

國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程

International Master's Program in Asia-Pacific Studies

College of Social Sciences

National Chengchi University

碩士論文

Master's Thesis

20 世紀早期毒品控制：

在國際聯盟之下的鴉片會議

及在日本統治之下的臺灣毒品控制

Early Twentieth Century Narcotics Control:

International Conferences on Opium under the League of

Nations and Narcotics Control on Taiwan under

Japanese Rule

Student: Mark Brett/馬永昕

Advisor: Chou Whei-ming/周惠民

中華民國 100 年 4 月

April 2011

20 世紀早期毒品控制：

在國際聯盟之下的鴉片會議

及在日本統治之下的臺灣毒品控制

Early Twentieth Century Narcotics Control:

International Conferences on Opium under the League of

Nations and Narcotics Control on Taiwan under

Japanese Rule

研究生：馬永昕

Student: Mark Brett

指導教授：周惠民

Advisor: Chou Whei-ming

國立政治大學

亞太研究英語碩士學位學程

碩士論文

A Thesis

Submitted to International Master's Program in Asia-Pacific Studies

National Chengchi University

In partial fulfilment of the Requirement

For the degree of Master in Taiwan Studies

中華民國 100 年 4 月

April 2011

Abstract

The aim of the research is to identify and apprehend all the factors in terms of administration, economy, culture, and ideas within and without Taiwan that influenced drugs control there in the early twentieth century. The means is to explore narcotics control on the island with special consideration to international conferences on opium. The period covers the late Qing dynasty (1850-1895), early Japanese period (1895-1920), and late Japanese period (1920-1940). The conclusion will discuss the relationship between narcotics control and the conferences, compare practical measures and cultures of drugs, and compare abstract ideas that defined the practical side. The research is original because it studies previously unexplored cultural and intellectual history. It is also a synthesis of a rarely researched topic: namely: the international conferences angle on drugs control on the island during Japanese rule (hence its emphasis in the thesis title).

The main findings regarding the Qing dynasty is that the administration was weak and opium culture was acceptable, fashionable and useful. The administration was weak because officials were undermined by informal administrators who were gentry. The gentry occupied a privileged socio-legal position and were relied upon by officials for implementing policy. It was also weak because it could not enforce the law: edicts stipulating prohibition of opium smoking and emigration to Taiwan were ignored. Opium culture was rendered fashionable and acceptable by the literati who smoked it. Opium also served as a treatment for many illnesses. It was popular especially among professional men in Taiwan. Opium was largely available since the treaty ports were opened in 1858. A favourable balance of trade meant the Chinese could afford opium.

The early Japanese period had a strong administration and definitive new ideas. The administration was strong because of its army, Law 63, and the *hokō* and police systems. It successfully established the opium monopoly system. It was a licensing and rationing system that was on the whole effective, but it was flawed because of its recording and commission on sales system. Biological principles and economic warfare defined the opium policy. The former meant that the Taiwanese would be made fitter over time by gradually suppressing opium. The latter referred to selling opium as a means to enhance national survival in the newly perceived protracted war

where resources were crucial for victory. Fear of national destruction through Japanese adopting the smoking habit triggered the formulation of an opium policy. Occasional and habitual smokers were homogenised through media. Opium smokers were presented negatively. Iwai Tatsumi had opium revenue become Government-General revenue. It was important until 1930. A black market of opium for secret smokers flourished possibly with the approval of the administration for profit or social stability.

The late Japanese period was marked by introduction of powerful foreign ideas and cultural change. The ideas were self-determination and humanitarianism. The former incited anti-colonialism. That forced the administration to adopt a concessionary attitude towards the Chinese in order to maintain peaceful rule. It promoted accelerated assimilation that undermined the discriminatory biological principles that was the bedrock of the gradual suppression policy. Humanitarianism put opium on the international public and national government agendas. It stimulated reform such as the 1928 Taiwan Opium Ordinance, 1929 Addict Registration Campaign and expedited the 1930 Rehabilitation Programme. Du Congming established the first rehabilitation centre after administration funded research into opium. Cultural change is expressed in the ambiguous attitude towards opium crystallizing into a fiercely anti-opium one held by Chinese. Opium was rendered unacceptable and traitorous. The Japanese viewed opium addiction as a disease; hence addicts were medicalised. Allegedly Japanese officials and businessmen respectively approved of and engaged in the export of crude morphine and cocaine from Taiwan. The opium monopoly system allegedly provided cover for the import of excessive quantities of opium. Weak regulations in Japan meant exporting cocaine was not problematic. Increasingly opium businesses became unprofitable or were closed excepting wholesalers. Revenue from opium was minute but still useful.

The main points of the international conferences concern their aims, origins, results, the League of Nations and Japanese policy. The aims were to eliminate opium smoking and suppress narcotics. They originated from American President Theodore Roosevelt who was prompted by American missionary Charles Brent. British diplomat Sir Malcolm Delevingne was instrumental in calling for the 1924-25 Geneva conferences. The results are vast and complex. The sound ideas were: a) licensing; b) rationing; c) recording; d) government monopoly; e) standardised import and export

certificates; f) independent body to handle estimates from consumer countries and orders to supplier countries; g) education. The main problems were: a) the agreements were only obligatory; b) diplomatic language afforded the ability to neglect reforms; c) there was not a timetable for limiting supply. The League of Nations was established in order to avert war. It was revolutionary because it provided a platform for open and multilateral diplomacy, and redefined acceptable behaviour of nations. It added a new dimension to traditional closed and bilateral diplomacy where states had freedom of action. The League was a phenomenal propaganda machine because it was admirable, authoritative and hence held global media attention. The Japanese view was originally typified by indifference and strategic interest. The latter is regarding the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It developed to become morally concerned and concerned as per foreign pressure over the illicit traffic of narcotics from Japan. Indifference was due to the fact that in Japan drugs were not an electoral issue. Moreover, the government was dominated by businesses which had an economic interest in the trade. Lastly it was offensive to undermine business in Japanese culture. Moral concern arose in terms of humanitarianism under the League of Nations. Additionally social hygiene viewing opium as a treatable threat to survival was applied to the eradication of opium.

The conclusion reveals the relationship between conferences and narcotics control on the island to be mutual, direct, indirect and significant. The Chinese and Foreign Powers created and surmounted the opium crisis in Taiwan. Japanese rule provided for suitable conditions for the Chinese to resist opium. Administration and culture are the most influential factors in narcotics control. Foreign ideas of self-determination and humanitarianism defeated Japanese ideas and compelled reform of the opium system. Mobilisation of public opinion is vital for cultural change. The opium monopoly system was on the whole efficacious. Lastly, the statistics on opium are dubious as they are provided by Kaku Sagatarō who may have been involved in the illicit traffic of narcotics.

Keywords

Narcotics, opium, narcotics control; International Conferences; China, Taiwan, Japan; Qing dynasty, early Japanese period, late Japanese period; Administration, law, policy, culture, ideas, economy, and history.

Table of Contents

Abstract	3
Keywords	5
Chapter One: Introduction	8
1.0. Introduction.....	8
1.1. Aim	10
1.2. Research Plan.....	10
1.3. Research Framework.....	12
1.4.0. Opium and Opiates.....	12
1.4.1. Cocaine	15
Chapter Two: Late Qing Dynasty Rule	16
2.0. Chapter Aim and Outline	16
2.1. Historical Setting	16
2.2.0. Administration in the Late Qing Dynasty	18
2.2.1. Qing Dynasty Administration of Taiwan.....	19
2.2.2. Formal and Informal Administration	20
2.2.3. An Introduction to Chinese Gentry	21
2.2.4. Gentry Roles	22
2.2.5. Law on Opium	24
2.2.6. Administration and Opium.....	25
2.3. Opium and Culture.....	27
2.4. Opium and Economy	31
2.5. Conclusion for the Late Qing Dynasty.....	32
Chapter Three: The Early Japanese Period	35
3.0. Chapter Aim and Outline	35
3.1.0. Historical Setting for The Japanese Annexation of Taiwan.....	35
3.1.1. Issues Confronting Japanese Rule.....	36
3.2.0. Japanese Administration of Taiwan	39
3.2.1. Early Colonial Policy	40
3.2.2. Law 63	43
3.2.3. Opium Policy	44
3.2.4. The Opium Monopoly System.....	46

3.2.5. Social Organisation	50
3.2.6. Policing	53
3.3. Opium and Culture.....	54
3.4. Opium and Economy	60
3.5. Conclusion for the Early Japanese Period.....	65
Chapter Four: The Late Japanese Period	71
4.0. Chapter Aim and Outline	71
4.1.0. Historic Setting	72
4.1.1. Issues Confronting Japanese Rule.....	73
4.2.0. The New Taiwan Opium Ordinance	75
4.2.1. Addict Registration	77
4.2.2. Addict Rehabilitation	80
4.3. Opium and Culture.....	82
4.4. Opium and Economy	87
4.5. Conclusion for the Late Japanese Period	93
Chapter Five: International Conferences on Opium and Narcotics	102
5.0. Chapter Aim and Outline	102
5.1. League of Nations	102
5.2.0. International Conferences	106
5.2.1. 1909 Shanghai International Opium Commission	107
5.2.2. 1912 Hague Conference on Opium.....	112
5.2.3. 1924-25 Geneva Conferences on Opium and Narcotics	116
5.2.4. 1931 Bangkok Conference.....	123
5.3. Conclusion for International Conferences on Opium and Narcotics	127
Chapter Six: Conclusion	139
6.0. Conclusion Outline	139
6.1. International Conferences and Narcotics Control on Taiwan	139
6.2.0. Practical Comparison	143
6.2.1. Abstract Comparison.....	155
6.3. Final Thoughts	163
Bibliography	166
References	171

Chapter One: Introduction

1.0. Introduction

Can international conferences really cause a government to reform international trade policy at its economic expense?

How is it that the Japanese government could on the one hand prohibit opium consumption on Taiwan as an “evil habit” but on the other hand neglect to suppress the traffic of narcotics from Japan to China?

Should we remember opium smoking as more than a vice?

These and other such questions provide inspiration for the research. Like the contemporary case of climate change, there were international conferences held on the matter of opium. These occurred in the early twentieth century, and just like talks on environmental policy today, there was much progress in producing conventions obliging reforms, but little definitive action was undertaken. While Greenland’s ice melts and potential catastrophe looms on the horizon, the zeitgeist is that reductions in carbon dioxide emissions are to be effected gradually. Similarly, whilst opium addiction was ubiquitous in the East and South-east Asia, delegates were concluding conventions which did not include concrete articles that had significant impact. The factor impeding such progress in both cases is the economy. It is easy to agree to cuts in emissions, but it is not so easy to restructure and reorganise your economy when your country is in competition with other countries in the world. The fact is it should be against national interest to make sacrifices which realistically your competitor may not emulate in the spirit of fairness. In light of this it would be enlightening to research a prior case where the implementation of international reforms are hindered by economic interests. In such circumstances can international conferences really have an effect? Moreover, if so, then how much and by what means?

Continuing to the historical introduction, in 1895 Japan annexed Taiwan after emerging victorious in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Having secured its rule through pacifying resistance, a pressing issue which the newly established

Taiwan Government-General had to confront was the matter of opium. The island was home to over one hundred thousand opium addicts and the spread of opium to Japan from it represented a threat to national survival: opium had to be controlled and suppressed. Although the Japanese viewed the drug as “evil”, the problem was the Chinese and aborigines who smoked it were not necessarily sympathetic to that view. What is more, having been subjugated by an empire, which was traditionally regarded as subservient to China, the vast majority of the islanders were less than likely to adopt foreign cultural mores. Aware of these issues the administration faced the challenge of creating a system that was paradoxical: it had to permit the Taiwanese to smoke opium lest they incite unrest yet it simultaneously had to prohibit opium consumption lest the drug spread to Japan. The solution they conceived was an ingenious precedent for future systems of narcotics control, but the problem was that it was not perfect. Moreover, the impression of the narcotics control system suggests the intention of Japan was to eliminate drugs usage within and without its empire, but the fact is Tokyo did not take any measures to suppress the illicit narcotics traffic conducted by its citizens to China whilst it gradually prohibited opium consumption on Formosa. This issue was addressed repeatedly in meetings of the Opium Advisory Committee under the League of Nations. In connection with this, the matters of limiting the cultivation of raw materials for and manufacturing of narcotics in accompaniment with prohibiting their export were raised at international conferences on drugs control. But would such deliberation result in reforms implemented by Japan and the Government-General?

The topic of this thesis has been researched before as evidenced by two books that include reference to the role of international conferences regarding the opium problem on Taiwan under Japanese rule in a few chapters. Such literature is concerned with administration and the economy. However this paper shall additionally factor in culture as a facet for study. In addition unlike prior literature the dissertation’s scope will extend to cover the intellectual history behind the unfolding of events. Lastly by synthesising literature on such an understudied area it should be possible to challenge statements and facts, open new avenues for research, and answer the aforementioned questions. In this way the research will arguably contribute to the body of human knowledge.

1.1. Aim

The aim of this research is to explore narcotics control on Taiwan under Japanese rule in relation to international conferences on opium under the League of Nations in the early twentieth century. That means not only narcotics control on the island but also those international conferences held at the time will be examined. That will also entail an investigation of items that are related to the island, the period of Japanese rule, and the League of Nations (hereafter: League) contingent upon necessity. This way the author can most likely identify all of the factors in terms of administration, economy, culture, ideas and historical conditions within and without Taiwan that influenced narcotics control there so that a thorough conclusion can be reached regarding its development. Once that is complete the goal can be said to have been attained.

1.2. Research Plan

The plan for the research is regarding the division of chapters and the aspects of information to be obtained for achieving the aim.

In this thesis there will be four chapters that constitute the main body excluding the introduction and conclusion; namely: a) the late Qing period; b) the early Japanese period; c) the late Japanese period; and d) international conferences on opium under the League of Nations (hereafter: League). The first three chapters are regarding factors that affected the development of narcotics control. They are included for the sake of a comparison between the periods and with the international conferences. The chapter on the Qing period serves as a control group as in sociology and psychology. By studying that period it is possible to clearly ascertain the changes the early Japanese wrought on narcotics control through comparison. The two chapters on the Japanese periods are also prepared for a comparison in order to identify changes in narcotics control. The chapter on the late Japanese period is vital to enable a comparison between it and the international conferences on opium that were convened under the League during the same period. Investigating it will reveal the influence of those conferences on the island and vice-versa.

Broadly speaking the Qing period covers the latter half of the nineteenth century from 1850 until 1895 when Taiwan was annexed by the Japanese empire. Albeit knowledge from an earlier time of the Qing dynasty shall also be drawn upon as is necessary. The early and late Japanese periods respectively cover between 1895 and 1920, and generally between 1920 and 1940. The wartime period of Japanese rule is not covered by the dissertation owing to its irrelevance to the aim as per international conferences. The two conferences hosted by the League in which Japan participated occurred between 1924 and 1931. Though research on two other major conferences that preceded the establishment of the League and were held between 1909 and 1914 will also be investigated as necessary. With respect to the above, the essential period of interest extends from the early 1850s until the late 1930s.

There are two groups of aspects of information in which the author is interested. The first group is comprised of administration, culture, the economy, historic setting and issues, and ideas. It is designed for the three chapters related to Taiwan. Administration means law and policy. Culture concerns opium and narcotics in terms of its use, consumers and attitudes towards it as well as any other data deemed relevant. The economy refers to the business of drugs as per their quantity, value and distribution and akin to the above any other matters of relevance. Historic setting and issues is regarding the circumstances and matters that defined the context in which administrative, cultural and economic developments occurred. Ideas are thoughts that defined policy. This group is interrelated. Administration impacts upon culture and the economy and so on. In the dissertation each aspect of information such as culture shall be separated to become a section within a chapter as a focus of research. Being more complex than other sections, administration will be further divided into sections. This way it is clearer and hence easier to observe development without the write up becoming vast, disorganised and confusing. Ideas will be elicited based on research into administration, economy and culture. As for the second group, it is composed of the background, aims, results, and Japanese policy towards the international conferences. It is created for the chapter on international conferences. The background, aims and results of the conferences are necessary for an analysis on their development and influence. A survey of the evolution of Japanese policy towards the conferences is required for an assessment on its impact on narcotics control on Taiwan. In addition there will be a section introducing and analysing the League.

The research will conclude the relationship between international conferences on drugs and narcotics control on Taiwan. Additionally, it will not only reveal practical data regarding the role of certain individuals, laws and institutions, but also abstract information as per the ideas and sentiments that provided the rationale and motivation for the undertaking of certain measures by administrators. This way a fuller understanding of the early twentieth century history of drugs, international conferences and Taiwan can be reached. Lastly, final thoughts on the subject will be presented in order to advance knowledge and suggest new avenues for research.

As a final note it should be clarified that in the title and the essay narcotics control means control over both opium and narcotics. Similarly drugs also refers to both narcotics and opium. But when narcotics appears as a lone word not in a compound word it strictly refers to narcotics, and likewise opium solely denotes opium. The distinction is made because the culture, economy and administration of opium is not the same as for narcotics, and narcotics is more convenient to write than to list cocaine, morphine, heroin and other relevant narcotics.

1.3. Research Framework

The research framework is within and without, and is regarding administration, culture, ideas and economy in history. Within and without can also be understood as domestic and international or international relations. Within means on the island of Taiwan, whereas without denotes the area outside Taiwan. Administration, culture, ideas and economy are apprehendable as political-economy depending upon your definition of it. The author prefers to specify administration, culture, ideas and economy for the sake of clarity. They have been defined above. Both within and without Taiwan administration, culture, ideas and economy will be investigated variously as is necessary and as much as is possible.

1.4.0. Opium and Opiates

Opium is derived from opium poppies. When harvested from the poppies that are botanically classified as *Papaver somniferum* it oxidises into a dark brown, sticky, viscous substance. This is raw opium. After a process of boiling, purifying and

simmering it is reduced to a thick brown paste which is sun dried until it has the consistency of clay. This is called cooked or prepared opium, and is ready for consumption. Opium poppies flourish in warm, sunny, temperate, and dry climates¹.

The origins of the opium poppy are unknown but archaeological evidence indicates that the earliest recorded discovery of its remains were in fourth millennium BCE Neolithic pile-dwelling villages in Switzerland². It is also thought that the opium poppy might have been utilised over 30,000 years ago by Neanderthal man; and hence in Europe³.

In history there are cases of opium being used as medicine, poison, money, currency, aphrodisiac, and a tranquiliser. In Ur opium was regarded as a “joy plant” as is inferred from its ideograms dated to 3400 BCE⁴. The Greeks dissolved it in alcohol to banish fear, anguish and hateful memories whilst Turkish soldiers chewed it for courage in battle⁵. In Qing dynasty China it was recognised as a treatment for diarrhoea and coughing. It was consumed at brothels by prostitutes and the literati and became “a natural and welcome addition to the Chinese dinner table and Chinese entertainment”⁶. It was moreover utilised as both money and currency in the late period⁷. At that time Singaporean labourers smoked opium for invigoration by suppressing hunger and pain while British peasants added it to ale for relief from neuralgia, rheumatism, malaria as well as the drudgery of life and the cold and humid climate of The Fens in Norfolk county⁸. Lastly a county magistrate who was captured by rebels in Chuanghua in 1862 “mixed up a little opium with... tea and tossed off the poison, thus inviting death”⁹. Regarding the actual opium poppy, families grew it to “appreciate its beauty” in Ming dynasty China¹⁰.

Contemporary medical science offers insight into the facts of opium and its derivatives. To begin with opium and morphine are both opiates, that is, a drug that produces opiate effects. In this way their effects are not required to be described separately. As a rule, the stronger the opiate, the stronger the effects. Those effects are: a dreamy euphoric state, lessened sensation of pain, slowed breathing, constipation, flushed skin, a dry mouth, reduced body temperature, impaired reflexes, both enhancing and impairing learning and memory cognitively, and pinpoint pupils¹¹. Kuhn writes: “Although the effects on breathing can be quite dangerous, the other physiological effects are fairly benign”¹². Nevertheless chronic usage is “linked with

financial and social decline” and causes reduced blood pressure, increased heart rate, impotence, and in the case of intravenous users collapsed veins and possible mental disturbances¹³. What is more, some addicts report pleasure is not felt from even high doses¹⁴. The reason is the body rapidly increases its tolerance to opiates. It also quickly decreases its tolerance which threatens the risk of overdose to regular users¹⁵. Addiction is not clearly defined. Parrott writes it is developed through opiates interacting with the mesolimbic dopamine system that creates strong needs and cravings¹⁶. But Kuhn understands it to manifest once withdrawal symptoms emerge¹⁷. Actually withdrawal is not dangerous. Kuhn and Parrott thinks “opiate withdrawal is miserable but not life-threatening (unlike alcohol withdrawal)¹⁸. The symptoms of it are watery eyes, runny nose, yawning, sweating, restlessness, irritability, and loss of appetite until it climaxes when addicts suffer diarrhoea, shivering, sweating, general malaise, abdominal cramps, muscle pains, increased sensitivity to pain, difficulty sleeping, yawning and muscle spasms¹⁹. This lasts a few days and is “like the flu”²⁰.

Opium and China is well known history as evinced by the Opium War (1839-1842). This dispute over the import of opium suggests Britain was the Power that introduced opium to the Middle Kingdom of Eastern Afroeurasia. Actually Parrot in accompaniment with Dr. Edkins of the Royal Commission on Opium state that it was Arab traders who first brought the drug to China in the seventh or eighth century AD²¹. The modern Chinese national language word for opium is *yapian* which originates from the Greek *opion*. Opium was taken as medicine until pipe technology and tobacco was introduced to Fujian province from the Americas by European traders in the seventeenth century. Once tobacco smoking was prohibited in 1641 opium was mixed with tobacco for smoking as a means to subvert the law. Opium smoking subsequently spread and was especially prevalent in Taiwan²². Although opium was originally imported, it became increasingly cultivated in China’s Western regions²³. During the nineteenth century the British were the biggest traders of opium but from the beginning of the twentieth century China which produced the most opium became its biggest trader²⁴.

Opium is a sensitive topic. It is apprehended that in Chinese history the Opium War represents a fatal rupture between modern China and its glorious past. In the wider world it is understood that particularly the derivatives from opium not only finance criminal gangs and terrorism but also precipitate “social and financial decline” and is

a health risk. Considering the negativity surrounding our memory of opium it is not surprising that opium is perceived as a narcotic contemporaneously. That is typically an illegal substance which has a physiological and psychological effect when taken according to Oxford Dictionaries²⁵. Narcotics are therefore on the whole socially unacceptable. However such a perception is a modern phenomenon. Its consumers did not necessarily regard opium consumption as detrimental to health, finance or social status as suggested by its myriad uses illustrated above. With that in mind, the origins of the present negative view prompts the question: should we remember opium as more than a vice?

1.4.1. Cocaine

Cocaine is obtained from the coca plant. The plant, which is formally known as *Erythroxylum coca*, is transformed into cocaine through chemical processes in three stages. The final result is a white powder called cocaine. Coca is a tough plant that grows in poor soil, ideally in hot and damp conditions.

The oldest discovery of coca leaves in the archaeological record is in a grave dated to 2000 years BCE located in South-western Ecuador and Northern Chile according to Karch²⁶. He states that cocaine was first isolated by Professor Enrique Pizzi who lectured in chemistry and pharmacology at the University of La Paz in Bolivia²⁷. However Kuhn writes it was purified by Albert Niemann, who was a German scientist, in 1860²⁸.

Coca leaves were chewed as an aphrodisiac, invigorator, hunger and thirst suppressant, and tranquiliser. The plant was utilised as a magic instrument to banish evil. Seventeenth century Spanish accounts indicate its leaves were taken by peoples for sex and by sacrificial offerings prior to execution²⁹. It was also noted that the American natives consumed it to work harder³⁰.

As a stimulant, cocaine's effects are unlike those of an opiate. Such effects are: elation of mood, a sense of energy, increased heart rate, raised blood pressure, dilation of the bronchioles, localised numbness, seizures, cardiac arrest, stroke, breathing failure, cerebral haemorrhage, and a psychotic state of paranoia and hostility³¹. But akin to opium, tolerance is rapidly developed by its users. It is addictive, though the

exact nature of it is unknown. Kuhn thinks individuals who smoke crack cocaine or inject cocaine intravenously experience an intense change in state of mind³². That change is related to addiction. Withdrawal is also not life-threatening but it is more pleasant than in the case of opium: exhaustion, excessive sleep, depressive symptoms, and a surge in appetite. Albeit anhedonia precipitated by an over-stimulated dopamine system is a possible side-effect.

The relationship between cocaine and China is not explicit during this period of history. Coca plants were cultivated on Taiwan under Japanese rule, cocaine is a narcotic, and narcotics were smuggled to China. With respect to these facts, it is inferable there was a relationship. Albeit that is all that can be maintained.

Chapter Two: Late Qing Dynasty Rule

2.0. Chapter Aim and Outline

The aim of this chapter is to produce data for comparative analysis that will contribute to a conclusion for this thesis.

That information will be attained by investigating the late Qing period regarding its history relevant to opium in terms of administration, culture and economy where possible. The chapter shall be written holistically and sequentially to ensure that all relevant data is covered and it is easy to understand. Here holistically means according to necessity. At the end of the chapter a conclusion will be presented that summarises and analyses the knowledge gained from the investigation.

2.1. Historical Setting

Taiwan was incorporated into the Qing empire when Qing Admiral Shi Lang forced the Ming loyalist Guo regime to capitulate having emerged victorious in a decisive naval battle in 1683¹. From the Qing dynasty perspective, the Guo regime threatened

¹ For an excellent introduction to the history of the Qing dynasty regarding Taiwan, please refer to: RUBINSTEIN, Murray A. 2007 (ed.). *Taiwan: A New History*. An East Gate Book: US.

its sovereignty by possessing legitimacy for rule predicated on its loyalty to the Ming dynasty. That threat had to be eliminated. Having subjugated the “bandits” there was a debate regarding the future of the island. On the one hand the court opinion was that the island ought to be abandoned and its subjects be evacuated in order to guarantee a rival to the Qing dynasty could not manifest. But on the other hand Shi Lang vociferously argued that the island should be settled. His rationale was that: a) without rule the island would develop into a pirate lair and possibly a rival regime because a complete evacuation of subjects would be impossible in the case subjects retreat to the mountains to settle with aboriginal groups; b) valuable commodities such as deer hide and sulphur were available on the island; and c) garrisons stationed along the Southeast could be reduced if Taiwan was under Qing rule. Shi’s reasoning convinced Kangxi Emperor to keep the island.

The Qing policy towards the island frontier is best described as suppression. The territory was subsumed into Fujian province as a prefecture rather than established as an independent province. Such low status ensured it was politically weak. The island was furthermore denied its own garrison. It was to be defended by the Fujian garrison of the Green Standard army. Soldiers on duty on the island were to be rotated with fresh ones from Fujian frequently. This arrangement guaranteed that Taiwan was powerless militarily. Lastly, the economy was permitted to be developed as exemplified by the lifting of the trade embargo imposed on the Guo regime but its development was to be limited by a quarantine policy on immigration. That policy would diminish the likelihood of ethnic conflict between aboriginal groups and Chinese settlers regarding land disputes, and simultaneously limit economic growth and thus check military power. Such a policy of suppression should have been highly effective if it were not for the facts that: a) Chinese settlers simply ignored the quarantine; and b) the administration was too attenuated to enforce the law. The result was the island’s population expanded substantially, and rebellions erupted regularly. Shepherd indicates that the population increased from 130,000 to 1,328,069 and then 2,545,731 in 1684, 1824, and 1895 respectively³³. Roy holds there were 159 large rebellions altogether³⁴. That means during the 212 years of Qing rule a rebellion occurred every one year and four months. Albeit regarding Taiwan and rebellion it is commonly said: “Every three years a rebellion, every five years an uprising”³⁵. This suggests the island was an economically booming, wild frontier.

The first opium war was waged between Britain and China in a series of skirmishes between 1839 and 1842 regarding the trade of opium. Britain was interested in protecting its merchants trading the drug which was a significant source of government revenue, but the Qing dynasty intended to

eradicate the trade and thus opium addiction entirely². Having defeated the Qing dynasty Britain set about opening ports for free trade through the Treaty of Nanjing. That unequal treaty saw the cession of Hong Kong to Britain and the opening of treaty ports across China with concomitant extraterritoriality. Opium remained illegal under Chinese law but extraterritoriality, which meant the laws of relevant Powers superseded Qing law, enabled opium smuggling to occur. Nevertheless it was not until the second opium war was fought between the two countries that the Treaty of Tianjin was signed in 1858. It was in that year that Danshui and Dagou (in contemporary Tainan) were opened for free trade. Although the opium habit predated the opening of the ports by over two hundred years, it is thought that the number of its occasional and habitual consumers increased dramatically owing to the establishment of the treaty ports. After all, their opening meant that smuggling and thereby the supply of opium rose. Under free trade as a part of Britain's informal empire the island's economy experienced tremendous growth. Formerly closed to international trade Chinese entrepreneurs found they had access to an international market. The export of tea was particularly profitable. This illustrates that an economy emerged that could afford to purchase the opium which flooded it.

2.2.0. Administration in the Late Qing Dynasty

According to Shepherd the late imperial Chinese state was a “highly centralised, agrarian bureaucratic empire and one of the most sophisticated of pre-modern states”. It ruled a vast and highly differentiated territory and economy through civil and military bureaucracy. The civil officials and military officers who served in the bureaucracy were selected from among those who passed the civil service examinations, and were appointed on the basis of qualification and experience by the

² A fine source on early modern Chinese history is: HSU, Immanuel C.Y. 1995. *The Rise of Modern China: Fifth Edition*. Oxford University Press: UK.

Board of Rites. Their performance was reviewed in office, and they were subject to promotion, transfer and dismissal³⁶.

Administrators can be classified into two ranks: low and high. The lowest ranking officials administered counties (*xian*), subprefectures (*ting*), or departments (*zhou*). They were subprefects or county magistrates, for example. They were responsible to various higher level officials who served in prefectures, provinces, central government ministries, and ultimately the emperor³⁷. Generally speaking, the time administrators served at any one post was considerably restricted. Chang's research on Luyi in Honan and Changning in Hunan suggests the average term spent in office ranged "from 1.7 to as little as .9 years"³⁸. The duties of civil officials included not only governing territory to ensure the well-being of the populace in accordance with Confucian maxims but also arbitration in cases regarding minor and major offences. They were solely imbued legal powers to settle disputes and could not delegate such power to others. While civil officials maintained civil order, military officials were responsible for defence and security of the empire. They suppressed rebellions and thwarted foreign invasion. The civil officials controlled yamen which were the police who enforced the law.

2.2.1. Qing Dynasty Administration of Taiwan

The case of Taiwan largely mirrors the above as per administration, though there are some exceptions.

Taiwan was a frontier region. It was scarcely populated. Prior to its 1683 incorporation into the Qing empire the island harboured the Guo regime which was Ming loyalist. It was furthermore a renowned haven for pirates. Such a historical background induced the island to be regarded as a potential producer of dynastic threats. That inspired a few peculiarities in its administration. For instance administrators were selected by the provincial magistrate (Governor of Fujian Province) rather than the Board of Rites. The highest ranking official was the Taiwan-Amoy military circuit intendant. That is also unusual. In addition, rather than recruit locals into the standard Green Army, soldiers from Fujian province were transferred to the island and were rotated every three years at great expense. In fact it was prohibited to recruit locals. The Fujian garrison force was moreover particularly large.

