4): 1057-1073.
18. Kaufman, H. (1990). "The End of an Alliance: Public Administration in the Eighties." In *Public Administration: The State of the Discipline*, Naomi B. Lynn and A. Wildavsky, eds. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
19. Leach, W. D., N. W. Pelkey and P. Sabatier. (2002) "Stakeholder Partnerships as Collaborative Policymaking: Evaluation Criteria Applied to Watershed Management in California and Washington." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 21(4):

- 645-670.
20. Len Pullin, Ali Haidar. 2003. "Managerial values in local government – Victoria, Australia." *International Journal of Public Sector Management*. 16(4): 286-302.
 21. Levine, C. H., B. G. Peters and F. J. Thompson. (1990). *Public Administration: Challenges, Choices, Consequences*. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.
 22. Maranto, Robert and B. Douglas Skelley. 1992. "Neutrality: An Enduring Principle of the Federal Service." *American Review of Public Administration*, 22(3): 173-187.
 23. Miller, H. T. (1994). "Post-Progressive Public Administration: Lesson from Policy Networks." *Public Administration Review*, 54(4): 378-386.
 24. Moe, T. (1990) "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 6(Special Issue): 213-253.
 25. ---. (1993) "Presidents, Institutions and Theory." In *Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches*, G. C. Edwards III, J. H. Kessel, and B. A. Rockman, eds. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press.
 26. Peters, B. G. and J. Pierre, eds. (2001) *Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform*. Routledge.
 27. Putnam, Robert D. (1973) "The Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants in Western Europe: A Preliminary Report." *British Journal of Political Science*, 3:257-290.
 28. Rourke, F. E. (1992). "Responsiveness and Neutral Competence in American Bureaucracy." *Public Administration Review*, 52(6): 539-47.
 29. Schubert, G. A., Jr. (1957) "'The Public Interest' In Administrative Decision-Making: Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory?" *American Political Science Review*, 51(2): 346-368.
 30. Vinzant, Janet, (1993). "Strange Bedfellows: Public Administration, Neutral Competence, and Strong Parties." *Public Administration Theory and Praxis*, 15(2), 11-24.
 31. West, W. F. and R. F. Durant. (2000). "Merit, Management, and Neutral Competence: Lessons from the U. S. Merit Systems Protection Board, FY1988-FY1997." *Public Administration Review*, 60(2): 111-122.
 32. Wiatr, J. J. (1995). "The Dilemmas of Re-organizing the Bureaucracy in Poland during the Democratic Transformation." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 28(1): 153-160.
 33. Wynia, B. L. (1974) "Federal Bureaucrats' Attitude toward Democratic Ideology." *Public Administration Review*, 34: 156-162.

Delving into the Mystery of Neutrality Ethic in a Consolidating Democracy: A Preliminary Exploration from the Taiwan Government Bureaucrat Survey (TGBS) in 2008

Don-yun Chen, Ph.D.

Associate Professor

Department of Public Administration

National Chengchi University, Taipei, TAIWAN

donc@nccu.edu.tw

Tong-yi Huang, Ph.D.

Associate Professor,

Department of Public Administration,

National Cheng-chi University, Taipei, TAIWAN

tyhuang@nccu.edu.tw

Hsiu-chuan Tsai, Ph.D.

