

# 行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫 成果報告

宗教經驗及其理論建構：以 Wilfred C. Smith、Mircea  
Eliade、Ninian Smart 為探討範例(3/3)  
研究成果報告(完整版)

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計畫主持人：蔡彥仁

計畫參與人員：碩士班研究生-兼任助理：蔡竺君

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## 一、中英文摘要

第三階段的「宗教經驗及其理論建構：以 Wilfred C. Smith, Mircea Eliad, Ninian Smart 為探討範疇」研究計畫(NSC 95-2411-H-004-001)，其成果主要分為兩部分：(一)「群體的、批判的、自我意識——論史密斯的宗教神學」；(二)“Selfhood and Fiduciary Community: A Smithian Reading of Tu Weiming’s Confucian Humanism.” 兩篇論文內容摘要如下：

### (一)「群體的、批判的、自我意識——論史密斯的宗教神學」

宗教學者史密斯(Wilfred C. Smith, 1916-2000)的宗教理論影響二十世紀後半葉的西方學界至為深遠，但是他企圖建構的世界神學在過去數十年來卻激起評論者不同的反應。本文首先指出，史氏的問題意識在批判西方自啟蒙時期以降的基督教中心思想，以及極端客觀主義所導致的物化「人」與人文現象。為糾正這些弊病，他從世界宗教史的角度出發，論證人類歷史的連續相關與一體性，並強調「人」方是宗教的核心，也是宗教探討的肇始與依歸。為此他提出「群體的、批判的自我意識」作為總結其理論的焦點，以此開創新的認知典範，亦以此檢證任何「真理」論述的可信度與有效性。本文更進一步根據史氏的宗教神學理論，就宗教的定義與內容以及宗教的範疇與詮釋兩子題，引述正、反雙方學者的意見加以延伸討論。本文最後歸結得出，史氏的革命式見解雖然激發抽象與具體、普遍與特殊、唯心與唯物、本質與現象等之偏重或先後之爭，但他的宗教神學促使我們對於宗教的定義、範疇、主題、內容、研究者、研究對象、方法等議題，能更深刻地進行反思，在宗教研究領域有其重要且巨大的貢獻。

### (二)“Selfhood and Fiduciary Community: A Smithian Reading of Tu Weiming’s Confucian Humanism”

杜維明身為新儒家第三代的代言人，多年來不斷的重新詮釋儒家傳統以應對現代化的挑戰。他以「己」為出發點，強調深化與擴充修心的過程為體現「道」的必經路程。他提出「信的社群」的概念，認為因為有此概念儒家傳統方成一動力十足的「包容性人文主義」。杜維明的思考模式與史密斯(Wilfred C. Smith)的宗教理念不謀而合，特別是後者所標舉的「信心是人類普遍特質」與「群體的、批判的、自我意識」兩項。本篇論文即在詳述此兩位學者的宗教理論，一方面凸顯其相似之處，另一方面也指出其不同之處。本文主要在論證，史密斯的世界神學正好提供一啟發性的角度，讓我們可以窺知杜維明如何將儒家從中國哲學或文化傳統引進世界宗教的範疇裡。

關鍵詞：史密斯、宗教神學、信心、杜維明、儒家、心學

This is the last stage of the three-year research project, “Religious Experience and Its theoretical Construction: Thinking through Wilfred C. Smith, Mircea Eliade, and Ninian Smart.” Two papers were produced as a result, and they are: (A) “Corporate, Critical Self-consciousness”: On Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s Theology of Religion; (B) “Selfhood and Fiduciary Community: A Smithian Reading of Tu Weiming’s Confucian Humanism.” Their respective abstracts are given below.

(A) “Corporate, Critical Self-consciousness”: On Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s Theology of Religion

Wilfred C. Smith has been very influential in the field of religious studies since the second half of the twentieth century. His theology of religion, however, has also incurred much debate from supporters and detractors. This article first points out that Smith sets his theory on his critiques of two major problems, the Christianity-centered mentality and the tendency to reify the subject of investigation in the Western intellectual and academic world. To rectify these errors, Smith, approaching from the history of world religions, argues that human cultural traditions have been interlinked and manifested a continuum. Person, he emphasizes, should be the core of religion, as well as the beginning and end of religious studies. He proposes “corporate, critical self-consciousness” as the key to his theology of religion. He also uses it to illustrate a new paradigm by which one interprets religion and verifies the conclusion of one’s research. The article further presents different opinions about Smith’s world theology, under the rubric of definition and content of religion and that of category and interpretation of religion, and proceeds into extensive discussion and evaluation of them. It observes that Smith’s revolutionary approach creates a strong tension between noumenon and phenomenon, abstractness and concreteness, universality and particularity, and idealism and materialism. That be the case, the article, in conclusion, affirms that Smith’s theology of religion fruitfully helps us rethink the definition, category, theme, content, the relationship between outsider and insider, and ways of understanding religion from a deeper perspective, and that his fresh insight contributes substantially to the whole field of religious studies.

(B) Selfhood and Fiduciary Community: A Smithian Reading of Tu Weiming’s Confucian Humanism

Tu Weiming, as a leading spokesman for contemporary New Confucianism, has

been reinterpreting the Confucian tradition in face of the challenges of modernity. Tu takes selfhood as his starting point, emphasizing the importance of cultivating human mind-and-heart as a deepening and broadening process to realize the anthropocosmic *dao*. He highlights the concept of a “fiduciary community” and advocates that, because of it, Confucianism remains a dynamic “inclusive humanism.” Tu’s mode of thinking tallies well with Wilfred C. Smith’s vision of religion, specifically the latter’s exposition of faith as a universal human quality and proposal of “corporate critical self-consciousness.” This article details the theories of both scholars, highlights their similarities, and contrasts their differences. It argues that Smith’s world theology provides a heuristic framework through which one understands how Tu has advanced his Confucian humanism from a Chinese philosophical or cultural tradition to the midst of world religions.

Keyword: Wilfred C. Smith, theology of religion, faith, Tu Weiming, Confucianism, mind-and-heart

## 二、前言

本人自九十三年八月一日起，受國科會為期三年的資助，進行題為「宗教經驗及其理論建構：以 Wilfred C. Smith、Mircea Eliade、Ninian Smart 為探討範例」的研究計畫。(NSC 93-2411-H-004-014; NSC 94-2411-H-004-004; NSC 95-2411-H-004-001)期間本人因旅外一年，故延期繳交成果日期至九十七年三月三十一日。回顧過去三年八個月的研究期，本人的研究過程進展順利，並已獲得部分的成果，然對於當初所標舉的研究目標，仍有一段尚待努力的距離。

## 三、本計畫緣由與目的

誠如本人在申請案中所言，本計畫的主要目的和內容，在於「以 Wilfred C. Smith、Mircea Eliade、Ninian Smart 三位二十世紀最具影響力的宗教學者為範例，探討他們如何觀察人的宗教經驗，並建構廣為當代學者討論的對應理論。」

西方的宗教理論相當多元歧異，尤其自一九八〇年代以來，因為「全球化」議題的熱烈展開，在受到科技文明、多元文化、種族議題、地方意識高漲、後現代解構思想等因素之影響，越顯得錯綜複雜，因此如何從特定主題著手，撥雲見日，以簡御繁，誠為有心宗教理論研究者之挑戰。另一方面，所謂「宗教經驗」指涉多端，就廣義而言，所有的宗教現象即反映人類的宗教經驗，亦即研究宗教經驗等同研究宗教之所有主題或範疇。狹義而言，晚近學者特指宗教經驗為「神秘經驗」或「冥契經驗」(mysticism)，縮小範圍至人類「非常」的心智體驗。本人申請之初，以廣義為主，希望不限縮「宗教經驗」，而由當前西方學者的反覆

論辯，亦可得知縱然是超常的「神秘經驗」，亦不可能超越特定的宗教教義或文化脈絡。

基於上述兩項考量，本人認為最妥當的研究方式為選則西方具有代表性的宗教學者，檢視其如何觀察與分析人類的「宗教經驗」，並建立其詮釋理論。本人因此選 Mircea Eliade、Wilfred C. Smith、Ninian Smart 三位學者，主要理由在於：

第一、此三位學者之學術成就與影響力，遍及歐美的宗教學術世界，為當今的「宗教研究」訂定基調，值得我們合觀並論，據此理解現階段西方宗教研究的背景與內涵，並做為他山之石可以攻錯的對象。另外，此三人生卒年歲涵蓋二十世紀的大部份，面對期間各歷史階段相同的問題，也個別提出相對應的宗教理論，可供相互參照之用。

第二、此三位學者對於人的宗教經驗，皆有深刻的探討。以他們的洞見為基礎，正可回溯百年來西方宗教學界對於「宗教」的看法。

第三、此三人雖然生於西方，受教於歐美，但是其學術視野卻及於世界各宗教與文化傳統，其身份不是今日學術領域中的「專家」(specialists)，而是人文理想中的「通才」(generalists)或「比較學者」(comparativists)。此對於我們現今的宗教研究發展，具有提醒的作用。

第四、此三位學者雖然熟悉現象學、社會學、人類學、心理學等不同的研究途徑，但是並不囿限於一，反而力主多元、折衷、跨科際的宗教研究方法，這對於定義此學門的身份與建立其獨立的地位而言，具有重大的參考意義。

依此設構想，本人提出三年的研究計畫如下：

第一年首先研究 Smith 和 Eliade。仔細閱讀他們的原典著作，分析其內容，探討的問題包括：

- 1、他們如何看待人類的宗教經驗？有何前提？怎麼理解？如何描繪？
- 2、更具體方面，他們如何運用不同的方法，特別是採取多元的科際整合方式建立個別的理論？
- 3、檢視其問題與理論的建立之間，是否構成一個周詳、具有邏輯的體系？

第二年分為兩部份。第一部份將仔細閱讀 Smart 的原典著作，除了依循第一年對前兩位學者所提的問題以及檢驗程序之外，將增加探討 Smart 在規劃「宗教研究」的內容與實踐經驗。第二部份的研究將著重一般學者對此三位學者的正、負評價。

第三年的研究也將分為兩部份。第一部份將歸納此三人的理論，比較其異同，凸顯其長、短處，為前此的研究工作做一總結。第二部份則是本人在前述的基礎上，提出個人的對應看法，希望藉此呼應 Smith、Eliade、Smart 三者的宗教理論，也為「宗教經驗及其理論建構」提出另一思考途徑。

#### 四、結果與討論

回顧三年多來的研究，本人認為已大略達成上述的原始規劃。至目前為止，

本人就「宗教經驗」的相關主題，已發表期刊論文三篇，專書論文兩篇，會議論文八篇(有些經修改後投稿刊載，另外其中一篇投稿已被接收，將於2008年底正式刊載)。茲根據三類型分列如下：

(一) 與 Mircea Eliade、Wilfred C. Smith、Ninian Smart 三位最直接相關者

1. 全球化與宗教研究：再思伊利雅德的「新人文主義」，魏澤民主編，  
《覺醒的力量》。台北：世界宗教博物館，2004。頁107-138。
2. 論史密斯(Wilfred C. Smith)的「宗教性」：兼談當代儒家的宗教觀，  
國立政治大學文學院編，《中國近代文化的解構與重建：中華文化與台灣文化—延續與斷裂》(2005)，頁37-52。
3. 『世界觀』與『面向』：析論斯馬特的宗教哲學，《台灣宗教研究》，第五卷，第二期(2006)，頁105-133。
4. 斯馬特論宗教與宗教研究，《法鼓人文學報》，第三期，頁55-76。
5. 「群體的、批判的自我意識」—論史密斯的宗教神學，  
《新世紀宗教研究》，第五卷，第四期(2007)，頁171-206。

(二) 「宗教經驗」之比較研究

1. “Desirelessness and Quiet-sitting: Idea and Practice of Spiritual Cultivation in Ming Neo-Confucianism,” presented at the Annual Conference of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Pacific Grove, June 18-21, 2006.
2. “Selfhood and Fiduciary Community: A Smithian Reading of Tu Weiming’s Confucian Humanism,” presented at the International Workshop on “Confucianism among World Religions: A Dialogue with Tu Weiming,” Leiden, the Netherlands, May 23-25, 2007
3. “Preserving the One and Residing in Harmony: Daoist Connections in Zhu Xi’s Instruction for Breath Control,” presented at the Symposium on Foundations of Taoist Ritual,” Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany, Dec. 9-11, 2007.

(三) 延伸研究

1. “Ritual Violence and Communal Sanity: The Case of *Hērem* and Its Solution in Biblical Judaism.” Presented at the XIXth World Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions, Tokyo, March 24-30, 2005.
2. “An Interpretation of the Confucian Classics as Scripture: the Case of ‘Classics Recitation Movement’ in Contemporary Taiwan,” presented at the International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, the Netherlands, March 6, 2007.
3. “The Current Development of Religious Studies in the Chinese Intellectual World,” presented at the American Academy of Religion, San Diego, Nov.

17-20, 2007.

上列屬（一）範圍之第 1, 2, 3, 4 篇，本人於 93、94 兩年的期中報告中已述及，而第 5 篇(附錄一)與屬（二）範圍之第 2 篇(附錄二)，其摘要內容也置於本報告之首，詳文亦附於後。需要說明者是有關「宗教研究」之比較部分。

本人認為，Eliade, Smith與Smart三者的宗教理論，雖有不同的著重點與建構體系，但是他們亦有共同的關心點。其中最顯著的莫過於他們皆強調宗教的主體在「人」，有其內在的本質。宗教在不同的文化傳統中有不同的展現，但其具有普遍與先驗特性則無庸置疑，此是宗教研究者最需肯定與探討之處。其中又以Smith的宗教哲學主張最力。職是之故，本人發覺這些學者論「宗教經驗」，皆重視人的主體經驗，甚至包含「神秘經驗」所指涉的範疇。此點聯繫激發本人進一步考察中國傳統中有關身體實踐和主體經驗的宗教現象，以及有關此方面的哲學或宗教論述。本人選宋、明儒家與當代新儒家為例，探討其「靜坐」經驗與「心性」哲學，即是認為此可作驗證與比較的對象。“Selfhood and Fiduciary Community: A Smithian Reading of Tu Weiming’s Confucian Humanism”一文即是此種嘗試。

## 五、成果自評

本人執行本計畫，最大的成果在詳讀 Eliade, Smith 與 Smart 三位之著作後，做一重點式的分析與整理，並根據多位現代學者之見，進行評述論辯。此三位宗教學者的著作等身，能有機會細讀思索，本人獲益良多。不過，如欲集結成書，本人仍有未盡之處。第一，他們三者的宗教理論，畢竟是西方一百多年來宗教研究史之一環，需置其於發展脈絡內觀之，方可說明清楚他們的重要性。因此本人還需要另外為文，闡述他們理論生成的共同背景及意義所在。第二、本人雖然已大致論述他們三人的個別宗教理論，可是仍須進行綜合比較，除了凸顯他們的異、同，還得聯繫或還原至「宗教經驗」主題，測試其相關性與有效性。第三、本人的最終目的不僅在引介評述，而是企圖建立適合我們文化或宗教脈絡的理論。此一標的相當高遠，上述「『宗教經驗』之比較研究」內之文章屬於初試，仍需要持續探討研究。

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附錄一

「群體的、批判的自我意識」——

論史密斯的宗教神學

**Corporate, Critical Self-consciousness——**

**On Wilfred Cantwell Smith's Theology of Religion**

國立政治大學宗教研究所教授蔡彥仁

Tsai, Yen Zen ( Professor, Graduate Institute of Religious Studies,  
National Chengchi University )

# **Corporate, Critical Self-consciousness— On Wilfred Cantwell Smith's Theology of Religion**

**Tsai, Yen Zen**

**Professor, Graduate Institute of Religious Studies, National Chengchi University**

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## **Abstract**

Wilfred C. Smith has been very influential in the field of religious studies since the second half of the twentieth century. His theology of religion, however, has also incurred much debate from supporters and detractors. This article first points out that Smith sets his theory on his critiques of two major problems, the Christianity-centered mentality and the tendency to reify the subject of investigation in the Western intellectual and academic world. To rectify these errors, Smith, approaching from the history of world religions, argues that human cultural traditions have been interlinked and manifested a continuum. Person, he emphasizes, should be the core of religion, as well as the beginning and end of religious studies. He proposes “corporate, critical self-consciousness” as the key to his theology of religion. He also uses it to illustrate a new paradigm by which one interprets religion and verifies the conclusion of one’s research. The article further presents different opinions about Smith’s world theology, under the rubric of definition and content of religion and that of category and interpretation of religion, and proceeds into extensive discussion and evaluation of them. It observes that Smith’s revolutionary approach creates a strong tension between noumenon and phenomenon, abstractness and concreteness, universality and particularity, and idealism and materialism. That be the case, the article, in conclusion, affirms that Smith’s theology of religion fruitfully helps us rethink the definition, category, theme, content, the relationship between outsider and insider, and ways of understanding religion from a deeper perspective, and that his fresh insight contributes substantially to the whole field of religious studies.

**Keywords:** Faith, Pluralism, phenomenology of religion, history of religion, Theology of religion

# 「群體的、批判的自我意識」——

## 論史密斯的宗教神學

蔡彥仁

國立政治大學宗教研究所教授

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### 摘要

宗教學者史密斯(Wilfred C. Smith, 1916-2000)的宗教理論影響二十世紀後半葉的西方學界至為深遠，但是他企圖建構的世界神學在過去數十年來卻激起評論者不同的反應。本文首先指出，史氏的問題意識在批判西方自啟蒙時期以降的基督教中心思想，以及極端客觀主義所導致的物化「人」與人文現象。為糾正這些弊病，他從世界宗教史的角度出發，論證人類歷史的連續相關與一體性，並強調「人」方是宗教的核心，也是宗教探討的肇始與依歸。為此他提出「群體的、批判的自我意識」作為總結其理論的焦點，以此開創新的認知典範，亦以此檢證任何「真理」論述的可信度與有效性。本文更進一步根據史氏的宗教神學理論，就宗教的定義與內容以及宗教的範疇與詮釋兩子題，引述正、反雙方學者的意見加以延伸討論。本文最後歸結得出，史氏的革命式見解雖然激發抽象與具體、普遍與特殊、唯心與唯物、本質與現象等之偏重或先後之爭，但他的宗教神學促使我們對於宗教的定義、範疇、主題、內容、研究者、研究對象、方法等議題，能更深刻地進行反思，在宗教研究領域有其重要且巨大的貢獻。

**關鍵字：**信心、多元主義、宗教現象學、宗教史、宗教神學

## 壹、導言

宗教學者史密斯(1916-2000)早歲專攻印度次大陸的現代伊斯蘭發展,採用馬克斯主義的觀點,從歷史與社會角度分析在英、美列強宰制下,伊斯蘭社群被分離在印度與巴基斯坦兩個對立國度之當代現況。<sup>1</sup>他雖然以伊斯蘭研究為專業,但是或許源於印度自古即是文化繽紛、宗教多元的社會,對於如何細膩地處理在此複雜環境下的絕對一神觀傳統如伊斯蘭者,自然成為他苦心思索的重大議題。<sup>2</sup>他日後的宗教理論,即植基於這種學術與現實經驗。在一篇名為「比較宗教:何去何從以及為什麼?」(*Comparative Religion: Whither—and Why*)(1959)的論文中,他力主宗教學者需意識到自身與研究對象的互為主體性關係,因為雙方都是具有性靈的「人」(person),而預設的讀者群之背景也是世界性的,因此對於宗教信仰者的欣賞與同情、研究結果需有研究對象的檢證、研究脈絡需以比較宗教為參照對應等主張,即已表露無遺。<sup>3</sup>史氏三年之後繼之出版的《他人的信心》(*The Faith of Other Men*)一書,持續此一基本觀點,以世界宗教為範疇,深入淺出地分別敘及對印度教、佛教、伊斯蘭、中國宗教、基督教、猶太教諸傳統應有的態度與理解。<sup>4</sup>逮至隔年發表的經典之作《宗教的意義與目的》(*The Meaning and End of Religion*),他更進一步指出,所謂「宗教」必須分兩層次視之,一為「信心」(faith),另一為「積累傳統」(cumulative tradition),前項係人類普遍的質素,蘊含企求與回應超越的機能,而後者即是孕育與反映此機能的歷史印證,兩者的關係雖然是辯證、互補,但是「信心」方是宗教信仰者的主體,亦是學者所應窮究的終極對象。<sup>5</sup>

一九七〇年代後期的世界局勢發展,多元種族、文化與宗教的急遽交叉互動越發明顯,但也帶來誤解與醜化「他人」信仰的負面結果。有鑑於此,史密斯於一九七七、一九七九、一九八一分別出版《信仰與歷史》(*Belief and History*)、<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 史氏在此階段的兩本專門著作為 *Modern Islam in India: a Social Analysis*. (1943). Lahore: Minerva; *Islam in Modern History*. (1957). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>2</sup> 有關史密斯的學思歷程資料,可參考 Kenneth Cracknell, (ed.)(2001). *Wilfred Cantwell Smith: A Reader*. Oxford: Oneworld, pp.1-10.