The settlement policy was mostly one of quarantine to prevent further emigration. Albeit the immigrant population swelled irrespective of the policy. Land was reclaimed and hidden from tax registers. Censors, moreover, inspected Taiwan annually to offer advice on administration immediately following the 1721 Zhu Yigui rebellion in 1722 until 1756. In 1782 communal strife resulted in land and marine commanders being ordered to rotate on annual tours of inspection. Lastly, after the two year Lin Shuangwen rebellion that erupted in 1786 the Taiwan intendant and prefect were appointed by and reported to the emperor.

The aforementioned examples suggest that civil administrators encountered difficulty in governing the island. It was on occasion an unruly frontier that necessitated special considerations. The most salient of which should be the appointment of the highest ranking officials by the emperor in accompaniment with soldiers rotated from Fujian province. Such peculiar circumstances shall be discussed in connection with opium later on in this chapter.

2.2.2. Formal and Informal Administration

Although the above two chapters incline one to think of the empire's administration as indistinguishable from the civil and military bureaucracies, the reality is actually more complex. In Qing society the gentry or the aristocracy were powerful and played an important role in maintaining order in the country.

Administration is defined as “the management of public affairs; government” according to Oxford English Dictionaries³⁹. The bureaucrats passed examinations to be selected as officers and officials. They can be considered to embody the formal or official administration of China. However, the gentry, who also held proof of educational standing, could exert substantial influence over the administration of their locality or region. With respect to that they are deemed to be the informal or unofficial administration.

The dynamic interaction between formal and informal administration (ie. bureaucrats and gentry) is significant in regard to the conditions for utilising opium in Taiwan in the late Qing dynasty. Accompanying a description of the gentry's role in society, that interaction will be made evident shortly below.

2.2.3. An Introduction to Chinese Gentry

Aristocratic status was by no means necessarily related to wealth. On the contrary the position of gentry was reached through acquiring a title, grade, degree or official rank. Chang dichotomises the aristocracy into “regular” and “irregular” groups. The former attained their status by passing official examinations. It is worth remembering here that very few of those who obtained a qualification were selected to be officials. The latter purchased educational titles. Although one may suspect the irregular group to be too incompetent to administer a region, they were in fact in competition with the regular group for such posts. They were also educated after all.

Chang further separates gentry into lower and upper classes. They were classified by academic title. The academic titles for the lower group were: a) *shengyuan*, b) *jiansheng*, and c) *kengsheng*. A was obtained by passing an examination. County and subprefectural officials held this qualification. B was purchased. It prioritised one’s application to take an exam. C could be acquired by the most able students who failed at the *churen* examination and bought as a title. The academic titles for the upper group were: d) *churen*, and e) *qinshi*. D was attained by passing an examination. Prefectural magistrates among other high level officials possessed this qualification. E was likewise obtained through passing an examination. It was the highest level qualification that was held by provincial governors. Upper class gentry held more influence over a broader area than lower class gentry whose sphere of influence was generally confined to their locality. As a rule, the scope of your influence was contingent upon social connections.

These preceding two paragraphs indicate that the Chinese aristocracy was homogeneous, meritocratic, perceptively hierarchical, and dependent on the state. They were not heterogeneous with respect to the fact all gentry required academic titles that could only be attained from the state. Those academic titles assisted in homogenising the gentry into an upper class group vis-à-vis the commoners. Academia was emphasised in Qing society. One’s title was not inheritable directly. Children had to purchase or be awarded a title through studying. By extension Qing society was socially mobile. It was possible for commoners to ascend to gentry through examinations and for the literati to descend into commoners through failure to

pay tax and committing crimes. Though the privileges granted to gentry increased the likelihood of their offspring retaining such status (more on this later). The multifarious academic titles present in the meritocracy caused social distinction to be highly visible. Not all gentry were equal, and the higher the status the better. Indubitably this fostered a situation which evoked competition among literati to aspire to be the most respectable of all literati. Lastly the aristocracy could not exist without the Qing government's countenance. Passing examinations bestowed gentry status. Only the Qing dynasty could hold those examinations.

With the above in mind it can be held that the Chinese aristocracy was: a) unquestionably undivided owing to group homogeneity; b) slightly insecure due to the revocable nature of their status; c) highly educated in universally accepted learning from a vested interest to study; and d) greatly respected because of their social position. These points are important as per the aforementioned relationship between formal and informal administration regarding opium.

2.2.4. Gentry Roles

Broadly speaking the literati were paragons. Bimonthly they were required to preach the Sacred Edicts to commoners in their locality. The Sacred Edicts are Confucian precepts promoted by the Qing dynasty since they seized power. They voluntarily undertook acts related to public welfare such as constructing dams and irrigating land, as well as representing local interests vis-à-vis local administration. They preserved and built temples, schools and libraries. In addition, they recorded history in local gazettes. When the Qing dynasty's power waned owing to internal and external threats to its legitimacy in the middle of the nineteenth century the gentry invaded the military side of rule by raising and maintaining their own militia. They furthermore began to collect taxes. Studied this way the gentry were models that concerned themselves with local affairs for the benefit of the local community.

The aristocracy was also exceedingly powerful. In fact it is arguable the gentry were vested with more power than administrators through comparison.

Firstly both lower and upper class gentry should remain in a single location for long duration. This is unlike administrators who might only reside at a post for one or two

years. It was typical for the gentry to have a local power base in terms of social connections while the official was without one. The scholars were the head of the common people, and highly respected. Their connections were established through social visits and presenting gifts. A bureaucrat would therefore necessarily rely upon gentry cooperation to implement policy. According to Chang on occasion literati would act under the command of an official, or an action initiated by an official should be undertaken by gentry⁴⁰. That suggests the importance of the gentry role in policy execution.

Next the literati occupied a privileged social and legal position. Even though they were not officials they were regarded as their social equals. In a handbook for magistrates it is taught “scholars should be loved and treated with importance”⁴¹. Chang thinks administrators recognised that the gentry were “potential troublemakers who could lead the people in threatening and endangering the administration”⁴². Additionally if an aristocrat committed a crime he could not be humiliated. Only if the crime were sufficiently serious should he be first deprived of his title and then punished. What is more, as a gentry was frequently equal in rank to an official and sometimes his superior, he could not be judged by a magistrate. It was only his educational superiors that could do so. Lastly, the most interesting point of all, is the gentry communicated with the imperial court. Chang writes “it is clear that even high provincial officials feared the local gentry who had access to the court and could force them out of their official positions”⁴³. In other words, the local gentry could be beyond prosecution: local officials were unable to personally or too fearful to prosecute. A modern analogy should be the aristocrats held to some degree a type of diplomatic immunity. Unsurprisingly then there are records of scholars exploiting their privileged position by evading tax, extorting commoners, bribing administrators, and engaging in malpractice for economic advantage⁴⁴. Chang furthermore holds “the gentry initiated actions for which it gained the approval of the officials and sometimes actual official support, financially or otherwise;” and “often, however, the gentry simply went ahead with activities which the officials silently accepted or reluctantly tolerated”⁴⁵. Therefore the gentry could play the role of informal administrators that were in a more powerful position than actual officials.

Another role the literati played was indirectly protecting the position of the local official. Allee claims that “magistrates were... under pressure from their superiors

above, who evaluated their performance, and from complainants below to bring cases to satisfactory conclusion”⁴⁶. As mentioned above gentry could serve as adjudicators in disputes. In difficult cases it was not unknown for officials to solicit mediation not only from relatives but also from local notables (scholars)⁴⁷. It was therefore in the interest of administrators to have cordial relations with gentry insofar as they should cooperate in legal cases for the sake of avoiding a negative evaluation.

In summary, the gentry assumed various roles such as a paragon and an informal administrator. It was in the bureaucrats best interest to befriend literati in order to implement policy, settle disputes and avoid deleterious influence bound to the court. Both the lower and upper aristocracy were ensconced in a relatively powerful position. That increased the likelihood they should not be prosecuted for criminal acts and offered them substantive freedom to act. This is all extremely important to the aforementioned formal and informal administrative relationship regarding opium.

2.2.5. Law on Opium

Opium smoking as recognised from Chinese history commenced after the introduction of pipe technology in the late Ming dynasty. The importation of the pipe first gave rise to tobacco smoking. Both the pipe and tobacco were products from the Americas. Deemed unfavourable by the court, tobacco smoking was prohibited in 1641. Lee writes that as a consequence “desperate [tobacco] addicts resorted to the recently acquired Taiwanese habit of mixing opium with tobacco... and soon began to experiment with new methods of smoking pure opium”⁴⁸. Opium smoking proliferated. According to Zheng even the Qianlong Emperor “indulged in snuff consumption” of it⁴⁹. Nevertheless he issued an edict prohibiting opium as an illegal drug in 1729⁵⁰. That was the first time opium smoking was illegalised. The ensuing instance was in a proclamation by the Daoguang Emperor in 1836. Lastly the Guangxu Emperor prohibited opium smoking in 1906. That edict launched the great anti-opium campaign of the late Qing dynasty⁵¹.

In observation it is notable that opium smoking was illegalised as many as three times in China under Manchurian rule. It is worth remembering that the edicts did not

prohibit opium consumption as a medicine. That firstly suggests laws were promulgated in an ad hoc basis as necessary. It further indicates the Qing dynasty was insufficiently able to enforce the law. The latter point is of particular significance regarding the relationship between gentry and officials over opium.

2.2.6. Administration and Opium

The Qing dynasty confronted significant issues in enforcing the prohibition of opium smoking in Taiwan. These issues are namely: a) Taiwan's peculiar conditions; b) the literati's role; and c) the relationship between formal and informal administration. Here the impact of the island's administration on opium usage will be discussed exclusively.

To begin with Taiwan was an island frontier distant from the mainland. It was governed so that it

should not give rise to a rival regime. Immigration was for the most part prohibited. Settlement was confined. A local army was not recruited. Taxes and the extent of civil and military bureaucracy was high compared to the mainland. Nonetheless the island's population increased dramatically, settlers reclaimed land which was beyond the reach of the administration, and they furthermore rebelled over centuries. In other words there is a long history wherein official edicts were ignored by the populace. That suggests the administration was unable to enforce the law effectively. Takekoshi, a officially sponsored journalist, supports that assertion by stating the "Chinese government made but little effort to establish their supremacy" and "they took no measures whatever to enforce... regulations"⁵². That point can be applied to opium smoking.

Additionally, it is worth mentioning that settlers who reclaimed land were competing with other ethnic groups. Hoklo, and Hakka, as well as "cooked" and "raw" aborigines inhabited the island. Any acquisition of new land could precipitate conflict amongst them. It is thought that threat undoubtedly inclined pioneering settlers, who were outside the administration's scope of influence, to arm themselves and form independent militia. That should cause them to be self-dependent. They were

furthermore unable to join the ranks of the Green Standard Army: there was no such army in Taiwan. Without an institution such as that army to subsume pioneering settlers under the authority of officialdom, it is held that the pioneers developed their own sense of authority. That is thought to undermine local official authority as evinced by the aforementioned rebellions. Such a situation continued for centuries. In light of the above it is concluded the peculiar circumstances of the frontier region discouraged pioneers to heed local official edicts that were against their interests. This is also applicable to opium smoking.

Next literati status is thought to have contributed to sustaining the popularity of smoking opium. As stated previously the literati were paragons in Qing society: they embodied the lifestyle that was considered to be best, and were greatly respected for it. Both officials and gentry smoked opium. Their privileged economic position enabled them to afford the addictive habit, and their high social status is deemed to have made it fashionable. Zheng writes “When they smoked it, opium was cultured and refined”⁵³. Here consider the following. Opium smoking was illegal. Some literati smoked it regardless. Commoners should revere the scholar-officials. It is therefore arguable that the literati’s behaviour legitimised opium smoking from the perspective of commoners. If those models of excellence could defy the law, then why could commoners not do the same? With that in mind you can say some literati did not assist in changing commoners’ attitudes to the drug, and rather sustained its popularity by making it acceptable behaviour.

Lastly the status of the gentry as informal administrators impeded the efficacy of officials in implementing policy. Were a *shengyuan* to attempt to enforce opium prohibition in his county he might encounter deleterious opposition from gentry who smoked it. After all, the gentry occupied a privileged socio-legal position. They were immune from prosecution by *shengyuan*. Officials which were unfamiliar with the inhabitants of their locality had to enlist the support of gentry who were respected by commoners in their area to undertake action. They moreover were afraid aristocratic influence could affect their standing among peers to whom they were subordinate. Thus formal administrators were in a disadvantageous position. However, the civil prefect and military intendant of Taiwan prefecture were appointed by and reported to the emperor directly since 1786. This implies officials based on the island enjoyed influence over gentry through the connection to the emperor. Yet that implication

must be qualified. Since 1786 both officials and gentry had access to the imperial court. That suggests their relationship was more equal in theory. Still, officials were encouraged to treat gentry decently and their cooperation was required to implement policy. Thus in praxis officialdom was restrained in exerting influence. Gentry had an added incentive to cooperate owing to bureaucrats' link to the emperor in theory but in practice it is unknown whether that incentive resulted in cooperation. With this in mind, it can be held that the bureaucracy did not clearly occupy a position superior to the aristocracy in Taiwan. That suggests the gentry could still retain a certain degree of freedom of action. In other words, they could smoke opium irrespective of the law. This is suggested in Dr. Maxwell's account for the Royal Commission on Opium. He cites a conversation wherein a local businessman concerns that "the large number of wealthy families who had, since he himself had set up in business, gone to the wall, and he had no hesitation in putting it down to the abuse of opium"⁵⁴.

With the above in mind it can be asserted that opium smoking could continue on the island because of four reasons; namely: a) the administration could not enforce the law effectively; b) the pioneers were not unaccustomed to defying official authority; c) the exalted literati who smoked opium legitimised and thereby sustained the habit amongst commoners; and d) the gentry could smoke opium owing to their privileged position.

2.3. Opium and Culture

First of all the focus of this section is opium culture in Taiwan as opposed to mainland China. Most English language literature discusses opium in China. Exclusive research on Taiwan, which is on the periphery of the empire, is rare. Fortunately sources are available. Here the author wishes to express gratitude to Hsu Hungbin who directed the author to them, and additionally permitted him to quote his doctoral thesis. Sources describing opium culture are introduced below. Conclusions predicated upon them are presented afterward.

The first record of opium use on the island is during the era of Dutch trade which lasted from 1624 to 1661. Jennings writes at that time the Dutch "smoked a mixture of

opium and tobacco in the belief that it would prevent malaria and other topical diseases”⁵⁵. That practice continued into the eighteenth century. Dr Eddins who participated in the Royal Commission on Opium refers to an account titled “Tai-hai-shih-cha’lu” which was written by “Huang Yü-pu” and published in 1746. He explains opium for smoking is mixed with hemp and the root of the grasscloth plant, cut finely, boiled in a copper pan or tripod, and then “so prepared is mixed with tobacco” before it is smoked with a bamboo pipe. It is popular, addictive, and is a business operated by “opium tavern keepers”⁵⁶. He also draws from another account called “T’ai-wan-chih”. Collectively both sources identify “aborigines” and “depraved young men without any fixed occupation” to be the smokers. They were enticed to patronise opium taverns by free of charge smoking for first time smokers. There various delicacies prepared with sugar and honey were provided to smokers. Akin to Zheng’s description of opium as an aphrodisiac, there aborigines smoked it “as an aid to vice”. Moreover it was utilised “as an aid to sensual indulgence”⁵⁷. The author of the latter account perceives opium to be deadly. He writes regarding smokers that: “After three years all such persons die”. It is further stated “the barbarian inhabitants of Formosa thus use craft and cunning in order to cheat the Chinese residents out of their money at the expense of their lives”⁵⁸. His account suggests certain aborigines who socialised with Chinese owned and managed those opium taverns.

Dr. Maxwell’s account portrays the culture of opium smoking in the late nineteenth century. At that time he was a medical missionary running a clinic in Dagou near Tainan. His account illustrates that it was the “working class” who sought assistance from him in curing their addiction. They were “small shopkeepers, coolies or labourers, ordinary artisans”⁵⁹. Mostly men smoked it but there were female smokers too. Their reasons for quitting opium were related to their physical complaints, opium smoking’s moral repugnance, and financial consideration for their families and themselves. He states that merchants occasionally smoked opium in connection to their business⁶⁰. The wealthy also smoked opium. It is unknown whether wealthy in definition means both aristocracy and affluent commoners, though it is expected it applies to both classes. Lastly although children were not permitted to smoke opium, they did take it owing to its ubiquity and popularised sensual effect⁶¹.

Dr. Rennie, who was a medical practitioner in North Formosa for seven years, qualifies and adds to the prior accounts with his own from 1894. He answers that “75

per cent” of the populace smokes opium. A distinction is made between occasional and habitual smokers. He writes “many indulge in the habit only on very rare occasions, and have by no means become addicted to it”⁶². A majority of that 75 percent were therefore unlikely to be addicts. In fact Consul Hopkins writes “33 per cent” were habitual smokers⁶³. Smokers are mostly men, some are women, few are children and none are either plains or mountain aborigine⁶⁴. Smokers are primarily officials, shopkeepers, small traders and chair coolies⁶⁵. Except in malarial areas, North based soldiers do not smoke, and in the countryside there are far fewer smokers⁶⁶. Opium is consumed by pipe and mouth. Morphine pills which were once sold as cures for opium addiction increased in popularity to the degree that: “Many now use the pills exclusively, and express a decided preference both on the ground of convenience and economy”⁶⁷. They are more favoured by women. What is more, it is in his opinion that “it is incorrect to say there can be no moderation in the use of the drug”⁶⁸. He refers to a Chinese official named Tuig Taotai and aged 44 years that was healthy and physically and mentally active having smoked opium for twenty years. Though he regards “chair coolies in North Formosa as a class almost entirely opium consumers”⁶⁹. Consul Hopkins agrees with that statement and cites an example of a similar 42 year old man⁷⁰. Excessive use of the drug is mentally and physically incapacitating. He furthermore thinks: “By a high principled Chinaman opium would be pronounced as injurious and degrading, but I do not think such is at all the general opinion”⁷¹. Consul Hopkins thinks that heavy and regular smoking is regarded as injurious⁷². Dr. Rennie next mentions that opium is prescribed by Chinese doctors to ameliorate pain in severe illness, to prevent malarial fever, and shared by friends who wish to have a confidential conversation. Consul Hopkins agrees and moreover thinks 70 percent of smokers are introduced to the drug through “associating with public women”⁷³. Dr. Rennie detected no ill feeling directed against England. Imported opium was smoked by the affluent whilst the poorer purchased the lower quality native product. Lastly he concludes: “A new arrival usually find that his ideas moulded on statements current at home, are immensely exaggerated; he seldom comes across that type of degraded opium victim... Still, after more mature experience and looking into the question with an unbiased mind, he must admit that the habit is an evil... the opium habit is in every respect a lesser evil than the consumption of alcohol”⁷⁴.

Francis Ashton who lived in Danshui presents information similar to the above. However his account differs on two points. That is: “The majority of labourers and agriculturers do not consume opium. Merchants and artisans do”⁷⁵. In addition it is “... fashion, together with the desire for some kind of stimulant, natural to most men, leads the Asiatic to try opium”⁷⁶. Like Ashton, Consul Hurst, Consular Servant Perkins, and Dr. Myers, who were called upon in the Royal Commission on Opium, typically agree with the above. Albeit Dr. Myers writes opium analogous to “other vices” is sought “for relief from otherwise unbearable *ennui*”⁷⁷.

In July 1901 the “Soaring Phoenix Descends to Write Society” was created to promote abstinence in employing opium in Daoist rituals. It spread in popularity until the Government-General suppressed it⁷⁸. Its objective and popularity indicate opium was widely utilised in Chinese religious ritual. In addition the Chinese living in Formosa called opium “black rice” (*heimi*)⁷⁹. That suggests opium was as prevalent or important as rice. In 1905 Takekoshi wrote: “At present, opium seems to be fanatically believed in, for the smoke is often blown in the faces of newly-born children to make them utter their first cry”⁸⁰. Additionally “there were also sixty or seventy different medicines containing it which were used as substitutes whenever the supply of the drug ran short” before the Japanese acquired the island⁸¹.

The following information is not sourced from Taiwan province. It is included because it is new data for you. To begin with, missionary Justus Doolittle describes opium as socialised for business and treating guests. “Friends often invite each other to smoke opium as a preliminary to the discussion of business matters or at intervals while engaged in ordinary conversation. It has become the popular way of ‘*treating*’ among some”⁸². Opium shops were numerous. According to him there is a saying that: “Opium shops are more numerous than rice shops”⁸³. George Flemming, who visited China in 1862, presents information that suggests officialdom was corrupt. He writes “every shop ought to or does pay a secret tax – a squeeze – to the mandarins”⁸⁴. Zheng states opium was used when receiving guests and entertaining friends and family. It was a “natural and welcome addition to the Chinese dinner table and Chinese entertainment”⁸⁵.

With regard to the preceding paragraphs, a series of conclusions can be reached. The first is that amongst foreigners medical missionaries unlike general practitioners are

most likely to portray opium in a negative light owing to their moral convictions. The next is that the gentry were possibly those most inclined to object to the opium habit on principle. They were not directly identified as a smoking group unlike officials. They were voluntarily responsible for the welfare of a locality as de facto informal administrators. In addition, dissimilar to officials for whom, Jennings holds, *likin* on opium constituted a considerable part of their revenue, they did not all necessarily have an interest in retaining the opium trade unless they profited from it⁸⁶. The last point is that opium smoking was most prevalent in affluent urban centres such as Taipei and Tainan. There was wealth and opium, unlike poorer rural townships and villages where they should have been scarcer.

2.4. Opium and Economy

Opium was a significant product in Taiwan's import and exports. The records that are available to the author begin in the middle of the nineteenth century. As a rule, opium imports increased dramatically until they stabilised at approximately 400,000 catties (one catty equals 650 grams) annually. Here opium's significance to the economy will be explored⁸⁷.

To begin with Liu illustrates the opium imports rose from a minimum of 99,700 catties to a maximum of 588,072 catties in 1864 and 1881 respectively⁸⁸. Based on his data the average imported amount is roughly 411,000 catties per annum. The average amount was first reached in 1874. Before then the total imports were below average. There is marked variation from 1880 onwards. In 1885 imports fell to 377,506 catties, and again in 1895 imports reduced to a mere 172,900 catties. The average imported amount is not representative of the reality of annual imports.

The value of those imports is not easily determined. One British source which is relied upon for their calculation does not utilise uniformed categories or measures over time. That renders thorough, meaningful comparisons impossible. Nevertheless some comparisons are feasible. In 1876 opium imports were worth £305,167 (pounds sterling) when total imports were £404,448 for Taiwan province⁸⁹. Opium thus comprised 75.5 percent of imports in terms of value. Advancing to 1888 total imports were £334,472, and opium was worth £233,890⁹⁰. Opium therefore constituted 70

percent of imports. Total imports includes native imports from China, and all imports from trading countries. Evidently opium was an important import.

The type of opium imported to Taiwan changed over time. Originally there were five types of opium imported; namely: Benares, Patna, Persian, Malwa and Turkey. Persian and Turkey respectively originated from Persia and Turkey. The others were from India. In 1872 by far the most popular sort of opium was Benares. It was three times as imported as Patna and Persian opium. Malwa and Turkic opium were unavailable⁹¹. We witness a change in tastes by 1888. At that time Benares was popular but is insignificant compared to Persian opium that is three times as favoured. The Malwa and Turkey varieties were scarcely on the market. Patna was not available that year⁹². It is salient that Persian opium became the drug of choice for many Chinese on Formosa, and Benares was also reasonably liked.

Generally speaking the balance of trade shifted from in substantially in favour of the importers in the 1870s to exceedingly in favour of the exporters from the 1880s. It is difficult to make a statement predicated on this information owing to excessive variables for which there is no data. Nevertheless, the least that could be maintained is that the economy was booming and the Taiwanese could therefore afford the opium habit.

2.5. Conclusion for the Late Qing Dynasty

The aim of this section in this chapter is to chiefly provide data for comparative analysis for the thesis's conclusion, and partly familiarise the reader with the topic. That data is related to narcotics control, and is regarding administration, culture and economy. This goal has been accomplished. Below the main points from above will be summarised for convenience and new points added. Some data will be arranged differently also for convenience.

Opium was first prohibited in 1729 and most significantly illegalised in 1836 during the Qing dynasty. It remained an illegal substance after 1836.

Civil and military bureaucrats encountered issues in enforcing the law in Taiwan. The island was a frontier region with peculiar conditions because of its geographical location and rebel history. Evidence of widespread illegal immigration and land reclamation illustrates officialdom was unable to enforce the law effectively. Pioneering settlers were accustomed to not respecting official edicts. There were two types of administration; namely: formal and informal. The former were officials. The latter were gentry. The gentry occupied a privileged socio-legal position. The bureaucrats feared gentry influence, relied upon the gentry to implement policy, most officials could not easily prosecute them, and above all the gentry were paragons to be respected. That socio-legal position enabled the gentry to smoke opium irrespective of the law. Both gentry and officials as literati smoked opium. By doing so they legitimised and thereby sustained opium smoking by the commoners.

With this in mind it is arguable that the administration was insufficient in its ability to enforce opium prohibition because they possessed insufficient resources to rule to frontier, the literati legitimised smoking, and the position of the gentry was too powerful.

According to historical record opium was smoked since the seventeenth century and was chewed in the nineteenth century. At first it was mixed with tobacco. Later it was smoked pure. Opium smoking occurred most in urban centres and least in rural regions. Accounts from urban centres state 75 percent of the population smoked occasionally, and 33 percent of the populace smoked habitually. These statistics are not based on survey. As a rule you can hold very many smoked occasionally and some were addicted there. Both occasional and habitual smoking are perceived to be dangerous according to medical missionaries. The latter more so than the former. However, missionary accounts were considered to be exaggerated and do not represent public opinion. There are moreover cases of healthy habitual smokers, and degraded addicts were rarely sighted. Opium smoking was typically a health problem for the working class such as chair carriers and merchants. They were too poor and overworked to eat and live healthily. It was additionally a moral issue for some, and a financial issue for both wealthy and poor. The wealthy smoked imported opium. The poor mixed native opium with imported opium to smoke. Both men and women smoked opium. It was mostly men, a few women, and rarely children. Morphine was taken as cure for opium addiction from the late nineteenth century. Morphine pills

became increasingly popular amongst women. The literati made opium smoking fashionable due to their high socio-economic status. Smoking opium was also popular because of its sensual effect. Opium was utilised diversely. It was called “black rice”. In medicine it was a prophylactic against malarial fever and a tranquiliser for serious illness. It was employed in Daoist ritual. It was treated to guests at home, to friends for a private conversation, and to businessmen for business. It was also customarily taken by clients in brothels. It was lastly consumed to relieve boredom. Officials smoked opium. It is possible that officials accepted bribes to ignore businesses involved in opium in Taiwan.

In light of the above it is observable opium was widespread and pervaded many aspects of culture and affected both commoners and literati as well as the wealthy and poor in Taiwan.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century approximately 411,000 cattles of opium were imported per year until 1895. They composed broadly speaking 70 percent of imports. The balance of trade grew in Taiwan’s favour during that time. There were five varieties of opium: Benares, Patna, Persian, Malwa and Turkey. Persian opium from Persia became by far the most popular variety. Benares from India was consistently popular throughout the period.

As previously mentioned, the Qing policy towards opium was absolute and immediate prohibition. The rationale behind it is expressed by Zhu Zun whose advice as a councillor was accepted by the Daoguang Emperor. He considered opium to be deleterious to the empire because it sapped the army of its strength and stupefied the intelligentsia. It was contemporaneously held that opium was “destructive of time, injurious to property”, unhealthy and addictive⁹³. The military protected the empire and the intelligentsia managed it. Injured by opium the empire consequently required restoration to its former power. It is therefore thought that the concept of imperial recovery underpinned the policy. Unfortunately for Daoguang Emperor imperial recovery was an insufficient reason for the administrators, gentry and commoners to abstain from opium smoking. In Taiwan the Chinese continued to consume opium freely until Japan secured rule there.

Chapter Three: The Early Japanese Period

3.0. Chapter Aim and Outline

Akin to the prior chapter the aim of this chapter is to produce data for utilisation in a comparative analysis for the conclusion of the thesis.

The areas of research to be explored to accomplish that goal are primarily the administration, culture and economy of opium and other drugs in the early Japanese period. Other information that advances apprehension of those areas such as the history of Japan annexing the island and factors that impeded rule shall also be investigated. At the end of the chapter a conclusion that both summarises and analyses the knowledge obtained from exploring the aforementioned areas will be written.

3.1.0. Historical Setting for The Japanese Annexation of Taiwan

The First Sino-Japanese War was waged between 1894 and 1895. Seeking to take advantage of the unrest caused by the Donghaks, Japan dispatched marine and land forces to Korea. China emulated such action. A tense situation developed wherein the two powers should battle for influence over Korea. On the 25th July 1894 Japanese warships attacked Chinese forces. On the 1st August war was formally declared. After a series of Japanese victories the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on the 17th April 1895, concluding military operations⁹⁴.

The treaty was named after the Japanese islands in which it was negotiated. The Chinese and Japanese representatives were Li Hongzhang and Itō Hirobumi respectively. There were eleven articles. The most interesting of which was article two. It stipulated that “China will cede Taiwan and its accompanying islands, the Pescadores and the Liaodong Peninsular to Japan”⁹⁵. Li had attempted to dissuade Itō from annexing Taiwan. He impressed that “uncivilised Taiwan was an island where the flowers were not fragrant, the birds did not sing, and heartless women were immoral to their men” and highlighted Taiwan’s ‘four evils’: “disease, opium, rebellion and savages”⁹⁶. Nevertheless Itō was undeterred. Rubinstein states that the

acquisition of Taiwan was a historic occasion for Japan in that it had annexed its first territory from a Power and had gained parity with the Western Powers in East Asia⁹⁷. He furthermore explicates that Taiwan was economically and strategically important to Japan: it produced resources, was a market for Japanese goods, and was a bastion for marine defence and a Southern advance⁹⁸. Next, Japan had become economically and technologically dependent on the Powers by modernising. It was a resource poor country. It also became an imperialist through encountering the Powers. It is thus thought having a colony such a Taiwan at least mitigated the economic burden, and contributed to advancing its designs for achieving security and independence. However, not all of Japan's demands were met. Immediately following the conclusion of the treaty, France, Russia and Germany intervened⁹⁹. Amassing battleships they advised Japan to relinquish its claim on the Liaodong Peninsular. Japan acceded to their call. On 2nd June 1895 Taiwan was formally transferred to Japan.

3.1.1. Issues Confronting Japanese Rule

Having annexed Taiwan, its accompanying islands and the Pescadores in law, Japan next confronted the problem of establishing rule over its new colonial possessions. It encountered a multiplicity of issues that are classifiable as: a) local attitudes, b) equality vis-à-vis the Powers, c) uprisings, d) societal, and e) economic.

Taiwan was formerly a part of a China. Traditionally China was the axial power in North-east Asia. Such a Power is one which exerts considerable influence on surrounding territories. The Japanese for instance adopted aspects of Chinese culture such as the writing system and philosophy. All of the Chinese recognised China's unequalled influence and thus regarded themselves highly. Other peoples were merely barbarians in their eyes. With this in mind, it should be expected that the Chinese living on Taiwan were far from exhilarated to be ruled by foreigners. Such sentiment is evidenced in declarations made by the movement for establishing a Taiwanese Republic. It was proclaimed that: "China has been grossly insulted by the Japanese dwarfs, and we cannot be other than their enemies. Therefore, we the literati and all the populace, must join together and oppose the barbarians if they dare to land. If any one sympathizes with the dwarfs let them be seized and killed at once"¹⁰⁰. It was

furthermore announced on 23rd May 1895: “The Japanese have affronted China by annexing our territory of Formosa, and the supplications of us, the People of Formosa, at the portals of the Throne have been made in vain. We now learn that the Japanese slaves are about to arrive”¹⁰¹. Considering the aforementioned attitude to foreigners and the influence of literati on society, it is understandable that the Japanese confronted organised resistance or rebellion from the Taiwanese.