Associate Professor

Department of Political Science

Soochow University, Taipei, TAIWAN

sutsai.joy@msa.hinet.net

Chih-kai Chang

Ph.D. Student

Department of Public Administration

National Chengchi University, Taipei, TAIWAN

f680818@ms17.hinet.net

Abstract

For many democratizing nations, the establishment of the neutrality ethic in bureaucracy is crucial to stabilizing democratic competition and promoting governing effectiveness. However, for external or internal reasons, it is very difficult to detect how the neutrality ethic emerges and what are the believed substances of it are in bureaucrats' minds. For both research and practical purposes, we treat Taiwan as a critical case to answer the previous questions for the following reasons. First, if the emergence of the neutrality ethic can be attributed to imposed trainings (internal) and party turn-over (external), both elements have just presented in the Taiwanese case. We can test both arguments and their relative importance in one case study. Second, Taiwan' s bureaucratic system presents a high continuity before and after democratic transition. We can observe the change within one survey by using the cohort analysis. Lastly, because there is a very rigid examination system in recruiting civil servants in Taiwan, it is relatively easy to identify who are bureaucrats and conduct a bureaucrat survey. By using the data from the first national survey (Taiwan Bureaucrat Survey, TBS) sponsored by the National Science Council, we try to answer the following research questions. (1) What are the substances of bureaucrats' neutrality ethic in Taiwan? (2) How can the attitudinal differences among bureaucrats be explained by seniority, rank, gender, and other explanatory variables? (3) Do external party turn-over or internal trainings contribute more to the change of neutrality ethic in Taiwan?

Keywords: Bureaucratic Attitude; the Neutrality Ethic; Democratic Consolidation; Taiwan Government Bureaucrat Survey (TGBS)

@ Explain how your proposal fits the conference theme


The establishment of neutrality ethic in bureaucratic system is one of the most important governing issues in newly democratizing countries. However, very little research has been done and the outcome of this research can be useful to countries around the world other than the industrialized democracies to meet their diverse needs on their efforts to build effective governing bodies.

投影片 1

**Delving into the Mystery of Neutrality Ethic
in a Consolidating Democracy: A
Preliminary Exploration from the Taiwan
Bureaucrat Survey (TBS) in 2008**

Don-yun Chen
Tong-yi Huang
Chia-ying Lu
Chih-kai Chang


Dept. of PA, National Chengchi University
2009 ASPA at Miami, USA




投影片 2

Quotation...

*“Loyalty is a fine quality, but in excess it fills
political graveyards.”*



Neil Kinnock (1942~)



Introduction



- ***A Living example of Taiwan:*** The Former Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director-general Yeh Sheng-mao (葉盛茂) was sentenced to ten years prison terms by court of finding Mr. Yeh guilty of leaking confidential information from the Egmont Group to his former boss, former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). However, Mr. Yeh denied that he was trying to protecting his position to leak the information. He said that “I thought that it was only ordinary information for president to know.”
- ***Comments:*** Serving the nation is equal to serving the leader in non-democratic era, but after the party turn-over in Taiwan, for bureaucrats, to serve the nation is beginning to be separated from serving the “temporary” leader. **Neutrality** is beginning to be an important ethical value for bureaucrats in appointees/bureaucrats relations !

What is Bureaucratic Neutrality?

- ***Various Terms used:*** Neutral competence (Hecllo, 1975), Political neutrality (Kemaghan, 1976), Impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008), Administrative neutrality (used only in Taiwan)...
- ***Conflicting Values:*** It is said that the civil service is “above politics” (Miller, 2000) where civil servants should be **non-partisan**, **obedient**, and **anonymous**. However, they should be politically responsive and accountable to politicians at the same time. Although neutrality can be politically optimal in strategic term (Huber, 2007), it is also an ethical dilemma within democratizing state as well as democratic states (Mengistu and Vogel, 2006). It is called “the neutrality ethics.”
- ***Six components (Kemaghan, 1976):*** (1)politics and administration, (2) political patronage, (3)political activity, (4) public comment, (5) anonymity and ministerial responsibility, and (6) permanency in office.

Research Strategies

- **Objects:** The scope of neutrality ethics is too broad. In this research, we focused on the politician/bureaucrat relations from bureaucrat's viewpoint.
- **Definition:** Adopting the non-partisan, obedient, and anonymous as neutrality ethics.
- **Styles:** In the past, most research are non-empirical and a few have surveyed a small group of local government. This research has collected a representative sample of Taiwan's local governments.(Pullin and Haidar, 2003; Maranto and Skelley, 1992)
- **Questions:** In the past, the questions were about the content of neutrality ethics and how bureaucrat (and politicians) have opinion on them. In this research the behavioral realities are the key dependent variables.
- **Modeling:** Using Multi regression as statistical tool to decode the information behind the data.