<sup>3</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1959). "Comparative Religion: Whither—and Why?" in Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa, (eds.) *The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp.31-58.

<sup>4</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1962). *The Faith of Other Men*. Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation / (1972). New York: Harper & Row; reissued as *Patterns of Faith around the World* (1998). Oxford: Oneworld. 本文採用 1972 年版。

<sup>5</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1963). *The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind*. New York: Macmillan / (1978). New York: Harper & Row. 本文採用 1978 年版。

<sup>6</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1977). *Belief and History*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia; (1998). reissued as *Believing: an Historical Perspective*. Oxford: Oneworld. 本文採用 1998 年版。



《信心與信仰》(*Faith and Belief*)、<sup>7</sup>《邁向世界神學》(*Towards a World Theology*)<sup>8</sup>「三部曲」(trilogy)，全面而集中地處理此一宗教內、外因素錯綜交織的棘手問題。<sup>9</sup>在此三本著作之中，史氏依舊堅持其以「人」為本的基本信念，可名為「人本主義」(personalism)，強調對於宗教的認知、定義或研究，皆應以此為出發點，亦應以此為歸結。他根據史料論稱，一般所謂的「信仰」(belief)不能等同於「信心」(faith)，從世界宗教史的觀點考察，各個宗教傳統的緣起與深層理念，莫不以「信心」為基調、為原旨，近世慣以「宗教」(religion)或「信仰」等詞凌駕或替代之，其實背離原意，蒙蔽「人」的真正價值，也顯示以基督教為主流的西方知識界扭曲「人」的軌跡。為解決當今世界的「宗教」問題，一方面須追本溯源，恢復「宗教」中的「人」的本來面目，另一方面則須秉持多元主義的觀點，從歷史的、比較的與全球的角度詮釋各宗教傳統，特別是應該重新認識非基督教的「他教」。依史氏的理想，唯有透過「群體的、批判的自我意識」(corporate, critical self-consciousness)之深化與普遍化，方有可能達到此一目標。<sup>10</sup>

的確，「群體的、批判的自我意識」一詞已成為進入史密斯宗教理論的關鍵，亦是導引我們理解近代西方的知識脈絡、思考「宗教的意義與目的」、宗教多元主義、詮釋宗教的方法、以及掌握宗教研究的現況與未來的重要途徑。本文即是在此認知底下，試圖更詳盡的探討此一關鍵概念，並藉此反思史氏「宗教神學」的利弊得失。

## 貳、問題意識

史密斯在其專攻伊斯蘭與探討一般世界宗教史的過程中，對於如何理解「他教」並詮釋與定義「宗教」，一直是其縈繞於心的重大挑戰。他先從自我反省意識出發，檢驗孕育他的人格心智，也是自己最為熟悉的基督教傳統。他發覺就「宗教」而論，其所關連的西方近、現代知識脈絡，自啟蒙時代之後即呈現偏狹(parochialism)與物化(reification)的趨勢，即是這種弊病，嚴重地阻礙西方知識界與學界對於「宗教」的認知。<sup>11</sup>至為明顯的事實是，當代人一論及「宗教」，皆以可觀的、可考的外在現象為焦點，而一涉世界宗教，特別是非基督教傳統，則經常以抽象的系統或信念替代「人」的複雜層面，誤認為研究這些外在現象，即可把握「宗教」的內涵與意義。<sup>12</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1979). *Faith and Belief*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; reissued as *Faith and Belief: the Difference between Them* (1998). Oxford: Oneworld. 本文採用 1979 年版。

<sup>8</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology: Faith and the Comparative History of Religion*. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press.

<sup>9</sup> 參閱 Philip C. Almond (1983). Wilfred Cantwell Smith as Theologian of Religions. *Harvard Theological Review*, 73(3), pp.335-342.

<sup>10</sup> 此一專有詞彙在史氏的多本著作中經常出現，但以 *Towards a World Theology* 一書最為集中，特別參閱該書 pp.59-70；其內容與意義則參看本論文以下之解釋。

<sup>11</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*. pp.22-23.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.24-25; Wilfred. C. Smith (1962). *The Faith of Other Men*. pp.24-38.

史氏從西方宗教史考察，具體指出「宗教」(religion)一詞本身即是一個問題。從原始字義解釋，「宗教」(*religio*)指涉「外在於人的一種力量，含帶威嚇、懲罰與禁忌而驅使人從事某些行為，或者人內心對此力量激發而生的情愫。」<sup>13</sup>因此「宗教」本意意指人的內在情緒與感覺，代表一種品質而非可觀、可計量的物件。由基督教史可得知，截至十七世紀之前，在西方超過千年以上的中古歷史階段中，「宗教」總是被使用於表達虔敬(piety)、順服(obedience)、崇拜(worship)、儀式(rite)、信心(faith)等「宗教性」(religiousness)層面的多樣情境，偏重於人的內在心理狀況描述。<sup>14</sup>十七世紀之後，源於理性主義的昂揚，西方人逐漸輕忽或拒斥此一宗教的內在層面。另一方面，拜世界地理大發現與西方殖民擴張之賜，基督教傳教士與異教文化接觸越趨頻繁，多元的現實環境激發其反思「我教」與「他教」之別，「宗教」遂帶區別含意，由原指信仰的內在品質轉化為指涉可數的、具有差異性的個別宗教，單數的「宗教」(religion)認知由是裂分為複數的「宗教」(religions)用法。<sup>15</sup>

近代西方「宗教」詞彙與概念的發展，由是深染區隔與護教的目的，寓含刻意比較基督教傳統與其他世界宗教，此根本背離了「宗教」的原始內涵。一俟複數的「宗教」形成，西方人對「我教」經常採取內在的、質量式的理解，而對「他教」則採有距離的、物件化、系統式的認知，依史密斯所言，此即是「柏拉圖化己教，卻亞理斯多德化他教。」<sup>16</sup>十九世紀之後盛行的「比較宗教」，非基督教的世界宗教常被冠以某某信仰「體系」(-ism)，比如印度教／體系(Hinduism)、佛教／體系(Buddhism)、穆罕默德教／體系(Mohammedanism)、儒教／體系(Confucianism)、神道教／體系(Shintoism)等專有詞彙之形成，即是例證。究其實，這些受到物化或外在化的宗教傳統，千百年來其信仰者無人從「外部」證成自己的宗教體會，也無人藉由「體系」定義自己的宗教傳統，更進一步考察可得知，這些「他教」的信眾與啟蒙時代之前的基督教徒並無不同，各擁類似「宗教」原始意義的詞彙或理念，以質素為考量，藉由具體的實踐，追求或形塑其個別視為最虔誠、最終極的性靈境界。西方「宗教」從個人的、內在的、質化的、單數的，淪為集體的、外在的、量化的、複數的轉化過程，解釋了當代宗教認知的根本問題，也提醒我們在自我反思「宗教」時，應該自何處著手。<sup>17</sup>

同樣地，史密斯透過仔細的字源學與宗教史考察指出，<sup>18</sup>西方語言常用的「相信」(believe)與「信仰」(belief)兩詞彙，亦經歷由內轉外的不幸過程。動詞「相信」的原始字義為「摯愛」(to love)、「引為珍貴」(to hold dear)，正如當今德文

<sup>13</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1963). *The Meaning and End of Religion*. p.20.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp.23-37.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp.37-44.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p.57.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp.53-79.

<sup>18</sup> 值得提出的是，史密斯在論證其理論時，經常藉多種語言、大量的歷史資料與細膩的考據作為支持佐證，而非一般的空言玄想。這種「憑證據說話」的作法，有時達到驚人的程度，例如氏作 *The Meaning and End of Religion* 一書，正文二百零二頁，小字註解頁數即有一百二十九頁，而 *Faith and Belief* 一書的正文一百七十二頁，小字註解卻達一百五十七頁，字數實質上超過正文。

的「愛」或「親愛」(Lieb)仍保持此字源與字義。引伸言之，中古時期的西方人對於其所認為最珍貴者，亦是其願意以身相許或戮力以赴者，皆以 believe 或 belief 表達，此由教會講道詞(sermons)、宗教文學作者例如韋克力夫(John Wycliff, 1329-1384)，甚至稍後的彌爾頓(John Milton, 1608-1674)以及其他俗文學例如《亞瑟王傳奇》(*The King Arthur*)、《皮亞斯農夫》(*Piers the Plowman*)等可佐證之。<sup>19</sup> 在此用法與含意底下，「相信」或「信仰」表示個人內在之情，帶有濃烈的「你我」(I-You)親和感。可惜自十七世紀之後，此種字義與用法逐漸轉變，至十九世紀時，表達心境的「摯愛」原意，轉換成表達理性認知(cognition)，狹隘地專指身外之物，此在講效用主義的英國哲學家彌爾(John S. Mill, 1806-1873)身上最能清楚看出。自此之後，「相信」或「信仰」常是「非『人』的」(impersonal)指涉，用於第三人稱、帶有條件式的(propositional)陳述語詞。在現代的宗教範疇中，所謂「信仰」某教條或「相信」上帝或鬼神的存在等說法，遂充斥氾濫，掩蓋了其純指個人內在之情的本來面目。<sup>20</sup>

「宗教」、「相信」、「信仰」詞彙與觀念的演變，可說具體而微地反映西方人文知識界在啟蒙時期之後，漸漸從自我、人我、內心層面歧逸遠離，趨向外物與純知識假設的虛擬之境。依史密斯之見，二十世紀的語言分析哲學家例如艾爾(A. J. Ayer, 1910-1989)等的理論，更加惡化此一趨勢。語言分析哲學的邏輯實證觀點，經常視宗教語彙或表達為「無意義、非理性、或根本就是錯誤」，<sup>21</sup>例如古埃及人謂「天空是隻母牛」的陳述，被判為純屬荒誕無稽，<sup>22</sup>這是因為此種哲學所感興趣者僅在抽離字句加以分析，不及語言進行的互動脈絡，更不顧語言乃自「人」而出、可能深富象徵含意的事實。史氏強調，所謂純「客觀」(objectivity)與「非『人』主義」(impersonalism)是理解宗教的障礙，學者反而應該先瞭解人的生活、人的生命及其內在企求，方可能理解其看似無意義與非理性的宗教表達，否則永遠無法進入信仰者的意義世界。<sup>23</sup>

史密斯進一步指出，在執著「客觀」、重實證的知識潮流席捲下，原本「宗教」意涵所著重的「超越」(transcendent)指涉或層面被摒除於現代人的意識之外，也難見容於當今的學術探討範疇，而此正是令人最感憂心者。從長遠的世界宗教史衡量，「反超越思想」(anti-transcendent thinking)是近、現代的畸形產物(an aberration)，究其實違反人性，也不符「真理」(truth)，名之為「虛無實證主義」(nihilistic positivism)或「負面世俗主義」(negative secularism)當不為過。<sup>24</sup>無怪乎許多宗教學者在研究宗教時(此以秉持「歷史批判法」的基督教研究學者為著)，經常陷於技術層面的操作，對於宗教史的探討，也常溺於歷史單點式的考證與

<sup>19</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1979). *Faith and Belief*. pp.105-117.

<sup>20</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1998). *Believing—An Historical Perspective*. pp.36-79.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p.5.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p.11.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 29-35; Wilfred C. Smith (1979). *Faith and Belief*. pp.20-32.

<sup>24</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1963). *The Meaning and End of Religion*. pp.188-190; (1979). *Faith and Belief*. p.139.

趣，而忽略整體的「積累傳統」及其所反映的「人」與「超越」世界。<sup>25</sup>如果意欲掃除這些迷障，超越當今人文知識界的偏頗格局，唯有意識到我們所傳承的知識包袱，正本清源，方有可能開創認識「宗教」的新坦途。

史密斯非常嫻熟世界宗教歷史的發展，清楚地意識到現代西方人對宗教的錯誤認知，也洞悉當代宗教研究的問題所在。職是之故，他堅持我們首先必須檢討己身的「宗教」觀念，更正由來已久卻未經深刻反省的物化、抽象化取向，扭轉以教條或所信(orthodoxy)界定「宗教」(尤其是「他教」)的作法，回歸以「人」的生活、實踐、所感等存在景況為中心(orthopraxy)。<sup>26</sup>如係重新認識基督教，應突破多年來專注神學表述的作法，直取信仰者的本心，此方是拉丁文「吾置吾心」(credo)的原意。<sup>27</sup>如係認識「他教」如印度教者，即應知此宗教非等於一抽象的系統(Hindu-ism)或物件(entity)，而是由人的參與、委身、奉獻、組合而成的活傳統，其焦點亦是其信仰者「置吾心」(梵文 *sraddha*，與拉丁文 *credo* 字根與字義相同)的活動累積。<sup>28</sup>由此觀之，史密斯意圖恢復人的「信心」或「宗教性」層面，將「超越」重新導入現代人的視域，以此作為他論述世界宗教神學的普遍基礎。

### 叁、理論內容論述

為了超越基督教傳統視野的狹隘格局，亦是更正近、現代西方思潮極端化客觀、實證而導致物化人文的弊端，史密斯提議仍應從整體世界宗教史出發，並以比較的觀點，重新理解人類宗教的真正意涵。他首先指出，人類的歷史是多元的，這雖然是常識，但是西方人在下意識裡並未在平等的基礎上對「他教」一視同仁，因此才產生千百年來的外在多元認知但意識裡卻是排他的思想(exclusivism)。他主張多元主義(pluralism)，意即不但承認歷史與宗教存在多樣性的客觀事實，在以「人」及其內在情愫為終極關懷的前提下，我們必須平等而嚴肅地看待此一事實，並將其納入思考人類現實處境與未來發展的議程裡。<sup>29</sup>另外，歷史與宗教並非僵化凝滯的平板現象，其所展現的並不是觀察者能夠輕易定位的客體(hypostatization)，<sup>30</sup>歷史與宗教其實是不斷變動的流程，自有人類伊始，經過無數世代的傳承與累積，至今仍活潑、動力十足地向前延續。<sup>31</sup>更為重要者，這些

<sup>25</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*, pp.152-156; idem (1982). *The Study of Religion and the Study of the Bible, Religious Diversity*, Willard G. Oxtoby (ed.) New York: Crossroad, pp.41-56.

<sup>26</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1979). *Faith and Belief*. p.15.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp.70-78.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp.53-68.

<sup>29</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1998). *Believing—An Historical Perspective*. pp.26-29; *Towards a World Theology*, pp.22-23.

<sup>30</sup> 參閱 Ninian Smart (1992), W. C. Smith and complementarity. *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion*, 4.1-4.2, pp.21-26.

<sup>31</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1963). *The Meaning and End of Religion*. pp.154-169.

多元繽紛、持續流動的歷史事件與宗教活動雖發生於不同時空，但如整體視之，其實彼此密切相關，形成一個「複雜而纖細的人類關係網絡。」<sup>32</sup>無論就歷史或全球性觀點而言，意識到我們之間的「連貫」(continuum)與「一體」(unity / coherence)乃是認識世界宗教的必要條件，<sup>33</sup>而史氏也坦承，他所強調的是「人類宗教史的合一與互為關連」，<sup>34</sup>他的世界宗教神學處理的即是「比較宗教史神學」(a theology of the comparative history of religion)。<sup>35</sup>

史密斯的觀點並非抽象立論徒託空言，而是得自世界宗教史的整體考察之結果，為此他多舉生動實例，證明人類歷史或宗教史的多元、連續與相互影響。約兩千五百年前的佛陀出家可為例。姑不論歷史的悉達多·喬答摩(Siddhartha Gautama)出家的史實如何，從比較宗教史的「捨離」主題觀之，由其所激盪的漣漪及於世界各大宗教。「佛陀出家」奠定佛教的緣起與基本教義，也塑造此一傳統兩千多年的歷史發展。但是此一動人的「傳奇」或「故事」傳播久遠，初隨佛教進入近東地區，翻譯成古土耳其文、中古波斯文、粟特文(Sogdiana)等版本，在中亞廣為人知。為人類犧牲小我、拯救人類苦難的佛陀(Buddha)或菩薩(Bodhisattva)人格，成為一神聖的理想造型，吸引各地閱聞此一傳奇故事者。在摩尼教(Manichaeism)的社群中，佛陀名為菩提薩夫(Bodisaf)，阿拉伯文則是猶達薩夫(Yudasaf)，古喬志亞文是伊歐達薩夫(Iodasaph)，希臘文是伊歐薩夫(Iosaph)，拉丁文則是約薩法(Josaphat)。不同版本的佛陀事蹟或類似的改編故事在經由早期近東與中東民族散佈後，也廣受第七世紀方興起的伊斯蘭世界所歡迎，激發此宗教內部的虔敬運動。猶有甚者，中古基督教團體除繼承上古不同版本的佛陀故事外，也深受伊斯蘭世界的影響，其《聖巴蘭與聖約薩夫傳》(*Hagiography of Saints Barlaam and Josaphat*)即是傳承自後者，不但有拉丁文版，更以斯拉夫文、捷克文、波蘭文等地方方言普及至民間信眾。<sup>36</sup>

更有宗教意義的是，佛陀故事實際上感動千萬人並促其付諸行動。即以近、現代的世界知名人物而言，十九世紀的托爾斯泰(Leo Tolstoi, 1828-1910)出身貴族，早歲過優渥不羈的生活，及至中年遭遇精神危機而憂鬱徬徨，最後在聖巴蘭與聖約薩夫故事的感召下，毅然放棄田園家產出走，堅守禁欲與非暴力原則，度其貧窮與社會服務之餘生。無獨有偶，青年聖雄甘地(M. K. Gandhi, 1869-1948)在倫敦時因為閱讀托爾斯泰的「捨離」故事，也大受感動而思索其人生方向，他後來領導印度走向非暴力的獨立運動其來有自。更有甚者，二十世紀六〇年代美國民權運動領導人金恩博士(Martin L. King, 1929-1968)的基本人格取向與神學概念，可說絕大部分受益於甘地。<sup>37</sup>「捨離」或「出家」在世界宗教史上幾乎是廣為人知的重要宗教模式，其普遍、深化、影響之程度難以衡量，但就其歷史淵源，竟出於古印度北部釋迦族王子出家的傳奇，流風餘韻，錯綜複雜，如非從世界宗

<sup>32</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*. p.42.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.19, 33.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p.4.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p.27.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.6-11.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.10-11.

