

# 行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫期中進度報告

計畫名稱： 麥道爾論自我、身體、意義與世界

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## (一) 中英摘要

### 1. 中文摘要

本計畫第一年度主題為「麥道爾的自我觀」，主要議題為「What exactly is McDowell's view on self? Is it justifiable?」，研究成果包括期刊論文一篇：「A Shaping of the Intellect: McDowell's Self in Mind and World」（台大文史哲學報，No.70, pp.269-289.( THCI Core)）；指導碩士論文兩篇（翟君剛：Disjunctivism and Illusion。鄭會穎：World and Subject: Themes from McDowell）；開授相關主題研究所課程一門。

第二年度（本年度）研究的主軸為探討麥道爾用以支持「心靈與世界相互滲透，心靈不是一個封閉的內在空間」的三個論證：(1) 單稱思想的對象依憑性、(2) 經驗的選言模式 (a disjunctive model of experience)、(3) 真思想與事實等同理論。本年特別著重在探討麥道爾思想中的幾個重要概念：minimal empiricism, spontaneity, receptivity, the space of reason and second nature。直接的研究成果呈現在三篇會議論文中：「Fine-grained argument and propositional conceptualism」（Conference on Neo-Pragmatism, Institute of European and American Studies, Academic Sinica, 2010.01), "Conceptualism, objectivity and false experience"（AAP 2010 Philosophy Conference, Australasian Association of Philosophy. 2010.07）以及 "Experience outruns empirical belief but remains conceptual"（科學、文化、生命--2009 年度學術研討會，台灣哲學學會. 2009.10. 同文一個較早的版本發表於『批判與反思』研讀會，台灣哲學學會2009.08）。此外，本文同時也指導研究生學位論文數篇，其中與本研究主題直接間接相關的包括：【經驗，語言，思想：賽拉斯的意向性理論】（博士論文）、【經驗主義的第三個教條——終點或第六個里程碑】（碩士論文）、【在多大程度上心靈是展延的？】（碩士論文）、【學生地球與內容的寬窄】（碩士論文）。此外，本人也在研究所開設「經驗與理性」探討Davidson與McDowell在本研究主題上的思想。

關鍵詞：邁道爾、自我、身體、世界

## 2. Abstract

The subject of the first year of the three-year research project is “McDowell’s conception of self”. The main question I addressed is “What exactly is McDowell’s view on self? Is it justifiable?” The research has the following as the results: (1) a paper, “A Shaping of the Intellect: McDowell’s Self in Mind and World”, published in *Humanitas Taiwanica* (forthcoming in June, 2009); (2) supervises two master theses: *Disjunctivism and Illusion*, by Chai, and *World and Subject: Themes from McDowell*, by Cheng.

The main theme of the second year of the research is to explore and evaluate the three arguments that McDowell uses to support that thesis that mind and world are interpenetrative and that mind is not closed inner space: (1) de reness of singular thought; (2) a disjunctive model of experience ∨ (3) the identity thesis of truth belief and fact. We focus on the following concepts of McDowell’s: minimal empiricism, spontaneity, receptivity, the space of reason and second nature. The research has the following as its direct results:

First, three conference papers: “Fine-grained argument and propositional conceptualism” (Conference on Neo-Pragmatism, Institute of European and American Studies, Academic Sinica, 2010.01), "Conceptualism, objectivity and false experience" (AAP 2010 Philosophy Conference, Australasian Association of Philosophy. 2010.07) and "Experience outruns empirical belief but remains conceptual" (Science, Culture, Life -- 2009 Annual Conference of TPA, 2009/10) .

Secondly, supervising the following degree theses: 1. “Experience, Language, Thoguht: Sellars’ Theory of Intentionality” (doctoral thesis); 2. “The third dogma of empiricism – the end or the sixth milestone” (MA thesis); 3. “To what extend is mind extended?” (MA thesis); 4. “Twin Earth and the Width of Content” (MA thesis).

Thirdly, running the seminar course “Experience and Reason” which concerns Davidson and McDowell’s thoughts on the subject matters of this research.