The Research Questions

- 1. How can the attitudinal and behavioral differences among bureaucrats be explained by seniority, rank, gender, and other explanatory variables?
- 2. What are the substance of neutrality ethics in Taiwan's local bureaucrats?
- 3. Do party turn-over contribute to the difference of neutrality ethic in Taiwan?

Methodology: Surveying Bureaucrats

- **Project Name:** TBS (Taiwan Bureaucrat Survey) sponsored by National Science Council
- **Population:** Civil servants at the local government of Taiwan (excluding military personnel, medial personnel, school teachers, and employees of stated owned enterprises.)
- **Time:** January to March 2008
- **Type:** Face to face interview
- **Total Sample:** 935, weighted with local governments.

Variable Defined (I)

- **Dependent Variable:**
 - 1. **BE(1Q):** Evaluation of Politicians/Bureaucrats Relations (6 point scale; attitude)
<1.Very Good-2.Good-3.A Little Good-4.A Little Bad-5.Bad-6.Very Bad>
 - 2. **BP(4Q;V-0.44):** Parisian Actions (5 point scale; behavior)
 - 3. **BO(3Q;V-0.79):** Obedient Actions (5 point scale; behavior)
 - 4. **BA(3Q;V-0.72):** Anonymous Actions (5 point scale; behavior)
<1.Almost Always-2.Often-3.Sometimes-4.Once-5.Never>

Variable Defined (II)

□ Independent Variables

- Values:
 - **PT(5Q; V-0.82)** : Political Tolerance (ARP, 1981; 6 point scale)
 - **ET(5Q; V-0.97)** : Elitism (ARP, 1981; 6 point scale)
- Personal Characteristics:
 - **GD:Gender(1M/0F); PS: Partisanship (1/0); Age (Conti.); MG: Manager (1/0)**
 - **PCF: Politician Contact-frequency(7 point scale)**
- Structural
 - **TURN: Party turn-over (1-at least once/0)**

Results (I)

Table I: Factors Influence Neutrality

Var.	Model I (BE)		Model II (BP)		Model III (BO)		Model IV (BA)	
	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
Const.	3.335	0.000	1.802	0.000	2.635	0.000	4.055	0.000
PT	0.112	0.012**	0.021	0.433	0.023	0.563	0.009	0.796
ET	0.001	0.196	-0.001	0.155	0.00005	0.911	0.00008	0.839
GD	-0.106	0.060*	-0.086	0.041**	0.153	0.002***	0.174	0.000***
PS	-0.052	0.368	0.144	0.001***	-0.077	0.128	-0.107	0.015**
Age	0.010	0.003***	-0.004	0.130	0.010	0.001***	0.004	0.107
MG	0.137	0.054*	-0.046	0.388	-0.035	0.572	0.112	0.041**
PCF	0.139	0.000***	0.145	0.000***	-0.034	0.103	-0.053	0.003***
TURN	0.108	0.196	0.072	0.231	-0.103	0.162	-0.081	0.206
	R ² =0.095		R ² =0.046		R ² =0.031		R ² =0.045	

Note: "****", 99%; "***", 95%; "**", 90%

投影片 11

- **Value:** Bureaucrat's value of Political tolerance will have a positive effect on his or her evaluation of the P/B relations. However, his or her value of elitism has no effect on any of the evaluation and behaviors.
- **Characteristics:**
 - **GD (Gender)** : The most influential factor. Statistical significant in all four models. A male bureaucrat will evaluate the P/B relations less than female one. He also will be more partisan, less obedient and anonymous in his behavior.
 - **PCF (Politician-contact-frequency)** : The more a bureaucrat contacts with politicians the more he or she will evaluate the P/B relations positively. He or she will also behave less partisan and more anonymous.
 - **PS (Partisanship)** : A bureaucrat with a political preference will have more partisan behaviors. Also, he or she will be more obedient.
 - **Age** : The older the bureaucrat, the more positive he or she is to evaluate the P/B relation.
 - **MG (Manager)** : A bureaucrat in a manger position will evaluate the P/B relation more positively. Also, he will behave more anonymously.