教史或比較宗教的角度逆源與順流探索，實難以窺知各源流發展的密切相關性。

另外又可舉歸屬法器或宗教飾物類的念珠為例。就廣大的世界宗教現象觀察，許多宗教社群皆使用念珠，雖然外在形狀、材質、顆數、披戴方式等各有差異，唸誦所本的經典、教義、效力等也有不同的依據與詮釋。中古基督教前一千年歷史中絕無此物，後因十字軍東征與伊斯蘭世界接觸的結果，自後者引介而入。穆斯林也非念珠的發明者，他們其實從中亞地區的管道，間接從印度大陸得知。另一方面因為佛教源自印度，藉由高僧東傳佛法，念珠遂傳至中國、韓國、日本等地。時至今日，伊斯蘭信徒的念珠由三十三顆串成，循環三次，默想《古蘭經》所載阿拉九十九種至高屬性；亞洲天主教的修女可能配戴總數五十的念珠唸誦《玫瑰經》，以此虔誠地向聖母瑪麗亞祈禱；而美洲大陸的佛教徒亦手持一百零八顆或減半的念珠默唸佛經，期待由此澄心止觀，進入空靈的超越境界。源起於印度的單純宗教物品，經過人類歷史千百年的複雜傳遞與發展，最後呈現在世界各角落的不同宗教社群裡。經過世界宗教史的參照、比對與合觀，人類歷史的多元與合一又是另一明證。<sup>38</sup>

從以上兩個實例可以得知，自宏觀的角度看來，人類的歷史有地域、民族、語言與文化之特殊性，自然呈現繽紛多元的現象，不過在歷史流動與形塑的過程中，藉由各傳統之間的不斷往返互動，在吸納與融合的效應下亦分享許多共通性。當今所謂的世界宗教，強調個別的傳承與特色，容易見樹而不見林，因而產生複數的「宗教」(religions)，如果視人類為一整體，論及「宗教」時即指全體的、單一的「宗教」(religion)。史密斯依此認為，在歷史連貫與世界合一的觀點下，佛陀亦為各宗教所共有，視其為印度教、伊斯蘭、基督教等之聖人當不為過。<sup>39</sup>另外，各宗教之間縱然彼此援用聖人形象或法器飾物，但是信仰者皆有能超越具像，在引用之後加以轉換，融攝成適合己身之傳統。因此研究者不宜專注表象，僅落於佛陀或念珠本身，更應探究其形上的象徵含意，方更能體會「人」或「信心」的深層意涵。<sup>40</sup>

史密斯倚重世界宗教的過去與現況為論述的資料根據，並強調我們需要從世界一體、人類歷史合一的觀點理解「宗教」，目的在建構一個新的認識論，以此取代舊的認知模式。他認為長久以來一神教傳統如基督教慣以「神聖」對應「世俗」的二分法看待世界，如此強制將「宗教」抽離於人類具體的生存環境之外，徒然造成人、我、我教、他教之分的不幸後果。從多元主義與世界一體的觀點衡量，歷史、文化、宗教其實互涉混合，認知或指涉其一，必涉其二，「神聖」與「世俗」的區分未能反映客觀的人類經驗，也無益於我們對「宗教」的認知。<sup>41</sup>近、現代盛行的主、客二分認知模式，在要求研究者必須「客觀」的狀況下，與研究的對象保持相當的距離，彼此的關係是斷裂而非聯繫，縱然研究的主題屬於

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., pp.11-14.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp.9-11.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp.12-13.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., pp.54-55; Wilfred C. Smith (2001). What Should We Expect in the New Millennium? in *Wilfred Cantwell Smith: a Reader*.pp.241-247.

「人」的範疇，卻導致嚴重物化客體的結果。在新的認識論檢驗下，尤其考慮到研究者與研究對象皆是「人」，皆含「超越」的精神層面，又同生存於相互聯繫與影響的世界，這種主、客二分的認知觀顯然大有問題。<sup>42</sup>

史密斯堅決主張「透過人的世界在日常層面理解人類的精神品質」，<sup>43</sup>認為此類模式的知識活動並不是非理性、一廂情願式的主觀主義，正好相反，學者研究人類的歷史與宗教，仍須從具體與實證出發，但又能超而上之，及於人的內在情愫。<sup>44</sup>證諸史氏每一立論，必輔以縝密、客觀的史料，例如前述的「佛陀」與「念珠」兩例，可知其所言有據。他反覆宣稱自己的新認識論屬於「性靈科學」(humane sciences)<sup>45</sup>或「性靈知識」/「人本知識」(humane knowledge / personalist knowledge)，<sup>46</sup>乃一方面秉持理性、客觀與科學的態度，但又超越傳統的「客觀主義」(objectivism)或「惟科學論」(scientism)之上，另一方面更加細緻地顧及「人」以及由「人」組成的多元社群。猶有甚者，為了確定「性靈知識」的真實與有效性，史氏提議其結論必須經過嚴格地雙邊驗證，如他所言：

任何涉及「人」的陳述如非經過參與者和非參與的觀察者同時認定為真的話，其有效性即不成立。<sup>47</sup>

具體而正面言之，對於任何宗教議題，研究者的論述或結論必得經由信仰者的確認方才成立。史氏認為唯有遵循此一檢證標準，才能確實地顧及人的主體性，而在符應歷史與宗教多元、連貫、合一的認知前提下，也才能確保我們知識運作的合法性與合理性。

顯而易見地，史密斯的新認知理論顯示拾級而上、循序提昇的軌跡。他反對「宗教」等於「信仰」，認為後者僅是「積累傳統」的一部份，更反對現代人的認知專門聚焦在宗教現象，抽離其中主題單項，並將其客觀化與物化。可是，在另一方面，他並不否認「積累傳統」當作「構成社群過去的宗教生活所遺留的、客觀而顯然的資料總體」<sup>48</sup>有其正面功能，因為此層面見證宗教信徒如何在不同的歷史情境實踐其「信心」。觀察者在理解與詮釋「積累傳統」時，必須不蔽於現象，反而應該超越、昇騰，體悟物像所蘊含或反映的「信心」所在。以「廟宇」為例。一般純客觀主義者視其為一建築物，考其歷史或探求其形制，盡其把握此宗教現象之能事。史氏卻辯稱，「廟宇」非物而是一個象徵，是出自「人」的一種概念。觀察者認知其歷史沿革與形制之美僅是表象功夫，須體會出「廟宇」係一流動的歷史過程，是千萬信眾參與其中、由此建構其個人生命以及社群傳承的見證，研究者因此有必要更進一階，探索「置其心」於此「廟宇」的廣大信眾。

<sup>42</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*. pp.51-53.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p.54.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p.55.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.62-63.

<sup>47</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1976). Objectivity and the Humane Sciences: a New Proposal, in *Religious Diversity*. p.164; 類似說法亦見於氏著 Wilfred C. Smith (1959). "Comparative Religion: Whither—and Why?" in *ibid.*, p.143.

<sup>48</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1963). *The Meaning and End of Religion*. p.156.

要理解宗教現象或「積累傳統」唯有透過宗教參與者的心眼方有可能達成。<sup>49</sup>史密斯的新認知模式，最後仍然回歸到「人」的身上，並且是「人」的「信心」，此是其所堅持的「宗教」原始意義與出發點。

史密斯宗教神學的終極目的，在於企圖達到如何真正理解「人」以及如何進行有效地詮釋。的確，「性靈知識」本來即是由人的主體出發，理解另一主體的知識，而「性靈科學」亦是基於人的自我意識所建構的人文或人本認知。<sup>50</sup>為此，史氏提出「批判的、群體的自我意識」作為概括其宗教神學的總結，也可視為進入其複雜理論的關鍵。他首先強調，他的宗教論述雖然著重個人的「信心」，但是此處的個人並非現代西方社會所標榜的「個人主義」(individualism)中的個人，而是作為值得我們尊重、嚴肅對待、蘊含超越機能的每一個「人」(person/personalism)。依他之見，單一個體唯有投入參與一個社群，才成為真正的「全人」(full person)。<sup>51</sup>亦即，一般人必須藉由人我關係互動中滋養其「信心」，相反相成地，亦是在此網絡中奉獻與彰顯其宗教性。因為群體的「人」寓含「信心」，在相加與相乘的效果下，方將「一個社會(society)變成一個社群(community)」。『信心』不但是結果，更是群體的『人』之所以能夠凝聚的原因。<sup>52</sup>如此「社群」有其基礎與共識，而聚合而成的「人」也在相同的歷史情境下，彼此委身與互動，建構其所「引以為珍貴」的「積累傳統」。

另一方面，史密斯認為「意識」(consciousness)在人類歷史上亦是逐漸發展而成，由淺至深，亦由小及大。人類有別於其他生物，秉賦自覺或自我意識的機能(self-consciousness)，世界文明與人文精神即由此肇基發微。逮至啟蒙時期之後，在崇尚科學精神與宣揚個人理性的風潮下，「批判的自我意識」(critical self-consciousness)高漲，主導近、現代幾百年的歷史。既然其弊病已至為明顯，史氏提議唯有應進入更高階的「批判的、群體的自我意識」境界，方是解決之道，此也是未來人類歷史與文明發展的必然路徑。<sup>53</sup>

如上所述，「批判的、群體的自我意識」以全球為範圍，以多元、合一為認知前提，融合理性態度，也秉持科學精神。它以「人」為思考中心，著重參與和互動，而對知識的形塑與結論，必訴諸於全體參與者的印證。<sup>54</sup>在全球意識籠罩之下，每一位個體不論是先前的特定宗教信仰者、世俗主義者或無神論者，皆須面對我群或部分全體的直接經驗，「批判的、群體的自我意識」促使世界所有的成員覺悟其存在模式，也更積極思考與投入與其密切相關的人際網絡。在此理解脈絡下，當今推展的不同宗教之間的「宗教對話」(inter-religious dialogue)即有其侷限性，因為人類的宗教究其實只有一種，起而代之的應該是同一信仰下

<sup>49</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1976). *Objectivity and the Humane Sciences: a New Proposal*, pp.164-173.

<sup>50</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*. pp.56-57.

<sup>51</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (2000). *Wilfred Cantwell Smith: a Reader*. p.246.

<sup>52</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1998). *Believing An Historical Perspective*. p.85.

<sup>53</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1976). *Objectivity and the Humane Sciences: a New Proposal*, pp.162-163.

<sup>54</sup> 有關此一特定概念的綜合評述，參考 Bård Maeland (2003). *Rewarding Encounters: Islam and the Comparative Theologies of Kenneth Cragg and Wilfred Cantwell Smith*. London: Melisende, pp. 67-73; Huston Smith (1981). *Faith and Its Study: What Wilfred Cantwell Smith Against, and For*. *Religious Studies Review*, 7(4), pp.306-310.



的「共同會談」(intra-religious colloquy)，所有參與者的與談對象不是「他者」，而是「我們自己」(us-all)，所討論的議題不是「他人」的議題，而是「我們自己」的議題。<sup>55</sup>

在堅持「批判的、群體的自我意識」信念下，史密斯建構一個「世界社群」(a world community)的圖像，其中雖然人類因為語言、文化或思維模式的不同而呈現多彩多姿的真理表達方式，但是「終極而言，真理是一，…從超越層次觀察，我們的『一體』才是真實」。<sup>56</sup>史密斯選擇人類的宗教歷史從事神學建構，因為從此一領域我們最容易發覺「人」的超越層面，而在已經進入「地球村」(global village)的今天，我們更能從多元、比較、全面的角度，理解與詮釋「人」為追求與回應此一「超越」所留下至為豐富的材料。<sup>57</sup>如史氏自稱，他所奉獻或委身的主題是「比較宗教神學」(theology of comparative religion)，或稱為「全人類的宗教歷史神學」(a theology of the religious history of humankind)更為適切。<sup>58</sup>

## 肆、延伸討論

史密斯所提議的宗教神學，並非處理專門、單一的宗教議題，也非分項式的主題陳述，而是全方位的新典範建構，如當代知名的基督教神學家希克(John Hick)所言，「史氏藉由解構一個宗教(a religion)的概念，遂使〔我們〕更容易看出世界人類宗教性(human religiousness)的連續性甚至是合一。」<sup>59</sup>即因為如此，在解構與建構的過程中，史氏的宗教神學蘊含豐富的問題意識，觸及宗教的歷史、現況、定義、內涵、認知、詮釋、檢證等複雜層面，加以他的遣詞用字艱澀獨特，行文特色在以情說服重於邏輯析辯，歧義與誤解遂在所難免。為釐清之故，本文以下據「宗教的定義與內容」以及「宗教的範疇與詮釋」兩子題再申論其宗教神學的引伸含意，並援引其他學者以及個人的意見評述之。

### 一、宗教的定義與內容

史密斯對於「宗教」的理解，明顯地傾向唯心的、抽象的形上思考。他在論述「宗教」時，將其區分為「信心」與「積累傳統」兩領域，而在提出「批判的、群體的自我意識」時，我們亦可清楚認知他以人、傳統、特定的生存環境、超越

<sup>55</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*. pp.100-103; (1959). *Comparative Religion: Whither—and Why*, pp.141-142. 另外亦參考 Edward J. Hughes (1986). *Wilfred Cantwell Smith: A Theology for the World*. London: SCM Press Ltd., pp.165-173.

<sup>56</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1979). *Faith and Belief*. p.171.

<sup>57</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*. p.186.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p.125.

<sup>59</sup> John Hick (1992). On Wilfred Cantwell Smith: His Place in the Study of Religion. *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion*, 4(1)-4(2), p.9.

實體(transcendent reality)作為宗教構成四要素的原因所在。<sup>60</sup>但是實質上，史氏的宗教基本理念是人類對「神聖激發下的回應」(a response to a divine initiative)。<sup>61</sup>此意味著他的「宗教」有一假設前提，即人秉天賦機能，能感知神聖亦能適時回應。更進一步論之，他雖然經常以「人」(man)或「人類」(humankind)表達此「信心」機能的普遍性，以此對應所提的「全人類的宗教歷史神學」，他的重點卻是每一個人內在的宗教情愫。史氏建構的「批判的、群體的自我意識」，或者說其理想的整體宗教神學，全然立基於個人的內在「良知」及其對神聖的感應。在此關連上，史氏的理論可能引發三個問題。

其一，史氏對於個人的「信心」為何，並未詳加說明，而對於其是否存在或以何種形式存在，也認為僅能「旁參」(referred to)得知。<sup>62</sup>同樣地，對於「神聖」或「超越」的實質含意以及是何種「實體」(reality)，他也未加明言，更未證明其是否存在，且為顧及此層面具有普遍意義，幾乎所有宗教與人文傳統中的終極理想概念皆在涵蓋之列，因此「法(dharma)」(印度教、佛教)「平安(shalom)」(猶太教)「上帝」(基督教)「愛」(基督教)「真理」(古希臘、基督教)「公義」(猶太教、基督教、古希臘)「美善」(古希臘)並列，全部視為指涉同一「超越」的同義詞，而未考量這些終極概念可能在其個別傳統有特殊義，彼此之間也有不同程度的共量性或可比性。<sup>63</sup>史氏的理論以「信心」與「超越」兩要素為最重要的構築底基，但此二者的定義與內容卻籠統不明，如僅旁徵博引加以比附，反而徒增解讀者更多的聯想與揣測，此是一大問題。

其二，史氏反對近、現代西方知識界極端化「客觀」的思潮，提出「批判的、群體的自我意識」以為對治，深信此是解決主、客二分、匡正傳統曲解「他教」的唯一有效之道。至為明顯地，史氏極其偏重個人的意識，或者更精確地說即是個人的自覺。觀其苦心孤詣地反覆強調「信心」的重要，不難看出他視其為純、為善，係一可絕對肯定與倚賴的天賦機能。史氏在此流露出他對人性的樂觀態度，亦對建立一個世界性的社群抱持高度的期望之情，此所以說明他在大量的著作中，絕少提及人「性惡」的可能以及「罪」或「惡行」的現實問題。<sup>64</sup>幾千年來世界宗教史反而顯示，流血、衝突、戰爭經常發生在每個宗教傳統之內或不同宗教社群之間，其肇因皆是人在「神聖」激動之下，鼓其「信心」之勇而荼毒肆虐其他同樣具有「信心」者。「信心」是否純然全善實屬可疑，各宗教所推崇的「神聖」是否等同亦值得再思，在嚴格的意義上，此二者正是世界宗教史或社群的根本問題而非前提。史氏或許意圖打破傳統基督教的「基督中心論」(Christocentrism)所產生的偏狹與排他後遺症，期待以較具超越特質的「神論」

<sup>60</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*. p.26.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p.30.

<sup>62</sup> Kenneth Cracknell (2001). Introductory Essay, in idem, (ed.). *Wilfred Cantwell Smith: A Reader*. p.14.

<sup>63</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*. pp.180-187.

<sup>64</sup> Philip C. Almond (1983). Wilfred Cantwell Smith as Theologian of Religion, p.304; Donald Wiebe (1992). On the Transformation of 'Belief' and the Domestication of 'Faith' in the Academic Study of Religion. *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion*, 4(1)-4(2), pp.47-67.

(theology)作為統整世界宗教歷史的形上架構，不過究其實對大部分的宗教而言，不是「神觀」而是「救贖」(salvation)或「解脫」(liberation)方是信仰的重心，<sup>65</sup>史氏的西方神學式預設是否能夠有效地放諸四海皆準，仍有待觀察。

其三，緊緊上述所論，史氏的宗教神學偏重個人的「信心」，而世界社群的實現端賴「批判的、群體的自我意識」，亦即從個人的「良知」醒悟與意志抉擇為肇始。此一思想脈絡流露近代基督新教神學(Protestant theology)的注重單獨個體，再輔以晚近流行的存在主義哲學。<sup>66</sup>問題在於，個人的「信心」無法憑空發生，反而必須藉助特定社群的培養滋潤，方才茁壯生長。史氏在其論述中，特別著重前者，卻較少詳述後者，視其以「信心」為鵠的，卻以「積累傳統」為輔佐工具的前後對應關係觀察，史氏確實輕忽每一宗教社群形塑個人「信心」的重要性。如果「信心」無法抽離具體的環境，或者由於特定社群的關係方造就每一個體之「信心」，史氏理想中的世界性「信心」即須仰賴世界宗教社群共構而成，可是此一具有「批判的、群體的自我意識」之世界宗教社群仍是未實現之理想，因此史氏的「信心」前提仍值得商榷。

另外，史密斯對宗教的理解以「人」為前提、為依歸，由此避免陷入宗教現象學式的惑於表象，也超越實證主義思想的物化傾向，因此極其重視從歷程(process)與轉變(change)的角度理解任何的宗教。<sup>67</sup>他明確地反對傳統基督教在神學教義為尚的認知下，經常高舉某一特定主題或思想為此一宗教之代表，視為精華或本質，誤以為深入此要點即掌握此一宗教之全體，而對於「他教」之詮釋，亦經常觸犯這種「本質論式」(essentialist)的作法。<sup>68</sup>傳統基督教學者即是絕對化其教義中的某些主題，例如「上帝觀」、「創造論」、「基督論」、「聖靈論」、「道成肉身」、「終末論」等，在比較「他教」之後，經常發覺「他教」無之或己身信仰更勝一籌，因而形成一元式的排他思想。弔詭的是，史氏在尋求新的宗教定義時，本來意在突破這種僵局與弊端，但是他在綜觀所有的世界宗教，意欲將其統合成相互關連的同一整體時，其所拈出的「信心」、「虔誠」、「委身」、「愛」、「真理」、「超越」等要項，似乎有平行傳統基督教的「本質論」之嫌，只是其討論與運用範圍更擴大而已，無怪乎有學者評其所建構的宗教神學屬於「超理論」(meta-theory)，意在涵蓋與適用所有宗教，表面上是多元主義，但實質上卻是屈從「他教」至基督教之下的「含攝主義」(inclusivism)。<sup>69</sup>持平而論，史氏當然無意另創一個「本質式」主題或排他主義以重蹈前人之覆轍，但是他在界定宗教以

<sup>65</sup> 有關此二重要的宗教主題，可參考 Ninian Smart (2005). Soteriology, in *Encyclopedia of Religion*,(ed.)Lindsay Jones. Detroit: Thomson Gale, vol.12, pp.8526-30; Kenneth Surin, Liberation, also in *Encyclopedia of Religion*, vol.8, pp.5435-5438; Peter Slater (1982). Review Essay: Three Views of Christianity. *The Journal of American Academy of Religion*, L (1), pp.97-100.

<sup>66</sup> 有關此一見解，參考 Langdon Gilkey (1981). A theological voyage with Wilfred Cantwell Smith. *Religious Studies Review*, 7(4), p.303.

<sup>67</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1979). *Faith and Belief*. pp.1-8.

<sup>68</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1963). *The Meaning and End of Religion*. p.47; Kenneth Cracknell (2001). Introductory Essay, pp.10-13.

<sup>69</sup> S. Mark Heim (1995). *Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. pp. 53-70.