Keywords: McDowell, self, world

## (二) 報告內容

### 1. 前言以及研究目的

The main purpose of this research project is to attribute, by way of an explication, McDowell with the three ideas as follows:

- (1) The integration of body and self (intellect)
- (2) The integration of meaning (value) and self (agency)
- (3) The integration of self , body, mind and world

### 2. 第一年研究

#### (1) 主題及成果

第一年年度計畫主題為「麥道爾的自我觀」，本研究選定的議題是「What exactly is McDowell's view on self? Is it justifiable?」，更具體地說，本研究探究以下問題「麥道爾以下這六個對於自我的刻劃彼此之間是一致的嗎？麥道爾有沒有什麼理據支持它們？」

1. A self is a bodily presence in the world (*MW*: 91n5 & 103);
2. A self is shaped through *Bildung* and part of one's second nature (*MW*: 95). In other words, a self is connected to a form of life (*MW*: 103 & 2002: 297)
3. A self is a commonsense, ordinary object (*MW*: 99), and thus is specified in largely third person terms (*MW*: 102).
4. A self is a being that has some form of diachronic identity (*MW*: 99);
5. A self is a being that is substantial, i.e., has a non-consciousness-bound persistence (*MW*: 101);
6. A self is more than a merely formal or subjective point of view (*MW*: 101).

如同筆者在計畫書裡所陳述的，在這是一個棘手的問題。舉例來說，麥道爾如同 Descartes, Locke 以及 Kant 都同意，“in the “I think” that can “accompany all my representations”, the reference of the “I” is understood as reaching into the past and future”，但是這個主張與上述他對於自我的第1. 3. 4點就不是看起來那麼相容的。這個相容性的問題可以被持續提出，特別是涉及第一人稱知識的權威性時。任何涉及麥道爾的看法的探究都非常困難，所幸我們將以本人「語意外部論者 --

麥道爾、布蘭登與戴維森」計畫的相關研究成果為基礎，直接切入此年度計畫主題進行研究。

本人在第一年研究的同時也由指導兩位研究生相關主題的研究：“Disjunctivism and Illusion”以及“The Mutual Dependence of Meaning and Self – An Extension of McDowell’s ‘Openness’ Claim””。這兩個碩士論文的重心都是邁道爾哲學，而兩位學生是公認台灣近年來最優秀的哲學學生，此刻他們正在撰寫論文及準備出國留學，我們可以期待他們是我國哲學界未來的優秀人才。

更具體而言，第一年的研究計畫成果分成三部分，一是期刊的發表，二是碩士論文的指導，另一是研究所課程的開設，茲分別簡要說明如下：

#### A. 期刊發表

本年度研究的主要成果呈現於本人“A Shaping of the Intellect: McDowell’s Self in *Mind and World*”一文中，該文於2009年6月於《台大文史哲學報》第70期刊出。為呈現該文與本研究計畫的相關性特列其摘要如下：

This paper ventures to propose a McDowellian account of self by articulating a rationale underpinning McDowell’s conception of self. The rationale identified and explored is also the one McDowell offers for the objectivity and intentionality of experience, which is the coordinating theme that McDowell performs in *Mind and World*. More specifically, I advocate two theses: (1) McDowell’s assurance on the objectivity of experience can be extended to the objectivity of our “intellectual life” and the norms governing our ways of thinking and doing. (2) McDowell’s assurance would endorse or, at least strongly suggest, a conception of self in which a self has to be conceived not only as an embodied self in the empirical world, but also as a self with intellectual life in the realm of reasons. This is a kind of hybrid view on self, but the hybrid account McDowell would endorse is much richer than mere inseparability of one’s consciousness and one’s body. It is in fact saying that it is impossible for one to isolate oneself from one’s body (hence the empirical world it resides), one’s personal intellectual life (created by self-decisions in responding to the demands issued by the space of reason and those imposed by the empirical world) and the space of reason created socially and cumulated historically.