投影片 12

Result (II): Identify Intervening Variables

```

graph LR
    PCF[PCF] -- "-" --> BA[BA]
    PS[PS] -- "-" --> BA
    BA -- "-" --> BP[BP]
    GD[GD] -.-> BA
    GD -- "+" --> BO[BO]
    BO -- "-" --> BP
  
```

Using Model II to identify intervening variables:


1. BO is partially intervening between PCE and BP, PS and BP.
2. BO and BA are perfect intervening variables between GD and BP.

Result (III)

- The structural factor of party turn-over has no systematic effect on the difference of attitudes and behaviors among local bureaucrats.
- One interesting finding:
 - **If TURN is continuous (0-1-2-3), it is negatively related to PCF.**
- Several possibilities of this results:
 - 1. **Wrong Model:** Statistical model need to be change into two-level model with adding more structural variables.
 - 2. **Mobility of Bureaucrats:** Bureaucrats can move all around Taiwan.
 - 3. **Better Measurement:** Need better measurement for party turn-over.

Conclusion

- 1. **Gender and neutrality:** Gender is an important factor influencing neutrality ethics in P/B relations. However, its influence on PS can be perfectly intervened by BO and BA. That is to say, male is more partisan can be better explained by their activities of non-faceless and disobedient behaviors.
- 2. **Value Conflict and Neutral Behaviors:** PT and ET have little systematic influences on bureaucrat's behavior might be explained that there is a more complicated relationship between ethical values and actions. It might be the case that the "conflicting values approach" to neutrality ethics is not sufficient to guide behaviors in a complex world.
- 3. **Non-faceless Bureaucrat and Partisan Activities:** According to model IV, the more PCF the less BA. However, the less BA means a less partisan activities. It might be the reason that **transparent** bureaucratic system is necessary to be politically impartial.
- 4. **System Factors and Neutral Behaviors:** There is no statistical significant relations between TURN and all the B's. More efforts are needed to uncover whether democratic institutions do not have systematic supports for bureaucratic neutrality.



References

- Aberbach, Joel D., R. D. Putnam, and B. A. Rockman. (1981) *Bureaucrats & Politicians in Western Democracies*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hecllo, H. (1975) "OMB and the Presidency – the Problem of 'Neutral Competence.'" *Public Interest*, 38(1): 80-89.
- Huber, Gregory. (2007) *The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kemaghan, Kenneth. (1976) "Politics, Policy and Public Servants: Political Neutrality Revisited." *Canadian Public Administration*, 19(3): 432 – 456.
- Maranto, R. and Skelley, B.D. (1992), "Neutrality: An Enduring Principle of the Federal Service" *American Review of Public Administration*, 22(3): 173-87.
- Mengistu, Berhanu; Vogel, Elizabeth. (2006) "Bureaucratic Neutrality among Competing Bureaucratic Values in an Ethnic Federalism: The Case of Ethiopia." *Public Administration Review*, 66(2): 205-216.
- Miller, Gary. (2000). "Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of Public Agencies," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 10: 289-327.
- Pullin, Len and Ali Haidar. (2003) "Managerial Values in Local Government – Victoria, Australia." *The International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 16(4): 286-302.
- Rothstein, Bo and Jan Teorell. (2008) "What Is Quality of Government? A Theory Of Impartial Government Institutions" *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, And Institutions*, 21(2): 165-190.
- Ridley, F. F. (1986) "Political Neutrality, the Duty of Silence and the Right To Publish in the Civil Service" *Parliamentary Affairs*, 39: 437-448.

赴國外出差或研習心得報告：ASPA 年度研討會報告(2009/3)

Delving into the Mystery of Neutrality Ethic in a Consolidating Democracy: A Preliminary Exploration from the Taiwan Government Bureaucrat Survey (TGBS) in 2008

Don-yun Chen, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Public Administration
National Chengchi University, Taipei, TAIWAN
donc@nccu.edu.tw

Tong-yi Huang, Ph.D.
Associate Professor,
Department of Public Administration,
National Cheng-chi University, Taipei, TAIWAN
tyhuang@nccu.edu.tw

Hsiu-chuan Tsai, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Soochow University, Taipei, TAIWAN
sutsai.joy@msa.hinet.net