及描述其內容時，為張綱舉目、以約御繁之故，無可避免地選擇最適當的條目或要素以為說明與溝通之便，陷入其所反對者之窠臼亦是「非有意之結果」(unintended consequence)。比較有意義的是，史氏在宗教的定義與內容方面所遭遇的辯證式兩難，反倒引發我們進一步思考宗教的範疇與詮釋問題。

## 二、宗教的範疇與詮釋

我們從宗教的範疇觀點反思，發現史密斯的宗教神學呈現意欲打破框架或企圖超越以系統界定宗教的流行作法。上文提及他的問題意識在於反對神聖與世俗對立二分以及視「他教」為「體系」(-ism)，或者強烈批判科學主義與實證主義「物化」人文，皆是明證。即是在此意義上，他對社會學家認為「實體」(reality)係由社會所界定、所建構的主張頗有微詞，<sup>70</sup>而對於行為主義者(behaviorists)假設人如動物般可操控、制約與預測的「科學」主張，則是不留情地大肆撻伐。<sup>71</sup>在當前主流的宗教研究領域裡，例如伊利雅德(Mircea Eliade, 1907-1986)的宗教現象學或容格(Carl G. Jung, 1875-1961)的神話與象徵學說，認定世界宗教之間存有共同的主題模式之看法，史氏則強調象徵本身不可能寓含獨立的意義，「宗教性的主要焦點在人，不是事物，而宗教史的研究次要地才落在物與現象，但也不是獨立地研究它們，而是關連於人〔方才為之〕。」<sup>72</sup>他繼而提出人的「信心」說，則更進一步去除現象界的匡限，往普遍的、內在的天賦機能挖掘，在確定人的精神與意志主體後，留給宗教參與者與研究者更大的迴旋與想像空間。據他自己的表白：

要達到具有認識論上的深度以及歷史性的自我批判與普及特色，此工作不是先於而是緊密關連於宗教領域裡的群體的、批判的自我意識。<sup>73</sup>

他堅持以個人的「信心」為肇基，縱然在擴大至世界宗教的範疇時，仍然訴諸「群體的、批判的自我意識」，可見其宗教神學的反物像、反框架執著，亦見其強烈的唯心色彩。

但是，即是這種偏於唯心與形上的認知典範容易招致不同觀點者的反對。史氏提議由世界宗教所組成的合一社群並非如此的多元，而是有其選擇性。綜觀其眾多的著作，皆是以「大」宗教傳統例如猶太教、基督教、伊斯蘭、印度教、佛教等為對象，其他如儒家與西方的希臘、羅馬人文傳統亦可涵蓋在內，但是卻不涉及各洲的原住民宗教或亦是「人」的意味濃厚的馬克斯主義。<sup>74</sup>相較之下，宗

<sup>70</sup> Edward J. Hughes (1992). Wilfred Cantwell Smith and the perennial philosophy. *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion*, 4(1)-4(2), pp. 29-37.

<sup>71</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*. pp.67-68.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p.87.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p.189.

<sup>74</sup> Frank Whaling (1986). Introductory Essay, in idem, ed., *The World's Religious Traditions: Current Perspectives in Religious Studies*. New York: Crossroad, p.12.

教現象學者所處理的宗教，舉凡顯現於感官現象界(what appears)、可捕捉者皆是研究資料，其範疇涵蓋更為廣泛。<sup>75</sup>史氏心儀的世界宗教社群參與者，皆是具有高深的知識程度並企求精神超越的各傳統菁英，例如他認為具有代表性的下列五位：基督教的聖維多(Hugh of St. Victor, ob. 1142)、猶太教詩人猶大 哈 理維(Judah ha-Levi, ca. 1080-1141)、伊斯蘭經學家嘎札理(Ghazzali, 1058-1111)、印度哲學家拉曼奴賈(Ramanuja, 1017-1137?)、儒家的朱熹(1130-1200)。<sup>76</sup>這些知識菁英約活躍於中古十一、十二世紀，各在極為不同的社群生活，卻皆能本於「信心」創發洞見，超脫世俗的教條或信念，上達具有普遍性、單一的「真理」(truth)。因此縱然「信心」與「真理」的表達有多種，但這兩個終極概念其實為一，我們如能以這些菁英為楷模，以「信心」為肇基，以「真理」為依歸，世界社群的建立必然可期。<sup>77</sup>

反對的學者從唯物的觀點辯駁，點出史密斯在此呈現的是一種規範式的(normative)基督教神學理念，認為人類的終極理想不僅類似，並且應該是同「一」。在當今的「地球村」情境下，弱小的原住民與地方性宗教根本無立足之地，即是所謂的世界「大」宗教亦失去其獨特性與自主性，反而須屈就於建構自基督新教的神學規範。標舉「相同的人類歷史」之說其實是依循西方主導的世界歷史模式延展，即是散播西方的霸權意識，最終仍是一元而不是多元主義，史密斯本來有意翻轉舊的認知結構，但是其主張的宗教多元新典範仍未跳脫舊框架。<sup>78</sup>很明顯地，此種解構式論點持完全相反的假設，與史氏的全方位建構確實大相逕庭。

不過，就宗教的認知範疇而言，史密斯所提的「信心」與「積累傳統」之分的思考模式，容易導入依舊是二元的「本質」與「現象」或「普遍」與「特殊」彼此對立之爭。史氏高度重視「信心」，引超越的「真理」為貴，但「信心」不可能憑空運作，「真理」也必須有所指涉，如果我們慮及「人」必須具體而生、而活的事實，而人的宗教理解皆根源於一連串的宗教經驗之事實，所謂「信心」或「真理」必受歷史界定，必染時空的特殊性。更進一步而論，史氏意欲實現的「群體的、批判的自我意識」須植基於世界宗教，包括猶太教、基督教、伊斯蘭、佛教等，而非無脈絡性的「宗教」，缺乏具體的宗教傳統，即無整體、抽象的「宗教」可言。<sup>79</sup>毫無疑問地，「信心」與「積累傳統」、「本質」與「現象」或「普

<sup>75</sup> 有關宗教現象學的背景知識，可參考 G. van der Leeuw (1976). *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*, 2 vols, tr. J. E. Turner. Gloucester: Peter Smith, esp. vol. 2, pp. 671-694; Mircea Eliade (1974). *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, tr. Rosemary Sheed. N. Y.: New American Library, pp.1-33.

<sup>76</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1979). *Faith and Belief*. p.159.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., pp.160-172.

<sup>78</sup> Kenneth Surin (1990). Towards a 'Materialist' Critique of 'Religious Pluralism:.' Examination of the Discourse of John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell Smith, in *Religious Pluralism and Unbelief: Studies Critical and Comparative*, (ed.) Ian Hamnett. London and New York: Routledge, pp.114-129; idem (1990). A 'Politics of Speech:.' Religious Pluralism in the Age of the McDonald's Hamburger, in *Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions*. (ed.) Gavin D'Costa. New York: Maryknoll, pp.192-212.

<sup>79</sup> Langdon Gilkey (1981). A Theological Voyage with Wilfred Cantwell Smith, p.304.

遍」與「特殊」之間並非彼此對立，而是彼此依存、相互辯證，如此方成就世界宗教，而史氏探究「宗教」也方有所本、方有實質意義，其過度偏重理想的形上層面，難免引發詰難之辯。

與以上論點相關的是，對於史密斯所提的重要關鍵詞彙或概念，例如「信仰」、「信心」、「宗教」等，我們仍然可以討論其是否可成為有效的認知範疇。

史氏並非否認人類必須藉由觀念或模式進行認知活動，但是觀念或模式隨歷史情境與文化特殊性而變動，其指涉自然有其侷限。若專就真正地理解「宗教」而論，其內涵關乎「人」最深層的情愫，係「人」對應超越層面而發，往往牽涉一個人的忠誠、委身與全然奉獻。「信仰」某神、某教義或某特定宗教之說，其性質有若一般的觀念認定，往往淪為僵化的刻板表達，如又受到近、現代的客觀主義化影響，「信仰」更可能被簡化成條件式、第三人稱的認知陳述，例如「基督徒相信耶穌是神的兒子」、「伊斯蘭教徒相信《古蘭經》是阿拉的話語」、「佛教徒相信六道輪迴」等，而未能體會所有的宗教參與者並非止於宗教認知層次，而是經常轉化宗教知識為體知甚或感知，以實體經驗證成自己所珍貴的宗教，在此意義下，「信仰」之用詞「去自然化了宗教生活」(to denature the religious life)，以其代表或等同於「宗教」其實至為不妥。<sup>80</sup>另一方面，史氏認為「信心」是一「基本的宗教範疇」，<sup>81</sup>最能反映普遍的、「人」的宗教實體經驗。此一概念詞彙不是指涉固定的宗教知識，反而著重信仰者所做、所感，強調的是其實存的生命歷程。<sup>82</sup>在表面上各宗教的「積累傳統」有異，因此「信心」的表達繽紛多元，但是此一人類的質素普遍存在殆無疑義，可謂有侷限但又超越。嚴格而言，所謂印度教徒即是以印度教的「積累傳統」表現出其「信心」者，猶太教徒即是以猶太教的「積累傳統」表現出其「信心」者，儒家信徒即是以儒家的「積累傳統」表現出其「信心」者，依此類推，及於所有的不同「積累傳統」卻又是同樣的「信心」者。如此觀之，「信心」的概念更具深度、超越性與涵蓋性，更適合成為普遍的宗教或宗教研究範疇。<sup>83</sup>

史密斯的新認識論議程對於許多深受現代科學或實證主義思潮洗禮者來說，確實是一大挑戰。對於後者而言，「知識」(knowledge)源於亦是取決於人的「認知」(cognition)，其中包含感官的接觸、判斷、歸類、分析等程序，皆由實際與具體的經驗為肇始、為基礎。「信仰」正是人「信心」的具體展現，不管其形式是教義、經典、廟宇、儀式、組織、器物等，只要顯現於人可觀、可考、可感的現象界，即提供人認知的途徑，可藉此理解人的「宗教」行為與內在動機。研究者或觀察者初次面對「他教」，不可能立即進入此一宗教信徒的「信心」，體會其內在情愫，「信仰」在此恰好是一個重要的橋樑。因此考慮人的知識運作程序，「信仰」作為一個認知與詮釋範疇，有其正面的功能與意義，不能貶為膚淺、刻板、物化而揚棄之。反之，「信心」泛指一超越層面，抽象而無範圍，屬於質

<sup>80</sup> Wilfred C. Smith, *Faith and Belief*, pp.142-151.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p.33.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.39-40.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.129-142.

方面的領會而非可具體指陳的物或數量，在人的認知運作過程中，是一個難以定位的形上概念，如以其為宗教或宗教研究的認知範疇，恐怕引起難以解決的爭議。值得再考慮的是，縱然「信心」與「超越」具有「後設」(meta-)方面的意義，但是就宗教經驗而論，信仰者的「信心」不可能是空泛、抽象，反而必有一具體對象，如對「上帝」、「佛陀」、「阿拉」、「耶穌」等神祇產生「信心」，亦即是經由教導、學習而得之的互動經驗累積，而這些具體的指涉與經驗皆是在現象界運作與完成。<sup>84</sup>平行類推至「宗教」，史密斯因為察覺到此一流行的專門詞彙在過去西方知識史上，已經由指涉人的內在虔敬之情轉換成帶有物化與量化意味的個別「宗教」，既然名不符實，則宜揚棄而以「信心」取代之。依前述反對者的實證邏輯推論，「宗教」其實仍有其正面的意義，特別是在我們需要區辨個別不同的宗教傳統時，此一名詞可以具體指陳某一宗教及其涵蓋的系統內涵，在認知上極為重要，我們亦是藉此方有可能進入此一宗教傳統或社群信仰者的內心，探索其與「超越」的互動關係。<sup>85</sup>

宗教的範疇認知是一極其難以決斷的問題，這其中涉及抽象與具體、普遍與特殊、唯心與唯物、本質與現象等之偏重或先後之爭，亦需考慮及人的認知程序與宗教經驗的獨特性等層面。講求客觀或實證者也許有理由認定應由具體與經驗著手，因此堅持「宗教」概念的正面功能，但是如認清宗教現象本身是一不斷遷移、變動的過程，學者試圖將其知識系統化以便於掌握的作法，是否能完全吻合實證與客觀的本意，仍是值得懷疑，畢竟「宗教」在認知功能上的「有用」不等於「充分而有效」，而其缺漏、不足之處，或許正是宗教的精微重要處。反之，史密斯在以人為本的前提下所建構的「信心」與「超越」等概念，因為抽象、形上的特質使其難以成為一般智性認知的途徑，但因其具有豐富歧義、多面意涵的特質，如先給予一「功能上的定義」(functional definition)，視其為一非價值判斷卻涵蓋性廣的導引指涉，此兩個關鍵詞仍可成為宗教與宗教研究的重要運作概念。<sup>86</sup>

最後值得一提的是，以上有關「宗教」的認知問題，其實與詮釋本身密切相關。史密斯反覆強調，宗教研究的對象非物而是「人」，是一門「人」理解「人」的學問，而他所揭櫫的正是如何運用科學、理性的態度於「人」最深沈、最可貴的情愫上，此即是「理性的人本主義」(rational personalism)。<sup>87</sup>他所提的「群體的、批判的自我意識」宗教神學，目的在提醒宗教信仰者與研究者應更加自覺式地、細膩地詮釋「我們自己」。在此意義之下，宗教詮釋不可能對等於一般的知識理解，後者在認知者與被認知的對象之間，經常保持距離以求客觀，而前者卻

<sup>84</sup> 有關此一實證主義式論述，參考 Donald Wiebe (1979). *The Role of 'Belief' in the Study of Religion: a Response to W. C. Smith*. *Numen*, vol. xxvi (2), pp.234-249; Eric Sharpe (1973). *Dialogue and faith*. *Religion*, 3, pp.89-105.

<sup>85</sup> Peter Slater (1982). *Review Essay: Three Views of Christianity*, pp.99-100.

<sup>86</sup> 有關「宗教」是否適合成為有效的認知與研究範疇之討論，可參考 Robert D. Baird (1971). *Category Formation and the History of Religions*. The Hague: Mouton, pp.14-16,126-133.

<sup>87</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*. p.78; Wilfred C. Smith (1976). *Objectivity and the Humane Sciences: a New Proposal*, p.180.

要求認知者與被認知的對象之間不存距離，且需彼此委身投入、互為主體。在史氏的觀念裡，詮釋並非求取客觀知識的累積，而是一個「我們」主體逐漸深化、邁向真知識的過程。職是之故，他主張的宗教知識或宗教研究帶有強烈的道德意味，因為其中要求參與者（特別是傳統上握有主導權甚至霸權的西方學者）必須為自己的行為負責，一改長久以來物化「他教」的積習。宗教詮釋在此結合了「利他倫理」(altruistic ethics)，<sup>88</sup>目的在一方面消彌西方知識傳統的弊病，另一方面亦將宗教研究推向更嚴肅也是更嚴謹的境地。

## 伍、結論

史密斯所關切的是「人」，也清楚地意識到近、現代西方知識主流對於「人」、特別是「他人」或「他教」的扭曲，因此其宗教神學的目標在建構「群體的、批判的自我意識」，以作為更正當下弊端、開創新局的革命式嘗試。由以上的評述與分析，我們確實可知其所建構的理論重點不在特定的主題或方法而是「全方位的考量」(totalizing approach)。<sup>89</sup>細而分之，這其中包括對於歷史、人性、當今世界、宗教的定義、內容、主題、範疇、詮釋等，皆進行深刻地反思與處理。尤其專就宗教研究而論，他期望所建立的新認知典範能夠突破西方狹隘的基督教神學自我中心思想，亦能夠秉持新的詮釋觀點為漸趨「物化」與專業化、窄化的宗教研究擴充新視野。誠如他所言，宗教現象學或宗教史學(history of religions)有必要自物、現象、個別傳統等框架解放出來，轉移至以「人」為主、以全世界宗教為一整體的研究。<sup>90</sup>

或許即因為史氏的目標過於高遠，所提議的嘗試亦非現代習於客觀、實證或專業取向的學者所能理解，尖銳的反對聲音自然難免。例如，有譏評史氏根本不知「客觀」為何物，僅是抒發個人「主觀」感受者，<sup>91</sup>更有詆毀其論點不夠精準、前後混淆、不過是想像力豐富、自創烏托邦世界神學而已。<sup>92</sup>史氏早即洞悉西方知識界多年累積的偏見，也知道全新、有效的詮釋理論不易立時建立，但是他仍公開倡議，西方學界有必要嚴肅面對我們所處的新世界、新資料、以及需要新的認知典範以便謀求解決之道。<sup>93</sup>

觀諸史密斯所標舉的主題或概念，例如「信心」、「超越」、「真理」、「性靈知識」、「人本主義」等，確實逾越一般的宗教研究範圍之外，而史氏不忌諱違反學術常規，引其進入此一領域成為公眾議題，並力言世界單一的宗教史(history of

<sup>88</sup> Bård Maeland (2003). *Rewarding Encounters*, p.24.

<sup>89</sup> S. Mark Heim (1995). *Salvations*, p.56.

<sup>90</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1981). *Towards a World Theology*, pp. 67, 87; idem, *Faith and Belief*, p. 7.

<sup>91</sup> Richard M. Frank (1986). Ambiguities of Understanding. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 106(2), pp. 313-321.

<sup>92</sup> Gerard Loughlin (1992). Review essay: Towards a Theology of Religion (Glyn Richards) and *Towards a World Theology* (Wilfred C. Smith). *The Heythrop Journal*, 33(10), pp.209-212.

<sup>93</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1980). Belief: a Reply to a Response. *Numen*, xxvii (2), pp.247-255.



religion)正好可以有效地見證人類在世又企求超越的雙重努力軌跡，值得我們藉此探究最深奧、最有價值的「人」的存在意義。<sup>94</sup>在史密斯的觀念中，人類的歷史、宗教、宗教史應當可以等同視之，而神學與宗教亦是內容相通，今之學科專業將之強分區隔，再加以僵硬的實證方法之桎梏，徒然蔽障其中所透露的純粹人文精神。<sup>95</sup>史氏不但努力剷除這些現代學術迷障，更進一步引介同情心、關懷、道德、價值觀等「後現代」、「非學術」與「主觀」的要素進入宗教研究者的視域，試圖建構宗教研究成一名實相符的「性靈知識」之學。如謂「信心」是史氏宗教神學的基本核心，細讀他在許多篇章中給予的描繪(description)：

信心是對超越的自覺以及由此引發對其崇敬與全然地參與。<sup>96</sup>

信心是世界性的人類特徵，自有人類歷史以來，其不同程度的彰顯例子即已明確地佈滿人類歷史。它促使人有能力體察與象徵化〔事物〕，並在人的生活〔導引〕其忠誠而豐富地回應一超越面向。<sup>97</sup>

信心是人品的導引〔力量〕；導向自身、鄰人、宇宙；是全然的回應；是一種促使人觀應與處理「事物」的方式；一種活於塵世之上的能力；對應於一超越層面，〔促使其能〕觀之、感之、行動之。<sup>98</sup>

我們可據此而言，與其定位史氏是歷史學家、<sup>99</sup>宗教學者<sup>100</sup>或神學家，<sup>101</sup>在感受其對超越的嚮往以及聆聽其發自肺腑的深沈呼喚之後，視其為詩人或先知也許更為恰當。

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<sup>94</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (2001). Seeing Transcendence in History, in *Wilfred Cantwell Smith: a Reader*. pp.186-189.

<sup>95</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (2001). Methodology and the Study of Religion – Smith's Misgivings, *Wilfred Cantwell Smith: a Reader*. pp.106-119.

<sup>96</sup> Wilfred C. Smith (1979). *Faith and Belief*, p.65.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p.141.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p.12.

<sup>99</sup> John Berthrong (1989). The Theological Necessity of Pluralism: the Contribution of Wilfred Cantwell Smith. *TJT*, 5.2, p.188.

<sup>100</sup> Langdon Gilkey (1981). A Theological Voyage with Wilfred Cantwell Smith, p.304.

<sup>101</sup> Philip C. Almond (1983). Wilfred Cantwell Smith as Theologian of Religions, pp.335-336.

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## 作者簡介

姓名：蔡彥仁

職稱：國立政治大學宗教研究所教授

通訊處：116 台北市文山區國立政治大學宗教研究所

電話：(02)29387730

E-mail：[yztsai@nccu.edu.tw](mailto:yztsai@nccu.edu.tw)

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## **Selfhood and Fiduciary Community:**

### **A Smithian Reading of Tu Weiming's Confucian Humanism**

*Yen-zen Tsai*

#### **Abstract**

Tu Weiming, as a leading spokesman for contemporary New Confucianism, has been reinterpreting the Confucian tradition in face of the challenges of modernity. Tu takes selfhood as his starting point, emphasizing the importance of cultivating human mind-and-heart as a deepening and broadening process to realize the anthropocosmic *dao*. He highlights the concept of a “fiduciary community” and advocates that, because of it, Confucianism remains a dynamic “inclusive humanism.” Tu’s mode of thinking tallies well with Wilfred C. Smith’s vision of religion, specifically the latter’s exposition of faith as a universal human quality and proposal of “corporate critical self-consciousness.” This article details the theories of both scholars, highlights their similarities, and contrasts their differences. It argues that Smith’s world theology provides a heuristic framework through which one understands how Tu has advanced his Confucian humanism from a Chinese philosophical or cultural tradition to the midst of world religions.