The Japanese were criticised and doubted regarding their ability to successfully colonise the island by certain citizens of the Powers. Civil Administrator Gotō Shimpei writes in the introduction to the survey of Taiwan conducted by Takekoshi that: “Our administration in Formosa has been severely criticised...”¹⁰². Takekoshi adds that: “Western nations have long believed that on their shoulders alone rested the responsibility of colonizing the yet unopened portions of the globe, and extending to the inhabitants the benefits of civilisation”¹⁰³. In addition “Some people... are inclined to doubt whether we possess the ability requisite for such a task”¹⁰⁴. Japan was a new Power. Unlike every other contemporary Power the Japanese were of an entirely different culture. At that time it was popular to classify peoples into races by the Powers. Regarding Japanese colonial policy, Peattie explains it was known as “scientific colonialism” and its approach was “biological politics” that “implied a way of looking at supposed differences in political capacity between ruler and ruled” though “biological principles”¹⁰⁵. The Japanese were the first of the so-called Asiatic or Oriental race to emerge as a Power. Previously they were subject to unequal treaties by the Powers which they regarded to be humiliating. Having just annexed Taiwan, the Japanese felt they had to prove their equality as a race. That is evidenced in the above quotations that appear in the preface and introduction to a book that was purposed with illustrating their ability to colonise successfully. Understandably, the Japanese were therefore sensitive as per their national standing among the Powers.

Takekoshi’s account illustrates that the Japanese faced resistance as soon as their forces had landed at Jilong on the 3rd June. Unlike the Japanese army the Chinese soldiers were familiar with the local geography and guerrilla warfare. Soldiers were disguised as peasant farmers. Although difficulty was experienced in Xinzhu prefecture, the Japanese force secured Tainan and thereby the island under Chinese control by 12th October. Interestingly among Japanese army fatalities only 164 died in combat but 4,642 including Prince Kitashirakawa died from tropical diseases¹⁰⁶.

However, combat operations did not conclude in 1895. Records of armed rebellion indicate it occurred periodically until 1915 for Chinese and as late as 1930 for the Atayal aborigines.

When Japan acquired Taiwan the whole island was not under Qing rule. Actually a substantive portion of the East was the territory of the putative mountain dwelling aborigines who were regarded to be savages. The Japanese were interested in opening the mountain regions which they believed held untold wealth. This meant intruding on aboriginal hunting lands. Takekoshi thinks that under Qing rule the mountain aborigines were “continually maltreated and oppressed” and saw “all other members of the human race as their natural enemies”¹⁰⁷. They thus confronted the additional military issue of pacifying them in order to explore the mountain ranges. This task was largely accomplished by 1915¹⁰⁸.

It is thought the displacement of the gentry posed a significant threat to the Japanese maintaining social order. The gentry being informal administrators played a crucial role in managing commoners. At the arrival of Japanese troops there emerged feelings of resentment towards the Qing who had abandoned them, hostility and fear toward the Japanese, and disillusionment with the resistance movement. A large share of the “fearful and disgruntled” upper gentry returned to the mainland. Collaborators could possess a semblance of their former status but on the whole for the majority of the gentry Japanese rule precipitated the dissolution of their privileges and authority¹⁰⁹. The heads of the common people were in a position to exacerbate resistance. The Japanese therefore confronted the issue of co-opting the gentry to aid social stability.

Another social problem the Japanese confronted was eliminating undesirable local customs. Unlike the Hakkas or the aborigines Holko traditionally bound the feet of girls. In addition, all Chinese men had to have a particular hairstyle called a queue. Spitting on the street also occurred, and some dwellings were without windows¹¹⁰. Opium smoking was a regular sight. What is more the aborigines residing in the mountainous regions headhunted. The Japanese authorities sought to halt all such practices. Opium was an especially serious issue. Jennings writes “given Taiwan’s long and intimate association with opium smoking, Japanese commanders feared that their troops would acquire the habit from local inhabitants”¹¹¹. Expectedly these goals should not have been attained without causing notable unrest among the islanders.

What is more, the Japanese encountered significant difficulties in communication: the Japanese spoke Japanese whilst the Chinese and aborigines spoke their languages¹¹². Mutual unintelligibility in language should have impeded reform and promoted discontent.

Colonial possessions were not inexpensive. Takekoshi first explains that because the island was in such a disturbed state it was impossible to accurately estimate its finances. He then writes “it was estimated that she would require an income of Yen 9,650,000, of which not more than Yen 2,710,000 could be raised in the island by taxation, the remaining Yen 6,940,000 having to be supplied by Japan”¹¹³. Although he only provides estimates rather than solid data, the point is clear: Taiwan had to achieve economic self-sufficiency. In 1895 Taiwan’s infrastructure was not heavily developed. It necessitated development to assist in promoting economic growth. Japan was thus burdened with a double bill for not only maintaining rule but also investing in future growth.

In light of the above paragraphs it is evident that Japan confronted numerous problems in ruling the colony. Those issues impact on conditions for opium use. To begin with, there were cases where Chinese regarded the Japanese as invading barbarians in accordance to tradition. Armed uprisings continued to occur after decades of rule. Certain customs such as foot binding and wearing a queue were prohibited while homeowners were forced to install windows to suit Japanese tastes. Such an attitude and events should most definitely reflect the Taiwanese disinclination from wholeheartedly conforming to Japanese policy. That disinclination was indubitably exacerbated by the Japanese needs to impress their equality with other Powers and attain colonial economic self-sufficiency, as well as having a sense of superiority vis-à-vis Chinese. Those needs are thought to have pressured and motivated the Taiwan Government-General to unfailingly strive for the best results without accepting compromise. Given the above, it should not be unreasonable to assert that the islanders would not have been willing to fully cooperate with the newly promulgated opium law.

3.2.0. Japanese Administration of Taiwan

The Japanese and Qing dynasty administration of the island were considerably different. Unlike a provincial magistrate a Governor-General was unchecked by local gentry, more diversely educated in rule, had more detailed intelligence on the island, and deployed an unassailable military and civil police force that could better enforce ordinances. In addition the Government-General was first provided substantive revenue from Tokyo and later developed the economy to become highly productive. Modern bureaucratic institutions replaced archaic ones. The Japanese administration was thus far more efficient, effective and affluent than the Qing dynasty one. That meant it could manage the import, production, distribution and consumption of opium better than the Chinese.

3.2.1. Early Colonial Policy

Japan did not wage war against China for the annexation of Taiwan: it fought for influence over Korea. In fact Chen maintains the idea to seize the island only appeared after the war had erupted¹¹⁴. Based on his research it is understood the island was coveted to defend against the threat of a Power occupying it, as well as to elevate Japan's national status and to satisfy a jingoistic public's demand for territorial gains. In addition it was the only part of China that could be most likely seized without transgressing the interests of the Powers¹¹⁵. Thinking this way the annexation of Taiwan was therefore not the result of masterful grand strategy: it was an opportunistic gain.

Supposing that were the case it should be unsurprising that Japan had not prepared a concrete colonial policy. The first three years of rule were coined "the age of mistakes and failures"¹¹⁶. There were three Governor-Generals in as many years. The only notable policies was the promulgation of 1896 law 63 (*rokusan-hou*) by the Diet and proclamation of the 1897 Opium Law (*Taiwan ahen-rei*) by the Government-General. The former endowed the Governor-General with the new legal power to pass ordinances. Yet, until Kodama Gentarō and Gotō Shinpei were inaugurated in 1898 no concrete colonial policy was devised. The latter will be discussed in detail later. Nevertheless Schencking informs that at that time "certain military and political leaders viewed the island, as a springboard for subsequent Japanese penetration of the

South Seas”¹¹⁷. In 1896 Governor-General Katsura Tarō held “... the development of Taiwan should not be confined to the island, but should be planned in terms of an advance into a wider area”¹¹⁸. Thus a Governor-General proposed to utilise the island as a military base (Kodama should later frame this idea as “southern advance” (*nanshin*). Yet employing Taiwan as a springboard for imperial expansion is best regarded as an imperial policy: it is for imperialist expansion after all. The colonial policy was thus to develop the island for an imperial policy.

In 1898 Kodama assumed the position of Governor-General and Gotō became the head of Civil Administration. Under their stewardship many policies were formulated and implemented. Unlike previous administrators they had a clear vision of the island’s colonial development. Kodama was a respected and influential general in the army. Gotō was an outstanding bureaucrat who specialized in public hygiene issues. He learnt of “biological principles” during his studies in Germany. Kodama sought to utilise the colony as an instrument in advancing Japan’s ability to conduct “economic warfare”. He understood the Powers won “special interests and political advantages” by “their power and resources”¹¹⁹. That was economic warfare. He thought Japan ought “to oppose them so that we can continue to dominate in the Far East and preserve the peace”¹²⁰. He concluded: “Today’s most urgent task is to develop the resources of Taiwan”¹²¹.

Gotō wanted to modernise the colony in accordance with “biological principles”.¹²² Allegedly in response to a question on the meaning of “biology” asked by Kodama Goto stated: “It is cherishing customs. Generally speaking it is that. Even if you say you must suddenly make a Flounder into a Sea Bream, it is something you cannot do. The fact we have to cherish customs comes from the principles of biology...”¹²³. Chang reveals that in effect that means “...to promote science and develop agriculture, industry, sanitation, education, communications and police force” in order to “be able to persevere in the struggle for survival and win the struggle of the survival of the fittest”¹²⁴. He apprehended animals survive “because they adapt to their environment”. Correspondingly “we too should adopt suitable measures and try to overcome the various difficulties that confront us”¹²⁵. In other words, “biological principles” is the basis for devising colonial policy with respect to understanding local customs, and formulating and implementing policies that consider both Government-General goals and local sensibilities. Moving on, he did not want to proclaim his policies to the

islanders: his policy was “silent implementation”(fugen jikkō)¹²⁶. Lastly, Tsurumi’s biography indicates he was most interested in solving practical problems that confronted him such as mounting debt, communication, transport and consolidating rule¹²⁷. This is further evidenced in that she writes “there were three difficult matters for colonial management”; namely: a) improving the climate and environment as well as making life easy for nationals; b) to ensure high interest and capital invested in the island would not become a problem; and c) the issue of inexperience in colonial management¹²⁸.

It is also worth making a note on sources here. The quotes as per Gotō and Kodama that are presented above are both derived from a secondary source that derives its information from secondary sources. Kodama’s “economic warfare” originates in Taiwan Colonial Policy (*Taiwan shokumin seisaku*) that is authored by Mochiji Rokusaburō and published in 1912. There is a possibility that Kodama did not espouse “economic warfare”. Rather it was merely Mochiji’s impression of Kodama’s mindset. Another issue is the validity of Gotō’s understanding of “biology”. Both Chang and the author depend on Tsurumi’s biography of Gotō Shinpei. He cites the 1937 original edition while the author refers to the 1965 one. In the latter Tsurumi presents conversations between Kodama and Gotō. The original was written over three decades after those conversations were held. What is more she does not indicate who informed her of those conversations. Kodama passed away in 1906 and Gotō died in 1929, many years before her book was published: it is doubtful she communicated with them. The problem is we have no way of knowing if Gotō and Kodama really had that conversation. Though Tsurumi regards Gotō as Mr Gotō (*Gotō-san*) and with a word translatable as a familiar “Count”, distant “uncle” or “elder brother” (*haku*). That suggests the author knew Gotō intimately or admired him greatly or wished to convey that impression to convince readers of the authenticity of her work. The book was nevertheless published at war time when jingoistic ultranationalists held power. Considering the above it should be wise to be cautious as per the authenticity of the aforementioned perceptions of Gotō and Kodama.

With the above in mind the least that can be concluded is that the aim of early colonial policy was to develop the island to exploit its resources for strengthening Japan in its struggle for survival vis-à-vis the Powers. The colonised were regarded as subordinate to the colonisers in terms of biological fitness and status. It is maintainable that

gradually improving the island and islanders in terms of education, transport, economy and communications was deemed conducive for the aim of colonial policy. In other words, a stronger colony meant a stronger Japan. It should be improper to assert that the goal of Kodama and Gotō was to modernise the island to illustrate that Japan too could colonise territory like the Powers: there is no evidence indicating either of them actually thought that. The execution of such colonial policy was pragmatic and unannounced. It was characterised by solving issues that confronted the Government-General.

Such an outlook as per the aim of colonial policy, the execution of policy, and the status of the Chinese is deemed to have had a profound impact on opium in the island. This thought will be explored further below after relevant reforms such as Law 63, the hokō system (*hokō seido*), policing, and the opium monopoly system (*ahen senbai seido*) have been introduced.

3.2.2. Law 63

The first two decades of Japanese rule were marked by unrest. Chinese “bandits” employed guerrilla warfare and openly revolted against the new regime. Aborigines also enacted reprisals against encroachment on their territory. Fighting occurred most frequently in the first decade. During that time the administration was busy establishing the foundation for its rule of the colony. For the Government-General to realistically implement policy and enforce control over the island for that foundation it necessitated flexibility in promulgating laws. At that time only the Diet in Tokyo was permitted to create laws according to the Meiji Constitution. It was by no means practical nor sensible for each law devised by the Government-General in Formosa to be reviewed and passed by the government in Japan. It was also unwise for the government in Japan to instruct the administration in Taiwan on policy. The best policy was to thus allow the Taiwan Government-General to handle whatever situation arose and implement whichever policy it deemed optimal without interference. The law which enabled the administration to do so was Law 63 (*rokusan-hō*).

Law 63 was promulgated by the Japanese government in 1896 under the title “Law regarding Laws that ought to be implemented in Taiwan” (*Kanyu ougai zai Taiwan shikō no hōrei no hōritsu*)¹²⁹. Wu states that “... it regulated that the Taiwan Government could proclaim ordinance that held the effect of law within its administrative area”¹³⁰. It was originally limited to be valid for three years. Yet its validity was successfully petitioned twice in 1899 and 1902 to be extended for another six years altogether¹³¹. In 1906 Law 63 was repealed but replaced by Law 31 (*sanichi-hō*) which was essentially afforded the Government-General the same flexibility for a period of five years¹³². It was similarly repeatedly extended until it was similarly replaced by Law 3 (*san-hō*) in 1922. Unlike the preceding laws, Law 3 was indefinite. In addition it limited the passing of ordinances to cases when the application of Japanese domestic law was impossible. Yet akin to the other laws it continued to afford the administration flexibility in devising and implementing laws¹³³. It is thought that it is because these laws all provide that freedom to act that they are broadly referred to as Law 63.

This law is extremely significant. It granted more power to and elevated the status of the Government-General. Suitable comparisons could be that its power and status was similar to a feudal lord or a viceroy in terms of its freedom to issue commands without considerable legal constraint. Albeit the position of Governor-General was appointed and revoked by parliamentarians on behalf of the emperor in Japan. In light of this it was thus Taipei and not Tokyo that was responsible for opium policy across the island.

3.2.3. Opium Policy

The Japanese did not condone opium smoking. In fact it had been prohibited and opium was placed under a government monopoly in Japan prior to the annexation of Taiwan¹³⁴. As already mentioned it was feared that the habit of opium smoking might spread from the colony to Japan during the initial years of occupation. According to Jennings a decree mandating the death penalty for anyone who supplied the Japanese army with opium was promulgated in 1895¹³⁵. Takekoshi, who was a contemporary of the time, regarded smoking it as “an evil habit”, and its smokers were thought to be

“wretched” and “living in agony”¹³⁶. There was no question that opium must be prohibited. The issue was rather how it should be achieved.

Two schools of thought on the subject existed; namely: prohibition and gradual prohibition. The former called for prohibition to be effected quickly. This was originally supported by Premier Itō Hirobumi. The latter opposed immediate prohibition. Its chief architect was Gotō Shinpei. He contested immediate prohibition on the grounds it was both unhumanitarian and unwise in his 1895 report “Opinions regarding The Taiwan Opium System”. He warned that elder addicts would die in long suffering agony were they to be denied opium. In addition he wrote prohibition should incite unrest that would undermine Japanese rule. Suppressing such unrest would require two army divisions and the sacrifice of many lives. Most importantly the goal of effecting total prohibition would not be achieved¹³⁷. Instead he proposed the implementation of an opium monopoly system. Its aim was to reduce opium consumption by imposing a Government-General operated monopoly over opium that could only be consumed by confirmed addicts who possessed a licence: no new licenses were to be issued. That should result in the number of addicts to reduce through abandoning their habit or death. He predicted it should take between 30 and 50 years for his gradual prohibition policy to eliminate opium from the island. In addition he estimated the monopoly would generate 3,000,000 yen per year. Such income would be utilised solely in projects on hygiene in Taiwan¹³⁸. Lastly he proposed preventative education be prepared for students¹³⁹.

Gotō’s proposal was by no means warmly received by all. He was once accused of being a national traitor¹⁴⁰. Nevertheless the threat of unrest from banning opium during regime change in accompaniment with the Government-General’s deficit were factors that garnered support for his humanitarian, gradualist policy¹⁴¹. Indeed, during the first decade of rule opium revenue accounted for over 20 percent of annual income until 1905 excluding subsidies from Tokyo. At most it was worth 46.3 percent of such income in 1898¹⁴².

Liu notes the proposal “did not yet touch upon the task of relieving or rectifying old addicts; it merely proclaimed the administration’s target lied in preventing the production of new addicts”¹⁴³. In other words treatment for addicts was not envisaged. On the topic of treatment, a further point can be made. That is Gotō and Kodama

regarded opium that the Government-General pharmaceutical plant produced as a medicine. Kodama is remembered to have said “that drug opium is manufactured into a medicine without poison... at the pharmaceutical plant the drug opium is made into a good medicine”¹⁴⁴. That plant is the same one that should have produced opium paste for addicts during early rule. Considering opium smoking was disdained by the Japanese, it is peculiar that it referred to as a medicine. Perhaps calling it so was a strategy to induce Formosans to accept the product and support the administration’s activity. Perhaps the morphine content of the opium paste was lower and thereby less addictive. Unfortunately an explanation as to why opium paste was a “medicine” is yet to be discovered by the author.

With regard to the above it can be concluded the gradual prohibition policy reflects Gotō’s philosophical outlook and the contemporaneous circumstances of the Government-General. It reflects the “biological principles” in the sense it: a) considered the fate of Chinese opium addicts were they denied opium; b) cherished the opium smoking custom by allowing it to continue; c) sought to transform local culture gradually over thirty to fifty years as per being unable to make a Flounder into a Sea Bream abruptly. This is ideological. It is associated with the state of colonial rule with respect to the fact it generated revenue and should not precipitate unrest unlike immediate prohibition. This is pragmatic. It was thus both an ideological and practical policy. It should be argued that in the early period of Japanese rule it was necessarily pragmatic. Yet once the island had been pacified and was no longer in deficit it is thought to have lost its practical value. In that respect it should have been a purely ideological policy toward middle and late periods of rule.

3.2.4. The Opium Monopoly System

On 21st January 1897 the Government-General promulgated the “Taiwan Opium Law” (*Taiwan ahen rei*). It had 14 articles. Broadly speaking its aim was to restrict opium related activities. It was to accomplish this goal by creating an opium monopoly system operated by the Government-General. After numerous revisions it was implemented on 1st April that year¹⁴⁵. Later in accompaniment with the monopolies on salt, camphor and tobacco it was subsumed under the Monopoly Bureau (*senbaikyoku*) which was established in 1901.

Establishing a monopoly meant only the Government-General was able to import, buy, sell and produce opium for consumption. Anyone else was prohibited from entering into the business¹⁴⁶.

Profit earned from sales funded administrative operations.

The monopoly system is so called with respect to the fact regulations were devised to create a system in which the Government-General's monopoly would operate smoothly. There were three key aspects of the system; namely: a) issuing licences to addicts; b) prohibiting any unpermitted opium related activities; and c) penalising those who violated the law.

As for the former, only confirmed opium addicts were issued licences. Only licensees could consume and possess opium. Next you could say apart from holding or taking opium with a licence every other activity was illegal. Importation, manufacture, sale, assignment and exchange of opium and its instruments was forbidden. Government produced opium could not be mixed with other opium for consumption. Establishments for taking opium were illegal to set up. As for the latter violators were punished either by imprisonment or a fine. The duration of imprisonment and cost of the fine could be severe. Selling opium was for instance penalised by a maximum five year prison term or fine under 5000 yen. Lastly smoking without obtaining a licence was punishable by a prison term under three years and fine under three thousand yen¹⁴⁷.

As for other points on the monopoly system, Jennings states that there would be one licensed wholesaler in every police district and one licensed retailer for every forty five licensed opium smoker¹⁴⁸. In addition, licence holding addicts were issued a ration book¹⁴⁹. Wholesalers and retailers earned respective commissions of 1.5 percent (lowered to 1.3 in 1915) and 10 percent on each sale¹⁵⁰. According to Ts'ai they earned 1.3 percent and 8.5 percent respectively in 1926¹⁵¹. Takekoshi writes that Japanese were prohibited from dealing with opium: only Chinese could handle it¹⁵². Ts'ai writes that the *hosei* (Japanese) or *baozheng* (Chinese) "... stood a fairly good chance of becoming authorized opium agents"¹⁵³. They were in charge of opium-smoking surveys and many of them served as opium-distribution agents. Like the Chinese gentry of the Qing dynasty, they were the crucial mediating link between the state and common people¹⁵⁴. *Hosei* and the *hōkō* system will be discussed later. Lastly,

unlike the opium monopoly system that eliminated opium in Japan by the very late nineteenth century, there is no evidence available that suggests retailers had “to file a report with the local authorities every time they dispensed the drug”¹⁵⁵. Though from 1904 it was stipulated the retailer had to record the type of opium sold, its quantity, its value, the date of transaction and require the retailer to sign the document¹⁵⁶. What is more no more than three days provision of opium could be sold to license and ration book holders after 1909¹⁵⁷.

The Government-General hired two companies to purchase opium on the international market: Mitsui Bussan and Samuel and Samuel. They commenced purchasing Persian and Indian opium in Hong Kong from 1896. Here it should be noted prior to the implementation of the Taiwan Opium Law raw opium was processed into smoking paste at the Medicine Manufacturing Bureau (*Seiyakujo*) from the same year. In 1910 Samuel and Samuel were additionally commissioned to purchase Turkish opium. In 1912 the same company was exclusively contracted to purchase all opium. Yet Mitsui Bussan held the sole contract to do so from 1917¹⁵⁸. Opium was not cultivated on the island. It “was found to be unsuitable for large-scale cultivation”¹⁵⁹. Indeed in 1898 and 1901 test planting poppies proved unsuccessful owing to damage from wind, rain and insects¹⁶⁰.

A campaign to have addicts register was held in 1897. Then the island was not wholly subjugated. Only 95,449 addicts were registered from an estimated total of 170,000. Jennings writes that: “In their zeal to collect as many opium smokers as possible, the authorities either disregarded or loosened the registration guidelines”¹⁶¹. Waving strict physical standards, physicians also registered occasional smokers¹⁶². Further drives to register addicts were held until 1900. Nevertheless unlicensed smoking continued. That provoked the authorities to undertake two additional campaigns. By the end of the fourth drive in 1905, 220,657 addicts were registered altogether and there were 130,476 addicts in that year according to Jennings.

According to Jennings the reduction in the number of licensed addicts continued from a peak of 169,064 in 1900 to a low of 7,560 in 1941. The only year the number of such addicts increased was in 1908. Then it rose by 6,826 from 113,165 to 119,991¹⁶³. However, according to Takekoshi the number diminished from of maximum of 165,752 in 1900 to 132,903 in 1903. Within that period it increased by 7,576 to

163,842 in 1902¹⁶⁴. Based on Liu's research Takekoshi's figure for 1900 can be accounted for by the month in which the statistics are counted: there were 169,064 and 165,752 addicts registered by September 1900 and in 1900 respectively¹⁶⁵. Neither Liu nor Jennings' studies explain why Takekoshi's 1903 figure is different. Apart from that 1903 data all statistics correlate. Takekoshi and Liu do not indicate the sources. Jennings relies on Kaku Sagatarō's research included in Kikuchi Toraji's "*Ahen mondai no kenkyū*" (Research on the Opium Problem) published in 1928, and Ryū Meishu's "*Nihon no ahen seisaku to Taiwan zaisei*" (Japan's opium policy and Taiwan's finances) published in 1979¹⁶⁶. Regrettably both sources are unavailable to the author for examination.

Considering the above it is evident that the opium monopoly system was extremely thorough in controlling opium. However it was by no means ensured absolute control. By examining the system without regard to other influential factors three problems are identifiable. The first is that opium distributors had an economic incentive to sell more opium: wholesalers and retailers earned commission on sales. This commission system could be exploited by corruption. The second is, unlike in the Japan's opium monopoly system until 1904, opium distributors were not required to maintain records of sales to addicts. The effect was a retailer could in theory sell opium to addicts who did not possess licenses without raising suspicion from authorities. The authorities had no record for checking who the opium was sold to. This would make exploitation of the system easier. Lastly the *hōsei* were ubiquitously responsible for opium surveys and distribution. In practical terms these are the two most important parts of the monopoly system because they could control who did and did not smoke opium within their communities from day to day. With respect to that, it is thought peculiar that the most important tasks in regulating opium consumption were assigned to Chinese who were not staunchly opposed to opium smoking unlike Japanese and had an economic incentive and ability to sell more opium. Albeit, it was practical that the *hōsei* were endowed with such responsibilities. It is understood that fearing the spread of addiction to Japan the Government-General would not want Japanese nationals involved in retailing opium. It is further thought the Japanese should not favour retailing "evil" opium to "wretched" addicts who were Chinese. Lastly offering trust, responsibility and a secure opportunity to profit from the business of opium to respected and influential community leaders should satisfy them and discourage them

from becoming recalcitrant. In other words that would assist in maintaining social stability.

3.2.5. Social Organisation

Confronted with the tasks of eliminating unrest and economically developing the island, the Government-General had to instil order to accomplish those goals. However it lacked the manpower in terms of civil and military police to do so in the initial years of rule. The administration required a solution that would prevent subversive activities and mobilise the Taiwanese for public works without military force. The answer was to be found in reorganising society. There were two institutions that were instrumental in such social organisation; namely: the *hokō* system (*hokō seido*) and its militia (*sōteidan*).

According to Tsurumi the *hokō* system was essentially responsible for organisation of households and maintaining public order¹⁶⁷. The system's designation is derived from its two constituent parts: *ho* and *kō*. It is referred to as *hokō* in English because it cannot be translated into intelligible English. Households were organised into units of *kō* and *ho*. As a rule ten households compose one *kō*, and ten *kō* comprise one *ho*. Though exceptions to the rule were not uncommon. A headman was responsible for each unit. The head of a *kō* was called a *kōcho*. The head of a *ho* was known as a *hosei* or a *yakunin*¹⁶⁸. Such headmen were elected by the members of their relevant unit, and assumed their position only after receiving approval from the local police inspector. They served for two years. In that time they were responsible for many duties such as regulating the jurisdiction of household surveys, observation of arrivals and departures, precaution against natural disasters, reporting subversion, visitors who stay a night in the community, informing households of new regulations, and tax collection¹⁶⁹. Chen and Ts'ai think that the system applied only to Chinese but Tsurumi writes that it was applied to "natives and foreigners"¹⁷⁰. The *hokō* were self-financed by house-owning households within each *kō* and *ho*. There were five sources of revenue: a) *hokō* dues, b) provisional dues, c) negligence fines, d) voluntary contributions, and e) other sources. Only *hokō* dues were regular. All other sources were irregularly collected. Provisional dues funded public works, and negligence fines

were imposed on *hokō* that failed in its duties¹⁷¹. The most fundamental aspect of the *hokō* system was collective responsibility. If a *hosei* or *kōchō* did not report a case of subversion, for instance, then not the perpetrators of the crime but in fact all households in the relevant *hokō* unit would be punished. The penalty was typically a severe fine that could be devastating for the community. If the fine could not be paid then labour service was assigned to the whole community¹⁷². Full-time clerks were also hired to handle *hosei* duties. Their salary was also funded by the *hokō*. Lastly *hokō* were utilised in public works such as building infrastructure and improving sanitation directed by *hosei* and *kōchō* under police inspectors¹⁷³.

The *hokō* system was promulgated as the *Hokō Code* (*hokō kiyaku*) in 1898¹⁷⁴. It had seven articles. Article five stipulates the formation of militia or “Able-Bodied Corps” (*sōteidan*). Their function was to protect against natural disasters such as fires and earthquakes and to serve as auxiliary police in battling “bandits” for instance¹⁷⁵. On average ten able-bodied men aged between 17 and 50 were selected by *hosei* and *kōchō* from each *kō*. Their status was marked by the uniforms they wore. In addition they received police training and were involved in public works. The cost of the uniforms and food for militia were paid for by the *hokō*. Indeed, the militia was a part of the *hokō*¹⁷⁶.

Here it is worth noting that *hokō* and militia were not alien concepts to the Chinese. In fact the former was first established in 1733 in Taiwan and the latter as understood by the author was traditional¹⁷⁷. It would therefore not necessarily incite unrest: the Japanese were not changing the status quo. Albeit the land survey (*tōchi chosa*) which was conducted from 1898 identified new households for both taxation and inclusion in the *hokō* system¹⁷⁸. Lastly Tsurumi noted that the *hokō* system was also practised under the Tokugawa period in Japan¹⁷⁹.

Moving on, the regulations governing this system of social organisation were revised on occasion. In 1904 it was stipulated that revenue generated from negligence fines could only be utilised for rewards and emergencies¹⁸⁰. That contributed to reducing police corruption. In 1909 *hosei* were permitted to establish their own office and were ordered to work under the immediate local administrative official¹⁸¹. This illustrates that every household in the *hokō* system should be connected to not only the police but also to a political organ of the Government-General. Ts'ai writes: “By 1919 the

hokō system had been employed to assist in virtually every important aspect of the colonial administration”¹⁸². In other words, the system became an effective tool for not only organising households and maintaining public order, but also for mobilising the people to undertake policy directives.

At first glance the positions of headmen are undesirable ones. It is unpaid. You could be regarded as a collaborator by neighbours. You would also suffer the burden of protecting your community from collective punishment. However the Government-General offered incentives to make it a much sought after position. Privileges in education, business connections and government appointments were offered to headmen¹⁸³. In addition the *hokō* revenue system could be abused for personal gain. In Takao in 1926 “... the *hokō* surplus was often misused on ceremonial festivals, social entertainments, or similarly mismanaged by the *hosei*”¹⁸⁴. What is more, as previously mentioned, headmen were favoured for being opium retailers which could generate a fortune over night. Lastly it is thought to present an opportunity to ensure subversive and illegal activities in which you are involved to continue without the threat of an uninvolved headman reporting you to the authorities. You could thus argue that being a headman was desirable after all.

In analysis it is evident the *hokō* system of social organisation had a significant impact on opium smoking in Taiwan. Unlicensed smokers could certainly hide within a community but there was a constant risk that the *hokō* households would be punished. That should result in marked social pressure for addicts to register with a doctor to receive a permit. Moreover, Chen asserts “... under close police supervision there was little possibility for the *pao-chia* headmen to abuse their powers”¹⁸⁵. It was thus an indubitably instrumental system for achieving the gradual suppression policy. Nevertheless the system was not perfect: there were occasions for corruption to occur. Ts’ai evidences an excellent example. When opium was banned in China in 1916 a highly lucrative smuggling trade arose from Taiwan via Japan to most probably Korea or China. Retail licence holders would sell their permit having received it. In that time in Tainan when 17 unauthorised retailers had their permits revoked over 300 applied for the new contracts¹⁸⁶. Contending Chen’s opinion, she writes that *hosei*, who were likely to become retailers, “played an ambiguous role” regarding the sale of opium¹⁸⁷. Considering the fact that the smuggling occurred and *hosei* were in a trusted position that they could abuse, it is certainly maintainable that the *hokō* system was not

immune to corruption and by extension the *hosei* could and would abuse their positions.