Chih-kai Chang
Ph.D. Student
Department of Public Administration
National Chengchi University, Taipei, TAIWAN
f680818@ms17.hinet.net

Abstract

For many democratizing nations, the establishment of the neutrality ethic in bureaucracy is crucial to stabilizing democratic competition and promoting governing effectiveness. However, for external or internal reasons, it is very difficult to detect how the neutrality ethic emerges and what are the believed substances of it are in bureaucrats' minds. For both research and practical purposes, we treat Taiwan as a critical case to answer the previous questions for the following reasons. First, if the emergence of the neutrality ethic can be attributed to imposed trainings (internal) and party turn-over (external), both elements have just presented in the Taiwanese case. We can test both arguments and their relative importance in one case study. Second, Taiwan's bureaucratic system presents a high continuity before and after democratic transition. We can observe the change within one survey by using the cohort analysis. Lastly, because there is a very rigid examination system in recruiting civil servants in Taiwan, it is relatively easy to identify who are bureaucrats and conduct a bureaucrat survey. By using the data from the first national survey (Taiwan Bureaucrat Survey, TBS) sponsored by the National Science Council, we try to answer the following research questions. (1) What are the substances of bureaucrats' neutrality ethic in Taiwan? (2) How can the attitudinal differences among bureaucrats be explained by seniority, rank, gender, and other explanatory variables? (3) Do external party turn-over or internal trainings contribute more to the change of neutrality ethic in Taiwan?

Keywords: Bureaucratic Attitude; the Neutrality Ethic; Democratic Consolidation; Taiwan Government Bureaucrat Survey (TGBS)

@ Explain how your proposal fits the conference theme

The establishment of neutrality ethic in bureaucratic system is one of the most important governing issues in newly democratizing countries. However, very little research has been done and the outcome of this research can be useful to countries around the world other than the industrialized democracies to meet their diverse needs on their efforts to build effective governing bodies.

投影片 1

**Delving into the Mystery of Neutrality Ethic
in a Consolidating Democracy: A
Preliminary Exploration from the Taiwan
Bureaucrat Survey (TBS) in 2008**

Don-yun Chen
Tong-yi Huang
Chia-ying Lu
Chih-kai Chang

Dept. of PA, National Chengchi University
2009 ASPA at Miami, USA



投影片 2

Quotation...

*“Loyalty is a fine quality, but in excess it fills
political graveyards.”*

Neil Kinnock (1942~)



Introduction



- ***A Living example of Taiwan:*** The Former Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director-general Yeh Sheng-mao (葉盛茂) was sentenced to ten years prison terms by court of finding Mr. Yeh guilty of leaking confidential information from the Egmont Group to his former boss, former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). However, Mr. Yeh denied that he was trying to protecting his position to leak the information. He said that “I thought that it was only ordinary information for president to know.”
- ***Comments:*** Serving the nation is equal to serving the leader in non-democratic era, but after the party turn-over in Taiwan, for bureaucrats, to serve the nation is beginning to be separated from serving the “temporary” leader. **Neutrality** is beginning to be an important ethical value for bureaucrats in appointees/bureaucrats relations !

What is Bureaucratic Neutrality?

- ***Various Terms used:*** Neutral competence (Hecllo, 1975), Political neutrality (Kemaghan, 1976), Impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008), Administrative neutrality (used only in Taiwan)...
- ***Conflicting Values:*** It is said that the civil service is “above politics” (Miller, 2000) where civil servants should be **non-partisan, obedient, and anonymous**. However, they should be politically responsive and accountable to politicians at the same time. Although neutrality can be politically optimal in strategic term (Huber, 2007), it is also an ethical dilemma within democratizing state as well as democratic states (Mengistu and Vogel, 2006). It is called “the neutrality ethics.”
- **Six components (Kemaghan, 1976):** (1)politics and administration, (2) political patronage, (3)political activity, (4) public comment, (5) anonymity and ministerial responsibility, and (6) permanency in office.