#### **Keywords**

Enlightenment . Faith . Mind-and-heart . Community . Transcendence

#### **I. Introduction**

The 1958 “A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture,” jointly signed and published by Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai 張君勱), Tang Chun-i (Tang Junyi 唐君毅), Mou Tsung-san (Mou Zongsan 牟宗三), and Hsu Fo-kuan (Xu Fuguan 徐復觀), is considered a landmark in the rise of

contemporary Neo-Confucianism or New Confucianism.<sup>102</sup> In it, the signatories strongly assert the continued existence of Chinese culture as a living tradition and affirm the perennial value of the Confucian learning of mind-and-heart. Toward the Western intellectual community, they earnestly plea for the West to learn from Chinese culture such features as intuitive knowledge, modes of all-round understanding, commiseration, the wisdom of cultural perpetuation, and the treatment of the whole world as one family. In a time of political upheaval and spiritual crisis, they reveal their devotion to the centuries-old Confucian tradition and its transmission on the one hand, and their genuine desire to seek dialogue with equal partners of the Western world, on the other.

The last mentioned motivation -- to advance Confucianism into the realm of world cultures and religions for mutual understanding -- is particularly noteworthy. It marks New Confucians' understanding of their own culture not as a local, parochial product but as a universal, dynamic resource which can contribute significantly to the world community. Indeed, many of these New Confucians devoted their lifelong effort to the realization of this goal. Tang Junyi, for example, adopted Hegelian idealism to interpret the Neo-Confucian concept of mind-and-heart. Mou Zongsan, too, endeavored to present Confucian moral metaphysics to a contemporary audience by synthesizing it with Kant's philosophy of religion. They thus exhibited a common concern, and have characteristically charted New Confucianism's route of intellectual expansion in recent decades.

As a leading spokesman for the third generation of New Confucianism,<sup>103</sup> Tu Weiming inherited his predecessors' vision and carried it further in the face of rising

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<sup>102</sup> For the original text, see Tang 1975: 865-929. Its English translation can be found in Carsun Chang 1962: 455-483. For a discussion of the content and significance of this manifesto, see Hao Chang 1976, Tu 1991a, and Liu 2003: 21-40.

<sup>103</sup> For an introduction to New Confucian figures and their generational classifications, see Liu 2003: 24-25.

global consciousness. To better define the Confucian community which would assume the task of actualizing this vision, he formulates the idea of a “cultural China” which would include the geopolitical entities of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore as the first group, diaspora Chinese as the second, and non-Chinese “who try to understand China intellectually and bring their conceptions of China to their own linguistic communities” as the third (Tu 1991b:13). These three groups combined, sharing a “common creed” and historically operating in the “third epoch” of the Confucian tradition, are expected to engage in dialogue with other world religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as well as secular ideologies like Marxism and Freudianism (Tu 1986). For this reason, Tu Weiming, with his subtle interpretation of Confucian humanism, takes selfhood as his starting point and then emphasizes the importance of cultivating human subjectivity as a deepening and broadening process in order to realize the anthropocosmic *dao*. At the same time, he highlights the concept of “fiduciary community” and contends that, because of it, Confucianism remains a dynamic “inclusive humanism.”

It is interesting to observe that Wilfred C. Smith, a historian of world religions and stout advocate of religious pluralism, although approaching religion from a different perspective, shared many ideas Tu Weiming and his like-minded forebears proposed. Specifically, Smith bases his understanding of religion upon faith as a universal human quality from which different “cumulative traditions” are generated. He broaches the concept of “corporate critical self-consciousness” and argues that one should take it seriously if a world community is to be established and sustained. Both Tu and Smith are programmatic in their respective agendas; they begin with what is fundamentally personal and expand to what is necessarily worldwide and communal. In this connection, I find it significant to compare Tu’s “inclusive humanism” with Smith’s “humane knowledge,” as the latter would name his world

theology. My intent is not only to interpret their respective meanings in their own terms, but, by using Smith's theology of religion as a heuristic framework, I hope to elucidate how Confucianism has, through Tu's effort, creatively progressed from a Chinese philosophy or cultural tradition and has arrived in the midst of world religions.

## II. Wilfred C. Smith's Theology of Religion

Wilfred C. Smith's central intellectual concern is to explore the "meaning and end of religion."<sup>104</sup> He began his academic career as an Islamicist, working in religiously pluralistic India where Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims lived together and interacted closely with one another. Traditional Christian theology would aim to convert gentiles and uphold an exclusivist stance, while repudiating non-Christian religions. Smith found this inadequate and distorting. He was then searching for an interreligious hermeneutics which could best interpret and understand a community composed of people of different religious persuasions. The artificial, political partition of India and Pakistan after the Second World War, orchestrated by Western superpowers, ripped apart people and their shared identities and escalated internecine conflict. This prompted him to reflect upon the issue of communal solidarity and, at the same time, to critically reexamine the general Christian attitude toward other world religions.<sup>105</sup>

Smith finds that the ushering in of a cosmopolitan environment, after the mid-twentieth century, rendered traditional Christian theology parochial. Hendrik

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<sup>104</sup> The phrase is taken from the title of Smith's *magnum opus*, *The Meaning and End of Religion*; see Smith 1963b / 1978.

<sup>105</sup> Two books on Islam reflect Smith's scholarly engagement in this period of his life, *Modern Islam in India: a Social Analysis* and *Islam in Modern History*; see Smith 1943 and 1957. For a brief introduction to Smith's intellectual biography, see Cracknell 2001: 1-10.

Kraemer, representative of the modern conservative Catholicism, was unable to justify his missiology, just as Paul Tillich would find his liberal Protestant theology to appear isolationist (Smith 1972: 118-122). To Smith's mind, the evolving history of "religion" as a term and concept in the West most tellingly reflects this Christian parochialism. *Religio*, in Latin, originally referred to "a power outside man ( sic ) obligating him ( sic ) to certain behaviour under pain of threatened awesome retribution, a kind of tabu, or the feeling in man ( sic ) vis-à-vis such powers." (Smith 1963b / 1978: 20)<sup>106</sup> It in this sense expressed subjective human feelings, a human response to what was supposed to be divine or supernatural. A great amount of Western literature shows that before the seventeenth century, "religion" was primarily used to convey such human emotions as piety, obedience, worship, or faith, descriptions associated with the psychological state of the followers of faith (Smith 1963b / 1978: 23-37). The term gradually lost its inner human dimension during the Enlightenment. Compounded by the Western colonial expansion and wider contacts with the non-Christian world, "religion" started to designate a distinguishable belief tradition or system, often carrying with it an apologetic connotation. What used to be "religion" in the singular became "religions" in the plural. Hence this term, initially meaning a universal human quality, denotes observable or quantifiable entities in its modern ramifications. The resort to and emphasis upon cognitive knowledge was clear in this externalization process (Smith 1963b / 1978: 37-44).

The process during which "religion" was transformed into the modern usage also betrays Western misunderstanding and mispresentation of "the faith of other men ( sic ) ."<sup>107</sup> When dealing with Christianity, Westerners, as insiders, would express

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<sup>106</sup> I am aware that although Smith's theology is meant to be inclusive in culture, religion, race, and gender, he nevertheless cannot avoid using sexist terminology, especially in his early writings as cited here and in the following space. In this article, I use gender-neutral language, but, in order to be faithful, retain other authors' original texts when cited.

<sup>107</sup> This is also an application of another of Smith's books, *The Faith of Other Men*; see Smith 1963a.



what is most sacred and sublime in their own tradition, obviously an internal, qualitative approach. But when referring to non-Christian “religions,” they, after inheriting the legacy of the nineteenth century Comparative Religion, would apply “isms” to different traditions of faith. Thus one sees the existence of such nomenclatures as Hinduism, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Shintoism, etc. It is as if these “religions” are abstract systems or distanced objects to be grasped by the outsider’s cognitive power. In this way Westerners totally ignore what is valuable, holy, or even ultimate to other faith holders and reify what is most precious universal and human, while creating confusion and antagonism in the global community (Smith 1963b / 1978: 53-79).

Smith observes that the tendency toward reification in the Western intellectual world became evermore aggravated after the mid-twentieth century, a phenomenon most evident among linguistic analysts. Analytic philosophers, typified by A. J. Ayer, would appeal to logical positivism and regard religious statements as “meaningless, irrational, or simply false”(Smith 1998:5). They treated religious expressions as inanimate, isolatable objects and aimed at the analysis of words detached from their syntactic, cultural, and historical contexts. They ignored the fact that language is a human construct borne of lived experience, and as such it may be rich in symbolic meanings. Objectivity and impersonalism, cherished and upheld by modern scientism, stand merely as a hindrance to understanding religion. Smith argues that scholars should rather understand the ideals humans aspire to before analyzing seemingly “meaningless and irrational” religious language, otherwise they would always remain outside of the faith holder’s world of thought and feeling (Smith 1998: 29-35 and 1979:20-32).

Smith further points out that under powerful objectivist or positivist currents, crucial dimensions such as the transcendent that constitute human religiosity are

excluded from modern consciousness. Nor are they considered to be legitimate categories of academic discussion. From the perspective of the long history of religion, this “anti-transcendent thinking” is actually a modern “aberration.” It stands opposed to what is genuinely human and contrary to the truth. One can better name it “nihilistic positivism” or “negative secularism” (Smith 1963b / 1978: 188-190 and 1979: 139). As a result, scholars of religion today have commonly lapsed into technical operations, notably dwelling upon methodologies instead of the human agents who generate religions and searching for the historical points of origin rather than treating the “cumulated tradition” as a flowing process (Smith 1981: 152-156 and 1982a: 41-56).

To break through the narrow confines of the Western intellectual world, one has to be aware of its ideological baggage and seek a new way to approach religion. Smith asserts that this new way is to revert to the original understanding and meaning of “religion,” with special reference to piety, obedience, reverence, and devotion -- all human responses to the transcendent (Smith 1963b / 1978: 125-131). The emphasis then shifts from world religions as different systems of belief to what human agents existentially feel in the dynamic processes of respective “cumulative traditions” (Smith 1963b / 1978: 43 and 1979: 15). In this manner modern scholars may extricate themselves from the bondage of “schematic externalization” and directly explore the inner core of “religion” (Smith 1963b / 1978: 44).

Smith grounds his insight in faith as a universal human quality in order to revolutionize the traditional Christian theology and establish a new epistemological paradigm (Smith 1963b / 1978: 170-192). For this Christian foundational virtue, he does not present a precise definition nor explicate its ontological composition. Rather, he resorts to evocative descriptions, eulogizes its functional role, and expects his audience to feel and understand what it is:

[ Faith ] is an orientation of the personality, to oneself, to one's neighbour, to the universe; a total response; a way of seeing whatever one sees and of handling whatever one handles; a capacity to live a more than mundane level; to see, to feel, to act in terms of, a transcendent dimension (Smith 1979: 12).

Faith, then, is a quality of human being. At its best it has taken the form of serenity and courage and loyalty and service: a quiet confidence and joy which enable one to feel at home in the universe, and to find meaning in the world and in one's own life, a meaning that is profound and ultimate, and is stable no matter what may happen to oneself at the level of immediate event (Smith 1979: 12).

Faith is awakeness to transcendence accompanied by an adoring devotion to it and a permeating participation in it (Smith 1979: 65).

Faith is a planetary human characteristic, less or more consummate instances of which have in empirical fact characterized the whole of human history from the beginning; it involves man's ( *sic* ) capacity to perceive, to symbolize, and to live loyally and richly in terms of, a transcendent dimension to his and her life (Smith 1979: 141).

These descriptions well illustrate faith as an encompassing element that grounds a person in his or her very being. Smith consciously avoids fixing it to any cognitive category, be it ethical, existential, or metaphysical. To his mind, this human quality orients one's behaviors and even directs one toward the transcendent. In this sense it touches the mundane and the sacred and subsumes whatever realm modern intellectualization might conveniently devise. However, faith in Smith's presentations obviously leans toward human intuitive and affective dimensions. It appeals to its audience to think and search introspectively in order to locate its whereabouts. But when it is activated, its many manifestations are akin to what Smith insists "religion"

would originally mean, as well as to all admirable virtues Christianity has long espoused.

Lest one might suspect that faith as hitherto presented may smack of being too subjective and personal, Smith brings about the concept of “corporate critical self-consciousness” to further supplement and corroborate his theology of religion. He first clarifies that what he advocates is not individualism, a product of “negative secularism,” but personalism. By this he means the necessity of treating a person as he or she really is, especially holding dearly this person’s faith that is nourished in a community (Smith 1982b: 246). As he emphasizes, “the only knowledge that is accurate of the history of religion...is a knowledge that participates in the consciousness of those involved” (Smith 1981: 63). This new epistemology is a “personalist knowledge” or “humane knowledge,” and our study based upon this understanding and substantiated by historical facts can be termed “humane sciences” (Smith 1981: 55, 56-80). These terms are coined as antidotes to modern objectivism which Smith vehemently criticizes.

By recognizing that people of other religions also have a degree of faith similar to our own, we broaden our knowledge and deepen our spirituality as well. As far as the study of world religions is concerned, scholars therefore should not be content to linger over visible phenomena. A religious object is always a symbol. The only valid way to understand it is to perceive it symbolically. Because it is only the person endowed with faith who is able to create a symbolic object, it requires of scholars to transcend the material dimension to reach the inner recesses of those they study. The study of religion, in this sense, is the study of the creative agents, not visible or tangible objects. To be more accurate, it is not even the study of persons but the study of their faith. Once scholars realize this, obstacles between outsiders and insiders would naturally be eliminated and the human community would be expanded

accordingly (Smith 1981: 86-92). Smith sees that faith, a commonly shared foundation, “is what turns a society into a community. It is the cause, and not only the result, of corporate solidarity of persons” (Smith 1998: 85). His vision to transform our “world society” into “a world community” is exactly the extension of this understanding (Smith 1963a: 126).

Furthermore, Smith finds that “cumulative traditions” are not static or isolated from one another. From the perspective of the history of religion, they have been dynamically moving forward and have been interconnected. Although variegated events or activities take place in different times and places, human history “is an intricate and delicate web of human relationships” (Smith 1981:42). Many religious themes, concepts or practices, such as self-sacrifice by leaving home and the adoption of prayer beads in many religions, demonstrate that they have the same origins and are commonly inherited and shared by the human community as a whole (Smith 1981: 6-14). In light of “historical coherence” (Smith 1981: 19) and “global continuum” (Smith 1981: 18), one’s participation in a particular community means participation in a world-wide, on-going process of humanity. The single act of one person is thus intimately connected to that of another person, and its meaning and effect is always immensely far-reaching.

This realization brings one to consciousness on an elevated level. Smith proposes that humans, as distinct from other animals, developed consciousness in the early stage of human history. This consciousness progressed into self-consciousness and thereupon world civilizations arose and took shape. A surge of rationalism and individualism followed the Enlightenment and a spirit of critical self-consciousness ensued. That our world history has been dominated by this powerful current over the past two to three centuries is remarkably clear. Since this “negative secularism” has brought tremendous harm to humans as expounded, our global community should be

ready to advance into the higher stage of “corporate critical self-consciousness” (Smith 1982c: 162-163).

What Smith means by “corporate critical self-consciousness” is not intended to eradicate the rational and scientific spirit that has pervaded our present mode of thinking. On the contrary, it affirms its value but simultaneously transforms and enhances it by taking into account human faith and the reality of our global community most earnestly. This new epistemology challenges our previous concept about ourselves and others. At this new historical stage, the validity of human knowledge, or rather, “humane knowledge,” should be “verified both by the persons involved and by critical observers not involved”(Smith 1981:60, 1982c: 164, and 1982d: 146). Through mutual verification, humans may become more conscious of the relationship between part and whole, or self and the entire community. They would in this way exercise their sympathy and imagination in the proper context. Diversities and particularities could only be preserved and appreciated under these circumstances. In treating the world as one community, one would discover that what Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists think, act, or talk about concerns “us all.” In the end, inter-religious dialogues would be replaced by a common colloquy held in and for “our” community, and “religion” would then restore its true identity (Smith 1981: 97-103).

### III. The Smithian Paradigm and Its Application

Smith presents his theology of religion in a rapidly changing historical and global context. He detects that traditional Christian theology, parochial and exclusivist in its intent and orientation, is highly problematic when it faces a new world reality that is culturally complex and religiously pluralistic. In addition, western scholars,

under the spell of “negative secularism,” regard and interpret non-Christian religions as distanced objects or abstract systems. As a result, they fail to look into the dynamic processes of other “religions” which include the authenticity of what believers feel and the actuality of their lived experiences. Against this intellectual trend, Smith proposes to see “religion” afresh by reexamining its original meanings and exploring its rich implications. He thus takes “faith” as his starting point, emphasizing its grounding and encompassing nature, particularly its relationship with human aspiration to transcendence. He also asserts that although many different “cumulated traditions” exist, they have mutually influenced each other and have converged into a coherent unity. This realization from the perspective of the history of world religions should deepen and widen our perception of the world as one community. Ultimately, “corporate critical self-consciousness,” which Smith repeatedly stresses in his theological construction, is what we moderns exactly need to understand the “meaning and end of religion.”

What Smith comes up with is by no means a methodology that would instruct scholars of religion to research their subject from a specific approach. Nor is it merely a theory among many others that compete for interested followers, as we often see in modern scholarship. His is actually a strong appeal that invites us to reappraise our previous way of viewing and studying religion. The theology of religion he formulates is therefore nothing short of a new paradigm that intends to supersede that generated by the Enlightenment. It at least exhibits the following significant features.

In the first place, Smith’s theology of religion resists rigid cognitive forms as a valid way of understanding. The reason why it opposes linguistic positivism is because of its strong tendency toward reductionism: it ignores dynamic human spiritual activities while narrowly focusing upon the objectifiable, fragmented verbal statements extricated from a living context. When taking the positivistic view as

presupposition, scholars' perception of reality is distorted or limited and thus naturally fails to see the truth. By the same token, "religion" in the modern sense manifests a similar negative effect; it restricts rather than facilitates our understanding of what is crucially human. Smith's emphasis upon faith serves to deconstruct this conventional "religion" and replace it with a reinterpreted, much more flexible "religion." For sure, this newly interpreted "religion" is not a clearly delineated form to be conceptually grasped. To describe it phenomenologically, it at most can be compared to a moving process during which humans continuously respond to the transcendent. One better understands it as a guiding referent which is associated with the realm of human religiosity. What Smith reconstructs is thus an amorphous category, ambiguous and yet powerfully comprehensive, which calls for our deep reflection if we are to fully realize it.

If that would be the case, this all-encompassing "religion" then denies the validity of the Western dualistic mode of thinking. What used to be the form of sacred versus secular has become a meaningless dyadic pattern in Smith's theology of religion. Since faith is the focal point, upon careful examination, any kind of human activities may unfold this universal quality. Even the establishment of modern scientism, which rests its trust on human reason only, involves human faith (Smith 1979:15). The breakdown of the old cognitive mode enlarges our vision to comprehend "religion" in all dimensions. This vision deals not only with individual persons but with communities, whatever their "cumulated traditions," relating them to what they aim at transcendentally and experience existentially in ever-changing historical contexts. In this light, there should be little wonder that the scope of Smith's theology extends to cover what have traditionally been regarded as secular traditions, such as Confucianism and Greco-Roman humanism and their respective classics. In them, just as in all other world "religions," human faith is strongly present (Smith



1993: 176-195 and 1963a: 67-80).

Lastly, Smith's theology of religion is not value-neutral. The strong appeal to "corporate critical self-consciousness" demands that any persons or communities, without distinction between insiders and outsiders, make an all-out, concerted effort to realize our "religion" as an integrated unity. The requirement of being "critical" and "self-conscious" is intellectual and at the same time positively moral. The highlighting of such virtues as piety, reverence, devotion, commitment, courage, loyalty, and service, betrays a strong sentiment that is both religious and humanistic. Thus Smith's theology contains an obvious axiological purpose, although it is couched in rationalist terms and substantiated by historical evidence. It carries with it a prophet's vision and voice, which transcend the scholarly engagement we nowadays would commonly recognize.