3.2.6. Policing

Rule over the island was enforced by the police. A chief of police (*keisatu shochō*) located in the central administration presided over districts and sub-districts in a hierarchy. The aforementioned *hokō* were situated in sub-districts and their respective *hosei* and *kochō* were responsible to a police inspector (*keibu*) and his patrolmen (*junsa*). Chang writes: “In effect, the police force penetrated into every household”¹⁸⁸. The duties of the police extended from law enforcement to effecting administration policy regarding sanitation, household registration, tax collection, engineering works, water control, planting, and natural disaster prevention. Albeit, as previously mentioned tax collection and the prevention of natural disasters were also delegated to *hosei*. The police were paid an attractive salary in order to deter corruption. Taiwanese who were educated in Japanese were recruited from 1901. Chang continues: “Consistent and predicable police action encouraged public confidence and obedience to the administration”¹⁸⁹. In addition, besides general policing, there was also a high level police force (*kōtō keisatu*) that was responsible for combating subversion¹⁹⁰.

In analysis two points relevant to the thesis can be expressed. The first is that the Government-General was empowered with a significant degree of control over the colonised. The administration could enforce its will through the *police*, *hokō* system and Able-Bodied Corps to most families in each *kō*. It is thought that having not only the local notables but also many men in each *kō* in each sub-district participate in enforcing the law was an effective means to promote order. This is because participating in law enforcement caused law enforcement to be on the agenda for the concerned individuals. What is more, it was not strictly law enforcement, but also activities that were perceivably beneficial for the community. In agreement with Chang, the effect was that the public would gain confidence in the administration. That would mitigate rebellion. The second point is in connection with the culture of illicit smoking that shall be shortly discussed below. Zhou thinks that the police could

identify illicit smokers¹⁹¹. This is on the grounds that the police system was so efficacious. The implication being the Government-General allowed illicit opium smoking to continue. Such an implication requires explanation. It is thought there are three possible explanations; namely: a) police corruption; b) social stability; and c) administrative corruption. To begin with the Japanese police who immigrated to Taiwan tended to originate from less developed areas of Japan. Working in a hot and humid colony far from home was not necessarily attractive. Japanese who applied for work as police inspectors there most probably did so for the attractive salary. Thinking with these points in mind, it is possible some police reached an agreement with illicit smokers or related businesses. Next, social stability was of upmost importance for the colonial regime. Denying something desired by someone may anger them. Allowing an illicit smoker to continue smoking would satisfy them and thus reduce the likelihood of rebellion. Lastly, revenue from the opium monopoly constituted a major part of Government-General income. The retail of opium was not recorded. It was in the administration's interest to earn as much revenue as possible whilst generally reducing the number of addicts. With respect to the prior point on social stability, this meant that the police might have been ordered to tolerate or express leniency towards illicit smokers for the good of the administration. However, it is worth remembering that there were few Japanese police compared to the number of Taiwanese. It should not have been too difficult to evade detection whilst smoking secretly.

3.3. Opium and Culture

The focus of this section is the culture of opium in Taiwan under the early period of Japanese rule. Unlike the prior section on its culture during the late Qing dynasty there is a relative abundance of literature documenting such culture. Nevertheless it is worth remembering that opium consumption was not unrestricted in praxis as it was under Manchurian rule. The implication of such restrictions is that any illegal activity regarding opium is unlikely to be reported by offenders for avoiding prosecution by the authorities: there will be less material on illegal opium culture. Another regrettable fact is that all of people who experienced the early twentieth century on Formosa are deceased: they cannot be interviewed. It is therefore thought that a complete picture of

the culture of opium during the 1900s until 1920 is unattainable. However, owing to the wealth of literature on it, an enlightening vignette can be presented.

To begin with negative attitudes towards opium were ubiquitously promoted across the island. The instrument was negative ideas regarding opium. The media for the dissemination of those attitudes were common schools, newspapers, the *hōko* system, public lectures and mass movements. The degree to which one was exposed to those attitudes was contingent on the environment in terms of the extent to which your locality was developed and agents within it discussed such attitudes. But it is arguable that a majority of the population under Japanese rule was aware of the negative attitudes. These attitudes are important because they can change how you would regard opium, and by extension how you would react to those that indulge in it and whether you would consume it. Such attitudes are evidenced in the following examples.

First of all in 1903 a Japanese physician published an article in the Journal of the Medical Association of Formosa (*Taiwan igaku zasshi*) indicating that smoking opium made you unhealthy. He observed that although opium smokers in Taiwan were taller than the average Japanese male their weight and chest circumference were smaller. He concluded that “opium smoking would lead to an inferior physique and make smokers more prone to diseases”¹⁹². This idea when publicised could influence those who receive it to regard smoking opium to make you more likely to become unhealthy. The fact such a conclusion is reached by one who is scientifically trained should strengthen the impact in that it is more believable. Albeit, personal experience contradicting such a conclusion should negate the effect of the idea. The matter of who was most likely to have such experience will be discussed below.

Next the 1905 Provisional Household Survey (*Rinji Taiwan Kokō Chōsa*) produced evidence that construed opium smokers negatively. The survey was actually a population census. It was the first that was conducted in the Japanese Empire; the first census of Japan was held in 1920. The contents of the survey reveal many interesting facts. Opium smoking was included in the questionnaire for instance. Hsu writes: “It was regarded as a matter of fact that opium would bring down the vitality of the population and waste national resources”¹⁹³. With respect to that it is apprehendable why it was included. Another interesting fact is that the survey merely framed

habitual and occasional opium smokers under the rubric of opium smoker. In reference to that Hsu therefore asserts that it “homogenised” opium smokers. The effect being only a one sided rather than a two sided or even more complex notion of opium smoking was presented in the results. The results illustrated that opium smokers had a higher mortality rate, lived in urban areas, and were five times more likely to commit a crime¹⁹⁴. Hsu continues that the census “propagated the Japanese mindset, expelling the category of moderate or occasional smoker from the thinking of every inhabitant on the island”¹⁹⁵. Hsu does not explicate how or evince that it was achieved but the author hypothesizes that an ideational force aiming to that effect was manifest because: a) the survey, being a government survey, was convincingly respectable; b) it was disseminated through newspapers to the islanders; and c) the literate and those with an interest in opium are likely to have discussed it¹⁹⁶. Nevertheless such an ideational force was able to be contended by those with personal experience indicating otherwise.

Lastly, in accordance with Gotō Shinpei’s intention to educate children as per the deleterious effects of opium lessons instructing that featured in Japanese language readers and Chinese textbooks. Two lessons titled “hygiene” and “opium” appeared in Japanese language readers from between 1901 and 1903¹⁹⁷. In the lesson on hygiene it was written: “In Taiwan, there are people who smoke opium. Opium contains fearful harm. Even though they pay attention to their foods and drinks, clean their bodies and do a lot of exercise, the harm will not disappear. Their bodies will gradually become weak, and, in the end, they will become the kind of people who cannot do any job”¹⁹⁸. In the lesson on opium the substance was described as poisonous and addictive. In addition, addicts were regarded as “opium ghosts” who could not work, would spend their wealth on the habit, ruin their families and be despised by everyone¹⁹⁹. That suggests opium smokers were demonised. These ideas should influence children to deem opium smoking as not only unhealthy, pathetic and miserable for them as individuals but also as ruinous to their future families. It is thought that such negative ideas connected to opium smoking would present reasons to discourage them from smoking opium as adults. Nevertheless, akin to the preceding paragraph, personal experience and peer pressure could present reasons to encourage opium consumption. In addition, to further qualify the assertion at most only 21 percent of school aged Chinese children attended common schools (*kōgakkō*) by 1920²⁰⁰. Generally speaking

In the initial half of Japanese rule more than 80 percent of such children were not educated in common schools. That suggests that education presenting opium as a deleterious habit would not have reached almost all of the children during that period.

Mochiji Rokusaburō, chief of educational affairs in the Government-General between 1903 and 1910 explains: “The aim of ordinary education is to educate the children of the middle and upper classes”²⁰¹. In other words “ordinary education” is in fact “elite education”²⁰². Though their elite education should be hardly comparable with elite education in Japan. It is further explicated that: “it is indeed regrettable that the production of unemployed intellectuals in the mother country is so conspicuous in the mother country itself;” and: “it is of utmost importance... that we take care to see that similar results do not come out of the education facilities in the colony”²⁰³. This means it should be the middle and upper class children who should be affected by education on opium. It moreover implies that these children were not educated to the extent they became intellectuals. In other words, they were not immersed in a world where they would question knowledge. That suggests they should accept teachings on opium as truth. Yet akin to the above personal experience should contest that truth. There will be further comments made in connection to this below.

According to the 1905 Provisional Household Survey the typical opium smoker was a Chinese male who worked in professions where he could manage his time freely such as a writer or lawyer (*jiyūgyō*)²⁰⁴. This must be accurate. However we should not allow this stereotype to make us neglect the diversity of opium consumers that existed during the early period of Japanese rule. Interviews conducted on the island by members of the Philippine Commission organised by the United States of America reveal a more detailed picture of who consumed opium on the island in 1903. Reverend Terada, who was a priest resident in Taipei, wrote that: “there are more young woman [sic] than young men who illegally use opium, and most of the former are found in houses of ill-fame”²⁰⁵. Those women were prostitutes. Doctor Arranz, who was also a priest living in Taipei, said that: “... the savages in one of the districts of Central Formosa, Polisia... and the civilized natives, use it in about the same proportion of the Chinese”²⁰⁶. He continues that opium was smoked as a remedy rather than taken as a cure for medical complaints such as malaria and rheumatism²⁰⁷. Iwai Tatsumi, who was the director of the Monopoly Bureau, enlightens that Chinese mothers who are addicts and give birth to addicted children blow opium in their

baby's face or give them opium to swallow to settle them²⁰⁸. He furthermore states that: "a man prefers to smoke in his own home, where not only he but his wife and often his children also smoke; this is the way in which they pass the evenings"²⁰⁹. He lastly mentions coolies, meaning the labourers, were also smokers. Mr Yeap Song Kee, who dwells in Danshui, explains that teenagers can smoke by "misrepresenting their ages" and smuggling opium²¹⁰. He adds that "the rice women smoke much"²¹¹. Taiwan had for a long time had "rootless males" who with no fixed abode wandered here and there. Some of whom were also opium smokers. The 1908 "Regulations on the Management of Rootless Males in Taiwan" expelled such men from urban centres and some were kept in detention where they learned new skills helpful for integration into working society and quit opium²¹². Unlicensed "secret smokers" also existed²¹³. Some licensed smokers actually did not smoke opium: they applied for them to avoid prosecution from police inspectors who suspected they were smoking without licences when in the company of smokers²¹⁴.

The type of opiate consumed was restricted under Japanese rule. The Gradual Prohibition policy and The Opium Monopoly System meant only Government-General opium paste could be purchased: morphine pills and injections were no longer legal. It is thought they could only be obtained from smuggling. The official opium paste was not necessarily taken as intended. The Philippine Commission reported that government opium paste is mixed with opium smuggled from the mainland and the ashes of smoked opium²¹⁵. One reason for doing that is explicable by Mr Yeap Song Kee who maintains "... the opium is not so pure when the government prepares it"²¹⁶. Taste aside, it could also have been mixed or not mixed for other business reasons.

Opium was smoked for pleasure as an aphrodisiac and for euphoria, as well as a tranquiliser for ailments and boredom. Since the onset of the opium law and *hokō* system people became less likely to treat opium to guests. It is thought probable it was still consumed to conduct business although there is no record of it.

It is thought that collective responsibility and the "Bandit Punishment Ordinance" (*hito keibatsu-lei*) served as stimuli to discourage illegal smoking. The former, which was a part of the *hōkō* system, would mean that the entire *kō* would be punished were a secret smoker to be discovered. That should discourage people from smoking

illegally lest their neighbours be punished by the police and thereafter treat the offender poorly. The latter empowered a police inspector with the permission to freely execute those who incited and enacted violence against Japanese²¹⁷. That and incidents connected to it are likely to impress the Chinese with the power of the police. That should thus disincline them to offend their local police inspector who had the power to impose heavy fines and prison sentences on the community for catching a secret smoker.

Opium was both smuggled from the island to the mainland and from China to Taiwan. It is thought smuggling should have been difficult to prevent considering the length of the island's coastline. This is indicated in Mr Iwai's description of smuggling into the island²¹⁸. It is further indicated in Ts'ai's reference to smugglers who frequently shipped opium from Tainan via Japan in 1916²¹⁹. According to the Philippine Commission's report the price of opium paste manufactured by the administration compared to the market price of equivalent quality was favourable: it was much cheaper²²⁰. That is expected to incline the smokers to purchase it. Yet the "not so pure" flavour would provide smokers and retailers an incentive to create new blends of opium. That would include opium smuggled in from China. In addition, throughout Japanese rule the price of opium was gradually increased. Ts'ai maintains opium was taxed heavily, for instance²²¹. With that in mind it is likely the price of domestic opium rose above the market price of such opium. That should encourage smuggling. Such a market for illegal opium paste would thus explicate smuggling to the island. However, it is difficult to explain why opium was smuggled from Taiwan via Japan to elsewhere. In World War One there was a global shortage of opium: it was required by governments for morphine for their soldiers. There was thus a market amongst addicts who were affected by the shortage. It is therefore expected the Tainan smugglers had discovered a market for it.

Last of all it was not only the Government-General that promoted negative attitudes towards opium consumption. The aforementioned "Soaring Phoenix Descends to Write Society" was the first native mass movement to eliminate the habit. It was largely successful as illustrated by 92.7 percent of the 37,072 people who quit opium in 1901 attributed the society as the reason for their action²²². Nevertheless the society was suppressed for harbouring subversive ideas by the authorities. Mr Yeap Song Kee moreover states: "every wise man teaches his children that the use of opium is bad"²²³.

What is more it is thought that in order to succeed in Taiwanese society as a middle or upper class Chinese it was necessary to conform to Japanese norms. It should be unlikely that the Government-General staff that thought opium was “evil” would hire an addict as an interpreter or translator for example. The parents of such children indubitably pressured them to avoid opium. As seen here, it was therefore not only the Japanese administration which disdained opium.

3.4. Opium and Economy

Under Japanese rule the Taiwanese economy developed rapidly. According to Chuang between 1903 and 1940 the growth rate of per capita output was approximately 19 percent per decade. As for total employment, 70 percent and 30 percent of the labour force was engaged in agricultural and non-agricultural activities respectively. Such infrastructure as roads, railways and harbours were developed to facilitate the commercialisation of agriculture. Modern banking and financial institutions were established. New technology and techniques were introduced. Public health was improved. Compulsory education was increasingly provided to children²²⁴. Ho states that “...Japan regarded Taiwan as an agricultural appendage and a market for its industrial products...”²²⁵. Net domestic product in terms of 1937 prices (1937 prices equals 100) increased from 36 to a peak of 103 from 1911 to 1936. Similarly export volume predicated on 1925 exports (1925 export volume equals 100) rose from 25 to a maximum of 183 from 1906 to 1936. Likewise import volume based on 1925 import volume (1925 case equals 100) grew from 36 to at most 194 from 1906 to 1936²²⁶. Key exports were sugar and rice. The Government-General created monopolies over not only opium but also camphor, salt and tobacco. Between 1898 and 1939 they provided on average 32.3 percent of administrative revenue, which makes the monopolies by far the most sizeable contributor²²⁷. Incidentally, Iwai Tatsumi, the first director of the Monopoly Bureau is memorialised in his epithet by Gotō for succeeding in correcting the administration’s fiscal policy²²⁸. That suggests it was Iwai who convinced Gotō and Kodama to divert the opium revenue from public cultural improvements to financing the Government-General. The average life expectancy of Taiwanese males and females increased by 13.4 years and 16.7 years to an average of 41.1 years and 45.7 years respectively under colonial rule²²⁹.

Having established the Opium Monopoly System, the Government-General initially hired two companies to purchase opium on the international market. Those companies are Samuel & Samuel, which is British, and Mitsui Bussan, which is Japanese. Later in 1917 the administration permitted Hoshi Hajime, the Japanese narcotics magnate, to purchase Persian opium for the opium monopoly system²³⁰. Regrettably original documents detailing the type and quantity of opium imported by these companies to Taiwan is unavailable to the author. However, it is possible to ascertain the type and quantity of opium imported to the island based on Government-General statistics regarding quantity and types of opium sold by official retailers. These will be illustrated below.

First opium paste was divided into three grades; namely: first, second and third class. First class opium was Indian opium. Second class opium was imported from Persia. Third class opium was cultivated in Sizhou, China²³¹. Incidentally the initial costs for the aforementioned grades of opium per month were respectively: three yen, one yen fifty pieces, and twenty pieces²³². This suggests Indian, Persian and Chinese opium were the types of opium imported. Yet, to qualify that statement, in 1910 Samuel & Samuel were commissioned to purchase Turkish opium. It is unknown what grade Turkish opium was ascribed to. What is more, opium production and distribution was monopolised by the Korean Government-General from 1919. Opium was also produced in Japan during the First World War owing to its scarcity. It is not improbable Korean and Japanese opium was imported. Again there is no concrete evidence available to the author to prove this occurred. Lastly the variety of Indian opium is unspecified yet it is most probable it was Benares owing to the popularity it previously enjoyed under the Qing.

Next there is a downward trend for the quantity of opium sold. For each decade from 1900 to 1930 it was 200,927, 112,659, 65,851, and 36,359 respective kilograms²³³. Liu calculates the average amount consumed by licensees through dividing the kilos of opium by the number of license holders²³⁴. Generally speaking the quantity is elastic rising from a minimum of 0.87 kilograms to a maximum of 1.56 kilograms in 1901 and 1930 respectively. The average range is between 1.1 and 1.3 kilograms. Of peculiar interest should be the sudden increase in consumption of official opium paste during the outbreak of World War One. At that time there was a shortage of opium

owing to its utilisation as a painkiller by engaged military forces. Before and after the war the average quantity consumed is approximately 1.2 kilograms. During the war it is approximately 1.42 kilograms. The number of licensees a few years before the war was between 100,000 and 80,000. After the war their number was between 55,000 and 45,000. The observable trend is less registered addicts consuming more official opium paste during the war. It is thought increasing age and social discouragement could be factors related to the decline in the quantity of official opium consumed: older smokers consumed less opium due to advancing age and effective persuasion. Another factor also considered by the author is it might be licence holders acquired smuggled opium once regular opium distribution resumed after the war shortage. This among other relevant issues will be discussed in the concluding chapter after Japan's foreign policy and other factors have been explored.

As for the value of opium to the administration, predicated on Jennings' research the quantitative value of opium increased from 1897 to 1918 when it began to gradually decline. In 1900 opium was worth 4,234,979 yen. That year was the one having the most recorded opium licence holders. That was 169,064 individuals. The average cost for a year's habit per official consumer was thus 25 yen five pieces. That value increased to a peak of 8,105,278 yen in 1918. At that time there were only 55,772 confirmed addicts²³⁵. Then the mean annual amount spent per licence holder was therefore 145 yen 32 pieces. By 1935 opium monopoly revenue generated a mere 2,567,588 yen from 14,644 users. The average spent for the year on opium paste was thus 175 yen 33 pieces per registered addict²³⁶. With the above in mind it is evident the cost for the habit increased markedly.

In connection with the above the price of opium increased markedly during the early period of Japanese rule. Opium was sold wholesale in tins that weighed 100 momme (375 grams). In 1901 one tin cost ten yen. By 1910 it had doubled in price to be 21 yen per tin. The wholesale price of one tin rose to 40 yen in 1919. Thereafter it remained at the same price. The retail price of 375 grams of opium in 1931 was the wholesale price plus ten percent. 100 momme would thus require 44 yen²³⁷. Here it is observable that the price of opium increased 400 percent. Albeit this statement must be checked by the fact that the statistical data that the author presents here does not mention different grades of opium. Still, we can maintain that the price of opium increased greatly.

Moreover, the percentage that the opium monopoly was worth to the Government-General continually decreased from a peak of 46.3 percent to 2.1 percent of total revenue in 1898 and 1935 respectively. In 1918 its value was only 14.8 percent of total administrative income. It was worth more than ten percent of total revenue until 1920²³⁸. In addition, compared with the three other government monopolies in 1913, opium accounted for 33.2 percent of total income from monopolies²³⁹. That is the last year of data available from Liu. That year opium was worth 13.8 percent of total income. As previously stated, monopoly income on average accounted for 32.3 percent of total revenue until 1939. The declining value of opium as a percentage of total income compared with the consistent average of approximately 30 percent of total income being sourced from monopolies suggests that revenue from other monopolies such as salt, camphor and tobacco increased in value.

Lastly, there were many official opium related businesses operating in the economy. They were wholesalers, retailers, opium equipment manufacturers, opium equipment sellers, and opium dens according to Liu²⁴⁰. Incidentally, it should be noted that Liu does not state wholesalers but rather “buyers”. It is thought improbable “buyer” here denotes a company that purchased opium from abroad: only Samuel & Samuel and Mitsui Bussan and Hoshi were permitted to do so based on research. It is deduced that the “buyers” bought opium paste from the state monopoly and sold it to retailers; hence the author’s use of “wholesalers” in the above. Statistics on the above are available from 1897 to 1930. As for wholesalers there is an extremely gradual decline in number from 1910 onwards. On average there were approximately 65 wholesalers operating on the island. The number of retailers declined markedly from 3,045 to 991 between 1899 and 1901. Afterwards their number reduced from approximately 991 to 450 over three decades. The number of opium equipment manufacturers increased from seven in 1897 to a peak of 29 in 1906 and thereafter reduced gradually to eight in 1930. The number of such equipment retailers on the whole diminished from a maximum of 40 in 1899 to 19 in 1930. Lastly, the number of opium dens markedly from at most 259 in 1898 to 104 in 1904 and afterwards declined gradually to 29 in 1929. In 1930 there were no opium dens suggesting a change in Government-General policy. In observing the above it is interesting that the number of wholesalers remained constant whilst the number of retailers reduced in number. It is thought that the number of wholesalers was maintained at a continuous level because it was a

lucrative reward presented to Taiwanese the administration deemed promising and wanted to keep in line.

In analysis four points are deducible based on the above. The first thought is on the economic development of the island including reference to opium reflects early colonial policy. Taiwan's comparative advantage is that it is a very fertile island: it is the Ukraine of the East. It does not possess extensive natural resources like Siberia or Iraq. Agriculture was invested in and developed for providing Japan with inexpensive food. This can be interpreted to represent Kodama Gentarō's notion of "economic warfare". After all, the food resources should prevent Japanese citizens from starving in the event of a protracted conflict. In addition, the fact that number of licence holding confirmed addicts reduced over time is in accordance with Gotō Shinpei's gradual prohibition policy.

The second thought is that the fact opium monopoly revenue contributed to a substantive proportion of Government-General income until 1920 and the number of registered addicts was diminishing should encourage bureaucrats to be satisfied with the policy of gradual prohibition.

The third thought is on wholesalers and social stability. The number of wholesalers remained relatively constant though the number of retailers reduced gradually. It is posited that the reduction in retailers should be in accordance with the diminution in wholesalers. Possessing such wholesale permits could make you affluent. They were moreover awarded by Japanese authorities to influential figures in communities. With these statements in mind, it is asserted the number of wholesalers was intentionally maintained at a high level for the sake of the administration's efforts to satisfy such figures and discourage disaffection to the regime. It was thus a mechanism for maintaining social stability. Albeit there is a possibility retailers closed owing to poor business: addicts went to their favourite retailers to the extent that selling opium paste was not the best business choice. In addition the number of addicts was diminishing which should make having so many retailers unnecessary. However if that possibility is correct it does not explain why the number of wholesalers did not also diminish to a similarly impressive degree. Wholesaling should be poor business for some after all. Though it could also be a side business for some. Yet, not desirous in wanting to provoke discontent amongst the most trusted Taiwanese, the Government-General

should be unlikely to revoke licenses or cancel a significant number of them in accordance with the decline in retailers. This suggests that social stability was a factor in the explanation of the relatively high number of wholesalers.

Moving on, the prior thoughts regarding the increase in consumption of officially retailed opium paste during the First World War should be made salient. That is it is suspicious that when opium is scarce more opium is purchased from licensed shops. It is possible there is another as yet unknown explanation for it but the author thinks it likely opium was also bought on the black market by registered addicts. Government-General opium paste was increasingly expensive. The Chinese mainland was nearby. There opium was increasingly cultivated: it was the world's largest producer of opium in the first half of the twentieth century. The country was political unstable: revolutionaries and warlords required money for their armies. It is certainly plausible opium was smuggled from China to Taiwan to supply addicts with inexpensive opium and furnish the Chinese war chests.

Lastly, it must be highlighted that the degree of improvement in the standard of living for Chinese in terms of health, communications, transport, education and economy was visible to the islanders. Such comprehensive modernisation under Japanese rule is thought to have been appreciated by Taiwanese irrespective of the their unequal status. It is possible to relate that favourable impression of the Japanese to the issue of opium. It is argued that Formosans were more likely to listen to and accept the Government-General's position on gradual opium prohibition because it was possible to regard the authorities amicably.

3.5. Conclusion for the Early Japanese Period

The goal of this chapter has been accomplished through researching history relevant to opium and narcotics regarding the historic setting of annexation, issues the Japanese confronted on rule, as well as the administrative, cultural and economic aspects. Below the main points from above will be surmised and analysed as necessary for convenience.

To begin with Taiwan in accompaniment with its nearby islands including the Pescadores were formally transferred to Japan on 2nd June 1895. It was an opportunistic gain as a result of the First Sino-Japanese War.

Japan confronted and surmounted numerous challenges to its rule. Such challenges included rebellion, government deficit, language barrier, certain native customs and equality vis-à-vis the Powers. They were respectively surmounted by establishing the *hokō* system, setting up monopolies on opium, camphor, salt and tobacco etc. and developing the island's economy, promulgating prohibitive ordinances and conducting campaigns and spreading education, as well as successfully developing the colony.

Two ideas defined Japanese rule; namely: economic warfare and biological principles. The former is the perception that the country possessing the most power and resources will win wars to gain special privileges in the losing country. It endowed the administration with an incentive to develop the island's economy for the sake of advancing Japan's power and increasing its resources. The latter is a pseudo-scientific outlook on the relationship between nations and survival. Nations were considered races related by biology rather than people related by culture. Such nations were seen to be locked in a struggle in which the fittest race survives rather than embedded in a cultural milieu wherein people continue to survive adopting and discarding ideas which define their way of life either consensually or in protest. Some nations such as the Powers were fitter than others. Their fitness was evidenced in their cultural rather than biological accomplishments; namely: modernity such as in science, technology, power, sanitation and humanity. Unfit nations could only be gradually made to evolve to resemble fitter nations. Their limitations as evidenced in their backward customs had to be considered in colonial development projects. Such an outlook incentivised the Government-General to enhance Japan's fitness through developing the island's economy and extending modernity to the Chinese and aborigines. It moreover embedded the expectation that the inability of the colonised to become immediately as civilised as the Japanese to be unavoidable. The effect was that inconsistency in the realisation of cultural policy goals was tolerable.

The Government-General was responsible for policy decisions on the island since the passing of Law 63 which enabled the Governor-General to issue ordinances. That law

was promulgated because it was a practical necessity even though it was unconstitutional.

The opium policy formulated for the island's addicts aimed to gradually prohibit opium through a monopoly system. It was thought to stifle potential unrest precipitated by an immediate prohibition on opium consumption. It provided substantial revenue to the administration when it was in deficit. It was expected to result in absolute prohibition of opium within a range of thirty to fifty years. It was regarded as humanitarian, though treatment was not originally planned to be provided to addicts for recovery.

The Opium Monopoly System was established when The Opium Law was decreed on 21st January 1897. It mostly operated effectively for four reasons; viz: a) the administration held a monopoly over the import and sale etc. of opium; b) only licence holders who were deemed acceptable could sell and purchase opium; c) new licences were not issued after 1904 to ensure the habit would be eliminated; d) violators of the opium law would be punished severely; e) all non-Japanese were organised into a system of collective responsibility under the supervision of the police called the *hokō* system. However, the Opium Monopoly System encountered issues that undermined its efficacy; namely: a) Chinese who may collaborate with other Chinese who smoked opium were responsible for wholesaling and retailing; b) wholesalers and retailers received commission on sales which offered an incentive to sell more; c) records on who the opium was retailed to were not taken and that made illegal sales less troublesome; d) opium was smuggled from China for the black market that provided consumers with a new source of opium; e) new secret opium smokers without licences could obtain opium on the black market or through friends and family; f) the police partly relied on *hosei* and *kōchō* and the Able-Bodied Corps for intelligence on opium smokers who were Chinese who could be deceptive were it in their interest; and h) in practice punishments against violators of the opium law were not necessarily severe or collective.

Between 1900 and 1920 the number of licensees and quantity of opium paste sold decreased. In 1900 there were 169,064 users with 200,927 kilograms sold. In 1910 there were 98,987 users with 112,659 kilograms sold. In 1920 there were 48,012 users with 65,851 kilograms sold. This reflects the efficacy of the gradual prohibition policy.

The number of licensees and quantity of opium retailed diminished whilst the price increased. That is evidenced in the opium monopoly's worth to the administration. In 1900, 1910 and 1920 the opium monopoly generated 4,234,979, 4,674,343, and 7,847,739 yen respectively. Although the sale of opium increasingly earned more revenue its relative value as a percentage of total revenue of the Government-General decreased. In the same years it was worth approximately 32.4, 11.3, and 9.5 percent. This illustrates three points; namely: a) at ten percent of total revenue the opium monopoly was still a significant earner by 1920; b) the value of the monopoly was decreasing; c) the administration increased the price of opium markedly.

Negative ideas regarding opium were disseminated under Japanese rule. Opium smokers were regarded as "opium ghosts". They were more likely to become unhealthy, commit a crime, be unable to work, and ruin their families. They were redefined from occasional and habitual into solely habitual smokers. Such ideas were spread throughout the island by schooling, public lectures, newspapers, mass movements, and the *hokō* system. They should have been approved by those who already recognised opium was harmful among the wise, wanted to raise their socio-economic status in colonial society, and accepted by children who had no prior experience of opium. However, they should have been rejected by the opium smokers, and those who had a favourable impression of opium smokers. In addition, people who consumed opium legally or surreptitiously for medical reasons were unlikely to abstain irrespective of those negative ideas.

The typical smoker was a Chinese male who worked in a profession where he managed his own time such as a writer or a lawyer. That profession suggests who belongs to the middle or upper class. Affluent women also smoked. It was usual to find young women who worked as prostitutes to smoke and encourage the smoking of opium in brothels. Opium babies, they are, babies addicted to opium also consumed the drug. Labourers and vagrants also indulged in the habit. Teenagers lied regarding their age to obtain permits to smoke. Unlicensed secret smokers also existed.

Morphine pills and injections were illegal to obtain on the island for ordinary people. Opium paste was acquired from two sources: the Government-General and the black market. The opium monopoly's opium was presented in three grades; viz: a) first grade which was Indian; b) second grade which was Persian; and c) third grade which

was Chinese. Turkish opium was imported from 1910. Its grade is unknown. The black market's opium was imported from China. Its origin is also unknown but is suspected to be Chinese. On the black market opium was not only imported but also exported via Japan to most probably Korea and China.