Research Strategies

- **Objects:** The scope of neutrality ethics is too broad. In this research, we focused on the politician/bureaucrat relations from bureaucrat's viewpoint.
- **Definition:** Adopting the non-partisan, obedient, and anonymous as neutrality ethics.
- **Styles:** In the past, most research are non-empirical and a few have surveyed a small group of local government. This research has collected a representative sample of Taiwan's local governments. (Pullin and Haidar, 2003; Maranto and Skelley, 1992)
- **Questions:** In the past, the questions were about the content of neutrality ethics and how bureaucrat (and politicians) have opinion on them. In this research the behavioral realities are the key dependent variables.
- **Modeling:** Using Multi regression as statistical tool to decode the information behind the data.

The Research Questions

- 1. How can the attitudinal and behavioral differences among bureaucrats be explained by seniority, rank, gender, and other explanatory variables?
- 2. What are the substance of neutrality ethics in Taiwan's local bureaucrats?
- 3. Do party turn-over contribute to the difference of neutrality ethic in Taiwan?

Methodology: Surveying Bureaucrats

- **Project Name:** TBS (Taiwan Bureaucrat Survey) sponsored by National Science Council
- **Population:** Civil servants at the local government of Taiwan (excluding military personnel, medial personnel, school teachers, and employees of stated owned enterprises.)
- **Time:** January to March 2008
- **Type:** Face to face interview
- **Total Sample:** 935, weighted with local governments.

Variable Defined (I)

- **Dependent Variable:**
 - 1. **BE(1Q):** Evaluation of Politicians/Bureaucrats Relations (6 point scale; attitude)
<1.Very Good-2.Good-3.A Little Good-4.A Little Bad-5.Bad-6.Very Bad>
 - 2. **BP(4Q;V-0.44):** Parisian Actions (5 point scale; behavior)
 - 3. **BO(3Q;V-0.79):** Obedient Actions (5 point scale; behavior)
 - 4. **BA(3Q;V-0.72):** Anonymous Actions (5 point scale; behavior)
<1.Almost Always-2.Often-3.Sometimes-4.Once-5.Never>

Variable Defined (II)

□ Independent Variables

- Values:
 - **PT(5Q; V-0.82)** : Political Tolerance (ARP, 1981; 6 point scale)
 - **ET(5Q; V-0.97)** : Elitism (ARP, 1981; 6 point scale)
- Personal Characteristics:
 - **GD:Gender(1M/0F); PS: Partisanship (1/0); Age (Conti.); MG: Manager (1/0)**
 - **PCF: Politician Contact-frequency(7 point scale)**
- Structural
 - **TURN: Party turn-over (1-at least once/0)**

Results (I)

Table I: Factors Influence Neutrality

Var.	Model I (BE)		Model II (BP)		Model III (BO)		Model IV (BA)	
	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
Const.	3.335	0.000	1.802	0.000	2.635	0.000	4.055	0.000
PT	0.112	0.012**	0.021	0.433	0.023	0.563	0.009	0.796
ET	0.001	0.196	-0.001	0.155	0.00005	0.911	0.00008	0.839
GD	-0.106	0.060*	-0.086	0.041**	0.153	0.002***	0.174	0.000***
PS	-0.052	0.368	0.144	0.001***	-0.077	0.128	-0.107	0.015**
Age	0.010	0.003***	-0.004	0.130	0.010	0.001***	0.004	0.107
MG	0.137	0.054*	-0.046	0.388	-0.035	0.572	0.112	0.041**
PCF	0.139	0.000***	0.145	0.000***	-0.034	0.103	-0.053	0.003***
TURN	0.108	0.196	0.072	0.231	-0.103	0.162	-0.081	0.206
	R ² =0.095		R ² =0.046		R ² =0.031		R ² =0.045	

Note: "***", 99%; "**", 95%; "*", 90%

投影片 11

- **Value:** Bureaucrat's value of Political tolerance will have a positive effect on his or her evaluation of the P/B relations. However, his or her value of elitism has no effect on any of the evaluation and behaviors.
- **Characteristics:**
 - **GD (Gender)** : The most influential factor. Statistical significant in all four models. A male bureaucrat will evaluate the P/B relations less than female one. He also will be more partisan, less obedient and anonymous in his behavior.
 - **PCF (Politician-contact-frequency)** : The more a bureaucrat contacts with politicians the more he or she will evaluate the P/B relations positively. He or she will also behave less partisan and more anonymous.
 - **PS (Partisanship)** : A bureaucrat with a political preference will have more partisan behaviors. Also, he or she will be more obedient.
 - **Age** : The older the bureaucrat, the more positive he or she is to evaluate the P/B relation.
 - **MG (Manager)** : A bureaucrat in a manger position will evaluate the P/B relation more positively. Also, he will behave more anonymously.