#### IV. Tu Weiming's Confucian Humanism

Smith's theology of religion is a comprehensive vision; its emphasis upon such prominent features as human faith, transcendence, existential concern, interreligious connectedness, and global community, is conducive to relating itself to humanistic traditions. This Tu Weiming is keenly aware of. On quite a few occasions, Tu paid tribute to Smith, particularly subscribing to the inspiring scheme of "religion" versus "religiosity" Smith created (Tu 2000: 10-11 and 1985a: 132).<sup>108</sup> One feels that while Tu has been transmitting the intellectual legacy from his immediate New Confucian predecessors and endeavoring to bring Confucianism into the global community, Smith's paradigm appears to him congenial and illuminating. This intellectual connection triggers us to compare Tu's agenda with Smith's general

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<sup>108</sup> See also *Harvard University Gazette*, November 29, 2001.

theological framework we have outlined. This approach, I believe, would prove to be highly rewarding if we intend to understand Tu's interpretation of Confucianism or, even more broadly, the prospectus of Confucianism's status in the midst of world religions.

Tu's philosophical reconstruction is strongly motivated by his deep concern with two issues, one in recent Chinese intellectual history, the other in modern Western intellectual discourse. In his critical reflections upon the development of recent Chinese intellectual history, he meticulously notices that distinguishable forces have impacted on Confucianism and brought it to its present-day status (Tu 1987 and 1991b). Ruling authorities, often assuming the role of Confucian orthodoxy, took over this cultural and spiritual tradition and manipulated it for their political gains. They abused Confucianism, and thereupon complicated the tripartite relationship of "the Way, learning, and politics" that has so prominently characterized Confucian humanism (Tu 1985c). Equally, perhaps more seriously, were the radical iconoclasts of the May Fourth period who, witnessing successive military invasions and cultural onslaughts from the West, blamed Confucianism for China's defeat and weakness. They proposed to totally jettison this centuries-old tradition and in its stead opted for whole-sale westernization as the way out of China's predicament. This anti-traditional trend has exerted tremendous influence on a host of brilliant young Chinese in later generations who, in turn, defined the general intellectual outlook on Confucianism. Detrimental forces like these, as Tu perceives, are great challenges to the flourishing of the Confucian tradition.

On the other hand, eminent Western scholars' negative assessment of Confucianism also poses a serious problem for Tu. It impells him to rethink how to re-present this ethicoreligious tradition and engage in creative dialogue with these Western critics. For example, Max Weber's depiction of Confucians and their

“adjustment to the world...seriously undermines the Confucian capacity for psychological integration and religious transcendence”(Tu 1985b: 55). Joseph R. Levenson, in continuation of Weber’s rationalization theory, also judged Confucianism to be entirely outmoded because its amateurism was unable to respond to modernity defined by strict bureaucratic system, technology, and professionalism (Tu 1986: 3-8 and 1976: 242-247). Confucian China thus saw “its modern fate” doomed along with the demise of imperial China in the beginning of the twentieth century (Levenson 1968). In a parallel argumentation, Robert Bellah, grouping Confucianism with Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and Daoism, claimed that as it did not go through the same pre-modern stages as Christianity did, its historical experience and cultural constituency proved to be incompatible with modernity (Tu 1989a: 340-344).

In response to these criticisms, whether from Chinese or Westerners, that characterize Confucianism as backward, lethargic, or rigid and thus unfit for modernity, Tu argues that Confucianism’s inner, spiritual dimension which enabled this tradition to have continued for more than two millennia has been seriously misapprehended. Confucianism did not die at the time of the Qing Dynasty’s collapse. On the contrary, it has survived a series of historical setbacks, including the May Fourth iconoclasm in the 1920s and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976. The recent rise of industrial East Asia, a geographical area that has traditionally been influenced by Confucian culture, bears witness to the vitality and “modern” character of this ethicoreligious tradition.

Tu perceives that the cause behind these doubts and questionings lies in the problematic conception of modernity. To expose this obstacle, one has to trace its origin and explore its roots in the Enlightenment. In his reflection upon modernity and its relevance to Confucianism, Tu finds that since the eighteenth century, such notions

as “progress, reason, and individualism” have been absorbed by the Western mind as signposts of modernity (Tu 1998). Driven by this “Enlightenment mentality,” the West has rapidly developed science and technology on the one hand, and, on the other, implemented social systems to ensure human equality and freedom. What emerged from this development, however, is “instrumental rationality” or “rational instrumentalism” that nourishes narrow-minded scientism. It singularly emphasizes what is tangible and evidentially verifiable at the expense of the human spiritual dimension. World religions or spiritual traditions particularly of the East, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism, have been ignored or relegated to irrelevancy. In addition, undue emphasis on individualism has lapsed into extreme anthropocentrism in the West. Humans in this context are separate, isolated entities, alienated from both the natural and communal environments in which they live and to which they are an integral part. Also due to the effect of rational instrumentalism, the West, prejudiced by Eurocentrism, has excluded non-Western or less developed societies from its ken, losing the vision to treat the global community as an organic whole. Thus this “Enlightenment mentality” has not only brought havoc and disintegration to the West but has also given rise to the questionable views of other non-Western societies, including Confucian China.

In face of the stern reality that the modern West has posed to humanity, Tu has responded with the Confucian ideal world that is holistic and communal. He believes that in contrast to the Western “exclusive secular humanism,” Confucianism is a form of “inclusive humanism”(Tu 1989c: 93-121). This Chinese spiritual tradition regards human beings as “sentient, social, political, historical, and metaphysical”(Tu 1998: 13), which can therefore function as a potent remedy for our current malaise. Indeed, if “mutuality between self and community, harmony between human species and nature, and continuous communication with Heaven are defining characteristics and

supreme values in human project”(Tu 1998: 14), Confucianism, with its marked emphasis upon the four dimensions of “self, community, nature, and the transcendent”(Tu 1998: 14), can contribute greatly to our world today.

Tu’s confidence in and positive evaluation of Confucianism originates from his “faith” in the human person: humans are fundamentally religious. In his interpretation, this “Confucian ‘faith’ in the intrinsic meaningfulness of humanity is a faith in the living person’s authentic possibility for self-transcendence”(Tu 1985b: 64). That is, human nature, alternatively called human mind-and-heart, is conferred by Heaven. This immanent faculty bespeaks the fact that humanity, although limited by physical forms and life spans, shares the same substance with Heaven. Although living in the mundane world, humans are not entirely earthbound; they are able to transcend their earthly confines and attend to what they authentically are. It is this Heaven-endowed ontological constituency that defines humanity as anthropocosmic in its basic orientation (Tu 1989c:77-78). It reveals that Heaven, as a transcendent referent, and humanity are dialectically interrelated. Further, this universal human mind-and-heart is always lively and creative; it responds to the changing experiences a human person undergoes. It serves as a cognitive faculty, connecting to the person’s intellectual knowledge, but it also functions affectively in relation to the person’s emotional engagements (Tu 1976: 266-271). In a nutshell, it is the ground of being from which one derives one’s ontological self and is the base upon which one builds one’s existential experience.

Since the innate, organic human nature or mind-and-heart commonly dwells in every person, selfhood becomes the starting point of Tu’s interpretive scheme of inclusive humanism.<sup>109</sup> Since humans possess the heavenly endowed mind-and-heart,

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<sup>109</sup> Tu primarily followed the “eight-steps” scheme, as stipulated in the *Great Learning*, to structure his “inclusive Confucianism.” (Tu 1985a: 134-135) For a succinct explanation of the “eight-steps” and the text of the *Great Learning*, see Chan 1963: 84-94. To highlight Confucian religiosity, Tu summarized

Tu expounds, they thus have the potential to become sage-like. It is true that they are ontologically identical with Heaven, but existential circumstances distance them from their original substance. If they intend to achieve the state of their true identity, they must exert their utmost effort to reach this goal through an unceasing self-cultivation. As a matter of fact, because human nature is a person's ontological grounding, by necessity no human person can avoid engaging in this process of self-transformation in order to realize his or her authentic self. As human mind-and-heart is an inexhaustible resource, the more one explores it, the more one obtains nourishment from it for life's sustenance. Thus *junzi* 君子, or profound persons, constantly vigilant when alone, must examine their inner selves at all times. What is required of them is a reflective spirit and a clear self-consciousness. Self-cultivation hence points to a highly retrospective, inner-looking orientation.

Self-cultivation as a lifelong moral effort is both a deepening and a broadening process. It involves two dimensions that are simultaneously interrelated. Vertically it elevates one toward Heaven by delving into the depth of one's inner nature. Horizontally it expands one's narrow self to include other human fellows whom one may or may not be acquainted with. Self-cultivation then is not a solitary or privatized exercise that seeks joy in spiritual ecstasy or finds consolation in inner peace. Rather, the highest state of personality achieved by this kind of moral effort, popularly attributed to a sage, culminates in the commonality that is sharable among all human beings. This is the point where our universal human nature lies and the platform upon which we humans mutually communicate. At this stage, one returns to one's original self and reaches harmony with one's ground of being (Tu 1989c: 23-37).

Tu further explains that human persons are born into a network of human

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these "eight steps" into two categories, "person" and "community," added "metaphysics" to form three conceptual levels, and took the *Chung-yung* (*Doctrine of the Mean*) as his basis of interpretation (Tu 1989c). For an explanation and translation of this text, see also Chan 1963: 95-114.

relationships, with different degrees of complexity. With many external givens, they live as social beings, again with different degrees of complexity. Hence human relatedness and sociality circumscribe what humans may existentially encounter. In this context, self-cultivation as a deepening and broadening process always involves a community in which a person might happen to live and grow. In other words, it is not self-centered but “a deliberate communal act” (Tu 1985b: 58) that contains strong altruistic connotations. When profound persons establish themselves, they also establish others. Deepening one’s subjectivity brings benefits not only to oneself but also to the community as a whole. Conversely, it is only when one realizes that one is nourished by, is part of, and integral to the community, can one really complete one’s self-cultivation. Therefore profound persons are those who are always “conscientious, honest, and courageous” (Tu 1989c: 33-34). Human mind-and-heart and its cultivation, in the final analysis, is not value-free; to be sure, it carries with it an axiological purpose.

Confucian humanism, Tu argues, takes seriously the fact that humans are biologically and socially embedded. It actually treats this as its presupposition in its entire philosophical construction. From an individual person’s perspective, family, society, state, and the world, are progressive stages that one has to go through in one’s lifetime. These circles seem restricting on the surface. However, as mentioned, humans are able to transcend their limitedness and live out their authentic self through strenuous moral effort. The practice of self-cultivation, grounded in one’s mind-and-heart, is meant to facilitate a person to respond harmoniously and creatively in these different situations. In the Chinese context, for example, *xiao* 孝 (filial piety), the cardinal familial virtue, contains ethicoreligious meaning and functions symbolically. Pious children do not gain their worth by slavishly obeying their family instruction. Rather, by self-cultivation they should know how to creatively transform

what they inherit to fulfill their “moral obligation and historical consciousness.” (Tu 1989c: 43) *Li* 禮 (ritual propriety), the most important social virtue, is akin to a “dynamic process” more than a “static structure” (Tu 1989c: 53) in and by which *ren* 仁 (humanity / humaneness) and *yi* 義 (righteousness / rightness) “can be realized in the context of human relations.” (Tu 1989c: 53) That a ritual can take effect always presupposes social recognition and appreciation. It calls for reciprocity and public participation by moral persuasion. *Xiao*, *li*, and other Confucian virtues like *wuchang* 五常 (Five Constancies) and *sangang* 三綱 (Three Bonds) are not rigid rules meant to press individuals into conformity but rather, are meant to harmonize family or society into solidarity through communal consensus. In Tu’s words, “society so conceived is not an adversary system consisting of pressure groups but a fiduciary community based on mutual trust” (Tu 1989c: 48). To realize a “fiduciary community,” whether on the scale of a family, society, state, or the world, requires “communal critical self-awareness” (Tu 1986:21), as Tu conclusively affirms. If that were achieved, it would result in a situation where “ultimate self-transformation as a communal act” (Tu 1989c: 94) finds its consummation. It would be an ideal state where full humanity is revealed at its best.

Tu formulates his “inclusive humanism” as a response to the challenges coming from within China as well as from the West. To those who criticized Confucianism for being lifeless, reactionary, or outmoded, he counters with the affirmation that this cultural tradition is an “open system” (Tu 1985a: 131) whose spiritual wealth far exceeds how it is commonly understood or represented. In particular, its emphasis upon human mind-and-heart and the necessity of unceasing self-cultivation deepens our human subjectivity that is dearly needed in face of modern “secular humanism.” After all, humans as anthropocosmic beings should and can transcend their existential limitations by tapping the resources of their ontological



grounding. The stress upon “ultimate self-transformation as a communal act” also leads us to realize the dynamic relationship between every human person and the community in which he or she lives. Concentric human geography, from family to society, state, and the world, well defines the boundaries of our human existence. To impart the moral demand of “communal critical self-awareness” to all those who participate in these different spheres of life will turn our world into a “fiduciary community.” Confucian humanism thus enormously deepens and broadens our vision, and is an invaluable contribution to our world community today.

Against the Smithian paradigm, one sees that Tu’s programmatic presentation of Confucianism highlights three important dimensions: selfhood, transcendence, and community. These three, although categorized for expository convenience, are organically interrelated. In this context, it is significant to observe that Tu does not define Confucianism, as many scholars would do, in political, social, or ethical terms. By exploring these three salient features and interpreting their possible implications, Tu on the one hand deconstructs the traditional conception of Confucianism which its antagonists attacked relentlessly and, on the other hand, reconstructs it with a new face suitable for an age of global consciousness. For the latter end he makes his intent clear:

If the well-being of humanity is its central concern, Confucian humanism cannot afford to be confined to East Asian cultures. A global perspective is needed to universalize its perennial concerns (Tu 1986:21).

Understood in this way, these features do not constitute one more religion or system to be brought into juxtaposition with other world religions. Rather, they are exactly those “perennial concerns” which pertinently reveal Confucian religiosity. As such

they are more encompassing and appealing. This new Confucianism, with its reference to universal human nature and global conviviality, is much richer in content and wider in its boundaries; it is meant to accommodate all humanity and, indeed, it sincerely invites all to join in.

## V. Comparative Discussion

Trained primarily as an Islamicist, Smith works in a culturally and religiously pluralistic environment. Life experience informs him that traditional, exclusivist Christian theology is not only powerless to explain pluralistic reality but is miserably misleading in face of our rapidly changing modern world. He finds that the crux of this Christian parochialism lies in the Enlightenment project which manifests a reification process. “Religion” in this unfortunate context is thus deprived of its original meaning which emphasizes reverence, piety, obedience, and devotion. Instead it is replaced by another “religion” that refers either to objectifiable phenomena or to some distanced, abstract belief systems. What is fundamentally human disappears from the consciousness of the modern West. “The meaning and end of religion” is indeed in great peril. By centering upon the interpretation and understanding of Islam in the modern world as a heuristic example, Smith delves into the intricate developments of world religions and their mutual interrelationships and begins his quest for the authentic “religion.”

By contrast, Tu’s *Problematik* originates from his grave concerns for “the Confucian China and its modern fate.” He is laden with modern Chinese historical consciousness and takes what Confucianism has encountered since the early twentieth century most seriously. Analyzing the challenges posed by the Chinese critics of Confucianism as well as their Western counterparts, he detects that the

“Enlightenment mentality,” which upholds the value of reason, science, and technology at the expense of human spirituality, lies in their presupposition as their common creed. As a form of “negative humanism,” it wrongly informs Chinese radicals or liberals and many Western intellectuals, beguiling them to conclude that Confucianism, no more than a historical relic, belongs to the past. How to reinterpret this Chinese cultural and spiritual heritage as a living tradition while, at the same time, interacting with the global community has thus become Tu’s central task.

It is important to observe that Smith and Tu, although grounded in different backgrounds and experiences, formulate their issues almost the same way. Smith is a vehement critic of the Enlightenment, as is Tu. Both are opposed to the de-humanizing effect that this powerful intellectual trend has exerted on the general intellectual outlook of our modern and contemporary world. They take it to be the primary cause which denies humanity of its true identity and fragments our global community. Smith and Tu, therefore, while facing the present and looking forward to a renewed future, engage in their intellectual activities with an obvious retrospective tendency. They agree that by examining or reinterpreting the past, one finds answers that address our current malaise while opening new possibilities.

What is more significant is that when they begin to tackle their issues, the scope of their visions is no longer narrowly Christian, Confucian, or restricted to any particular religious tradition. Smith rejects the position of being a Christian theologian or merely an Islamicist, although undoubtedly he is well-qualified to be considered an expert on both, but rather assumes the role of a historian of religion. He argues his case in the context of world religions and substantiates it with many historical facts from a comparative perspective.<sup>110</sup> His purpose is, by alluding to more sources or

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<sup>110</sup> Smith’s readers are always awed by the voluminous and meticulous notes he quotes from various sources, including archaic classics and rare collections in different languages. For instance, the main text of *The Meaning and End of Religion* is two hundred and two pages in length, but its endnotes,

pieces of evidence, to present a convincing vision that is universal and acceptable to the world community. This effort to be more inclusive is a prominent feature in his theology of religion. Tu, in comparison, follows his Confucian tradition more closely. This is clear from the fact that in his argument for human religiosity, he relies upon *Zhongyong* 中庸, one of the foundational Confucian classics, for a systematic expression of his views. In the Confucian sense, he “transmits” (*shu* 述) more than “creates” (*zuo* 作). However, his concerns over Confucianism and its relationship to modernity require that he maintain constant dialogues with other world cultures or religions. In addition, because Confucianism as an “inclusive humanism” harbors the vision to include all humanity, it by nature transcends its cultural and geographical boundaries and reaches to the larger global community. This expanding nature of Confucianism from Tu’s side dovetails well with Smith’s agenda of world religions. It is Smith who sets up an inviting community for world religions, and Tu who responds by bringing Confucianism into its active participation.

For both scholars, correcting the Enlightenment distortions and presenting a universally available experience or “common creed” for humanity is an overriding concern. Smith deeply mistrusts any rigid, cognitive category as a valid way for true human understanding, considering it to be an offshoot of the Enlightenment project. Indeed he is extremely skeptical about approaches to religion that propose a “methodology;” his antagonism against phenomenology of religion is a case in point (Smith 1981: 86-87 and 1979: 7). In opposition to the emphasis upon external objects or phenomena, he affirms that a person and his or her subjectivity should be the locus of religion. It is the faith of a human person that brings meanings to life; it is also this faith that generates variegated “cumulated traditions” which we now call world

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printed in smaller font, exceed one hundred and twenty-nine pages. The main text of the other book, *Faith and Belief*, has one hundred and seventy-two pages, but its endnotes, also printed in smaller words, occupy one hundred and fifty-seven pages, actually longer than the main text.

religions. If the study of religion is of value, it is because in the process of uncovering a “cumulated tradition,” one witnesses how humans interact with the transcendent in which they find their ultimate meaning of life. These spiritual dimensions, the immanent and the transcendent, are what we moderns should retrieve in the first place.

Smith further reminds us that from the perspective of the history of religion, all “cumulated traditions” have influenced one another and are intimately interconnected. If this has been the case in the past, it should be evermore so in our contemporary world. This acute sense of our oneness is the foundation upon which we establish our global community. “Corporate critical self-consciousness” thus demands that we take every human person and his or her faith seriously on the one hand, and, on the other, treat our unity as an undeniable living reality. By resorting to our critical reflections and collective efforts, we may hope to bring about a world in which people of diverse faith expressions live together peacefully and talk about issues that concern “us all.”

Smith’s faith-oriented theology of religion might smack of Protestantism (Pruett 1990), but from Tu’s Confucian perspective, nothing could be more agreeable than Smith’s views. In a similar and comparable vein, Tu grounds his Confucian humanism in human nature or mind-and-heart, regarding it as the starting point to universalize a global vision. He basically follows the Mencian line of thought and subscribes to the notion that this human nature, as Heaven-endowed, innate knowledge, is good and worthy. It shares the same substance with Heaven and popularly inheres in every person. Because of it, humans are able to transcend their mundane living and aspire to what they authentically are. Human mind-and-heart as a generative and responsive faculty hence possesses the immanent and transcendent dimensions. However, one should point out that unlike Smith’s Protestant propensity to separate immanence and transcendence into two different realms, Tu’s human nature “lies not in radical

transcendence but in immanence with a transcendent dimension” (Tu 1989c: 121). This feature shows that Tu’s philosophy tends to be holistic as well as monistic. To transcend one’s physical limitedness and achieve unity with Heaven, the ultimate goal of Confucian humanism, one is required to engage in an unceasing process of self-cultivation. For this aim, one seeks no other place than to delve into one’s original mind-and-heart to tap our inexhaustible spiritual resources. This lifelong effort of self-cultivation for ultimate transformation, the way to maintain true selfhood, stands very prominently in Tu’s reinterpretation of Confucianism, but a similar discussion seems lacking in Smith’s theology of religion.