It is possible to estimate the quantity of opium smuggled to the island. During the First World War there was a global shortage of opium. Before and after the war the average quantity of opium consumed was 1.2 kilograms per person. During the war it was 1.42 kilograms per person. That increase by 0.22 kilograms could represent the quantity of opium originally smuggled if we assume smuggling was reduced owing to the scarcity of opium. Supposing that were accurate then broadly speaking 85 percent of opium on the island was official but 15 percent was illegally imported. If we increase the quantity of opium imported for a particular year by 15 percent and divide that result by the quantity of opium consumed by each licensee for the same year, then we can estimate the actual number of addicts on the island. The result is that in 1900, 1910, and 1920 there were possibly 194,000, 113,650, and 55,300 smokers in total rather than 169,064, 98,987, and 48,012 smokers according to official records.

The culture of consuming opium changed slightly. Due to the *hokō* system and the enforcement of the opium law it became unsafe to treat guests who were unlicensed occasional smokers to an opium pipe. Opium was secretly mixed against the law to satisfy smokers' tastes. Secret smokers also needed to be careful lest they were caught. However much remained the same as before. Following tradition, it was smoked by family at home for pleasure in terms of euphoria and as a tranquiliser, by clients of brothels as an aphrodisiac, and by individuals seeking pain relief.

It is thought social stability was a pressing issue for the Japanese. The last mass rebellion was in 1915, which was twenty years after Japan annexed the territory. It was therefore in the interest of the authorities to ensure that the Taiwanese were comfortable. This would have required the Government-General to not irritate them by forcibly prohibiting customs, disabling their ability to rebel and satisfying them by providing modern benefits in terms of health and social and economic status.

Regarding opium, the administration's goal to prohibit it was conducted gradually and presented convincingly. The Bandit Punishment Ordinance, collective responsibility in the *hokō* system and severe punishments for violating the law would have denied

the Chinese the hope of successful rebellion by threatening terror on the community. However, the relatively gentle punishments compared with the maximum penalty would have the offenders regard the police to be magnanimous. The prestige of becoming *hosei* or *kōchō* would have satiated the local notables who desired social status and privileges such as business connections and better schooling for their children. They were vital for maintaining social stability. In addition, the reward of a licence to wholesale or retail opium which would make you wealthy would ensure cooperation. What is more, the prospect of developing the island through forced labour might have augured unwell for the authorities but the benefits of development experienced by the people would certainly have outshone that.

Amongst the above it is thought the position of *hosei* and *kōcho* and licences for the sale of opium were the most crucial in maintaining that stability. It is worth remembering that frequently the *hosei* became retailers. They were respected members of their community and therefore exerted considerable influence on it. The threat of punishment and moderate enforcement of such penalties would have discouraged subversive behaviour. The benefits of modernity would also have discouraged insurrection. However it was the leaders of the community that managed such unrest. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that social stability was also promoted through the police state wherein men from most families in each *kō* would participate in enforcing administration policy. Placing such policy on the agenda of the participants would foster confidence in the regime and reduce the likelihood of subversion. This agreeable situation would have certainly made the management of unrest by local leaders easier.

Ts'ai noted that the relationship between *hosei* and the authorities was ambiguous. By extension the relationship between *hosei* and other local notables in charge of wholesaling and retailing opium and the authorities should also have been ambiguous. On the one hand the administration relied upon them to maintain social order and make the opium monopoly system operate smoothly, but on the other hand they had the economic incentive and freedom to sell and distribute opium freely to whoever so long as they outwitted the local police inspector. That posed a problem to the administration yet it also had a useful effect in mitigating social unrest. Were Chinese wholesalers and retailers able to exploit the system to become affluent they should be satisfied. Secret smokers and gangsters would also be satisfied if they could obtain

opium without having to submit to Japanese procedures or purchase a licence. The colonised would gain what they desired and believe they outsmarted the colonisers. However, there is also a possibility that the police were instructed to allow illicit smoking to occur for the sake of social stability and the economic benefit of the administration. Moreover, salaried police inspectors and patrolmen would still have an incentive to engage in corruption to earn more money. This situation where the Chinese and aborigines were simultaneously denied and afforded opium partly for social stability and economic reasons under Japanese rule is thought to contribute to the romantic image of Taiwan being what Zhou has described as the “Orphan of East Asia”²⁴¹.

The Opium Monopoly System was originally created with the aim to gradually eliminate opium smoking, earn revenue for the indebted administration, and avoid inciting unrest by alternatively implementing an immediate prohibition of opium. This was in accord with the Japanese disregard and fear of opium, biological principles and economic warfare. It is commonly understood that after it was set up it continued to eliminate opium gradually and generate income. However, here the author argues that it additionally assisted in maintaining social order through Taiwanese gaining satisfaction through exploiting the system.

Chapter Four: The Late Japanese Period

4.0. Chapter Aim and Outline

Again the aim of this chapter is to produce data for a comparative analysis that will result in a conclusion for the thesis.

Like the preceding chapter on early Japanese rule, this one will cover the same points to attain that goal. Those points are any history relevant to opium and narcotics in accompaniment with a special focus on administration, culture and economy. A conclusion that surmises and analyses the information acquired from investigating those points will be provided at the end of the chapter.

4.1.0. Historic Setting

By 1920 Japan had established itself as a Power. It proved itself strongest in East Asia by defeating the Qing dynasty in 1895. It had moreover demonstrated its power by defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1907. Annexing Korea in 1910 additionally advanced its status amongst the Powers. Issuing the Twenty One Demands to China in 1915 signalled that Japan was encroaching on China as a Power unconcerned with the positions of the other Powers. The unequal treaties concluded with the Powers had been at last revoked after over forty years of humiliation by the beginning of the early twentieth century. The First World War presented an opportunity for the country to rise from a protracted period debt. With respect to the above it can be maintained Japan had achieved parity with the Powers.

Japan had undeniably become a Power as exemplified by its status as a member of the Council in the newly founded League of Nations. To be a member of the Council was to be a member of an elite group of nations. That suggests it had reached full equality with the Powers that formerly asserted dominance over the country. However one issue remained unresolved, and that was racial equality. Abroad Japanese nationals suffered discrimination. Baron Makino Nobuaki attempted to rectify this problem by proposing the “racial equality clause” in the Covenant of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. It advocated “equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction either in law or in fact on account of their race or nationality”. It was a noble goal. However, Shimazu writes “the major protagonists – Japan, the British Empire and the United States – did not interpret the racial equality proposal as a demand for the universal equality of all races”²⁴². He continues that the Japanese viewed racial equality in connection with the status of a Power at a time when all Powers excepting Japan were of a different race²⁴³. The goal was never realised. The consequence was that Japan gradually became disillusioned with the international system.

In Taiwan the Government-General had developed the island colony successfully. It retained power by suppressing rebellions and the 1915 call for assimilation, limiting native education, and enforcing the *hokō* system. Apart from aboriginal groups that

retained territory in the central mountain range, the island was peaceful. It advanced its economy through establishing monopolies over important commodities, introducing new techniques and technology, setting import and export prices and developing infrastructure. As a result by the beginning of the last half of Japanese rule the administration was stable and the colony profitable.

4.1.1. Issues Confronting Japanese Rule

As illustrated above in the preceding section attaining recognition of racial equality by the Powers was an issue for the Japanese, yet a larger issue should be how to react to the new boundaries that were erected in the formation of a revolutionary international system: the League of Nations (hereafter known as: the League). These boundaries were not necessarily legal constraints placed on the freedom of action of a nation-state. Rather they were new rules of conduct to be observed on the world stage. The League was in the words of its leading proponent, American President Woodrow Wilson, a “society of nations”²⁴⁴. The involved nations accepted obligations to behave peacefully, justly, and honourably towards each other by joining the society. It could be maintained that the League redefined politeness, that is accepted appropriate behaviour, regarding action amongst nation-states. In addition the League provided a platform for nations to discuss issues multilaterally and openly. Such discussions could persuade states to regard certain issues differently. In other words they could trigger the formulation and amendment of policy. This revolutionary new society posed a peculiar dilemma for Japan; namely: should it choose its imperial interests over its obligations to the international society or not? In reflection it is possible new ideas regarding opium heralding from the League could impact on opium control on Taiwan under Japanese rule.

The outcome of the First World War not only restructured the international system by creating a “society of nations” but also exerted influence on changing the number of nations in the world. The idea that possessed such influence was “self-determination”. It was enunciated by Woodrow Wilson during the war. Whelan writes it was: a) “a scheme whereby identifiable peoples were to be accorded Statehood;” b) “the fate of disputed border areas was to be decided by plebiscite;” and c) “those ethnic groups

too small or too dispersed to be eligible for either course of action were to benefit from the protection of special minorities regimes, supervised by the Council of the new League of Nations”²⁴⁵. This principle espoused the notions that not the state but the nation is sovereign, legitimacy to rule is gained through consent of the nation, and above all, that the ethnic groups whose territory had been colonised held the right to determine their own destinies²⁴⁶. At the time it was an extremely radical principle that challenged the status quo wherein the Powers had occasion to exact rule by law over different ethnic groups through violence. It was moreover a widely disseminated principle owing to its advocate also being the chief proponent of the League during the 1919 Versailles Peace Settlement, and substantial interest taken by the public and media in the Treaty of Versailles and the League. The effect of the spread of the principle of self-determination was that it should inspire the colonised such as the Chinese in Formosa to seek independence from Japanese rule. This indubitably augured poorly for the Government-General: there should be an increase in subversion.

The Japanese response to self-determination was ingenious: “the idea of extending home territory” (*naichi enchō-shugi*). It was conjured by Den Kenjirō who was the eighth Governor-General in 1920. It was a policy that was composed of various measures and slogans to effect gradual assimilation. Such measures included ordinances that reformed the land system to be in accord with Japan and implemented co-education of Japanese and Taiwanese nationals from the middle schools. Persuasive slogans were “universal brotherhood” (*isshi dōjin*) and “Japan and Taiwan unite” (*nichitai yūgō*)²⁴⁷. The thought to implement gradual assimilation was that the Taiwanese would be Japanized to the degree that they should regard themselves as Japanese. Its consequence was to nullify the threat of Chinese nationalism and thus secure the island as a colony for the sake of economic warfare. Those measures and slogans were created to accomplish that goal. They would operate by affording the Formosans greater equality with the Japanese. The impact of the policy would additionally discourage them in perceiving the colonizers as cultural others and encourage them to identify with the colonizers as culturally the same. Extending the home territory posed a problem to the administration: it promoted equality only insofar as the Japanese maintained exclusive rule over the island.

It was within this complex milieu where the principle of self-determination and the idea to extend the home territory that the issue of opium prohibition was raised and discussed. The former should act to unite disgruntled Chinese in that they were a colonized ethnic group. The latter should make the matter of opium prohibition contentious in that becoming a part of the home territory would imply equitable treatment with Japan where opium was already prohibited unlike Taiwan.

4.2.0. The New Taiwan Opium Ordinance

In December 1928 the Government-General revised and effected the Taiwan Opium Law in accordance with the provisions of the 1925 Opium Convention signed in Geneva²⁴⁸. The law was revised four years after the 1925 convention because Japan only ratified it in 1928²⁴⁹.

In comparison the original 1897 and the revised 1928 laws are almost the same. In both instances the law is divided into two parts: a) ordinance on opium; and b) regulations concerning the implementation of the ordinance on opium. In 1897 the first and second parts contained 20 and 43 articles but in 1929 they contained 22 and 47 articles respectively²⁵⁰. The 1928 law includes three significant additions in the first part and one important addition in the second part. Those first three new articles are; namely: a) article seven that stipulates “no dross” (remnants of smoked opium) shall be possessed or transferred etc.; b) article eight prohibits the construction and maintenance of “opium divans”; and c) article ten dictates: “The Governor-General of Formosa may adopt the necessary measures for the purpose of curing the habit of opium-smoking”²⁵¹. The last article regarding implementing the ordinance commands that dross accumulated by smoking must be disposed of. Otherwise the revised law is on the whole an updated version of its original that arranges the articles and defines opium differently, as well as adding and excluding one theme. Opium is redefined to exclude powdered opium and include reference to medicinal opium. An added theme is exports. There are various restricting and punitive ordinances regarding exports as analogous to those pertaining to imports. An article on payment of licence fees is no longer present. Lastly punishments for violation of the Taiwan Opium Law is broadly

the same excepting two cases; viz: a) the penalty for those who illegally manufacture, import, export, purchase and sell opium equipment will be raised to imprisonment for a maximum of five years or a fine more than 5000 yen; and b) the punishment for secret smokers is imprisonment with hard labour for a period not exceeding three years.

In analysis the provisions of the revised law reflect the interest of the administration in being in accord with the international status quo regarding opium. The regulations prohibiting the trade, exchange and utilisation of opium dross should have the effect of limiting the purchase of opium by addicts to retailers only in law. Naturally the black market continued to be an alternative source of supply. The closure of opium dens signifies a measure taken by the Government-General towards absolute prohibition. The League's report to the Council conversely advises "the system of compulsory smoking in public smoking establishments be introduced everywhere"²⁵². The implication of such recommendation is that consuming opium in illicit opium divans and at home etc. be rendered illegal. The reasons behind taking that step will be investigated below. The meaning of article ten is unclear as it is translated into English there. The issue is the word "may". It can denote either "might" or "is permitted to" implement measures to rectify opium smokers. Yet citing a Chinese reference to it Hsu presents the word "may" to be translated as "can"²⁵³. That suggests the meaning of the aforementioned "may" correlates to "has permission to". Nevertheless the point of the article is vague in that it does not stipulate measures to be taken for the correction of addicts. That indicates the administration was unaware which policy for that goal was most suitable. It is thus thought article ten is best considered a platform for further reform that illustrates the direction in which the Government-General was heading as per the rehabilitation of habitués. Lastly the revised punishment for illicit smokers that orders they must serve a prison sentence of three years including hard labour should additionally discourage secret smoking. Albeit that is contingent on the efficacy of policy enforcement vis-à-vis the shrewdness of illicit smokers in any given area.

As for observations redefining opium to cover medical uses illustrates that opium was no longer considered a strictly "evil" substance by the Government-General: it had benefits too. Next, the inclusion of provisions as per the export of opium and related

items indicates the administration recognises and wants to combat the illicit trade that had emerged during the early period of rule.

It is interesting that policy towards opium dross and divans were reformed in accordance with the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Convention on Opium, but the commission based retail system was not reformed into a salary based one and the recording of retail sales was not implemented in accord with it. An explanation for it could be that the administration was on the whole satisfied with the opium monopoly system. It was efficacious after all. What is more, prohibiting opium dross and divans was relatively simple. However, employing wholesalers and retailers on a salary rather than a commission could possibly incite unrest amongst the notables who were accustomed to the system.

This is particularly so if they lost income as a result of the reform. It would be against the interest of the Government-General to guarantee a fixed salary for the wholesalers and retailers in case it lost income through declining addict numbers. Deciding upon a salary would necessarily be conducted annually in accordance with statistics on addict numbers. It would become an issue of dispute. This could further promote unrest. In addition, the administration would further lose revenue if the wholesalers and retailers were paid on a fixed salary because without a commission system they would not possess an incentive to sell greater quantities of opium. That means the Government-General would earn less. A sound recording system adopted by retailers would also reduce income by impeding illicit sales. Seen in this light, it was in the interest of the administration to not implement a salary and recording system for the sake of social stability and profit.

4.2.1. Addict Registration

Approximately one year after the revised Taiwan Opium Ordinance was implemented, on 18th December 1929 the Government-General ordered another addict registration drive. According to Hsu 48,991 smokers applied, among whom there were 25,527 illicit smokers²⁵⁴.

Unlike the previous campaigns when strict medical examinations were cancelled for expediency, the administration was pressured to “carry out strict physical examinations of smoking license applicants in order to limit the licenses to incurable addicts”²⁵⁵. That undertaking is expressed by the fact that amongst the applicants some were granted licences, some were ordered to receive rehabilitative treatment, and some were commanded to abstain from opium. Additionally, Liu holds licence applicants were “left for ten hours... to confirm the degree of addiction from withdrawal symptoms in an accurate examination” under police supervision²⁵⁶. Interestingly, the campaign was allegedly “facilitated by the fact that most unlicensed opium smokers were already known to the police...” according to Sha Shunmoku’s 1931 account of the development of the Taiwan People’s Party²⁵⁷.

It is thought that the trigger for the registration campaign was a proposal for the establishment of clinics for the purpose of rectifying opium addicts. Its author was Du Congming, who was an eminent doctor of medicine and researcher employed by the Government-General at the time²⁵⁸. Having recently travelled to Korea, Manchuria and Shanghai to research opium addiction, he submitted a report titled “Proposal for the Establishment of a Hospital for Rectifying Opium Addicts Medicinally” (*ahen insha kyōsei chiriyō iin secchi kengisho*) in August 1929²⁵⁹. That represented the first proposal to treat opium addicts the administration had received. Four months later the administration announced the registration campaign that for the first time aimed to order some addicts to receive such treatment.

There is disagreement on statistics regarding that matter. Liu writes that amongst the new applicants 7,170 were bestowed licences, 12,156 were dispatched to hospital for recovery, and 6,201 were denied licences²⁶⁰. Yet Jennings, who interestingly quotes the Japanese edition of Liu’s book (the author could only obtain the Chinese edition), states 5,518 were awarded licences, 13,584 underwent treatment, and 6,209 quit under police supervision²⁶¹. As for the totality of the 48,991 applicants Hsu records 23,845 were classified as addicts, 17,468 were sent to rehabilitation centres, and 7,454 had to abstain from opium²⁶². Incidentally, Jennings and Hsu maintain 216 and 224 died during the campaign respectively.

There were two consequences of the campaign. The first is that it signalled the administration was serious regarding the rectification of addicts: light smokers were

forced to quit smoking and moderate smokers were hospitalised for recovery. This should impact on how it was seen at home and abroad. Secondly, having a great number of addicts whose licences had been revoked meant they should be discontent or purchasing opium illegally on the black market. Nevertheless they were under police observation. Additionally the fact that the average consumption of opium per person rocketed from a trend of approximately 1.30 kilograms to 1.56 kilograms suggests that illicit opium had once more become scarce. It is thought that the 25,527 new applicants who unveiled their secret lifestyle to the authorities should have been interrogated by the police regarding where they purchased opium. Such interrogation would indubitably offer information on the identities of the smugglers. In other words, the new applicants' presumed desire to avoid three years imprisonment with hard labour for the sake of their secret lifestyle provided the means for the police to severely close the black market. There was therefore an increase in discontent amongst remaining illicit smokers who found it relatively difficult to acquire their drug.

Lastly, it is considered incredible that the number of illicit smokers matched the number of registered smokers. The author's original calculations, which were predicated on an assumed scarcity of supply of black market opium as suggested in an increase in the consumption of officially retailed opium per person, indicated that merely fifteen percent of the totality of smokers were secret consumers during the First World War. Actually here that figure has risen to as high as fifty percent. This suggests the author's method is erroneous. That suggestion can be confirmed by the fact from 1927 to 1929 exceptionally large quantities of smuggled opium were seized. They were respectively 548, 696 and 1,479 kilograms²⁶³. During that period the average amount of opium consumed per person remained static at approximately 1.30 kilograms per person. That thus indicates there is no relationship between opium seizures and an increase in the quantity of opium consumed per person per year. However, it is worth remembering that 1,479 kilograms may only represent a drop in the ocean regarding the quantity of opium smuggled onto the island. The fact is 1,479 kilograms is supply for a mere 1138 addicts per year. That number of addicts only represents 4.5 percent of the secret smokers who applied for licences in 1929. If 1,479 represents 4.5 percent of smuggled opium and we utilise 1.3 kilograms per year as the divider then in that year 32,833 kilograms of opium were clandestinely imported for

the secret smokers altogether. Incidentally 31,967 kilograms of official opium paste were retailed in the same year. Considering the quantity of opium seized was miniscule compared to total smuggled opium it is likely it is too small a figure to impact on the average amount of opium smoked per year per person. In other words, the author's method is still valid.

4.2.2. Addict Rehabilitation

The Government-General swiftly implemented a rehabilitation programme for addicts in conjunction with the addict registration campaign following the proclamation of the revised Taiwan Opium Ordinance. It represented the first instance the administration was actively concerned with the treatment of addicts.

On the 14th January 1930 the “Regulations concerning The Correction of Opium Addicts” was decreed, and on the following day the “Temporary Opium Addict Rectification Clinic” commenced operation²⁶⁴. After the field trials had proved successful the administration promulgated the “Procedures regarding The Correction of Opium Addicts” on the 28th March, and clinics formally began to treat addicts on the 1st April²⁶⁵.

The regulations stipulated six articles that ensured the clinic was securely under Government-General control and aimed to rehabilitate addicts. The clinics were subject to the authority of the police bureau, employed civil servants, and those employees were supervised²⁶⁶. The procedures covered various practicalities, and indicated youths and light addicts were the first to receive treatment and the cost for one day was 60 pieces etc²⁶⁷.

Clinics were established in hospitals in every prefecture. The first and foremost in treatment was the *Kōsei* hospital (*kosei iin*) or rehabilitation hospital (the literal translation can be resurrection hospital) which was specially constructed for rectifying addicts. The director and proposer of it was Du Congming, whose previously mentioned proposal was accepted by Governor-General Ishizuka Eizō²⁶⁸. Hsu writes that “It was not until the establishment of the *Kōsei* Hospital in 1930 that modern medicine became important in the correction project, and the treatment of opium addiction as a disease began to spread across the island and be imposed on

smokers”²⁶⁹. The treatment prescribed was a dose of an opiate such as morphine equivalent in effect to the quantity of opium smoked that was gradually decreased. This required one to two months. During the first four years 17,000 addicts were discharged after being cured. Actually, a 1934 report highlighted that among 7,727 of them 46 percent did not take opium but the remaining 54 percent either required supervision or rehabilitation²⁷⁰. This suggests that the facility was efficacious in having addicts rehabilitate but it only guaranteed approximately half of the cured should continue to abstain from opium in the long-term. On the topic of problems with the programme, Hsu notes initially smokers smuggled opium pills into the hospital, and generally addicts would feign being cured to be discharged, and some would escape²⁷¹. Albeit by 1933 Du Congming had devised a method to detect opium usage through urine analysis and by 1937 had published a report on a similar method for morphine²⁷². It is thought such technology would make it more difficult for secret smokers to evade capture by suspicious police.

The trigger for this series of developments is revealed by Liu who holds “...the temporary measure was adopted because of the Far Eastern Opium Problem Investigation Committee came to Taiwan to investigate”²⁷³. That is interesting because it contends the previously argued point that Du Congming’s proposal was the cause. In analysis it is thought that the proposal was the trigger for the development of such clinics. It was the original idea after all. However, Liu also maintains that the League committee’s arrival in accompaniment with vociferous discontent regarding the registration of addicts that was led by the Taiwan People’s Party (*Taiwan minshu-kai*) expedited the process of treating and establishing those clinics²⁷⁴. It was the Taiwan People’s Party that requested the League investigatory committee to visit the island on the 2nd January 1930 and published that request²⁷⁵. The request was approved by the League and the publication sparked a dispute which continued from January until March that year²⁷⁶. Several days after the 2nd January publication and the eruption of the dispute over opium the Government-General proclaimed the aforementioned regulations for treating addicts on the 14th January and opened the rehabilitation hospital the following day. With this in mind, it was Du Congming who inspired the Government-General to take action to treat addicts and domestic and international pressure that forced it to accelerate the process.

4.3. Opium and Culture

The late period of Japanese rule witnessed dramatic changes in the culture of opium through law and political campaigning. Those changes not only affected the regular culture of opium consumption but also attitudes towards opium smoking held by Chinese.

To begin with, there were three main attitudes towards opium smoking that were held by Chinese during the period that are evidenced in literature.

The first is the conflicting attitude held by some smokers. That attitude is demonstrated in a poem titled “Stopping Opium Smoking” (*jiéyan*) that was recited by Chang Lijun at reputable poetry club called *Lishe* in 1925. He was a licensed opium smoker who had abstained from his habit²⁷⁷. His poem is composed of two verses which express conflicting views. In the first verse he writes “... opium is smelly not fragrant, and definitely has to be quit, because it is not beneficial to your body and soul”²⁷⁸. But in the second verse he laments “it has been years since I had a close relationship with opium, and I gave it up not because the relationship was meant to finish; the blame falls upon opium prices raised by the authorities, and what is regretful is that the chance to associate with it is thus prevented and lessened”²⁷⁹. Hsu thinks it “vividly conveys the complex feelings of an occasional, middle-class opium smoker in early twentieth-century Taiwan”²⁸⁰. The author should agree with Hsu here, though would prefer to utilise the word “conflicting”. After all, Chang on the one hand expresses dislike for opium but on the other hand emotes regret that he can no longer afford to purchase it. It is speculated that without the rise in the price of opium there should be more opium smokers.

The second is the attitude that opium must be absolutely and immediately prohibited, and moreover its addicts must receive treatment to recover. This attitude was declared by members of two political parties, members of legal and medical communities on the island, as well as the *Rushui* society from the end of 1929. As a background to this attitude the author should first mention that political associations began to manifest in 1920. This is evinced by the “Movement for Establishing a Taiwan Assembly” (*Taiwan kaigi secchi undō*) which recognised the Taiwanese as distinct

from Japanese, and called for an elective assembly to be set up in Taiwan within the Japanese empire²⁸¹. Incidentally the request for limited autonomy coincided with the dissemination of the principle of self-determination and is thought to be related. The trigger for the development of the second attitude was the Government-General's proclamation to conduct a campaign to re-register addicts at the end of 1929²⁸². It highlighted the fact the gradual prohibition policy was not effective: illicit smoking occurred. The registration drive was merely considered a means for the administration to selfishly increase its income from opium revenue without correcting its ineffective policy²⁸³. The involved political parties were the New People's Association (*Xinmin-kai*) and Taiwan People's Party. The latter criticised the Government-General's opium policy and proposed that opium manufacture and sales be ceased with immediate effect, abstinence be promoted, and all those who apply for licences receive rectifying treatment on the 22nd December 1929²⁸⁴. The medical communities in Chuanghua and Tainan also became involved in pressuring the administration to eliminate opium smoking during the beginning of 1930. The former advocated immediate and absolute prohibition whilst the latter wanted smokers who could abstain to be denied licences and licensed smokers to be only able to consume opium in opium divans²⁸⁵. Members of the legal community are noted to have provided opinions in the document presented to the League committee tasked with investigating opium on the island by Lin Xiantang, who was the representative of the Taiwan People's Party²⁸⁶. It is thought such widespread involvement in the call for reform to existing policy to effect prohibition amongst the educated reflects that the opinion was popularly shared in that class. The fact that the Taiwan People's Party internationalised the issue by requesting the League dispatch the aforementioned committee to the island on the 2nd January 1930 indicates it was extremely determined to achieve its goal by revealing to the world the Government-General's failings. Last of all, that the same party referred to "international justice and international credibility" in its proposal to the administration suggests that it was influenced by the international condemnation of opium, particularly in China that was demonstrated in the 1924-25 Geneva Conferences on opium²⁸⁷. In connection with that, it is argued that it was such international condemnation that inspired the political movement to regard opium and the Opium Monopoly system with such disdain.

The third attitude was pro-opium and supported the administration's new policy. Whilst many groups were pressuring the administration to prohibit opium and rectify addicts, a local intellectual named Lian Heng made a speech in favour of opium. He noted that opium had played an important role in the development of Taiwan in the late nineteenth century. His opinion was met with disdain and he was consequently expelled from intellectual and social spheres²⁸⁸. Although his thoughts were unpopular, it nevertheless demonstrates that there were people who enjoyed smoking opium and wished to maintain the permission to enjoy it. Albeit it was likely there were very few of them. Hsu writes that during the opium dispute between the anti-opium intellectuals and the administration "smokers and opium dealers were often categorised... as 'a league of servants bought off by the authorities'"²⁸⁹. In the Taiwan Minpō newspaper smokers were "portrayed as shameless, un-awakened and worthless persons in need of correction" who supported the administration²⁹⁰. This is thought to have a profound effect on how opium smokers were regarded at the time in favour of those who can be categorised as holding the second attitude. After all, by 1930 the Taiwan People's Party was well known amongst the Chinese who should have been receptive to an association that fought for their benefit against the Government-General that subjugated them.

With regard to the above, it is thought that until 1929 most smokers were neither strongly for or against opium smoking as evidenced in the first attitude. However, the 1929 campaign by the anti-opium intellectuals is deemed a pivotal moment in changing people's attitudes to dislike opium smoking. Nevertheless there were still hardliners who continued to appreciate the poppy irrespective of popularised views. Albeit the fact that anti-opium intellectuals won in that they created a new status quo that could no longer be openly challenged.

Moving on from attitudes, the legal reform, registration of addicts and technological developments of the period profoundly changed opium culture.

The 1928 Taiwan Opium Ordinance contained three articles that reshaped opium culture. Article seven stipulated that all opium dross be disposed of. That article meant that it was illegal to possess, exchange, trade, assign or consume opium dross. Throwing away opium dross under police supervision became a new aspect of daily life for opium smokers. Impoverished smokers would have faced an additional

restraint in that they were denied opium dross for consumption. Next article eight prohibited the construction and maintenance of opium divans. A tradition that was over three centuries old was therefore extinguished. Without that institution opium smoking became a less social affair. Albeit, it was still possible for people to visit brothels, where they could savour the pipe with a prostitute. Though not all people would find going to such places acceptable. Lastly the punishment for illicit smoking was amended that those caught would face imprisonment with hard labour for a term not exceeding three years. This meant the wealthy could no longer retain their freedom by paying a fine. It was an added deterrence for secret smoking.

The drive to register new addicts netted over 25,527 unlicensed smokers. This campaign's immediate impact was to eliminate the custom of illicit smoking that had proliferated particularly after the last opium drive to register addicts. The additional effect was to impinge on the black market economy: 1929 was an extremely difficult year for smugglers who discovered their consumers under police supervision. Nevertheless a great body of unlicensed smokers were sent to onto the streets. Among whom 17,468 had attended rehabilitation clinics and it is thought almost 50 percent of them relapsed in the early 1930s. Another 7,454 were denied licences and kept under close police supervision. In addition, as evidenced by the fact that there were at least 25,527 illicit smokers who applied for a licence in 1929, the Japanese police were by no means the best at enforcing the law. These two points suggest that the black market would recover into the 1930s. However, Du Congming had invented technology to identify opium and morphine addicts in 1933 and 1937 respectively. Equipped with such technology the police force should be in a better position to limit the growth of the black market. In light of the above it can be held the drive to register new addicts and new technology should have impacted on illicit smoking heavily.

In 1928 third grade opium was prohibited²⁹¹. Such a reform meant that only more affluent smokers could afford the habit. In other words, by then the only opium smokers on the island were the sufficiently wealthy middle and upper classes. Though it was nevertheless possible for the working class to surreptitiously purchase smuggled opium on the black market.

Another part of culture that changed was that for the first time the Chinese medical community openly condemned opium smoking. Considering this, it is likely that they

should be less willing to support the use of opium in treating patients requiring a tranquiliser. In connection with that, the anti-opium intellectual movement that emerged in 1929 is moreover thought to have influenced people's decisions to adopt the opium habit for medical reasons. Indeed, as Hsu indicates, opium smoking began to be viewed as a medical problem: addicts were contemporaneously being rectified through a rehabilitation programme²⁹².