#### B. 碩士論文指導

本年度本人指導兩位研究生完成與研究主題相關之碩士論文：

1. 翟君剛：Disjunctivism and Illusion
2. 鄭會穎：World and Subject: Themes from McDowell

翟君剛同學今年申請到英國University of warwick哲學系，該校並提供其全額獎學金。鄭會穎同學現正服役中，他的論文獲得2008年台哲會最佳論文獎，現在他正準備出國留學。

### C. 開授課程

本人於政大開授一門與本研究主題相關的課程：語意外部論

#### (2) 評估

本研究計畫大體上依計畫進行。

## 2. 第二年研究

### (1) 主題及成果

第二年度（本年度）研究的主軸為探討麥道爾用以支持「心靈與世界相互滲透，心靈不是一個封閉的內在空間」的三個論證：(1) 單稱思想的對象依憑性、(2) 經驗的選言模式 (a disjunctive model of experience)、(3) 真思想與事實等同理論。本年特別著重在探討麥道爾思想中的幾個重要概念：minimal empiricism, spontaneity, receptivity, the space of reason and second nature。

本年度的研究計畫成果分成三部分，一是論文發表，二是碩士論文的指導，另一是研究所課程的開設，茲分別簡要說明如下：

#### A. 會議論文 (名稱及第一篇之簡述)

(A) “Fine-grained argument and propositional conceptualism” (Conference on Neo-Pragmatism, Institute of European and American Studies, Academic Sinica, 2010.01).

Since the publication of McDowell's *Mind and World* (MW), the issue of the nature of perceptual content becomes a subject of hotly debate in philosophy of mind and epistemology. A main concern of the issue is on the question whether the content of a perceptual experience is exclusively conceptual, just like what is typically ascribed to beliefs and judgments. The advocate may be called conceptualism, and the opponent, anti-conceptualism. And conceptualism comes into two kinds. The first holds that perceptual content is conceptual, but it is not required to be propositional. The second, on the other hand, insists that it has to be propositional. We may call the first kind of conceptualism, non-propositional conceptualism, and the second,

propositional conceptualism. There is only a handful hold on to conceptualism nowadays, and still fewer, if there is any, are there for propositional conceptualism. Nonetheless, in this paper I defend propositional conceptualism.

More specifically, this paper argues for the following two points. First, the fine-grained argument (and the infant/animal argument) fails to serve for non-conceptualism to undermine the conceptuality of perceptual content. Second, if content of experience and content of empirical belief are different in kind, then empirical beliefs would lack intentionality and the status of becoming knowledge. Since the content of a belief is propositional, the second point amounts to that the content in an experience has to be propositional, or empirical beliefs would be rid of intentionality and the potentiality of being knowledge. In fact, I argue that if the conceptuality of perceptual content is to be watered down to any degree away from propositionality, the skeptics about the external world would prevail.

My arguments against the fine-grained argument and for propositional perceptualism draw heavily on resources from McDowell's thoughts on experience in his MW, especially, the Wittgensteinian idea embodied in the following identity claim: "there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or generally the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case." (MW: 27). The identity claim can be extended, in McDowell's spirit, to perceptual content such that we may say: there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing one can perceive, and the sort of thing that can be the case. It is that how things perceptually appear to us can also be the content of a judgment, which also can be a state of the world. The identity claim states the core of McDowell's idea on the relation between mind and world; and, on the matter of perceptual content, it amounts to saying that when what an experience manifests is short of fact in the external world, intentionality of our thinking of the world be impossible, so is empirical knowledge. When one esteems the extended version of the identity claim enough, it can be found that the fine-grained argument is invalid and non-propositional perceptualism is not a viable line of thought.

Propositional conceptualism seems not only outran but also outdated, since recently (2009, hereafter AMG) McDowell himself has abandoned it and retreated to non-propositional conceptualism. But then, in a sense, this paper shows why he should not give in so easily.

(B) "Conceptualism, objectivity and false experience" (AAP 2010 Philosophy Conference, Australasian Association of Philosophy. 2010.07)

(C) "Experience outruns empirical belief but remains conceptual" (科學、文

化、生命--2009 年度學術研討會，台灣哲學學會. 2009.10. 同文一個較早的版本發表於『批判與反思』研讀會，台灣哲學會2009.08）。

B. 相關主題論文指導

- (A) 何宗興：【經驗，語言，思想：賽拉斯的意向性理論】（博士論文）
- (B) 薛明立：【經驗主義的第三個教條 — 終點或第六個里程碑】（碩士論文）
- (C) 唐孝儀【在多大程度上心靈是展延的？】（碩士論文）
- (D) 王祖灝【孿生地球與內容的寬窄】（碩士論文）。

C. 研究所課程：

「經驗與理性」探討Davidson與McDowell在本研究主題上的思想。

(2) 評估

本研究計畫大體上依計畫進行。