Tu’s stress upon self-cultivation, not as isolated or privatized but as a communal act, is predicated upon the understanding that humans are born and live in a network of relationships. Structurally, as the *Great Learning* clearly stipulates, this communal dimension expands concentrically all the way from the family to the world (See note 8). In other words, it starts with the relationship that is biologically defined and gradually extends to people of less blood-relatedness. As long as one is critically aware that one possesses a Heaven-endowed mind-and-heart, the same as is universally held by other human fellows, and practices self-cultivation, one is able to transcend selfishness and attend to the ground of common humanity. This ensures our hope to establish a “fiduciary community,” the basis of which is care and trust. Self-cultivation is therefore a deepening and broadening process, and it involves an obvious anthropocosmic orientation. What Tu presents above is, without doubt, characteristically Confucian, but its programmatic structure, particularly with reference to the interconnectedness of person, transcendence, and community, tallies perfectly with Smith’s overall theological framework.

Smith calls his theology of religion “humane knowledge,” with a clear emphasis upon the faith of every human person and a special appeal to the conscience of those

who look at this faith. By this “knowledge” he means to eliminate the distinction between the insider and the outsider and consolidate the global community because we are one intrinsically and intimately related existentially. Indeed with “corporate critical self-consciousness,” we humans as a whole can realize this vision. By comparison, Tu names his Confucianism “inclusive humanism,” an intentional coinage to counter the negative “secular humanism.” He hopes that by highlighting the importance of human mind-and-heart, the ontological ground of every human person, the Confucian vision can include the entirety of humanity. Human subjectivity, after all, is most fundamental. In that sense he would not mind calling himself a “fundamentalist” (Tu 1991a).<sup>111</sup> To regard him as an existentialist is justifiable, as long as by that one refers to a Confucian transmitter who takes human lived and living experiences with utmost seriousness (Neville 2000: 83-105). But Tu prefers using “inclusive” or “holistic” to underline his Confucian humanism as it is intended to deal with humankind’s ultimate concern in all its dimensions.

Both Smith and Tu are critically aware that they are engaged in a theme that is profound and subtle. They repudiate the “Enlightenment method” that treats a subject by presenting it as a well-defined category and calling for epistemological recognition. They realize that they are constructing a theology or philosophy the understanding of which requires a radical overhaul of intellectual attitudes. Instead of relying upon human cognitive power, they, coincidentally, appeal to human affective faculties for a true understanding. Smith suggests that one may compare the understanding of human aspiration to the transcendent to the appreciation of poetry or art, the only difference being that the level of the former is even higher (Smith 1993: 221-223, 227-228). Tu, too, likens the comprehension of traditional Chinese wisdom to the art of listening.

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<sup>111</sup> See also Arif Dirlik’s acrimonious attack by applying this same term but with a very negative meaning (Dirlik 1995: 254, 262).

Only with a calm and attentive mind can one's ears be attuned to the sound of the ancient sages (Tu 1989b: 54-57). Faith or human religiosity in their presentation is a kind of art which demands a delicate spirit and sensibility to approach it. Smith and Tu work in different social and cultural milieux, and yet they observe the same intellectual problems that have dominated our modern mode of thinking, formulate compatible conceptual frameworks in their explorations, and arrive at very similar conclusions to these perennial human issues.

## VI. Concluding Remarks

There is no doubt that the external circumstance which Tu Weiming faces today is far more complex than those his New Confucian predecessors actually encountered or could even imagine. While adhering to a vision that affirms the centrality of human subjectivity and the importance of self-cultivation as a communal act, an article of faith passed down from Hsiung Shih-li (Xiong Shili 熊十力) and Mou Tsung-san (Mou Zongsan 牟宗三),<sup>112</sup> Tu has to figure out how to introduce it to a global context characterized by ethnic, cultural, ideological, and religious pluralism. His effort to redefine “cultural China” by expanding it to embrace members, either communities or individuals, that were not previously included should be seen as part of his general New Confucian agenda.

Also one step forward from his New Confucian predecessors is Tu's effort to reinterpret Confucian humanism in the presence of other world religions. Here the stern challenge is the issue of comparability and compatibility between them, given the fact that Confucianism has for long been consigned to a tradition of state

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<sup>112</sup> For an introduction to their philosophies, see Tu 1976: 242-275, Liu 2003: 57-72, 107-125, Berthrong 1994: 103-131, and Makeham 2003: 55-78.



institution, political ideology, social ethics, or scholasticism; as a religion, it has not yet obtained general intellectual consensus in our global community. To Tu's mind, Confucianism is able to assume an important position among world religions, just as it used to be so prominent among ancient world civilizations in the Axial Age (Tu 1989a: 337-340). But he needs to argue for his cause. His decision to examine Confucian religiosity from the internal perspective of this tradition, instead of dwelling upon the term or concept of religion by offering possible definitions, is strategically creative. It is in this connection that Wilfred C. Smith's theology of religion serves an illuminating and helpful function, as this article has attempted to demonstrate.

Many Chinese and Western scholars have recently tried to answer this question: Is Confucianism a religion? There are various responses and they are offered from different perspectives.<sup>113</sup> To this question, Tu would give an implicit yes but with qualifications. To use the Smithian expression, Confucianism, just like any other world religion, is not a religion recognized as a system of beliefs. It is a "religion" because it is a tradition laden with strong religiosity. And this religiosity is best found among Confucian followers who have manifested their "faith" in their mind-and-heart.

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<sup>113</sup> A complete listing would be too numerous. Some notable examples are: Chen 1999, Huang 1997, Wang 1994, Neville 2000, Ching 1986, Taylor 1998, Berthrong 1998, and Tucker 1998.



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## 國外差旅心得報告(2007)

本人自93年8月1日起，獲得國科會之補助，進行為期三年題為「宗教經驗及其理論建構：以Wilfred C. Smith、Mircea Eliade、Ninian Smart為探討範例」之研究計畫。第三年因故延期八個月，至97年3月31日方結束研究。在屬於最後一階段的研究期間，本人利用資助參與國際會議之經費，參加2007年12月9-11日於德國柏林Humboldt University 召開，主題為“Symposium on Foundations of Taoist Ritual”之學術會議。本人在會議中發表題為“Preserving the One and Residing in Harmony: Daoist Connections in Zhu Xi’s Instruction for Breath Control”之論文。

按本次會議係Humboldt University之常志靜教授(Florian C. Reiter)所主持，目的在召集世界各地之道教學者，集聚一堂，專門以「儀式」(ritual)為主題，進行小規模、閉門式的密集討論。本人的專長雖非屬道教，但能有幸受邀參加，被要求從儒家傳統或觀點切入，提供跨宗教的不同觀點，藉以拓展討論的視域和範疇。同性質的道教研討會議已舉開過兩次，本次為系列會議的第三次。

本人在此次會議收穫頗豐，難得有機會向不少道教學者如John Lagerwey, Steven R. Bonkenkamp, Terry F. Kleeman等人請益，獲益匪淺。尤有甚者，因為本人的研究主題為「宗教經驗」，正是利用此次機會聆聽道教學者對此議題之高見，為本人的理論研究加入許多實例，以收驗證之效果。

本人所發表之論文謹附於後。

**Preserving the One and Residing in Harmony:  
Daoist Connections in Zhu Xi's  
*Instruction for Breath Regulation***

守一處和：朱子《調息箴》與道教的關係

Yen-zen Tsai  
Graduate Institute of Religious Studies  
National Chengchi University

鼻端有白，我其觀之。隨時隨處，容與猗移。靜極而噓，如春沼魚。動極而翕，如百蟲蟄。氤氳開闢，奇妙無窮。孰其尸之，不幸之功。雲卧天行，非予敢議。守一處和，千二百歲。

朱熹，《朱子文集》，卷八十五，〈調息箴〉

A white spot is on the tip of my nose, and I concentrate myself upon it. Whenever and wherever I move around, my countenance gracefully matches with it. In extreme serenity, I breathe like a swamp fish in the spring. In quick movement, I shut my breath like hundreds of insects in dormancy. The mist expands and contracts; its subtlety is inscrutable. Can anyone claim responsibility for this kind of transformation? It is the credit of the One Who Does Not Govern. The cloud lies [leisurely] and the sky moves [regularly]; that is something I dare not comment upon. If I preserve the One and reside in harmony [with it], I shall live twelve-hundred years of age.

## I. Introduction

It is commonly agreed that Neo-Confucianism arose in face of the great challenges of Buddhism and Daoism which had co-existed with this mainstream tradition for hundreds of years. In defense against the two “heresies,” however, the so-called orthodox Neo-Confucians exposed themselves, consciously or unconsciously, to the influence of their opponents. Very few Neo-Confucians, it is also observed, could resist the temptation of Buddhist and Daoist teachings while asserting their own Confucian identity.<sup>1</sup> The practice of *jingzuo* 靜坐, quiet-sitting, was a prominent case in point. It was derived from Buddhist and Daoist connections

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<sup>1</sup> For a general introduction to the syncretic tendency of Neo-Confucianism, see Jiang Yibin, *Songdai rushi tiaohelun ji paifolun zhi yanjin: Wang Anshi zhi rongtong rushi ji Cheng Zhu xuepai zhi paifo fanwang* (Taipei: Shangwu, 1988).

but prevalent among Neo-Confucians.<sup>2</sup> It became so popular that even Zhu Xi (1130-1200), spokesman for Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, practiced it and taught his students to follow suit.<sup>3</sup> His famous dictum that “half-a-day study and half-a-day quiet-sitting make one progress”<sup>4</sup> was often quoted to indicate the Master’s sponsorship for this exercise. Indeed, quiet-sitting as an important term appears frequently in the works of Zhu Xi and other Neo-Confucian scholars in the Song and Ming periods.<sup>5</sup>

Curiously, although Neo-Confucians were fond of quiet-sitting, only a limited number of pieces of literature were expressly devoted to the discussion of it.<sup>6</sup> These works either have *jingzuo* or *tiaoxi* 調息 (breath regulation) in their title, but the subject they describe is often short or vague. Not much is talked about with respect to its actual proceeding, and rarely is its method mentioned. As a result, we know of this practice by name much more than by its content. Why then did Neo-Confucians write so little about quiet-sitting or breath regulation which they practiced so much? Why were they so reserved? Was the feature of obscurity intentional or not? How did they feel when they were engaged in this exercise? Were there any observable physical characteristics? Were there concrete methods of cultivation by which the practitioner could follow or be trained? If yes, what were they? If not, why not? These are legitimate questions one would raise. This paper does not mean to answer all the questions. Rather, centering upon Zhu Xi and his *Tiaoxi zhen* 調息箴 (Instruction for Breath Regulation) as an illustrative example, it aims at exploring the cultural and religious environment in which quiet-sitting was conceived and practiced. It will analyze tensions that exist between Confucian and Buddhism and Daoism, quietude and activity, unmanifest and manifest, and private meditation and public ritual. These tensions, I will argue, are important elements that shed light on the understanding of Zhu Xi’s *Instruction* and other works of similar nature.

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<sup>2</sup> Wm. Theodore de Bary, “Introduction,” in idem, *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 17; Judith A. Berling, *The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 105-109.

<sup>3</sup> *Zhuzi wenji* 朱子文集 (Taipei: Yuchen, 2000) 46, “Fifth letter to Pan Shudu,” “Fifth letter to Pan Shuchang,” 51, “Tenth letter to Huang Zigeng; *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 (Taipei: Wenjin, ?) 116.

<sup>4</sup> *Zhuzi yulei* 116.

<sup>5</sup> Wing-tsit Chan, “Chu Hsi and Quiet Sitting,” in idem, *Chu Hsi: New Studies* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 255-270; Rodney L. Taylor, “The Sudden / Gradual Paradigm and Neo-Confucian Mind Cultivation,” in idem, *The Religious Dimension of Confucianism* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 77-91; idem, “Meditation and Ming Neo-Orthodoxy,” *ibid.*, 92-113.

<sup>6</sup> Some examples are Zhu Xi’s *Tiaoxi zhen* 調息箴 (Instruction for Breath Regulation), Wang Longxi’s 王龍溪 (1498-1583) *Tiaoxi fa* 調息法 (Method of Breath Regulation), Gao Panlong’s 高攀龍 (1562-1626) *Jingzuo shuo* 靜坐說 (Exposition of Quiet-sitting) and *Shu jingzuo shuo zhihou* 書靜坐說之後 (Supplement to Exposition of Quiet-sitting), and Liu Zongzhou’s 劉宗周 (1578-1645) *Jingzuo shuo* 靜坐說 (Exposition of Quiet-sitting).



## II. Tension between Confucianism and Buddhism and Daoism

Analogous to many of his predecessors and contemporaries, Zhu Xi had intimate relationships with Buddhism and Daoism. As his biographical accounts reveal, his early mentors like Liu Zihui 劉子翬 (Pingshan 屏山) and Hu Xian 胡憲 (Jixi 籍溪) took a great interest in these two religions. Under their guidance, Zhu Xi developed similar taste, engrossing himself in whatever teachings the two religions might offer. He thus read much Buddhist and Daoist literature, intercoursed with monks, and practiced Chan-like meditation. This lasted for more than ten years and contributed to an integral part of Zhu Xi's intellectual formation.<sup>7</sup>

At twenty-four, Zhu Xi met with Li Tong 李侗 (Yangping 延平), third-generation disciple of the Cheng brothers, orthodox transmitters of Neo-Confucianism. After some study with this new Confucian master, Zhu Xi returned to the Confucian tradition and began to realize that, in his own words, “the Buddhist instructions have gradually unfolded their hundreds of shortcomings and mistakes.”<sup>8</sup> In their stead, he found that “our Confucian tradition is great and profound; it is self-sufficient and without having to resort to outside help.”<sup>9</sup> At this turn and on the basis of his past syncretic experience, he launched his criticism against Buddhism and Daoism from comparative perspective.

Zhu Xi keenly observed that as long and great religious traditions, Buddhism and Daoism exhibited complicated dimensions. In the case of Buddhism, he distinguished three cognitive aspects: Buddhist philosophy (*foxue* 佛學), Buddhist practice (*fojiao* 佛教), and Chan 禪. In Zhu Xi's opinion, *foxue* takes emptiness as its ultimate reality, turns its back against familial and social order, and thus contradicts the fundamental value of Confucianism. *Fojiao* includes a variety of practices. While its ascetic cultivation and charitable activities may be beneficial to society, its extremity is reminiscent of the Moist School, contender of Confucianism in the Warring States period. Further, on the religious level, it tends to fall into superstition and deceive the ignorant populace. In comparison with *foxue* and *fojiao*, Zhu Xi regarded Chan as the most degenerative form of Buddhism. The Chan learning, according to him, was akin to that espoused by the Egoist Yang Zhu whom Mencius inveighed against mercilessly. It not only undermined human ethical relationships but thoroughly eradicated “rightness and principle” (*yili* 義理) upon which human cosmos could be possibly established.<sup>10</sup>

Zhu Xi applied this tripartite mode of observation to the evaluation of Daoism.

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<sup>7</sup> *Zhuzi yulu* 104; *Zhuzi wenji* 38, “Response to Jinag Yuanshi's Letter.”

<sup>8</sup> *Zhuzi yulu* 104.

<sup>9</sup> *Zhuzi yulu* 126.

<sup>10</sup> *Zhuzi yulu* 126; Jiang Yibin, *Sondai rushi tiaohelun ji paifolun zhi yanjin*, 6-7.

He opined that “quietude and non-action” (*qingjing wuwei* 清靜無爲) featured prominently in the original Daoism. This core idea was subsequently superseded by the pursuit of longevity and immortality. And in his own days, the Daoists were only concerned with shamanistic engagements (*wuzhu* 巫祝), taking no other interest than in apotropaic rites (*yanrang qidao* 厭禳祈禱).<sup>11</sup> He regretted that Daoism had gravely declined, leaving no qualified followers to talk about its philosophy. Lao Zi, then, was apotheosized unto the Three Purities (*sanqing* 三清), a slavish and deplorable imitation of the Buddhist Three Bodies (*sanshen* 三身). This three-stage development deviated from the original Daoist ideal, and its result was something even an orthodox Neo-Confucian like Zhu Xi would least like to see happen.<sup>12</sup>

From Zhu Xi’s diatribes against the Two Heresies, one senses that he was less severe toward Daoism than toward Buddhism. This may have something to do with the fact that the former was indigenously Chinese, while the latter was an alien, imported product. Cultural and nationalist sentiment may have affected his intellectual predilection.<sup>13</sup> (Let’s remember that as far as the history of Neo-Confucianism is concerned, Han Yu, initiator of Confucian revival in the Tang Dynasty, took Buddhism not Daoism as his primary enemy.) In actuality, although Zhu Xi returned to the Neo-Confucian pen after having wandered in the heterodox world for years, he still maintained deep interest in Daoist ideas and writings. An obvious evidence was that in his old age, he arduously engaged himself in collating different versions of the *Zhouyi cantongqi* 周易參同契 and *Yinfu jing* 陰符經, two foundational canons of religious Daoism.<sup>14</sup> The former book is particularly cogent and significant, because it serves as an important background against which Zhu Xi’s *Instruction for Breath Regulation* can be understood.

Zhu Xi was fully aware that the *Zhouyi cantongqi*, allegedly to have been authored by a mysterious Wei Boyang 魏伯陽 in the Latter Han, was not an exegetical writing of *Yi* 易, one of the Confucian Classics. It was a book devoted to the explication of *najia* 納甲, divinatory method combining the exercise of trigrams, hexagrams and other cosmic principles. Daoist shamans used this text as a manual to develop their craft, and it became an indispensable source from and by which many Daoists cultivated their “inner alchemy.” In a true sense, the book was closely related to the deteriorated aspects of Daoism which Zhu Xi vehemently attacked. He justified his intellectual interest, however, by saying that this book might not be a direct exposition of *Yi*, it nevertheless touched the gist of the latter. It could establish itself as a source of discourse without diminishing the canonical status of *Yi*. Besides, the text

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<sup>11</sup> *Zhuzi yulu* 125.

<sup>12</sup> *Zhuzi yulu* 125.

<sup>13</sup> Jiang Yibin, *Sondai rushi tiaohelun ji paifolun zhi yanjin*, 8.

<sup>14</sup> Su Jingnan, *Zhu Zi dazhuan* (Xiamen?: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe, 1992), ch. 23, pp?

was beautifully written and as such merited much appreciation.<sup>15</sup>

At this point, Zhu Xi seems to have expressed a complex feeling toward Daoism. In the first place, he upheld philosophical Daoism, cherishing the main ideas presented by such original thinkers as Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi. Secondly, he disapproved vulgar religious practices that were circulating among common people. Thirdly, syncretic texts such as the *Zhouyi cantongqi* which was utilized for religious purposes but contained Confucian canonical elements deserved special treatment. His early involvement in Buddhist and Daoist teachings tended to strengthen this last persuasion. These three layers of concern should be easily understood in a context where intermingling of different religious ideas and practices became a norm. But as a stout defender of Confucian orthodoxy, Zhu Xi had to be clear about his position although, in practice, this might be difficult to achieve. This explained why, after completing his textual research on the *Zhouyi cantongqi*, on the cover of the new book he superscribed an alias, *Kongtong daoshi zouxin* 空同道士鄒訢, for the publication purpose. He might be hesitant that revealing his real name could bring people's suspicion about his position and hence denigrate his true Confucian identity.

The alias *Kongtong daoshi* does divulge Zhu Xi's intention. In the *Zhuangzi*, Kongtong is an imaginary mountain where the Daoist immortal Guangcheng Zi 廣成子, aged twelve-hundred years, dwells and gives lecture on physical cultivation to the Yellow Emperor.<sup>16</sup> This Guangcheng Zi might be fictional, but as an ideal Daoist figure, he was widely received in the popular imagination. He, too, appeared quite often in Zhu Xi's poems composed in his old years.<sup>17</sup> Zhu Xi employed him to represent the highest Daoist spiritual state where longevity and harmony reign supreme. It is doubtful that one could attain it through physical cultivation, but Kongtong, Guangcheng Zi, and physical longevity became robust images that captured Zhu Xi's mind and were incorporated into many of his writings, including his *Instruction for the Breath Regulation*.