The report submitted to the League by the committee charged with investigating opium in Formosa observes a number of interesting facts. First of all after 1924 the youngest opium smoker was aged thirty²⁹³. The average smoker was over fifty years old²⁹⁴. However this fact is contestable by the inundation of illicit smokers in 1929 that provide the possibility of the existence of younger smokers. The next fact is that in 1929 the number of female smokers was 14 percent²⁹⁵. Such a figure can be taken as an approximate figure representative of all the years since the opium monopoly's inception predicated on the same data set. Continuing, the percentage of licensed smokers in the total population had reduced from 6.2 percent in 1900 to 3.2, 1.3, and 0.6 percent in 1910, 1920 and 1929 respectively²⁹⁶. Albeit factoring in the number of illegal smokers in 1929 puts the figure at 1.2 percent. Moving to the next point, at the end of September of 1929 57.6 percent of smokers consumed less than one momme (3.75 grams) and 34.9 percent of licensees consumed between one to two mommes (3.75 to 7.5 grams) per day²⁹⁷. Only 83 people smoked more than five mommes (18.5 grams) per day. In other words a majority of the licence holders could be said to be relatively light smokers or perhaps occasional smokers. It furthermore illuminates that there is no coast guard and the custom office's boats "only suffice for cruising in the principal ports and a few miles outside"²⁹⁸. That explicates why smuggling was so large: there was no special service patrolling the coast to intercept boats. Next, after 1914 no reference was made to opium in textbooks owing to the perceived success of the gradual prohibition policy²⁹⁹. Lastly, we learn that cocaine is cultivated by those who are issued a licence by the Government-General³⁰⁰. In relation to narcotic drugs the administration maintained it had caught morphine addicts and the use of narcotics was increasing in 1930.

On the use of opium Jennings is informative. He writes: "Most unlicensed smoking took place in rural areas, where the indiscriminate resort to opium as a panacea for a variety of ills facilitated the transition to recreational use"³⁰¹. He continues: "In an

environment where the pipe served the social function of providing a reason for friends to gather and share a few relaxing moments in a day otherwise filled with drudgery, there was no stigma attached to opium smoking”³⁰². While visiting the island in 1930 American journalist Edgar Snow complained the authorities did not put much effort into prohibition: there was no preventative education, lax enforcement of retail sales to licensed smokers, and no supervision to ensure only licensees were consumers. But the League report stated instruction on opium is provided in all schools³⁰³. He maintained: “Throughout the island men and women may be observed enjoying their smokes, in full view of the streets – not merely in outlying districts, but here, in the capital”³⁰⁴. That means some addicts smoked outside at their homes.

4.4. Opium and Economy

As previously mentioned both the qualitative and quantitative value of opium as a part of Government-General income began to gradually decline from a peak of 8,105,278 yen in 1918 in accordance with the decreasing number of opium smokers. The respective worth of the opium monopoly was 32.4, 11.3, 9.5, 4.4, and 0.9 percent in 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930 and 1940 in total income. Although there was a diminishing trend in the sale of opium, that does not necessarily mean the business of selling opium was unprofitable. In fact, the League report on opium in Formosa indicates the administration consistently earned a profit between 1919 and 1928. That profit fluctuated widely each year: in 1919 it was a mere 25,640.55 yen but it was 6,476,727.02 yen in 1921. Nevertheless the average income was 5,485,684 yen for the period of 1919 to 1928. During that period the average cost of the Opium Monopoly System was 2,774,599 yen. What is more, during the same period the administration consistently overspent in a range of five to twenty percent of total revenue. Considering the aforementioned data it can be held that the Government-General had an economic incentive to continue to operate the profitable opium monopoly system in order to mitigate outstanding debt in the late Japanese period of rule. Nevertheless the cost of the opium rectification campaign that treated at least 17,468 addicts from 1930 was not insignificant. Liu writes addicts sent for rehabilitation were charged 60 pieces (or 0.60 yen) per day, and treatment typically took one to two months: it thus cost between 18 and 36 yen per person per treatment³⁰⁵. Albeit if an addict could not

afford to pay the administration would subsidise their rectification. Thinking this way it should at most cost the administration 628,848 yen were it to pay for each treatment of those 17,468 addicts. Though in 1930 it was estimated the cost of curing addicts should be 250,000 yen altogether. Moreover the total annual expenses for opium control cost approximately 4,000,000 yen per year³⁰⁶. Incidentally in 1930 the opium revenue was 4,349,818. With the above in mind it can be concluded that although by 1930 the Opium Monopoly System's profits were extremely marginal, the overspending administration still had an economic incentive to continue it.

The decline in the number of opium related businesses has already been discussed in the preceding chapter. Such a trend is evidenced in the reduction in number of retailers from 604 to 425 between 1920 and 1930³⁰⁷. Here it should be specially mentioned that in 1928 opium divans were rendered illegal. They thus no longer played a role in the economy. Again in considering the above it is noted that the gradual prohibition policy was efficacious predicated upon official economic data for up until 1930.

The number of opium wholesalers continued to remain at a relatively high and stable level with an average of 65 businesses until 1930. In that year there were 56 wholesalers. The author regrets statistical data for post-1930 is unavailable. Although it is unobtainable a pattern where the number of wholesalers decreases at a much slower rate than retailers can be observed. This continues to support the thought that wholesalers who were local notables had an important stabilising role to play in colonial society.

It was mentioned that that the gradual prohibition policy was effective in that official data indicates opium held a diminishing role in the economy. However, the discovery of 25,527 illicit smokers who indubitably could only obtain black market opium during addict registration in 1929 suggests two points; namely: a) the policy was flawed; and b) opium played a larger role in the economy than previously thought. Smuggling was big business. Mirroring the author's estimate, the League report states that an estimated 32,000 kilograms of opium were illegally sold in 1929³⁰⁸. That quantity is calculated to have a value of 3,700,000 yen based upon official prices (44 yen per 375 grams of opium paste). The actual value of that much illicit opium is unknown. It is however known that the drug was smuggled in from China³⁰⁹. It is thus

assumed that the opium was Chinese opium. That is understood to be of inferior quality compared to Persian, Indian and Turkish opium. It sold as cheaper third grade opium paste before Turkish opium replaced it in the Opium Monopoly System. These thoughts tend to support the notion the smuggled opium was sold at a lower price than officially retailed opium. However, it is equally possible that it was sold at a higher price. Regrettably the author is unaware if the smugglers had a monopoly over the traffic or the supply was greater than the demand or vice-versa. In fact nothing is known regarding them other than that they were Chinese. At any rate it is reasonable to conclude that opium possessed a role in the economy which is far more important than official data previously illustrated.

There were allegations that Taiwan was a source of illicit narcotics traffic. They were made by the British consul in Danshui and its delegate to the League of Nation's Opium Advisory Committee Sir John Jordan in 1921³¹⁰. Calling the island a "black spot in the East regarding the traffic in drugs," the latter asserted that morphine produced there was being "spread all of China" at an OAC meeting³¹¹. He furthermore wondered why the quantity of opium which was imported was increasing whilst the number of licensed addicts was decreasing at the time, and great quantities of imported opium vanished from Government-General records. The consul thought that morphine was smuggled into China directly or indirectly via Hoshi Pharmaceuticals, and certain officials had to be cognisant of and profiting from the traffic. He wrote: "One of the latter is undoubtedly Mr Kaku... since not only do rumours freely connect his name with this traffic, but it would, moreover, be impossible to carry on same a large scale without his connivance"³¹².

The origin of this alleged illicit traffic are two individuals; namely: Kaku Sagatarō and Hoshi Hajime. Kaku was in charge of the Monopoly Bureau for a duration of seven years from 1914 until 1921. That is the longest period served in that office according to record. Hoshi was Japan's premier narcotics trader. He began to purchase crude morphine, which is waste from manufacturing opium paste, from the Taiwan Government-General, which had stored it, in 1914 with Kaku's assent. In addition, with Kaku's agreement, in 1917 he obtained permission to purchase Persian opium on behalf of the Government-General. He moreover ventured into cocaine and quinine production. He not only cultivated it in Peru and bought it from South-eastern Asia, but also grew it in Taiwan where he for example produced approximately 18 to

21 tonnes of cocaine each year in the 1920s³¹³. Though Karch claims “the real number was almost certainly twice as great”³¹⁴. Moreover, in the same year Hoshi became associated with Nitan’osa Otozō who was an opium business magnate and regarded exporting opium to China as acceptable³¹⁵. Amidst the global shortage of opium during the war in 1917 a new opium control law was passed: private companies were permitted to purchase and possess opium, as well as import limited quantities of opium but sell unrestricted quantities of opium³¹⁶. With the power derived from this new law, Hoshi and other businessmen were able to purchase raw opium on the international market. Although imports of opium to Japan were limited, such imports did not have to clear customs if they were stored in a bonded warehouse. Hoshi did so until it was discovered by the British consul in Kobe who alerted Tokyo to the matter in 1922. Wishing to avoid international condemnation Tokyo ordered the warehouses cleared. Hoshi responded by arranging to sell the opium to the Yakuro Shōkai, which was a Japanese syndicate that acquired the right to operate the opium monopoly in Dairen in 1922, and allegedly a Chinese syndicate in Shanghai. At that time North-eastern China was infamous for narcotics smuggling and China was understood to be suffering from a drugs plague. When the Kenseikai assumed power in Japan in 1924, changes were made to the personnel in government in Japan and the Taiwan Government-General: Hoshi lost his influential friends. The following year he was convicted of storing opium for the purposes of selling it to the aforementioned syndicates and fined over one million yen³¹⁷. Indeed, Goodman writes: “Hoshi’s shareholders included certain Taiwan officials and their wives, and the implication that Hoshi and the Taiwan colonial government were growing rich together was hard to miss”³¹⁸. Hoshi was moreover denied the crude morphine concession from Taiwan. Albeit in 1927 he regained it, though he had to share it with competitors.

The illicit traffic was thought to involve the Government-General by Taiwanese. Kerr writes during the 1930 League investigation into narcotics control on Formosa a document was submitted to the investigatory committee by Lin Xiantang who represented those opposed to the Government-General opium policy. Its contents alleged that: “The Monopoly Bureau... actually promoted chronic addiction to provide excuse for continuing operations and the vaunted ‘opium control programme’ was a façade behind which the Bureau processed opium, cocaine, and their derivatives for supply to the illicit international market on a very large scale”³¹⁹. He furthermore

states that in 1924 Governor-General Uchida Kakitsu and his then Civil Administrator Kaku Sagatarō were recalled from their respective positions owing to the fact they were discovered to “have been shielding an illicit international narcotics traffic on the largest scale”³²⁰. The recall was triggered by the eruption of a smuggling scandal. Interestingly, Uchida and Kaku already had been friends for fifteen years until that year. Both had worked in the Government-General as civil servants. Uchida had been Civil Administrator from 1910 to 1915. Another individual who was in office in the administration for many years until that year was Shimomura Hiroshi, who was the Civil Administrator from 1915 to 1921. Kaku was his replacement. Considering he spent such a long time on the island in such a high office, it is possible Shimomura was also aware of Kaku and Hoshi’s relationship.

The illicit traffic was possible owing to three factors; namely: a) possession of drugs; b) proximity to China; and c) the relative strength of Japan vis-à-vis China. To begin with Japan could cultivate and process opium and coca into opium paste and morphine, and cocaine respectively. The country moreover had easy access to China due to the proximity of it and its colonies. Both Korea and the Kwantung peninsular bordered China and the peninsular was ideally located for shipping. Last of all in the 1920s rule of China was divided amongst warlords and later between Nationalists and Communists whilst Japan was unified under a single, powerful, modern government. Additionally, owing to its power, Japanese citizens including Taiwanese and Koreans “exploited extraterritoriality to escape the clutches of China’s law enforcers” according to China’s National Anti-Opium Organisation³²¹. These factors facilitated the smuggling endeavour.

Specifically on the topic of cocaine, Karch provides a stimulating history of it on Taiwan under Japanese rule. He states that the Japanese drugs business was unearthed during the American occupation under General MacArthur³²². To begin with regarding cocaine, in 1916 the Government-General invited Abe Konosuke to cultivate coca on the island. Having failed by 1921 his company was sold to the Ensuiko Sugar Company of Formosa which was directed by Tetsu Maki. As a means to promote production he sought investment. His friend Norakata Takahashi succeeded in persuading his father who was the Minister of Finance to invest in it. The company was renamed Taiwan Shoyaku and restructured to produce as much as 500 kilograms of cocaine per month³²³. Mitsui also grew coca in Taiwan but the

quantity of its production is unknown³²⁴. This means in total at least possibly 56 tonnes of cocaine was traded in total per year considering Hoshi's business and Taiwan Shoyaku. The cocaine was exported from Taiwan. The largest steamship line of the time was Nippon Yusen Kaisha³²⁵. It should have shipped it. Under Japanese law a licence was not required to handle cocaine³²⁶. That meant possessing, importing and exporting it was not illegal and thus aided the drugs traffic. In connection with assisting the traffic, the company was owned by Mitsubishi, received imperial subsidies, and its directors served in government³²⁷. On that topic, Karch maintains boundaries among conglomerates (*zaibatsu*), the army, and the government were blurred, and conglomerate families dominated Japanese society³²⁸. Evidencing such a relationship during the Japanese invasion of China while the conglomerates Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo engaged in the sale of illicit narcotics, government bureaucrats "routinely 'cooked the books'"³²⁹. Albeit evidence indicating such a relationship before 1937 is lacking. Incidentally the conviction of General Teiichi Suzuki for drug related war crimes during the Second Sino-Japanese War suggests the army was also involved in the drugs trade³³⁰. Lastly, Japanese law regarding cocaine was not applied to Taiwan. Karch holds opium offenses carried severe penalties but the penalties for cocaine related offenses were light³³¹. With the above in mind, it is thought that cocaine exports constituted a significant part of the economy from the 1920s, and those exports formed a part of the illicit traffic to China.

With the above mentioned history and allegations in mind, it can be held that members of the administration were involved in the illicit traffic. At least it can be argued that the crude morphine Hoshi purchased from Taiwan might have been smuggled into China. After all, there is only circumstantial evidence that it was so: the author does not possess a record indicating what happened to the crude morphine once Hoshi acquired it. However, at most it can be asserted that with Hoshi Pharmaceuticals and other Japanese agencies Kaku, Uchida, and Shimomura and later officials facilitated the export of crude morphine and cocaine that was to be smuggled into China. Taking into account the 1921 Koga opium scandal that implicated high ranking officials in both the Kwantung Government-General and the Japanese government in smuggling, the 1926 and 1927 arrests of Taishō Pharmaceutical employees for smuggling morphine from Korea, and British diplomatic protests regarding opium disappearing from Government-General records in the early 1920s, it

can be concluded that there was certainly a smuggling issue that involved both businessmen and government officials in the 1920s³³². Considering the government sanctioned export of crude morphine, the legality of cocaine exports, and the possibly illicit transshipment of raw opium and export of morphine manufactured on the island, it is thought that narcotics constituted a significant part of the economy.

4.5. Conclusion for the Late Japanese Period

The aim of this chapter is to provide information for comparative analysis for the conclusion of the thesis. Thus far a multiplicity of data has been presented regarding the administration, culture and economy of opium and narcotics in accompaniment with other relevant and necessary historical information during the late period of Japanese rule. Here the aforementioned knowledge shall be further analysed to produce new points and summarised for convenience in reference.

To begin with, this period of rule was marked by significant historical changes in comparison with the earlier era. By the 1920s Japan had at last achieved parity with the Powers that had formerly subjected it to the unequal treaties. The country possessed an empire, had defeated not only China but also Russia which was a Power in war, and was admitted to become a member of the Council in the League of Nations which was an exclusive club of nations. Nevertheless, the rejection of its call for universal racial equality signalled that Japan had not achieved complete parity with the Powers in terms of race from the Japanese perspective. Discrimination against Japanese nationals by foreign governments continued at least in America. The country thereafter became disillusioned with the Powers and international system. As for Taiwan, colonial rule was prosperous from the early 1900s and politically and socially stable from 1915.

The late Japanese period of rule brought new challenges that confronted Japan and the Taiwan Government-General.

The terrific horror wrought by scientific advances in technique and technology in warfare inspired the creation of the League of Nations. It was a revolutionary institution that redefined political conduct amongst countries. Previously international

relations tended to be closed, bilateral and directed by self-interest. However, the League provided a platform that added a new dimension to such relations. On that world stage international relations were open, multilateral and considerate to the interests' of other nations. The result was that the national policy of a single country was obliged to be both restricted and directed by the international interest of a group of countries. The crucial word there is "obliged": it was not illegal for a nation to conduct action irrespective of the League's consensus. Albeit offending national leaders could be tried as war criminals if their country lost a war. In this society Japan was therefore thrust into a position where it had to consider to what extent it should act according to its will or the will of others.

As illustrated above and as will be discussed in detail in the following chapter Japan accepted obligations to the League by participating in conferences and ratifying the 1925 Geneva Convention on Opium. In others it conceded to international interest. However it ultimately rejected the encroachment on its freedom to act by withdrawing from the League in 1933.

The principle of self-determination which was espoused by Woodrow Wilson threatened the rule of Taiwan. It declared that the nation rather than the state was sovereign, and identifiable peoples particularly colonised ethnic groups should be at liberty to determine their own destinies. This notion applied to the Chinese who were ruled by Japanese on the island. It immediately resulted in the radical call for the establishment of a Taiwanese assembly within the Japanese empire. However the administration attempted to nullify that threat by presenting a rival idea: extending the home territory. Its goal was to gradually assimilate Chinese and aborigines into Japanese. Its mechanisms were reducing discrimination against the colonised to a limited extent and promoting Japanese language. Although it was an excellent response to self-determination, its success was undermined by two factors; namely: a) Chinese nationalism which presented another concept to rival gradual assimilation; and b) the 1930 opium dispute wherein the thought that the administration was not treating its subjects correctly in accordance with international justice appeared.

The Government-General increasingly confronted challenges to its policies by the manifestation of political associations. That evinces its aim to consolidate rule through promoting loyalty through assimilation was nevertheless undermined by self-

determination, Chinese nationalism and the opium dispute. However the administration was by no means defeated. It retained power in the same way it seized it. That is it had a police system and military force that was highly effective in its suppression of native unrest. In other words the Government-General was ultimately triumphant.

The way the administration managed opium also changed. In December 1928 the Taiwan Opium Ordinance was decreed. It was primarily an updated version of the 1897 ordinance but there were also significant additions and a revision. Opium dross was made illegal. Opium divans were ordered to be closed. The Government-General expressed it could treat addicts. In addition illicit smokers became only punishable by imprisonment with hard labour not exceeding three years. These impacted on society in that it affected what you could smoke, where you could smoke, implied opium addicts may receive treatment for the first time, and meant secret smokers had to be imprisoned if caught. The treatment for smokers was realised in the December 1929 addict registration campaign that regulated that light smokers would be denied licences and moderate smokers would be hospitalised for rectification. Altogether 17,468 addicts were rehabilitated in opium wards and the *Kōsei* hospital, and 7,454 addicts were made to abstain. Although rehabilitation was only approximately fifty percent efficacious the first time, it was an important mechanism in reducing the addict population. It was a mechanism that was difficult to surmount with illicit smoking considering in the 1930s police had technology to detect opium in urine and they most likely knew who the illicit smokers were after they applied for licences in the registration campaign. With the new ordinance and rehabilitation centres, the administration accelerated the diminution in the number of addicts as an effect.

The Government-General implemented reforms regarding opium dross and divans in accordance with the 1925 Geneva Opium Convention. But it did not adopt recommendations to transform the commission based wholesale and retail system into a salaried one or require records of retail sales to be taken. It is thought that on the one hand the administration was satisfied with the progress of the opium monopoly system and prohibiting dross and divans was simple, but on the other hand installing a recording and salary system would diminish opium revenue and threaten social stability. Closing divans would also upset locals but their owners are assumed to be relatively unimportant compared to the local notables who typically held the

wholesaler and retailer positions. As a colonial regime, social stability for the sake of economic exploitation was of paramount concern.

The way in which the Government-General regarded opium changed as well. It previously regarded opium as an “evil”, addicts as “wretched” and was terrified it should spread to Japan. The architect of the opium monopoly system was Gotō Shinpei who thought in terms of biological principles and worked in Department of Hygiene before assuming the position of Civil Administrator in Taiwan. It is thought opium was perceived as an issue of sanitation and the Chinese race. However this view changed gradually at first and then markedly in the late 1920s. The success of the gradual opium prohibition policy illustrated that opium addiction was manageable. It was no longer terrifying. What is more, the 1928 ordinance that included a reference to opium as medicinal and the provision of medical treatment to addicts suggests opium was deemed a medical issue. By 1930 smokers were categorised as light, moderate or heavy which implies an emergence of a new perception of smokers and suggests treatment was administered accordingly. It is thought opium was viewed as an issue of medicine and the Chinese race. The effect was that opium was no longer considered an uncontrollable poison but rather a curable disease. In other words, it was not such a serious issue anymore.

As for the culture of opium there were both changes as per its usage and how it was regarded by the Taiwanese. In a preceding paragraph on the aforementioned 1928 Taiwan Opium Ordinance, 1929 addict registration campaign, and 1930 opening of a rehabilitative centres it has already been stated that opium smoking became a more restricted activity. You could typically only indulge in the habit at a home. It was unlikely dress should be smoked. Moreover, with knowledge identifying prior licence holders, technology to detect opium in urine, and a fiercer punitive law, the police force could greatly reduce the number of illicit smokers.

There were three attitudes towards opium smoking that were expressed by the literati. The first was a conflicting attitude. On the one hand opium should be quit because it was unhealthy but on the other hand it could be continued because it was liked. Poorer addicts regretted abstaining from the habit owing to rises in the price of opium. This view was held in the 1920s. Next the second attitude was extremely opposed to opium. Smokers were deemed shameless, worthless and unenlightened. They were further

thought to constitute servants who supported the colonial regime. This perception appeared in 1929 in response to the administration implementing another addict registration drive. Unlike the first view that was generally expressed by the literati, this attitude was held specifically by members of Chinese political associations and the medical and legal communities. Their view was legitimate because both Japan and the international community were against opium smoking and authoritative because of their social standing. It was significant in that it represented the first instance Chinese were opposed to opium smoking in public. It was influential because after the opium dispute it became publically unacceptable to condone opium smoking. Lastly the third attitude offered countenance to the gradual opium prohibition, light addict abstinence, and moderate addict rectification policies effected by the Government-General. This emerged in 1930 as a reaction to the second attitude. In consideration of the above, it is thought that the 1930 opium dispute was pivotal and it represented a shift from when opium smoking was regarded as unhealthy yet acceptable amongst Chinese in the 1920s to immoral, backward and servile and thus illegitimate and unacceptable in the 1930s.

During the late Japanese rule a new culture of narcotics manifested on the island. Illicit morphine use increased during the 1930s. Coca was also cultivated under licence on the island for export like crude morphine. It is unknown whether cocaine was also consumed on the island.

Akin to the early period of Japanese rule the number of opium related businesses decreased gradually. The number of wholesalers also diminished although it was at a rate so slow it impresses the number actually remained constant on the whole. However, unlike the early period the opium monopoly system became decreasingly profitable. It was nonetheless profitable however marginal. The Government-General had an economic incentive to operate it because it was both profitable and necessary in that the administration overspent annually.

Smuggling opium into the island continued to play a large role in the economy. This is illustrated by the 25,527 illicit smokers who applied for licences in 1929. This figure approximately corresponds to the number of licensed smokers in 1928, which totalled 26,942. The only way of supplying so many secret smokers was through smuggling opium from China, where opium was abundant to Taiwan. It is possible

narcotics such as morphine and cocaine were also smuggled to the island from China. It is thought that the number of illicit smokers increased after the last opium addict registration campaign in 1908 because smokers who acquired the habit through friends, family, business associates and prostitutes could only smoke illegally.

Exporting narcotics such as crude morphine (that can be refined into morphine) and cocaine from the island was an aspect of the economy from 1914. It is unknown for certain that an alleged smuggling operation primarily involving Japanese businessmen and administration officials occurred on Taiwan. However, there is circumstantial evidence that suggests it did in fact take place at least after the First World War. For instance, Japanese companies could possess opium after the 1917 Opium Law and knowledge on how to produce opium paste, morphine and cocaine was available. Japanese citizens did smuggle narcotics into China, and in Korea, Taiwan and Japan scandals implicating bureaucrats in the narcotics traffic erupted in the 1920s. The imperial army was influential and wanted Japan to rule China. In Taiwan opium was allegedly made available to rebellious Hakka by the authorities. Another rumour was that Chinese prisoners were encouraged to work for the administration in China where they enjoyed extraterritoriality. China was fragmented amongst various warlords and later between nationalists and communists. Opium financed war there. It was also ubiquitous to consume opium and later morphine. The Japanese regarded the Chinese as racially inferior and opium as a manageable substance at the time. As evidenced by the notion of economic warfare, it was reasonable to profit from a rival race's loss for the sake of national survival. Additionally, as a rule bureaucrats tend to be satisfied with the respect derived from their occupation but are aware they should not be as affluent as certain businessmen: they may engage in corruption to become fully satisfied. With this in mind, it is not unreasonable to think Japanese officials and businessmen in Taiwan did smuggle narcotics to China. In connection with this, it would moreover be reasonable to operate the opium monopoly system as a cover for purchasing excessive quantities of opium on the international market for processing into opium derivatives for export. However, it is worth remembering that the above is merely speculation predicated on circumstantial evidence. What is more, the fact that the author is mostly reliant on literature written after World War Two, when it was revealed there were Japanese convicted of war crimes regarding narcotics traffic, might precipitate one to expect such smuggling to have occurred throughout colonial

rule. But the problem with that is fascist wartime Japan, and liberal yet increasingly conservative Japan in the 1920s were markedly different. Restated, just because the state smuggled narcotics during the second Sino-Japanese war does not necessarily mean it did so in the 1920s: it could have just been private firms. Another issue is that although hearsay from Kerr provides the author with something to write, it cannot be trusted without supporting evidence. In addition the origin of such rumours which were likely to be Taiwanese as expressed in the literature that the author utilises might be biased considering the growth of Chinese nationalism wherein Japan was demonised on the island after 1945. Considering this as a restraint on conclusions reached based on circumstantial evidence, it is thought that further research is necessitated before a concrete statement on the matter can be produced.

Moving on, the rationale behind Government-General opium policy was also modified during the late Japanese era of colonial rule. Unlike the preceding chapter such policy is exclusively discussed in this section owing to the fact that quotes of officials indicating it are unavailable to the author. It is therefore necessarily deduced from the implementation of related policies. The late period is divisible into two sections: early and late. The early part covers the early and middle 1920s. The other part refers to the late 1920s onwards.

The former is comprised of three to four aspects; namely: a) biological principles; b) economic warfare; c) accelerated assimilation; and d) possibly self-enrichment. Both economic warfare and biological principles defined the opium policy of the early Japanese era. The applicability of them to opium policy in the 1920s is demonstrated by the continuance of the existential and efficacious opium monopoly system which contributed to Japan's strength as per economic warfare and was gradualist as per biological principles. Accelerated assimilation as enunciated by Governor-General Den Kenjirō was a new factor. Calling for less discrimination and more equality between Japanese, and Chinese and aborigines meant that biological principles which fostered division was undermined. Its effect was to impinge on the applicability of the gradual opium prohibition policy from the perspective of both Japanese and Taiwanese. That should provide an incentive to expedite absolute prohibition. Lastly supposing bureaucrats such as Kaku, Uchida and Shimomura were complicit in the narcotics traffic to China, that should then suggest the administration was compelled

to maintain the gradual opium prohibition policy at least for the crude morphine concession to Hoshi.

In analysis it is evident that success with the opium monopoly system, biological principles, economic warfare and possibly self-enrichment ensured the continuation of the status quo whilst assimilation provided a background factor for reform that was later realised in the second part. The latter is composed of five aspects. They are precisely the same as the above except for the last aspect, which is international influence. Such influence manifested both directly and indirectly. It was expressed directly through the 1925 Geneva Convention on Opium. The international convention on opium caused the administration to overhaul the 1897 Taiwan Opium Ordinance when it was ratified by Tokyo in 1928. International influence was furthermore exerted indirectly through international pressure and zeitgeist. This is more complex. In the 1920s Japan was frequently lambasted for not preventing its citizens from smuggling narcotics to China. It was a national embarrassment that was recognised by educated Formosans. What is more such international pressure fostered an atmosphere where opium was regarded as negative more zealously. In these circumstances certain Chinese literati such as Du Congming (who witnessed addiction in Korea, Manchuria and Shanghai) and those activists involved in the opium dispute were inspired to challenge the administration's opium policy. The Government-General accepted Du's proposal and conceded to the activists. As already mentioned it resulted in a fundamental change to policy in that medicinal treatment was expeditiously provided to addicts against their will for the first time. In light of this, it is maintainable that international influence influenced the rationale behind opium policy both directly and obliquely. In connection to self-enrichment, again, it is only a possibility that bureaucrats connived in the smuggling of narcotics. Though the existence of the monopoly would provide a legitimate reason for purchasing opium on the international market for processing into narcotics.

In analysis it is thought that self-determination, assimilation, and international influence were crucial to the redefinition of policy. The administration was hamstrung by the spectre of self-determination that threatened its rule. Self-determination prompted the devising of accelerated assimilation in an effort by the Government-General to undermine it. However, assimilation undermined biological principles as a consequence. The "Flounder" Chinese could no longer be gradually transformed into

“Sea bream” Japanese because the new assimilation policy accelerated that transformation: they had to be transmogrified faster. In effect, the Government-General had two choices as per the prohibition of smoking opium; namely: a) be responsive to demands for reformation; and b) seize the initiative by implementing reforms immediately. This is because treating the Chinese as Chinese rather than as increasingly Japanese in accordance with accelerated assimilation should provoke dissatisfaction among the Chinese against the administration. After all, if the Japanese were prohibited from smoking opium, then the Chinese who were intended to assimilate quickly into Japanese should be forbidden from doing so too as a matter of equality. Such dissatisfaction should cause the Chinese to lose faith in the Government-General’s assimilation policy. That would consequently leave self-determination as the only alternative for their achievement of satisfaction. In other words, the administration had to be open to making concessions or pro-active in implementing equalising reforms lest a popular uprising engulf them. Calling for accelerated assimilation therefore not only eliminated the threat of self-determination, but also caused the gradual prohibition policy to be less applicable because the Chinese were no longer Chinese: they were additionally perceived to be something heading closer to Japanese. That forced the administration to be receptive to new ideas on the established opium policy. It moreover meant that the Government-General had made itself vulnerable to criticism from the colonised who were treated unequally when compared with the Japanese into whom they were intended to assimilate. It so happened that self-determination and the trigger for the later reforms to narcotics policy ultimately originated from international influence. The introduction of treatment of addicts and increasing restrictions on licensed smokers in the policy represented a significant change. Nevertheless, no matter how significant it was, it is still evident that the gradual prohibition policy remained in operation. That illustrates that biological principles was still paramount though undermined by assimilation. Economic warfare is thought to be important in the sense selling opium precluded unrest but was no longer as important as it once was because the opium monopoly system was not so profitable after 1930. With the above in mind, it is concluded assimilation and international influence redefined opium policy within existing boundaries yet biological principles was superior owing to the demonstrable efficacy of the opium monopoly system while economic warfare was important for its

social stabilising role though it became increasingly insignificant in terms of revenue. Self-enrichment remains debatable.

Chapter Five: International Conferences on Opium and Narcotics

5.0. Chapter Aim and Outline

The aim of this chapter is to produce data regarding international conferences on opium and other narcotics for use in analysis with the other information presented above.

The data of interest here refers to the origins, aims and results of the conferences, the Japanese response, and the ideas that defined it. The aim will be accomplished by researching such data of interest.

In definition, international conferences denote formal, multilateral meetings involving the Powers and other states for discussing opium and other narcotics under the aegis of the League of Nations or before its creation in the twentieth century.