投影片 12

Result (II): Identify Intervening Variables

```

    graph LR
      PCF[PCF] -- "-" --> BA[BA]
      PS[PS] -- "-" --> BA
      GD[GD] -.- "+" --> BA
      GD -.- "+" --> BO[BO]
      BA -- "-" --> BP[BP]
      BO -- "-" --> BP
  
```

Using Model II to identify intervening variables:


1. BO is partially intervening between PCE and BP, PS and BP.
2. BO and BA are perfect intervening variables between GD and BP.

Result (III)

- The structural factor of party turn-over has no systematic effect on the difference of attitudes and behaviors among local bureaucrats.
- One interesting finding:
 - **If TURN is continuous (0-1-2-3), it is negatively related to PCF.**
- Several possibilities of this results:
 - 1. **Wrong Model:** Statistical model need to be change into two-level model with adding more structural variables.
 - 2. **Mobility of Bureaucrats:** Bureaucrats can move all around Taiwan.
 - 3. **Better Measurement:** Need better measurement for party turn-over.

Conclusion

- 1. **Gender and neutrality:** Gender is an important factor influencing neutrality ethics in P/B relations. However, its influence on PS can be perfectly intervened by BO and BA. That is to say, male is more partisan can be better explained by their activities of non-faceless and disobedient behaviors.
- 2. **Value Conflict and Neutral Behaviors:** PT and ET have little systematic influences on bureaucrat's behavior might be explained that there is a more complicated relationship between ethical values and actions. It might be the case that the "conflicting values approach" to neutrality ethics is not sufficient to guide behaviors in a complex world.
- 3. **Non-faceless Bureaucrat and Partisan Activities:** According to model IV, the more PCF the less BA. However, the less BA means a less partisan activities. It might be the reason that **transparent** bureaucratic system is necessary to be politically impartial.
- 4. **System Factors and Neutral Behaviors:** There is no statistical significant relations between TURN and all the B's. More efforts are needed to uncover whether democratic institutions do not have systematic supports for bureaucratic neutrality.



References

- Aberbach, Joel D., R. D. Putnam, and B. A. Rockman. (1981) *Bureaucrats & Politicians in Western Democracies*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hecl, H. (1975) "OMB and the Presidency – the Problem of 'Neutral Competence.'" *Public Interest*, 38(1): 80-89.
- Huber, Gregory. (2007) *The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kemaghan, Kenneth. (1976) "Politics, Policy and Public Servants: Political Neutrality Revisited." *Canadian Public Administration*, 19(3): 432 – 456.
- Maranto, R. and Skelley, B.D. (1992), "Neutrality: An Enduring Principle of the Federal Service" *American Review of Public Administration*, 22(3): 173-87.
- Mengistu, Berhanu; Vogel, Elizabeth. (2006) "Bureaucratic Neutrality among Competing Bureaucratic Values in an Ethnic Federalism: The Case of Ethiopia." *Public Administration Review*, 66(2): 205-216.
- Miller, Gary. (2000). "Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of Public Agencies." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 10: 289-327.
- Pullin, Len and Ali Haidar. (2003) "Managerial Values in Local Government – Victoria, Australia." *The International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 16(4): 286-302.
- Rothstein, Bo and Jan Teorell. (2008) "What Is Quality of Government? A Theory Of Impartial Government Institutions" *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, And Institutions*, 21(2): 165-190.
- Ridley, F. F. (1986) "Political Neutrality, the Duty of Silence and the Right To Publish in the Civil Service" *Parliamentary Affairs*, 39: 437-448.