### III. Tension between Quietude and Activity

Zhu Xi opens his verse-like *Instruction* with the directive that the adept should concentrate himself by focusing upon an imaginary white spot on the tip of his nose. This is undoubtedly a concrete methodological instruction intended to calm the

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<sup>15</sup> “此雖非爲明《易》而設，然《易》中無所不有，苟其言自成一家，可推而通，則亦無害於《易》。...《參同契》文章極好，蓋後漢之能文者爲之。...言誦之久，則文義要訣自見。” Zhu Xi, *Zhouyi cantongqi kaoyi* (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 1988), 4-6.

<sup>16</sup> *Zhuangzi*, “Zaiyou.”

<sup>17</sup> *Zhuzi wenji* 9, “Ni xuanbu yichong mingqiu shi”; *ibid.*, “Kongtong fu”; 84, “Wei Guangcheng zi xiang tishi”; 85, “Tiaoxi zhen.”

practitioner's mind and balance his physical posture. This first technical step seems to have been shared by the Buddhist and Daoist meditative traditions,<sup>18</sup> and Zhu Xi felt no qualm to follow the general convention.

However, Zhu Xi goes on to express that whenever and wherever the quiet-sitting practitioner moves around, his countenance should gracefully match with the concentrated spot. Zhu Xi does not spell out how one could achieve that, but his instruction tends to turn away from the ordinary practice that often lingers upon quietude itself. His focus is no longer on quiet-sitting per se but on the possibility of applying the tranquil, balanced posture to whatever situation one might happen to be in. Quietude was not his utmost concern. On the contrary, as his other writings indicate, he showed a very critical attitude toward the Buddhist *chanzuo* 禪坐, disparaging the idea to sit in quietude solely for the sake of quiet-sitting.<sup>19</sup> He lamented that the unsophisticated were misled to the enjoyment of breath control, even to the tragic end in suffocation.<sup>20</sup> He warned that “empty quietness” (*xujing* 虛靜), characteristic of Chan and Daoist meditation, was the state one should avoid to fall into.<sup>21</sup>

Quiet-sitting was meant to bring one's mind and spirit into calmness, just like breath regulation served to reduce mental distraction, and yet it should be counterbalanced by activity. Zhu Xi disagreed with both the Buddhist pursuit of *dhyāna* and Daoist fondness of “breath counting” (*shuxi* 數息) at the expense of ignoring one's daily responsibilities. Their common defect was quite evident: they were capable of being quiet, but incapable of taking action.<sup>22</sup> If Zhu Xi would instruct his students to practice quiet-sitting or exercise breath control, the purpose was to train them to be ready to act. In Zhu Xi's scholarly world, quiet-sitting was a preliminary step that helped one advance into serious study; it functioned only as a “supporting role.”<sup>23</sup>

To Zhu Xi's mind, quietude and activity were mutually complementary. By adopting rich imagery and oxymoronic expression, his *Instruction* hints that in extreme serenity, vital energy could dart forth like “a swamp fish in the spring,” and that in quick movement, one could remain in tranquility like “hundreds of insects in dormancy.” The mutual reversal and interpenetration of quietude and activity is indeed inscrutable, the subtlety of which can only be likened to the unpredictable transformations of mist in the natural world.

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<sup>18</sup> See 《大智度論》卷七；《續道藏》，〈太一金華〉，「以兩目諦觀鼻端，正身安坐，繫心緣中。」

<sup>19</sup> *Zhuzi wenji* 62, “Seventh Letter to Zhang Yuande”; *Zhuzi yulei*, 115.

<sup>20</sup> *Zhuzi yulei* 125, “Lun xiuyang.”

<sup>21</sup> Qian Mu, *Zhuzi xin xuean* (Taipei: Sanmin, 1971), vol. 2, 285.

<sup>22</sup> *Zhuzi yulei* 126.

<sup>23</sup> Rodney L. Taylor, *The Confucian Way of Contemplation: Okada Takehiko and the Tradition of Quiet-Sitting* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 15-18, 36-41.

Zhu Xi in his *Yulei* 語類 thus expounds:

Before one begins to exercise one's mind, one is quiet; but when one responds to the external things, one is active. In quietness, one senses [ the presence of ] *li* / principle, and thereupon activity occurs. In activity, one is harmonized with *li* / principle, and therein lies quietude.<sup>24</sup>

Accordingly what is crucial is not how technically the adept could master the meditative method, but rather how he could see quietude and activity as two sides of one reality. Further, neither the practitioner should be instructed to concentrate upon quietude, but rather to realize that *jing* 敬 (reverence or seriousness) should take precedence over all other things. Without reverence, quietude is in vain. Zhu Xi affirmed that “reverence penetrates activity and quietude. Once one understands this, then there is no disruption between the two, and there is no need to distinguish between them.”<sup>25</sup> Therefore one sees a progressive line in Zhu Xi's *Instruction*: from concrete method to theoretical exposition, from quietude to activity and to their mutuality, and from visible action to the examination of one's inner motive.

#### IV. Tension between Unmanifest and Manifest

Zhu Xi's *Instruction* is evidently tintured with Daoist flavor. When he is awed by the variegated and mysterious transformations of nature, he attributes its inscrutable subtlety to the One Who Does not Govern. Here the One is recognized as an unknown power behind the cosmos. It is the generator that enables the cloud and the sky to move or stop without the intention to claim its sovereignty. The concept or image of this powerful, non-interfering One is derived from the *Laozi*.<sup>26</sup> Lao Zi in this text of his namesake equates the One with *dao*, the Way, regarding it the ultimate principle by which myriads of things come to be. He emphasizes the importance of *baoyi* 抱一, embracing the One, or *deyi* 得一, obtaining the One, in order to live in great harmony with oneself and one's environment.

Based upon the Daoist allusion, Zhu Xi goes further to translate the One into a psychological term. As far as quiet-sitting is concerned, he argues that it is essential for the practitioner to *shouyi* 守一, to preserve the One, or *zhuyi* 主一, to honor the One. He is not talking about seeking for the pervasive *dao* in the universe as implied in the *Laozi*. Rather, he is advising the practitioner to concentrate upon himself or “to

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<sup>24</sup> *Zhuzi yulei* 104, “Zilun weixue gongfu.” (“未發念時靜，應物時動；靜而理感亦有動，動而理安亦有靜”)

<sup>25</sup> *Zhuzi wenji* 62, “Seventh Letter to Zhang Yuande.”

<sup>26</sup> *Laozi*, chs. 10, 22, 39.

recollect his own body and mind” (*shoulian shenxin* 收斂身心), to use his other expression.<sup>27</sup> By that he means, in concrete prescriptions, “no misdemeanor, no frivolity, but tidiness and seriousness.”<sup>28</sup> In other words, preserving the One is to rectify one’s attitude and keeps one’s mental state in balance. It is a demand to look introspectively into one’s mind-heart so that one’s activity, if rightly triggered, would not deviate from the Way. The emphasis upon this concept, then, aligns well with the aforementioned *jing* 敬, reverence. As Zhu Xi testifies, honoring the One is no more than the practice of reverence.<sup>29</sup> Once the adept, in Zu Xi’s pedagogical agenda, preserves his mind and dwells in reverence, he would expel his anxieties and reach the state of quietude. Thus *shouyi* 守一 is the cause, which leads to *jing* 靜, quietude and harmony, the desired result.

Zhu Xi in his *Instruction* takes “preserving the One and residing in harmony” seriously, to the degree of alluding to the Daoist mythology and insinuating the hope for physical immortality. This combination of spiritual ideal and mundane longing, contrasted against his orthodox Confucian belief, has a paradoxical connotation and is itself simultaneously attractive and repugnant. The view toward body in the Confucian tradition consists of three aspects: *xing* 形/ appearance, *qi* 氣/ energy, and *xin* 心 / mind. Although these three are intimately interconnected, it is assumed that only by subtle cultivation of one’s consciousness or mind that one’s vital force can be nourished and one’s appearance beautified. Mind or spirit, in this context, takes precedence over and weighs more heavily than form and material.<sup>30</sup> Zhu Xi, akin to his Neo-Confucian predecessors, subscribed to this view and adopted it in his discussion of quiet-sitting.<sup>31</sup> He insists that as far as physical cultivation is concerned, mind is of utmost importance while energy or body is supplementary.<sup>32</sup> He is aware that quiet-sitting is beneficial to physical health, as he personally experienced and would recommend it to his friend.<sup>33</sup> But he is opposed to taking delight in its elaborate technicality. In his judgment, the prevailing craze for “the method of breath regulation only touches upon the ‘circulation of air’ (*xiaoxi* 消息), indeed an inferior engagement.”<sup>34</sup> What he regards more highly is the cultivation of human mind where the One resides. This is the fundamental view he adheres to in summarizing the gist of the *Zhouyi cantongqi* as the exposition of *jingqi* 精氣, energy-force, which is

<sup>27</sup> *Zhuzi wenji* 46, “Fifth Letter to Pan Shuchang.”

<sup>28</sup> *Zhuzi yulei* 116, “Xunmen ren si.” (“不要放肆，不要戲慢，整齊嚴肅”)

<sup>29</sup> *Zhuzi yulei* 116, “Xunmen ren si.” (“主一便是敬”)

<sup>30</sup> See Yang Rubin, *Rujia shenti guan* (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan wenzhesuo, 2004), esp. 1-26.

<sup>31</sup> Yang Rubin, “Songru de jingzuoshuo,” *Taiwan zhexue yanjiu* 4 (2004), 39-86.

<sup>32</sup> *Zhuzi yulei* 125.

<sup>33</sup> *Zhuzi wenji* 46, “Fifth Letter to Pan Shudu” and “Fifth Letter to Pan Shuchang”; 51, “Ten Letter to Huang Zigeng.”

<sup>34</sup> *Zhuzi yulei* 125. (“其導引法，只知消息，皆是下策。”)

galvanized and processed by *shen* 神, spirit, alternative name for mind.<sup>35</sup> If one understands the order of their priority, it is possible that “once I return to my root and draw near to my mind, preserving the One without abandoning it, I could live for long.”<sup>36</sup>

In a nutshell, what Zhu Xi is concerned with is the unmanifest state of human mind, a state before one’s “joy, anger, sadness, and happiness are aroused.”<sup>37</sup> The practice of quiet-sitting, with such manifest phenomena as smooth circulation of one’s vital force and progress of one’s physical health, is intended to reach this goal. Orthodox Neo-Confucians since the time of the Cheng brothers have actually advocated this philosophy.<sup>38</sup> And now Zhu Xi inherited it and particularly emphasized the importance of obtaining the unmanifest state, regarded as *li* 理 or principle, before anything else. This explains why Zhu Xi may have instructed his student to practice quiet-sitting but with reservation. What he wanted was to make sure that the practitioner was sensitive to the distinction between *benti* 本體 / original substance, the end, and *gongfu* 功夫 / physical effort, the means. It is only when the former was grasped, engaging in the latter would make sense.

## V. Tension between Private Meditation and Public Ritual

Kristofer Schipper observed that “Inner Alchemy is an individual practice, but it is a synthesis of all earlier rituals and is also integrated into liturgy as part of the meditation of the Great Master.”<sup>39</sup> Isabelle Robinet echoed a similar idea, stressing that the Daoist meditation has maintained “for a long time an equilibrium between individual religious experience and its communal form.”<sup>40</sup> Inner Alchemy or the Daoist meditation, in their opinion, involves personal esoteric experience on the one hand and, on the other, contains communal liturgical intricacies. Thus it is not merely a practice of mindful concentration, but a religious pursuit of “obtaining the Supreme Tao (Dao).”<sup>41</sup>

Zhu Xi’s *Instruction* indicates the casual and non-institutionalized characters of quiet-sitting. It is a physical exercise to be practiced by individuals whenever and wherever they think fit. No hint is given that the entire Confucian community is called into participation, nor is it regarded as a public ritual. In terms of physical position,

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<sup>35</sup> Zhu Xi, *Zhouyi cantongqi kaoyi* (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 1988), 32.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. ? “歸根返元，近在我心，不離己身，抱一毋舍(捨)，可以長存。” (cf. note S6)

<sup>37</sup> *Zhuzi yulei* 103.

<sup>38</sup> Qian Mu, *Zhuzi xin xuean*, vol. 2, 123.

<sup>39</sup> Kristofer Schipper, *Taoist Body*, tr. Karen C. Duval (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 152.

<sup>40</sup> Isabelle Robinet, *Taoist Meditation: The Mao-shan Tradition of Great Purity*, tr. Julian F. Pas and Norman J. Girardot (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), 229.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

there are no strict prescriptions. Full-lotus, half-lotus, or simply any form of relaxed sitting is acceptable. In this sense, as Wm. T. de Bary argued, the Confucian quiet-sitting aims at “the examination of conscience...but without mystical overtones.”<sup>42</sup> Judith Berling likewise concluded that the Confucian quiet-sitting is dominated by ethical and rational considerations, and that although it borrows techniques from Buddhism and Daoism, it is non-religious in nature.<sup>43</sup>

The personal and non-religious character of Confucian quiet-sitting seems obvious, in contrast to its Daoist or Buddhist counterpart. In practical exercise, however, their distinction may not be that clear. For one thing, Zhu Xi may have repudiated Buddhism and Daoism, he did not stop communicating with figures in these Two Heresies. He enjoyed the *Zhouyi cantongqi* and *Yinfu jing* not only for their affinity with *Yi*, hence intellectually traversing satisfactorily in their shared metaphysical realm, but also for their religious elements that have been widely practiced in society.<sup>44</sup> According to Wing-tsit Chan, Zhu Xi was actually very religious. He believed the existence of gods and spirits. On numerous occasions he celebrated public rituals, particularly offering prayers to the supernatural powers for communal welfare.<sup>45</sup> Patricia B. Ebrey’s study of Zhu Xi’s *Family Rituals* 家禮 also confirmed that Zhu Xi could not escape from the influence of the popular religious practices of his times. By reconstituting the rites of cappings, weddings, funerals, and ancestral sacrifices, he hoped “to promote the practice of rituals modeled on revered Confucian sources to combat the practice of Buddhist rites or other rites that could not be interpreted as Confucian.”<sup>46</sup> One has to add that, however, these ceremonies were designed in close relation to ordinary life, without the intention to indulge them in the manner of such extreme religious acts as “dancing, trances, or violence.”<sup>47</sup>

In this historical, social, and religious context, the Confucian quiet-sitting easily appeared as a suspicious practice. Zhu Xi would like to see it as a private physical exercise leading to the quiescence of mind; it was a preparatory step upon which the Confucian goal to realize the heavenly principle and to materialize it in the mundane world was anticipated. But due to its connection with Buddhist and Daoist meditations, some practitioners might not be able to discriminate between them and therefore practiced it as a religious rite. Its emphasis on the pursuit of the One in the

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<sup>42</sup> Wm. Theodore de Bary, “Neo-Confucian Cultivation and the Seventeenth-Century ‘Enlightenment,’” in idem, *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism*, 175.

<sup>43</sup> Judith A. Berling, *The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en*, 105-109.

<sup>44</sup> On account of this, Fan Shoukang regretted that Zhu Xi, although wise, fell into superstition nevertheless. See his *Zhuxi jiqi zhexue* (Taipei: Kaiming shudian, 1964), 244-249.

<sup>45</sup> Wing-tsit Chan, “Zhuxi zhi zongjiao shijian,” in idem, *Zhuxue lunwenji* (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1982), 181-204.

<sup>46</sup> Patricia Buckley Ebrey, *Chu Hsi’s Family Rituals* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), xv.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, xxvi.



pre-stirred mental state likely pushed its devotees to the mystical realm.<sup>48</sup> As Rodney L. Taylor demonstrated, this actually happened in the Neo-Confucian tradition, especially conspicuously so in the Ming period when quiet-sitting was practiced as “insight experience” or a process toward enlightenment.<sup>49</sup> Thus a careful reading of Zhu Xi’s *Instruction* against this complicated background also highlights its inner tension between quiet-sitting as a private act and as a public ritual.

Catherine Bell suggested that meditation should be classed as a “ritual-like behavior.” Unlike ordinary ritual acts, it does not exhibit symbolic meaning or is not “related to explicit doctrinal ideas.”<sup>50</sup> Rather, it “is a better example of the way in which invariant practice is meant to evoke disciplined control for the purposes of self-cultivation.”<sup>51</sup> Seen against this theory, Zhu Xi’s quiet-sitting or breath regulation seems to fall out of the proposed category. As his *Instruction* shows, the Confucian meditation is not a regimented act but a relaxed one. It does not involve public discipline, nor is it enforced by strict rules. Its primary concern is not with the body but with the attainment of one’s mental equilibrium and spiritual harmony. It requires intentionality for sure, but intentionality as brought up from one’s self-awareness rather than from external demands. In this way the Confucian quiet-sitting not only refuses to be likened to the Buddhist and Daoist meditations, it also rejects being treated as something like a ritual.

## VI. Concluding Remarks

Zhu Xi’s *Instruction for Breath Regulation*, vague and reserved in expression, is crucial for our understanding of the Confucian quiet-sitting in general. Our discussion above indicates that the syncretic context in which Neo-Confucianism interacted with Buddhism and Daoism in the Song period substantially determines the nature of this physical exercise. Orthodox Neo-Confucian scholars like Zhu Xi were heatedly opposed to the Two Heresies, but they were nevertheless influenced by their rivals, consciously or unconsciously, in many respects. Almost all of them studied Buddhist and Daoist texts and took a great interest in their spiritual or religious practices, meditation was just a case in point. This paradoxical attitude sets the basic tone in Zhu Xi’s *Instruction*.

As we have found, more tensions exist in the *Instruction*. Zhu Xi taught his

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<sup>48</sup> Julia Ching, “What Is Confucian Spirituality?” in *Confucianism: The Dynamics of Tradition*, ed. Irene Eber (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 63-80.

<sup>49</sup> Rodney L. Taylor, “Meditation and Ming Neo-Orthodoxy,” in idem, *The Religious Dimensions of Confucianism* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 92-113.

<sup>50</sup> Catherine Bell, *Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1997), 151.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 152.

students to practice quiet-sitting, but he alerted them to the danger of falling into “empty quietness.” By way of calming the mind, his real goal was to guide them to do daily activities in the right way, a fundamental concern that the authentic Confucian follower cannot ignore. Even in the quiet-sitting itself, Zhu Xi was conscious of the different levels or stages involved. What he cared was not the discipline of one’s physical body or the control of one’s breath but the rectification of one’s mind before the state of being aroused. Form or appearance is posed against mind or spirit, and the former is supposed to yield to the latter. Here Zhu Xi made a clear distinction between means and end. Furthermore, Zhu Xi would like to treat quiet-sitting purely as a private physical act conducted in a casual manner. This was a sharp contrast with the Daoist meditation which contained ritualistic elements and mystical connotations. These tensions, I would propose, account for the characteristics of vagueness and reservedness of Zhu Xi’s *Instruction*. They are also important features that one has to take into careful consideration as far as the interpretation of the Confucian quiet-sitting is concerned.

Last but not least, if the Confucian quiet-sitting is simultaneously similar to and different from the Buddhist and Daoist meditations, how do we assign it to an appropriate interpretive category for comparative purposes? Chen Lai, discussing the Confucian quiet-sitting in the context of Western theories of mysticism, argued that because this physical exercise lays its focus upon the subjective mind and sets its goal on the attainment of a spiritual state, it can be termed “experiential metaphysics.”<sup>52</sup> Yang Rubin further explained that Neo-Confucianism highly emphasizes human intuitive intellect, regarding it as the key by and from which unity between humanity and heaven would become possible. This philosophical insight is not broached out of theoretical interest, but as a realizable possibility that can be verified by concrete physical experience.<sup>53</sup> Put in this light, the Confucian quiet-sitting, not an equivalent of Buddhist or Daoist meditation, mystical engagement, or religious ritual but closely related to all of them, may deserve a new category of its own. And “experiential metaphysics” proposed by Chen and Yang may serve as a heuristic starting point for our further consideration.

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<sup>52</sup> Chen Lai, “Xinxue chuantongzhong de shenmi zhuyi wenti,” in idem *Youwuzhijing: Wang Yangming zhaxue de jing shen* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 390-415.

<sup>53</sup> Yang Rubin, “Xinrujia yu mingqizhuyi,” in *Dangdai xinrujia de guanhuai yu chaoyue*, ed. Chen Dehe (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 1997), 317-363.