5.1. League of Nations

The League of Nations was formally established in 1920. A plan for its creation was originally included in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. The principle aim of the League was to prevent future wars. This goal was to be achieved through nations becoming members of the League by agreeing to uphold the Covenant. The Covenant was a pact that contained 26 articles regarding the accomplishment of the aforementioned aim. It was the product of deliberations held by 14 nations such as the United States, Britain, Italy, Japan and France during the Versailles conferences in 1919. It expressed that members should: a) accept obligations not to resort to war; b) prescribe open, just and honourable relations; c) establish the rule of law as a code of conduct; and d) maintain justice and respect for treaty obligations³³³. In other words, members of the League

would not wage war and adhere to rules. It is thought the Covenant could be called the world's first constitution, though it was not legally binding. The Covenant also illustrated the structure and operation of the League. Essentially it was composed of three main bodies; namely: an elite Executive Council; a general Assembly; and a professional Secretariat. There were additional specialist organisations attached to the League such as the Labour Organisation and the Opium Advisory Committee that engaged in specific matters. The League would operate by resolving disputes and solving issues through discussion in the Assembly wherein delegates of nations would vote. Each nation only had one vote and a maximum of three representatives. It convened once per year in September. The Council met as necessary and desired to deliberate issues concerning the direction of the League. It was an exclusive club typically for Powers. Although League membership could be revoked for poor conduct, the original members of the Council held permanent seats. They were France, Japan, Italy and Britain. Ironically, America which first suggested the creation of the League was not a member: its government did not ratify the Covenant. The League was funded by its members. Any nation that defied its principles was subject to international condemnation that would incite domestic pressure and amount to economic sanctions and possibly war.

In analysis, the League was as already mentioned both revolutionary and reformatory. It was revolutionary in the sense it transformed international relations from closed and bilateral relations directed by individual state interest to open and multilateral relations influenced by multiple state interests. These multiple state interests referenced a universal constitution for its guiding principles. Such principles redefined acceptable behaviour amongst states. Domestic and international pressure invoked from the acceptance of the principles against defiant members served to promote peace. These developments were completely new and changed international relations. But it was merely reformatory when the aforementioned transformation is understood as a development. Establishing the League of Nations added a new dimension to international relations. That was a platform to conduct open and multilateral diplomacy. Yet this platform was an additional layer imposed on closed and bilateral relations that typified the nineteenth century. The League was obligatory but not compulsory in nature. A member nation could still act freely irrespective of its obligations to the League. Qualifying the above statement, the developments were

wholly new but they did not change international relations completely. As we know peace was not upheld because Germany and Japan started the most destructive war in history. The matter of the League's inadequacies will be discussed in connection with opium and narcotics below.

The concepts that underpinned the League appear in the speeches of its champion American President Woodrow Wilson. His words inspired cooperation amongst nations in creating the League. Considering that in 1920 the League had 27 members, and apart from Russia and Germany all other Powers had agreed to uphold the Covenant, Wilson's speeches for the League can be argued to reflect the general consensus of the time.

A dominant theme in his speech at the Paris Peace Conference on the 25th January 1919 was to "sweep away the foundations of war" to secure a "permanent peace"³³⁴. The logic was that the culture of nations that precipitated the First World War was exceedingly dangerous. It was stated that the foundation of war was "small coteries of civil rulers and military staffs" who in "private choice" exerted the "aggression of Great Powers upon the small"³³⁵. These "small bodies of men" would "use mankind as pawns in a game" according to "their will". In addition advances in scientific technique and technology in waging war resulted in "the powers of destruction" being enhanced³³⁶. In fact in the First World War losses reached an unprecedented and alarming 8,500,000 allied military and 10,000,000 civilian deaths³³⁷.

The solution was to evidently transform the culture of nations. The means was to redefine governmental duty. Wilson emphasised that in America citizens expect "their representatives to be their servants" without "a private purpose of their own"³³⁸. In other words governments were to serve their people rather than vice-versa. In this way "the select classes of mankind are no longer the governors of mankind" and "the fortunes of mankind are now in the hands of the plain people of the whole world" through proper representation in the League³³⁹. Presented as such this culture was not for the sake of fellow citizens but for the whole of mankind. The rationale for redefining a state's duty was that representative democracy would secure peace. Regarding mankind, Wilson holds: "Satisfy them, and you have justified their confidence not only but established peace. Fail to satisfy them, and no arrangement

that you can make will either set up or steady the peace of the world”³⁴⁰. Restated any other form of governance should result in war.

The aforementioned cultural reformation would be achieved through an international institution. It was to be “the eye of the nations to keep watch upon the common interest, an eye that did not slumber, an eye that was everywhere watchful and attentive”³⁴¹. It was to facilitate the “watchful, continuous cooperation of men” that would “see to it that science as well as armed men are kept within the harness of civilization”³⁴². Additionally, the threat of war lurked in the Covenant to ensure that the League’s ideals would be maintained. Seen in this light the League would operate constantly to prevent war for the common good.

The mode of thought that encouraged the acceptance of the aforementioned themes as expressed by Wilson was not only logical concern for peace to avert destruction but also a spirit for forging a better world. In his addresses to delegates at the Paris Peace Conference Wilson uses words to glorify the mission of the League. He styles himself as a “crusader”³⁴³. He rejects that obligations to the League constitute a “straitjacket” and asserts that it is a “vehicle for life”³⁴⁴. The Covenant is “universal” and the effort to create it was a “great and humane enterprise”. He moreover maintains that through it: “People that were suspicious of one another can now live as friends and comrades in a single family... the miasma of distrust, of intrigue is cleared away”³⁴⁵. It was a Covenant of “fraternity and friendship” and mankind were “brothers” that had a “common purpose”.

With the above in mind it can be concluded that the notions that embodied the League were the following. They are: a) the old pre-League world order was bellicose and dangerous; b) securing peace was necessary to avert cataclysm; c) at the domestic level state action should represent the will of the people and not private interest; d) at the international level governments ought to be continuously watchful and cooperative; and e) there was a spirit that the League was for the benefit of mankind.

With these concepts in mind, we can explain the inclusion of article 23 in the Covenant. It is extremely relevant to the thesis topic. It reads: “Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of the international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon the Members of the League: ... c) will entrust the League with general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in

women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs”³⁴⁶. Unlike other articles that were concerned with the operation of the League to avert war, this one was not concerned with that whatsoever. Rather it expressed an interest for enhancing the conditions of mankind: improving labour conditions, securing just treatment of the colonised and communications, and engagement in arms and disease control are also stated in it. Albeit the fact it is article 23 out of 26 signifies its relatively low status in terms of necessity. Nevertheless it is of great significance because it renders salient the matter of opium and narcotics before the eyes of the world. The association of opium with other the aforementioned noble matters further entrenches its equal importance. In effect opium and narcotics control became a marked issue of international concern.

The League occupied a supervisory role over agreements and therefore could exert pressure on any government that did not comply with the will of the Assembly. However such pressure would not necessarily result in compliance. As previously mentioned, members of the League were merely obliged to uphold the Covenant: it was not enforced in law. On the one hand members of “the society of nations” were idealistically obliged to peacefully cooperate on the basis of “fraternity and friendship” for the sake of mankind, while on the other hand states realistically retained the freedom to act according to their interests. The key issue here is what defined those interests: the private interests of the civil service and military versus the public interest of ordinary citizens. It is thought that in a representative democracy which is dominated by private interests it is more likely that the state should act freely regardless of its obligations to the League for the sake of those interests. With this in mind, it can be held that the League would only be a most effective instrument for preventing war if its members were democracies that represented their peoples. By extension, in a world where the zeitgeist was increasingly opposed to illicit narcotics trafficking, truly representative governments are deemed to be the most likely to cooperate in ending the traffic.

5.2.0. International Conferences

In total there were four significant international discussions on narcotics control that correlate with the thesis research; namely: a) 1909 Shanghai International Opium Commission; b) 1912 Hague Conference; c) 1924-1925 Geneva Opium Conference; and d) the 1931 Bangkok Narcotics Conference. The emphasis began on opium but expanded to cover narcotics in accordance with the development and spread of narcotic drugs. Only the latter two conferences were held under the League. All four of the discussions are thought to represent the zeitgeist of each time regarding the control of opium and narcotics. A survey of them will therefore illustrate changes and reveal a trend in development as per narcotics control. Hereafter the author shall separately review and analyse each conference in terms of its origin, participants, aims and results including special reference to Japan.

Some points must be qualified. Actually the 1909 Shanghai Commission was not a conference: its aim was to investigate the matter of opium and recommend action to rectify it. A conference is very similar but its aim is to explore specific issues highlighted for discussion and oblige governments to conduct agreed action to handle it. Moreover, altogether there were six international conferences excluding the 1909 Shanghai Commission. The additional ones were the 1913 and 1914 Hague Conferences, and the 1930 Geneva Conference. Predicated on their resolutions in comparison with the others they are deemed insignificant: they merely polish existential protocol and agreements. The significant ones are therefore more representative of the zeitgeist and influential, and it is thus thought prudent to examine them in detail. Naturally the additional conferences will be mentioned as considered necessary. Lastly the soon to be introduced Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB) and Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) can be included under the thought of international discussions on opium because they were essentially such discussions on opium. Nevertheless their impact in assessment is more instrumental in triggering the aforementioned conferences rather than reforming narcotics control through protocol, agreements etc. as concluded at the Hague in 1912 for instance. Relevant points pertaining to them will be produced as necessary later.

5.2.1. 1909 Shanghai International Opium Commission

The Shanghai International Opium Commission was held in 1909. Delegates representing a total of 13 countries attended the discussions. They were: America, Austria-Hungary, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia and Siam. It was the first international commission into opium in the world³⁴⁷. As already mentioned the commission was indeed a commission and not a conference. It is understood that in this case a commission is a preliminary event preceding a conference. That is inferred from two facts; namely: a) related conferences preceded this commission; and b) in the text reporting the proceedings of the commission it was stated that a conference was not held because the participating governments were insufficiently informed and unanimous for immediate results³⁴⁸. However delegates attending the commission regard it as a conference³⁴⁹. It is thought that calling the commission a commission outside discussions was a matter of diplomatic protocol, and regarding it as a conference during discussions was a matter of convenience.

The aim of the conference is inferable from the speaker that opened it. Yet it must be mentioned that such an aim merely indicates the topic of discussion. Naturally each government has its own policy towards the matter. The 1909 Shanghai Commission was opened by Tuan Fang. He was the Viceroy of Liangjiang in China. In short the goal of the commission was to: a) consider the matter of opium with the view to suppress it; and b) discuss the conflict between regulations that suppress it and certain clauses in unequal treaties applied to China. Tuan states: "On the whole, since the main object of this Conference will be to consider the question of putting a stop to the consumption of opium, fortunate indeed will it be for the whole world if by the labours of the Conference a way be found to shorten the limit and bring about the abolition of opium at an early date"³⁵⁰. What is more, he adds: "...the main idea will be to prohibit the cultivation of the poppy, the sale of the drug and the consumption thereof. It is only to be apprehended that in putting into effect the law for this prohibition it may conflict with certain clauses of the treaties. It is my hope that this Conference will carefully investigate the matter beforehand, so that there may be no misunderstandings in the future"³⁵¹. With this in mind it is evident that the Chinese hosts were desirous of prohibiting the cultivation, sale and consumption of opium through law without entailing diplomatic difficulties. This will be analysed later.

The origins of the commission are multiple. Ultimately it was the American government that triggered it by calling for it³⁵². The background factors that contributed to the rationale for that call are many. To begin with America was in possession of the Philippines where opium addiction was ubiquitous from 1898. Its government had appointed a committee to investigate the use of opium and recommend provisions for its suppression. The American delegation at the 1909 Shanghai Committee included Bishop Brent and Hamilton Wright who were fiercely anti-opium³⁵³. In 1906 the Guangxu emperor issued an edict prohibiting opium. McAllister reports in 1907 Britain and China concluded the Ten Year Agreement wherein Indian opium imports were to be reduced by ten percent points from that year over the following decade³⁵⁴. It is unknown whether he means ten percentage points but it is presumed so lest suppression of the traffic be unattainable within ten years. China was moreover well known to be flooded with opium at the time. It is in such a background that President Theodore Roosevelt considered the 1906 proposal for the establishment of an international forum on opium by Charles Brent who was an American missionary³⁵⁵. With respect to this, it was from Brent and Roosevelt that the commission originated.

The result of the commission can be understood in two ways. First of all in nine resolutions that were reached by participating governments. Secondly in highlighting the division between American on one side contra Japan and Britain on another side regarding the extent to which opium ought to be eliminated. Both are useful for this thesis.

As for the former, the resolutions can be surmised as participating governments: a) recognise China in terms of its government and public opinion is sincerely exerting effort in the eradication of opium production and consumption; b) recommends that non-medical opium use and opium divans be prohibited; c) suggests smuggling of opium and its derivatives be prevented; d) urges cooperation with China to suppress trade and manufacture of narcotics and apply national laws to consular districts in possessions in China; and e) calls each government to undertake scientific research into opium and its derivatives as well as develop a cure for opium addiction³⁵⁶.

In observation it is evident that there was a consensus that regulations for the suppression of opium would be passed. Additionally the issue of the legal conflict

between Qing law and the laws of the Powers applied to territories in China would be resolved through the application of the Power's laws that have been evaluated in accordance with recommendations to suppress opium. In conclusion initial steps were taken to accomplish the aim Tuan indicated in his opening speech. That is an undeniable success. Another observation is that cocaine was not referred to in the resolutions.

In connection with that it is worth remembering the obvious that resolutions are not legally binding. The language expressed in the resolutions is not forceful. The international commission "strongly urges" and "recommends" certain measures are taken. The language is moreover unspecific. It was recommended "reasonable measures" were undertaken and suggests drugs policy is "evaluated accordingly". The point is the resolutions mark a direction and are formed to be most accommodating. That means governments do not necessarily have to promulgate stringent measures. They retain their freedom to act. The implication is the resolutions are meaningless. However that is thought to be untrue. After all they serve as a stepping stone for future multilateral cooperation on the matter in that opium and its derivatives were raised as an issue to be discussed. Such multinational discussions could prove fruitful in the future. Restated it usefully initiates a series of processes aiming for suppression.

As for the latter, on the one hand American delegates were exceedingly enthusiastic in suppressing opium completely, but on the other hand British and Japanese delegates were more guarded in doing so. Brent and Wright wanted to accelerate the 1907 Ten Year Agreement but Britain and Japan refused to discuss it. They further posited that opium should be restricted for medical and scientific purposes only but all of the colonial powers objected to any contention that use of opium in traditional applications was deleterious. Lastly, they called for a plenipotentiary conference following the commission but that too was rejected³⁵⁷. These conflicts express differences in attitudes: progressive America versus static Powers. It is thought the underlying cause for the reluctant posture would be that the colonial powers had economic interests as per opium in colonies that they were unwilling to forfeit. Yet the fact they attended the conferences to discuss suppression indicates they were willing to address the issue of suppression. It is paradoxical. It is deemed that other reasons involved the colonial powers in the discussions such as it was prestigious, participating in it could protect interests by directing the argument, moral concern

regarding the “opium plague”, and ensuring votes would not be lost to an opposing party in elections by failing to satisfy public opinion by expressing moral concern. The fact resolutions aiming towards suppression was concluded suggests moral concern was an issue. The fact the resolutions were neither forceful nor specific suggests that defending economic interests was also an issue in the sense that such intentionally designed resolutions should not undermine them. With this in mind, the author thinks moral concern would guide and advance suppression but economic interest would check its progress. Electoral necessity and pride from participation are also deemed important notions, but it is held that moral concern and economic interest were the most fundamental to discussions on opium control in the 1909 Shanghai Conference. After all, they defined narcotics control. Albeit evidence suggesting electoral necessity and pride were factors for attending are unavailable to the author so it cannot be said whether they were or were not major factors.

The Japanese view towards the opium commission was marked by no strong convictions and loyalty to Britain. Jennings’ work supports this observation. He writes that overtures from Washington indicated Tokyo to be “without any strong convictions regarding international opium and narcotics control”³⁵⁸. It is explained that although Japan had an economic stake in opium from its colonial possessions, at home there was no opium addiction problem and public opinion was disinterested in the matter. It is thought Tokyo had thus no reason to formulate an international opium and narcotics control policy. He furthermore adds that because the Anglo-Japanese alliance was the “cornerstone” of Japanese foreign policy Komura Jūtarō, who was Japanese minister resident in London, was dispatched to Whitehall to ensure a “convergence of views”³⁵⁹. This evidently reflects Japanese interest in preserving the strategic alliance. Ideally the author should wish to peruse official documents from the Japanese foreign ministry on its views toward the opium commission but regrettably there are no records on the 1909 Shanghai International Opium Commission available in the foreign ministry’s digital archive or the Japan Centre for Asian Historical Records. That in itself suggests the perceived importance of control of opium and its derivatives in China from the perspective of Tokyo. With this in mind, it is maintained Tokyo sent delegates to attend in order to preserve the strategic alliance with Britain.

5.2.2. 1912 Hague Conference on Opium

The Hague Conference on Opium was the first international conference on opium. It originated from American calls for it to be held and was inspired from the progress made at the 1909 Shanghai Commission³⁶⁰. Interestingly Wright proposed a meeting under the auspices of the American government but the European powers deferred to settle for the Hague which was far from the moralistic tone of public opinion in the United States³⁶¹. Altogether the delegates of 12 governments participated in the conference; namely: Germany, America, China, France, Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia and Siam³⁶². The delegations represented the same countries as in the 1909 commission excepting Austria-Hungary which did not attend the conference. The Hague Conference produced the Hague Convention on Opium which was contemporaneously known as the International Opium Convention. That was the first international agreement on opium and narcotics control. The first protocol on it was concluded then too. Actually in total there were three conferences held at the Hague in succession from 1912 until 1914. The latter two conferences were supplementary and resulted in new protocol as deemed necessary.

The aim of the conference can be inferred from the opening speech. There it was stated that the conference was convened in order to “bring about the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine and cocaine, as also of the drugs prepared or derived from these substances...”³⁶³. The rationale for that undertaking is moral concern. It is evinced that such a goal was a “humanitarian endeavour” in the speech³⁶⁴. An international agreement on narcotics control was moreover considered necessary and mutually advantageous. This then can be maintained to be the topic and rationale behind the topic of discussion. Naturally the aforementioned aim by no means correlated with the policies of all participating governments. As previously suggested not only moral concern as expressed here as humanitarianism but also economic and strategic interest played roles in directing the outcome of the meeting.

The result of the conference was a convention and a protocol. The convention had six chapters which covered; viz: a) raw opium; b) prepared opium; c) medicinal opium, morphine, cocaine and derivatives; d) China; e) communication and possession; and f) final provisions³⁶⁵. Altogether there were 25 articles. Broadly speaking regarding

narcotics control they aimed for greater control, and gradual and effective suppression of opium and other drugs. It would be achieved through various schemes of licensing, limitation, prohibition and reduction regulated by the laws of contracting parties.

In analysis it is evident that the above presented generalisation does not reveal the true complexity of the agreement.

Firstly, regarding the control of raw opium it was agreed that exports and imports of it would be limited in terms of quantity and ports and towns etc., consignments would be marked, exports to countries that prohibit its imports would be prohibited, and only authorised persons could import and export it. However such limitations would be undertaken with “due regard to commercial conditions”; meaning economic interest was stipulated to be a decisive factor³⁶⁶. What is more, McAllister notes that there was no timetable for limitation³⁶⁷. That is thought to protract suppression.

Next, as per prepared opium which additionally refers to opium dross there was consensus that measures would be taken for the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture, internal trade in and consumption of prepared opium in accompaniment with a ban on exports and imports “as soon as possible”³⁶⁸. This should be sound policy. However, like raw opium there is no timetable but unlike raw opium a system of recording and licensing is not proposed. Moreover delivery and possession of it was not called to be an infraction. The consequence of such a laissez-faire approach was that the authorities could not: a) measure the actual quantity of drugs in a locality by statistic reference; and b) arrest smugglers for possessing and delivering opium. There was therefore an opportunity to bypass any regulations predicated upon the consensus. It is thought a licensing and recording system would stymie smugglers from doing so.

Third, regarding narcotics such as morphine and cocaine and medicinal opium (raw opium with a morphine content manipulated to be ten percent) they were to be controlled through limitations on manufacture, sale, consumption, and imports, as well as by licensing, recording. Exports had to be licensed. It was an extremely effective system. It is interesting that terms such as gradual suppression are not mentioned. This is thought to be because at the time narcotics were perceived as a minor problem compared to the “evil” of opium³⁶⁹. The fact its provisions were so completely dissimilar to those for prepared opium moreover reflects that generally

there was scarcer economic interest in undermining its control amongst the contracting parties. Nevertheless, there was no timetable for its prohibition, and possession was not to be illegal without authorisation. Additionally it is thought that although imports and exports had to be licensed, the fact such a trade existed created the concealing conditions for its smuggling: it should be best to manufacture narcotics internally under strict supervision.

Fourthly, on the matter of suppressing drugs in China, it was specially provided that Treaty Powers which possess territory in China would cooperate with it to prevent smuggling and suppress opium use. It is interesting that there is a special chapter for China. That illustrates how important the situation there was perceived to be. The provisions are suitable: retailers, opium smoking and divans etc. are suppressed while post offices take measures to prohibit illegal importation. The focus was opium: after all it was opium rather than morphine and cocaine that was the major issue of the time. But in accordance with the above specifics as per a timetable and quantity to be suppressed is not recommended. As such, suppression would not be hastened by way of pressure which would be wrought from reviews conducted by an international body.

Fifth as per communication and possession it was agreed that the contracting parties “shall examine the possibility” of making it a penal offence to be in illegal possession of drugs such as morphine etc. and convey information on existing laws and statistical data regarding such drugs as opium to the ministry of foreign affairs in the Netherlands³⁷⁰. In analysis the only salient point to be thought is the phrasing of the article on communication: it is far from concrete. Connected to the issue of language would be similar expressions such as “use their best endeavors” that appear in several articles³⁷¹. It indicates the low degree of enforcement expected and or suggested for the regulation. The effect being the contracting parties would not necessarily be zealous in dealing with whichever relevant matter.

Lastly regarding final protocol it is accepted that the convention was universal in applicability, could be ratified after signing and equally be denounced, and measures and regulations inspired from it were to be prepared before July 1913. Here the only point that can be made is that the convention was recognised as necessarily and inclusively global in scope; and importantly relevant laws were to be ready by that

date. In this sense there was at least a timetable for preparing gradual and effective suppression.

Moving on, the protocols ought to be mentioned. They indicate policy by consensus regarding matters that could be later added to the convention or affected its application. That is evinced in its call for the scientific study of Indian hemp and statement that the Netherlands foreign ministry would request signatories to ratify the convention³⁷². It was useful in maintaining political momentum for the cause. Yet they are apprehended to be relatively unimportant in terms of direct impact on narcotics control.

In comparison with the 1909 Shanghai International Opium Commission the results of this conference reflect it has followed the direction set by the commission's resolutions: it aimed at prohibiting opium consumption and smoking. However, unlike the 1909 commission the results of the conference were far more detailed. A significant difference is that the means to accomplish the goal of prohibition is indicated; namely: gradual suppression and various control measures. Other differences would be that cocaine and licensing, rationing, and recording are mentioned for the first time. Last of all, although it was not legally binding the 1912 convention was more binding than the 1909 resolutions: a deadline for preparing measures was obligatory for contracting parties. With respect to the above it is thought the 1912 Hague Convention represented a marked development in advancing prohibition.

Japan's policy could be said to be mostly one of non-interference. Jennings writes that: "Without a significant stake, either practical or philosophical, in the opium question, Japan contributed but little to The Hague convention of 1912"³⁷³. That suggests Tokyo's view was of disinterest. But he continues: "Instructions issued to the delegates on the eve of the conference reveal that, although Tokyo's basic orientation on the issue of international control remained closer to London than to Washington, the overriding concern was to follow along with the general tenor of the conference, whatever direction it might take"³⁷⁴. That suggests that Japan did not wish to disrupt proceedings. Albeit akin to France and Britain, Tokyo was opposed to the seizure of smugglers on high seas: meaning Tokyo did have a policy entry. Yet in the case that proposal was accepted by other delegations the Japanese were instructed to contact

the foreign ministry for further instructions³⁷⁵. This bolsters the thought Japan on the whole did not want to cause disruption that may affect its diplomatic relations. The fact Tokyo was closer to London in the meetings suggests preservation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was still important. Regrettably the minutes of the 1912 Hague Convention were unavailable to the author thereby disabling the presentation of evidence suggesting that was so. In 1911 the Republic of China was established. The country was in disarray and therefore ripe for illicit trafficking. Japanese businessmen did indeed smuggle morphine and heroin to China in the early twentieth century but there is no data indicating they did at such an early time. In fact it was only in 1917 that Japanese companies were permitted to purchase raw opium solely for use in manufacturing morphine and other alkaloids³⁷⁶. That suggests it was from 1917 that private companies would be able to mass-produce and arrange the smuggling of morphine to China; and therefore it was from then that Tokyo could have an economic interest. In light of the above it is thought that not economic interest but strategic interest and indifference defined Japanese policy at the conference. This signifies no new development from the 1909 commission.

5.2.3. 1924-25 Geneva Conferences on Opium and Narcotics

There were two conferences on drug control held under the auspices of the League at Geneva from 3rd November 1924 to 11th February 1925. The first conference focused on opium in the Far East and was called the “First Opium Conference”. The second conference was designated the “Second Opium Conference”. Though its focus was manufactured narcotics according to McAllister³⁷⁷. However, reviewing the agreement of the conference reveals that the discussions also covered opium to a significant degree. The first conference was attended by representatives of eight countries that had an interest in the Far Eastern opium issue; namely: Britain, China, France, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Siam. Persia, which was a competitive opium poppy cultivator, attended unofficially³⁷⁸. The second conference was not exclusive and representatives of forty governments that constituted the members of the League participated in it³⁷⁹.

The origin of the conferences can be attributed to four factors; namely: a) the Covenant; b) the Assembly; c) the OAC; d) Sir Malcolm Delevingne. To begin with, in article 23 (c) of the Covenant it was written that the League would be entrusted with general supervision over traffic in drugs. League members thus had a responsibility to examine opium and narcotics³⁸⁰. Next, the Assembly voted that the aforementioned conferences be held in December 1923³⁸¹. Thirdly the OAC produced resolutions on limiting the quantity of narcotics based on an American proposal³⁸². Being tasked with the purpose to officially advise the League on opium and other narcotics, any proposals it offered should merit the attention of the Assembly. The American proposal was raised by the first American observer to the OAC Rupert Blue. He was important for calling for the redefinition of all non-medical and quasi-medical use opium as illegitimate³⁸³. Last of all, McAllister states British delegate Delevingne secured the two conferences suggesting he played an instrumental role in their envisioning³⁸⁴.

As a background to the conferences it can be concluded that there was disagreement amongst governments regarding the creation of a new treaty. Vociferous American participation in the conferences was important but its solid position presented difficulties. France and Belgium demurred from proposed reductions, and Japan and Portugal exhibited hostility towards them. China blamed the colonial powers whose citizens enjoyed extraterritoriality on its dire situation but it was thought that the absence of civil control inside its borders exacerbated narcotics control. Turkey which was another significant opium poppy cultivator and Switzerland had not yet signed the 1912 Hague Convention. Meanwhile the British Empire was concerned that Persia would take over India's production of opium should it decrease production. Coca states in South America would not decrease their production³⁸⁵. Such issues are thought to have limited the extent of progress that could be achieved in the conferences.

The aim of the first conference is revealed in its opening speech. That was to conclude an agreement regarding measures for: a) applying the second chapter of the Hague Convention that proposed regulations on prepared opium in the Far East; b) reducing the quantity of raw opium imported for smoking in territories where it is temporarily continued; and c) suggesting measures the Republic of China ought to take to suppress illegal production and consumption of opium in China³⁸⁶. Here it is

interesting to note two items predicated upon the goals. First the 1912 Convention as per prepared opium was unsuccessfully applied to the Far East. Last the utilisation of “temporarily” implies that it was the general intention of governments represented in the League to completely suppress opium smoking.

As for the second conference its aim is similarly expressed in Danish delegate Herluf Zahle. That was to “suppress the dangerous traffic in narcotics”³⁸⁷. More specifically it was: a) “the conclusion of a number of agreements for restricting imports and exports of narcotics and raw materials to such quantities as are required for medical and scientific purposes”; and b) “the framing of a number of proposals for strengthening the provisions of the Hague Convention, more especially those relations to the control of imports and exports”³⁸⁸. The zeitgeist for the meeting is understood as humanitarian. Zahle concludes: “We must endeavour to regard this international programme in its true aspect, which is humanitarian and social. We must not jeopardise the wellbeing of thousands of mankind for material reasons”³⁸⁹. In analysis, this aim evidences the previously mentioned point that the second conference was not merely convened for the sake of managing narcotics but also for expanding upon the existing 1912 Hague Convention. In addition, this speech signals the first instance that decreasing the supply of narcotics for medical and scientific purposes appeared in an opening speech. That represents a development. However, akin to the 1912 convention the atmosphere was moral concern as evinced in “humanitarian” in the opening speech. Nevertheless the speech indicates that it was recognised that economic interest put lives at risk for “material reasons”. To conclude the aims of this conference are by no means innovative but its sentiment is more enthusiastic and its content is more informed.

The results of the conferences were many. The first one produced an agreement, protocol and final act. Altogether it amounts to 23 articles and 3 resolutions. The second one was likewise albeit a convention replaced the agreement. In total there were 42 articles and 4 resolutions. Here for the sake of expediency only the most significant articles will be discussed. Additionally any articles which are salient for their connotations will be analysed.

Regarding the results of the first conference on prepared opium in the Far East, they can be summarised as follows; namely: a) a government monopoly over opium in

terms of importation, wholesale and retail should be established; b) minors should be prevented from becoming opium consumers through prohibiting them from purchasing it and entering divans; c) in connection with the prior point anti-opium education should be prepared for children; d) the number of retail outlets and opium divans would be restricted; e) dross cannot be consumed; and f) complete opium consumption suppression would be accomplished within a period of 15 years once poppy cultivating countries have prevented the exportation of opium from constituting a serious obstacle to reduction in consumption in the Far East; g) punishing citizens for narcotics trafficking abroad would be examined; and h) although a system of licensing and rationing is recognised as successful it is deemed dangerous and useless when the contraband traffic exceeds the licit traffic³⁹⁰.

In analysis, the conference yielded substantive gains. A government monopoly in accompaniment with laws and education to discourage a new generation of smokers from emerging marked progress. Limiting the number of retailers and divans would also assist in reducing the number of addicts on the whole. What is more, the fact a timeline for complete suppression of consumption was unveiled represents unprecedented development. If we perceive the world regarding opium in a dichotomy of countries that supply and those that consume, then the aforementioned improvements signify that consuming countries' control should strengthen were they to adopt such proposed measures. However, the measures sought to regulate the supply side were insubstantial. The timeline for suppression depended on the prevention of the exportation of opium to the extent it should not pose a "serious obstacle" to suppression. The problem with this otherwise grand measure was that suppressing the illicit traffic was exceedingly difficult. The three biggest exporters were Persia, Turkey and India. It is thought the first two were largely indifferent to such exports considering opium was an aspect of their traditional culture and as expressed in their unenthusiastic participation in the conference: Persia was an unofficial observer and Turkey did not attend. India was under British rule and both countries pursued the matter of opium control vigorously as evidenced in the efforts of Delevingne and participation in conferences. Yet India's coastline and territory is so vast and its population was so great that effectively policing it is thought to have presented indomitable challenges. In addition, McAllister notes the British were concerned Persia would assume India's exports were it to reduce cultivation. In other

words the Far East would gain nothing from it but India would lose revenue to Persia. Thinking this way the timetable for suppression would be realised if only Persia and Turkey were cooperative. In such an environment the Indian government would have additional international pressure and an incentive to police its territory more efficaciously. Nevertheless any move to better reduce the supply of opium on humanitarian grounds irrespective of economic interest would have helped maintain the political momentum of the narcotics conferences. Incidentally, Britain had a sphere of interest regarding oil in Persia, but did not in fact exert any influence over Persian and Turkish opium poppy cultivation. Lastly, akin to all preceding resolutions, agreements, protocols and conventions the language utilised in typically the most influential articles was infirm and conciliatory. The article on education was to be adopted “except where a Government considers such measures to be undesirable under the conditions existing in its territory”. The prospect of punishing citizens abroad would be examined “in the most favourable spirit”. This meant that governments were endowed with considerable freedom in interpreting and applying such measures. The effect being the uniformity and standardisation required for unassailable control would be unattainable. Albeit the freedom of nations to act without subjugation to the law of other nations must be respected.

In connection to the case of Taiwan it ought to be mentioned that article one paragraph three (a) of the Final Agreement states that “the system of employing persons paid by a fixed salary and not by a omission on sales for the retail sale and distribution of opium shall be applied experimentally”³⁹¹. On the island both wholesalers and retailers received a commission throughout Japanese rule.

As for the second conference, its results demonstrate progress; namely: a) manufactured drugs were to be limited to medical and scientific purposes; b) a committee called the Substances and Health Committee was established to determine which new drugs were to be subject to the convention; c) import and export certificates detailing the name and address of involved parties, the quantity shipped, and the time period in which the consignment would be delivered would be required for raw opium only; d) bonded warehouses required an import certificate for unloading substances; e) a Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB) would be created under the auspices of the Council to serve as an independent body to collect and analyse drug related data; f) the contracting parties were required to submit estimated

quantities of substances to be imported for internal consumption a year in advance; g) those who offend against laws related to the convention would be punished; h) it would be the duty of signatories to prevent smuggling of raw opium from constituting a serious obstacle to implementing measures for suppressing opium consumption in the Far East; i) signatories would have their progress reviewed every five years; j) retailers would pay authorities to insure against their illicit sales; and k) a commission was proposed to visit Persia to examine how opium cultivation could be limited³⁹².

It is thought that in evaluation the results illustrated development. Two independent bodies were to be involved in identifying addictive drugs and reviewing statistically drug data. This represents a transition in such power from nations to the League. Signatories were additionally required to submit estimates on requirements for internal drug use. Those submissions would create a new system wherein the PCOB would be linked to demand. This relationship would enable pressure to be exerted on consumer countries when demand diminishes. Nevertheless governments could cultivate and manufacture opium and narcotics freely because the convention did not place a limitation on agricultural production or manufacturing. The result being the effect of such a relationship would be marginal. Next a standardised system of import and export certificates for raw opium transshipment would increase the difficulty for smugglers to import drugs clandestinely. Albeit it was not a guarantee. What is more the fact the certificates only applied to raw opium meant that the smuggling of prepared opium and manufactured drugs was not increased in difficulty. Another improvement upon the Hague Convention and First Conference Agreement was that supplier countries were obliged to take measures to prevent smuggling. That was the first time smuggling was explicit in such an article. A five yearly review of the progress of contracting parties regarding the implementation of regulations is thought to have further maintained political momentum by ensuring narcotics control was a salient policy issue and fostering a system wherein international condemnation would be directed at unprogressive governments. Penultimate, taking retailers hostage through forcing them to insure against illicit sales is deemed useful in theory but in praxis it should be challenging to execute smoothly. Lastly, the commission suggested to propose measures to reduce opium poppy cultivation in Persia is significant in that it represents the first time the League would attempt to solve a supplier country's problem.

The Japanese view is expressed in the statements of its delegates at the conference in accompaniment with a foreign office record on the conferences. To begin with, at the first conference Kaku Sagatarō held that the opium problem should be solved through preventative and treatment measures. This Kaku was the same one who directed the monopoly bureau in Taiwan and was allegedly involved in an illicit narcotics traffic from the island. His colleague was Yotaro Sugimura. He emphasised that Tokyo wanted to pursue a radical and swift policy for the extermination of prepared opium. In the second conference Sugimura maintained that Tokyo's chief interest was "strictly limiting imports and manufactures of dangerous drugs to the quantities required for medical and scientific purposes" from "considerations of humanity and social hygiene". Kaku added that "we must find a solution of the problem of the abuse of narcotic drugs, not only in suppressive measures for the control of the traffic in the drugs, but also in a rationale scheme for the treatment of addicts who are already victims of the drug habit". With this in mind, the Japanese policy is observed to conform to the aims of the conferences. Tokyo wanted to suppress opium smoking through preventative education and treatment for addicts, as well as limit narcotics to medical and scientific purposes under principles of humanity and social hygiene. Albeit social hygiene is unlike social as stated in the opening speech of the second conference: it conflates social norms with cleanliness and purity. It is moreover arguable that the Japanese policy was superior in terms of sympathy and humanity in that it sought to treat addicts. However, in a Japanese foreign ministry record on these opium conferences a bureaucrat opined that smuggling was a private action that was approved by the government. Regarding morphine he states: "While indifferently approving of the fact that it is manufactured in excess and clandestinely exported from Our Country, it is entrusted to be a private act"³⁹³. It was further added that at the meetings the government should appear regretful and express smuggling was not government policy. He wrote "...the government... will adopt a just and solemn attitude... and make it clear that smuggling does not typify fundamental policy"³⁹⁴. This mirrors the prior view evidenced by delegates' defensive indifference: the government neither supported nor condemned the smuggling. It is observed that Tokyo treated citizens and foreigners differently regarding opium suppression. The opium and narcotic policy for the Japanese and Taiwanese nationals was efficacious. But the narcotics policy for outsiders was laissez-faire: producers and the market set the rules. This suggests two points. Firstly the government was not economically

interested in the smuggling, though it defended the right of private enterprise to profit from illicit traffic. Secondly like other supplier countries such as Turkey it lacked moral concern for foreign citizens who are portrayed as victims in consumer countries like China. It is thought that the absence of a salient morphine problem in Japan precluded the fermentation of public opinion opposing the trade against the government. The businessmen that we contemporaneously regard as smugglers could thus continue unabated. Last of all, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was terminated in 1923. Tokyo consequently was no longer allied with any nation. This meant that strategic interest was no longer a factor in Tokyo's policy. In summary the Japanese view was marked on the one hand by exceptional moral concern for native and foreign citizens particularly regarding opium, but on the other hand by concealed indifference for foreign citizens regarding illicit morphine exports.

5.2.4. 1931 Bangkok Conference

The Bangkok Conference on The Suppression of Opium-Smoking was convened at Bangkok from 9th to 27th November 1931³⁹⁵. The number of governments that participated in the conference is unknown but it is expected to have totalled the membership of the League excluding China which abstained from attending. The aim of the conference is related to its origin. That is article 12 of the Final Agreement of the 1924 conference on opium in the Far East. It stipulated that the contracting parties would review the agreement on occasion at the latest in 1929³⁹⁶. Evidently the conference was held two years late. Actually in this instance the opening speaker of the conference who was Prince Devawongse expressed that the goal was to review to entire 1925 "Geneva Agreement"³⁹⁷. That refers to the convention, agreement, protocols and final acts of both Geneva conferences. The conference is described as relatively "modest"³⁹⁸. Its atmosphere for debate is unknown. This was the last drugs conference that Japan attended before it withdrew from the League in 1933.

Unlike the prior conferences and commission this one was not to specifically target aspects of narcotics policy: it was merely a review. Nevertheless certain parties had agendas. Delevingne wanted to resurrect the unpopular policy of direct manufacturing controls³⁹⁹. Alfredo Blanco, who was a Spaniard born in Britain, worked in the

Chinese maritime bureau and later founded the Anti-Opium Information Bureau, proposed a scheme of stipulated supply wherein governments would annually declare the quantity of drugs required and from whence they would be imported in 1930⁴⁰⁰. These ideas are thought to have influenced the results of the conference. Outstanding issues would also impact upon discussions. They were the fact that while India was decreasing agricultural production Persia was increasing it, and Turkey had emerged as a favoured narcotics manufacturing location in the wake of the 1925 International Opium Convention that had curtailed activities in Western Europe⁴⁰¹. Moreover the Great Depression which began in 1928 discouraged countries to reduce exports⁴⁰². Yet lastly it is worth mentioning that by 1931 only seven countries including Japan had ratified the 1925 Geneva Convention⁴⁰³. That illustrates that producing impressive conventions did not necessarily correlate to producing meaningful action.

The conference resulted in a new convention and final act that contained key developments. The convention was called The Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs. Notable developments were; namely: a) the establishment of another independent body called the Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) for the purpose of handling export quotas; b) signatories were required to submit estimates for manufactured drugs by 1st August the preceding year; c) those under 21 years of age were prohibited to smoke opium; d) inducing others to smoke opium was to be penalised; e) the social conditions of classes from which opium smokers were drawn were to be improved; f) drug addicts were to be cured and receive after-care; and g) the manufacture of narcotics for export was to be limited to countries that obtain orders⁴⁰⁴.

In analysis, the results on the one hand signalled improvements upon existing agreements but on the other hand failed to announce a timetable for the reduction in agricultural production to serve medical and scientific requirements only. As for the improvements setting up the DSB meant that substance requirements had to be approved by an independent body that set quotas for the manufacture of narcotics to countries⁴⁰⁵. This is the first time that a government became subject to the approval of an unelected body regarding the manufacture of drugs. It represents a greater shift in power to the League. Another similar development was that unlike the PCOB that merely examined imports the DSB also handled exports of narcotics: both supplier and consumer countries were subject to independent control. Regarding the role of the

PCOB it “was given the function of control over the estimates to ensure that they were not exceeded” in that it would require explanations from governments if they exceed estimates⁴⁰⁶. Next further obligations to discourage opium smoking illustrate that tighter measures on opium control illustrate a trend from the first conference. Of all the articles in the 1931 convention by far the most original and interesting one stipulates that social conditions must be improved to discourage addiction. That highlights a change in thinking whereby opium smoking and social class are associated regarding prevention of addiction. The definition of social conditions is not provided. Nevertheless it can be assumed that it refers not to educational but material conditions. In this way such an approach to the opium issue would be completely new. Proceeding to the next point, the duty to rehabilitate and care for addicts is similarly novel. The appearance of this reflects the Japanese proposal first offered in the 1924-25 Geneva conferences was at last adopted. In effect, addict populations should diminish in number markedly. Albeit effective policing to prevent smuggling under a monopoly system would be required to ensure its efficacy. Last of all, restricting the manufacture of narcotics for export indicated progress in advancing control over narcotics supply. But factories supply domestic demand for drugs posed a risk for leakage into the illicit narcotics traffic on the world market. With the above in mind it is thought that although the convention concluded in Bangkok was admirable it lacked vital provisions. Such provisions would be: *viz*: a) the aforementioned timetable on export reduction; b) an independent police force to serve in ineffectively unpoliced regions where opium consumption was temporarily permitted; c) effective anti-narcotic abuse propaganda in such unpoliced regions; d) an independent diplomatic body to facilitate economic cooperation among supplier countries; e) standardised and severe punishments for drugs smugglers; and f) an international campaign to promote less deleterious vices such as alcohol and tobacco as substitutes for narcotics that are socially and economically harmful, and in some cases directly bad for your health through consumption.

As for the Japanese view, its position was unchanged predicated upon the results of the conference and relevant foreign ministry documents. But considering that the minutes to the 1931 Bangkok Conference were unavailable to the author and such minutes might reveal an alteration to policy, the statement regarding its static position cannot be held to be accurate with absolute certainty. To begin with it is inferred that

the Japanese policy to rectify and care for addicts was adopted. It is also apprehended that the aforementioned progress in the stipulations of the 1931 convention was unachievable without Tokyo's assent. These points both indicate moral concern for not only opium addicts but also narcotics users. Here it is worth stating that it is assumed that the proposal to supply rehabilitative treatment and aftercare to addicts applies to persons addicted to any substance. It is so assumed because in the source opium addicts are not explicitly mentioned and statements on obligations tend to be vague. This suggests that addicts does in fact mean all addicts. Though in the 1924-25 Geneva Conferences Kaku Sagatarō spoke of such rectification programmes in the context of opium addicts, and this conference was held soon after the Far East Opium Investigatory Committee's report on opium management in consumer countries was presented. This suggests that addicts merely applies to opium addicts. Nevertheless the convention of the conferences reflects greater interest in narcotics, the zeitgeist tended to be humanitarian, and both opium and narcotics users were categorised as addicts, so it is thought likely addicts meant both opium and narcotics addicts. This is a significant conclusion because it represents development in moral concern from being exclusively on opium addicts to inclusively being for all addicts. Without possessing the minutes of the conference it is unknown which delegation raised the point originally. Continuing to the next point, Tokyo was on the whole indifferent to smuggling but expressed a willingness to consider a compromise if international pressure increased. A foreign ministry official opines: "... this nation's officials will collectively be indifferent to the prevention of smuggling. The instant greater sorrow is expressed than at present from outside on that position shall be the time when complete approval is necessitated as per relevant people of authority and entrepreneurs"⁴⁰⁷. This evidences that international pressure was a factor for triggering political reform, and that Tokyo may compromise its stance on its basis. Albeit this quote is sourced from a document on the preliminary 1930 London Conference. Incidentally the archive on the 1931 Bangkok Conference did not include any opinion pieces and was severely reduced in size compared with prior records on the same matter⁴⁰⁸. Although the quote is one year old it is thought that it is still useful because it was expressed near to the time of the conference. However, here it ought to be mentioned that the usefulness of the quote in indicating Japanese governmental policy towards smuggling is questionable. Two months prior to the conference young army officers had staged the Mukden Incident as a *casus belli* to occupy Manchuria.

That event is thought to represent the first step the military took in usurping the government's mandate. In other words, the foreign ministry's influence was on the wane. In all the Japanese view was marked by moral concern for opium and narcotics addicts particularly those under its rule, as well as indifference to the illicit traffic of morphine conducted by its citizens, and concern for international pressure on the subject.

5.3. Conclusion for International Conferences on Opium and Narcotics

The aim for this chapter is to produce data regarding international conferences in terms of their aims, origins, results and the ideas that defined the Japanese response. Such a goal has been accomplished. Below this data shall be compared, analysed and summarised to highlight trends, crucial factors, successes and failures, as well as reflect upon the relationship between the conferences and the narcotics policy on Taiwan under Japanese rule.

The League of Nations played a significant role in influencing narcotics control globally. That role will be revealed by analysis below. As its role was instrumental in shaping policy, it is worth discussing it.

To begin with its aim was fundamentally to avert war in order to avoid catastrophe for the sake of mankind though establishing the rule of law as code of conduct, respecting treaty obligations, discouraging war and negotiating disputes in the League institution. Related to narcotics control its aim was to supervise the execution of agreements as per the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. The fundamental aim is expressed in its Covenant that all members were obliged to uphold. It contained 26 articles. The article referring to drug control is article 23 paragraph C.

The creation of the League was an idea that originated from and was championed by American President Woodrow Wilson during the First World War. The pivotal idea that justified the League was that the world without it was bellicose and dangerous. That idea was exemplified by two problematic facts; namely: a) scientific advances in technology and technique in waging war enhanced destruction wrought by it to an unacceptable level; b) private interests that were bellicose dominated government.

The pivotal idea encouraged cooperation amongst governments as evidenced in the establishment of the League. The two problematic facts were countered by two ideas; *viz*: a) scientific advancement cannot be stopped but its empowering developments for states can be monitored by cooperative international governments in order to defend against potential threats; and b) government should represent the will of the people rather than private interests in order to undermine the bellicose culture of nations. Lastly the hope of peace in the wake of the despair of war cultivated the mood that the League was for the benefit of all of mankind and thereby motivated action.

Establishing the League can be considered both a revolutionary and a reformatory act. It was revolutionary in the sense that it transformed diplomacy from closed and bilateral relations directed by individual state interest to open and multilateral relations influenced by multiple state interests. It was moreover revolutionary in that as the first and only international political institution it attracted the attention of news media, interest groups and publics worldwide that were influenced by its actions. In other words, it was a phenomenal propaganda machine that influenced publics that influenced governmental policy. Incidentally, for clarification, the League influenced governments directly through conventions concluded under its auspices and indirectly through public opinion. It was lastly revolutionary with respect to the fact that its Covenant is fathomable as the world's first constitution, though it was obligatory rather than legally binding. However the League can only be deemed reformatory in the sense that establishing it as a platform for diplomacy merely added a new dimension to diplomacy on top of the traditional dimension where closed and bilateral diplomacy still continued. It must be remembered that the Covenant was obligatory and not compulsory. That implication being that the traditional dimension was not discarded by law and the new dimension was not necessarily followed by law. The effect was that national interest as expressed in the traditional dimension would conflict with international interest appearing in the new one. The key determinant as per which dimension wins the conflict is thought to be contingent upon national interest.

Altogether there were eight international conferences on opium and narcotics; namely: a) 1909 Shanghai Commission; b) 1912 Hague Conference; c) 1913 Hague Conference; d) 1914 Hague Conference; e) 1924-25 First Opium Conference in Geneva; f) 1924-25 Second Opium Conference in Geneva; g) 1930 London

Conference; and h) 1931 Bangkok Conference. The 1909 Shanghai Commission is formally regarded as a commission because its goal was to investigate opium suppression without entangling delegations to conclude an agreement for which they were unprepared, but it was informally regarded as a conference by delegates. The conferences in 1913, 1914 were review conferences to examine progress, and the 1930 conference was a preliminary one. After 1920 such conferences were convened under the auspices of the League of Nations.

Here the conferences will be compared in terms of their aims. First their aims indicate a constant trend to suppress opium smoking. In addition they highlight a trend to limit narcotics use emerging from the 1912 Hague Conference. Likewise the zeitgeist for the conferences was marked as humanitarian from 1912 and additionally social from the 1924-25 Geneva Conferences. Lastly the aims become increasingly specific over time from generally suppressing opium to specifically restricting the import and export of narcotics and their materials until the 1931 Bangkok Conference which was broadly convened for reviewing prior conventions.

Similarly for the origins of the conferences, to begin with, it can be asserted that America initiated the series of conferences and was actively involved in their promotion except for the 1931 conference. It was American missionary Charles Brent who submitted a request for an international commission on opium in 1906 to President Theodore Roosevelt who arranged one in Shanghai in 1909. Britain also played an instrumental role. Its chief delegate Sir Malcolm Delevingne secured the Geneva Conferences and introduced narcotics manufacturing controls to the agenda for that and the 1931 conferences. Lastly, once the League had been established its machinery as per the OAC and conventions on opium were important in having conferences held.

Next on the results of the conferences, it is worth mentioning that from the outset at the 1909 Shanghai Conference it was concluded in resolutions that opium and narcotics consumption would be prohibited to medical use only. By such resolutions the policy towards narcotics control was settled. But the problem was agreeing to a means to accomplish it. The 1912 Hague Conference signalled progress in introducing measures as means for that purpose which were steadily expanded upon in increasing

specificity conference after conference. It was concluded in 1912 that the suppression policy would be a gradual and effective one.

The measures proposed to implement narcotics control were; namely: a) limitation of substances in terms of quantity, availability in localities, and use; b) licensing agents and consumers regarding import, export, manufacture, wholesale, retail and consumption of substances; c) recording of aforementioned actions by agents; and d) rationing substances to the agents and consumers; e) certifying transhipped consignments of substances; f) managing the relationship of supply and demand in the market place by establishing an independent body to serve as controller over supply and demand in the market place; g) rehabilitating addicts; h) educating children to discourage drug use; i) penalising illicit agents and consumers; j) improving the conditions of social classes from which drug addicts are drawn; and k) forcing retailers to insure against illicit sales.

Landmark measures are thought to include the following; viz: a) 1912 Hague Convention article to limit manufacture of narcotics to medical and legitimate requirements; b) 1924 Geneva Agreement article to establish a government monopoly over the import, export, wholesale, retail and consumption of prepared opium; c) 1924 Geneva Agreement timetable to eliminate opium smoking within 15 years once exports of opium do not constitute a serious obstacle to its accomplishment; d) 1924 Geneva Agreement article to convene conferences to review the drugs traffic every five years; e) 1924 Geneva Agreement article to establish PCOB that was empowered to pressure governments for exceeding their annual drugs estimates; f) 1931 Bangkok Convention article to establish DSB to set quotas for the agricultural production and consumption of drugs by receiving estimates from consumer countries and submitting orders to supplier countries; and g) 1931 Bangkok Convention article to rehabilitate and provide aftercare to addicts. The significance of these articles shall be explicated in the part on analysis below.

Analysis reveals several points on the best means to control narcotics and issues that impeded the exertion of control.

To begin with the best means for control it is thought that control over agencies involved in the supply and demand of drugs is crucial. Implementing measures to restrict demand can be undermined by the smuggling of drugs from the supply side.

Similarly only executing orders to limit the supply of drugs will be undermined by a demand for them which will encourage illicit production. An approach focusing on both supply and demand is therefore crucial. The international conferences produced conclusions containing articles that focused both on supply and demand.

In the case of narcotics such as morphine and cocaine, supply was controlled in terms of manufacturing, exports, imports, wholesales, and retail was checked through limitation, licensing, recording and rationing to scientific and medical use only. The effect was such activity related to narcotics could only be undertaken with governmental permission. That meant the government had firm control over narcotics. The 1912 Hague Convention was important in requiring governments to implement such measures. The 1924-25 Geneva Conference set up the PCOB that could pressure governments formally for exceeding estimated requirements to promote cooperation. It also called for five yearly meetings to review progress in order to ensure progress and maintain political momentum. The 1931 Bangkok Conference that established the DSB to handle quotas was also important in promoting effective limitation. However, governmental control was not solid. Cultivating plants and processing them into narcotics was not under a government monopoly according to international agreements. Private supplier companies seeking profit could exploit their position to engage in smuggling. What is more, narcotics exports and imports were not certified. That meant the smuggling of narcotics was easier because smugglers did not need to present proof of order.

As for the demand side, it was controlled through licensing, recording, rationing, education, rehabilitation and improving social conditions. The first three means were included in the 1912 Hague Convention. Education was covered by the 1925 Geneva Agreement. The last two means were introduced in the 1931 Bangkok Conference. These measures empowered the government to advance suppression to scientific and medical necessity only. Amongst them the most important should be the first three measures because they placed demand under direct government control. Education and improving social conditions were theoretically important but in terms of practical effect a sound licensing, recording and rationing system should preclude the addition of new addicts to addict registers. Nevertheless the issue of illicit consumption remains. It is thought that rehabilitation was a significant policy for making illicit use difficult because it reduced the number of addicts and thereby made it easier to

manage them because there were less addicts to manage. Yet narcotics control would still be hindered by smuggling if supply control was not effective. The key to successful control was a vigorous licensing system wherein every consumer was detected. That should greatly eliminate illicit use.

As for opium, supply of prepared and raw opium were controlled through similar measures. Prepared opium was prohibited to be exported having been imported according to the 1925 Geneva Agreement. Raw opium was to be limited, certified and managed by the DSB as evidenced in the 1912 Hague Convention, 1925 Geneva Agreement, and 1931 Bangkok Convention respectively. The prohibition on the re-export of prepared opium solved the issue of such exports but it was not fundamentally important. After all, it was the supply of raw opium that produced prepared opium, morphine and heroin. Controlling the supply of it was thus vital. The stipulations concluded in the conferences were progressive. Certification assisted in the prevention of smuggling, and DSB management bolstered limitation by utilising demand to reduce supply. However, the fact is the means by which raw opium was to be limited was not thought of. The peasants that cultivated opium were not licensed, recorded or rationed. They were not stipulated to be under a government monopoly. Like coca growers, it was in their interest to cultivate and export as much as possible to earn a sufficient amount to care for their families. Without any specific means stipulated to limit supply, the supplier countries could not be held to account for their lack of progress. Additionally targets regarding the limitation of the quantity of supply were not designed for allocation to supplier countries. In light of this it is evident that the control of the supply of raw opium was inadequate and hence provided ample opportunity for over-production and smuggling. Another factor that further impeded limitation of supply was the unlikelihood of cooperation amongst supplier countries regarding agricultural production. India had reduced cultivation by the 1931 Bangkok Conference but Persia had filled the export gap by supplying more opium. What is more, after the 1925 Geneva Agreement Turkey ventured from supplying raw opium into manufacturing narcotics for export. It was in their economic interest to do so. With that in mind, it is thought economic cooperation among supplier countries should help in reducing overall supply. As it happened, the League did not propose such cooperation. Lastly, it must be stated that despite Zhou's claim that Britain could suppress opium poppy cultivation in Turkey and Persia,

actually the author has no found evidence suggesting it had a sphere of influence over opium in either country. Rather it had an interest in Persian oil only. It did not rule either country. In fact it was in competition with both countries regarding opium exports. Britain could therefore not reduce opium cultivation in Persia or Turkey.

Regarding demand for prepared opium, the measures stipulated were firm. The 1925 Geneva Agreement called for the establishment of government monopolies over the import, manufacture, wholesale, retail and consumption of prepared opium. By extension that meant the creation of at least a licensing system. The same agreement moreover stipulated the setting up of education to propagandise against opium. Lastly, the same agreement concluded that the complete suppression of opium smoking would be achieved within 15 years once the export of opium no longer constituted a serious obstacle. Unlike narcotics use that was necessarily limited, prepared opium was intended for total eradication. The formulation of a timetable for elimination was thus a marked step forward. However it was undermined by the fact that the pivotal factor upon which its implementation was contingent was vague. The definition of a serious obstacle was unoffered and it was therefore freely interpreted by governments. In addition, as already maintained, the control measures for the supply of raw opium were inadequate. These two points meant that the timetable was unlikely to be effected. Moving on, new approaches developed in the 1931 Bangkok Conference assisted in mitigating demand. The first was the stipulation to improve the conditions of social classes from which opium smokers were drawn. This article implies there is a relationship between conditions and the opium habit. It is thought that such a relation exists only insofar as the poorer class is expected to endure poorer working conditions and a worse lifestyle which promotes illness. In Chinese culture opium smoking was established as a means to treat rather than cure sickness. By improving the health of the poor the demand for opium should thus diminish. However, the fact remains that opium was a renown palliative and people irrespective of class became ill: opiates would still be consumed. With respect to that fact, this measure is thought to be helpful but not extremely so. The second approach was rehabilitation and aftercare. This was a tremendous idea in that it reduced the addict population and thereby affected demand. The provision of aftercare furthermore ensured that demand should remain at a decreased level.

The Japanese policy to the conferences is marked by indifference, moral concern, strategic interest, and concern for foreign pressure.

To begin with at the 1909 Shanghai Commission their delegation is deemed indifferent in that it did not propose any policy. Actually in order to preserve the Anglo-Japanese alliance which was the cornerstone of foreign policy, Tokyo dispatched ambassador Komura Jūtarō to ensure British and Japanese policy corresponded. During discussions at the commission the Japanese delegates acted to defend British policy. This reflects that Tokyo's policy was defined by indifference and strategic interest.

Next at the 1912 Hague Conference the delegation was similarly marked by indifference and strategic interest for the same reasons. The cause for indifference was maintained to be Japan did not have an opium addiction problem, its citizens were consequently uninterested in the matter, and thus did not form public opinion to exert pressure on the government to reform its position.

Third at the 1924-25 Geneva Conferences we witness an adjustment in policy. Under chief delegates Kaku Sagatarō and Yotaro Sugimura exceptional moral concern was voiced. It was moral concern because the delegation actively and enthusiastically supported the conference agenda as a humanitarian endeavour. That concern is thought to be exceptional because Kaku proposed a humane and significant policy for that cause. That was the treatment of opium addicts. It was the first time it appeared as policy.

The author thinks there are three reasons for the change in policy. The strategic alliance between Japan and Britain was terminated in 1923. That meant Tokyo was no longer constrained by considerations for the British position. Next Kaku's proposal reflects the growing opinion in Taiwan that opium addiction was a disease. Hsu calls this the medicalisation of smokers. Viewing addiction as an illness enabled it to be thought of in terms related to illness. Sickness could be treated and cured. Therefore addiction could be treated and cured too. Lastly the Japanese government was increasingly excoriated for its citizenry embroiling in the illicit traffic of morphine to China in OAC meetings from the end of the First World War. Such criticism undoubtedly seeped into public opinion worldwide. Kaku was moreover involved in that he allegedly approved or engaged in the illicit manufacture of morphine for

export to China on Taiwan. This was a grave embarrassment for Tokyo which could impact on elections. Enduring such embarrassment Tokyo therefore had reason to present a good image of itself in the conferences. Amongst the reasons, it is thought the second is certainly most important, whilst it is unknown whether the other two are important or not without evidence.

In contrast with exceptional moral concern for opium addicts, the foreign ministry expressed indifferent approval of the illicit traffic of morphine. It regarded it as a private rather than a governmental concern. Tokyo concealing its true opinion of the smuggling would suggest it held an economic interest in it. Yet It is unknown whether or not the smuggling operation was taxed by the government. That can cast doubt on the economic interest idea. At least it can be ventured that the illicit traffic enriched businessmen and certain officials. That cannot be considered an economic interest for the government, though it is certainly one for the involved parties. Here the author thinks it more appropriate to utilise the language of the foreign ministry rather than impute another idea to describe the policy as indifference. This way it is an indelible fact, whereas calling it an economic interest is merely ascribing a contestable idea to the matter of smuggling.

Lastly, at the 1931 Bangkok Conference the Japanese view towards narcotics control as evinced in policy is almost the same as before. It is moral concern. Like for the 1912 Hague Conference the author does not possess the minutes to the 1931 conference. That means moral concern as expressed in discussions is necessarily inferred. It is inferred moral concern was a part of the policy because moral concern had been previously expressed in the 1924-25 Geneva Conferences; hence there was a close precedent. It is also because Kaku Sagataō who vociferated rehabilitation in that conference also represented Japan in this one. What is more the 1931 Bangkok Convention featured the same proposal on addict treatment and aftercare as an article. These facts suggest moral concern was a policy. Continuing to the next point, foreign ministry archives also indicate that Tokyo was indifferent to the illicit trafficking of morphine. However, unlike in 1924 this record states that the matter of smuggling would be reviewed if criticism from abroad increases. In other words Tokyo was willing to consider revising its position on the traffic. That is a significant compromise that reflects the power of international pressure in influencing domestic policy.

Here the relationship between ideas appearing in the League and Tokyo's policy will be analysed in order to reveal influence.

To begin with the League was fundamentally defined by three ideas; namely: a) the world without the League was bellicose and dangerous; b) nations must cooperate to monitor scientific and other such threats to peace; and c) the League was for the benefit of mankind. Regarding the matter of opium and narcotics, the dominant ideas were that: a) the League was to supervise over drugs traffic; b) suppression of opium and narcotics was humanitarian; and c) suppression of them was also social. The mode of thought powering the reformation of the international system was cooperate in the League for the good of all of mankind. On the Japanese side the ideas the author has identified in its policy toward drugs in League conferences are: a) indifference; b) strategic interest; c) moral concern notably humanitarianism and social hygiene; and d) concern for foreign pressure.

In analysis it is evident that ideas from the two parties corresponded in the case of drugs. Japan entered the League to cooperate with other nations to suppress drugs traffic as a humanitarian and social endeavour. Here it must be mentioned that Japan had already participated in the conferences on opium prior to the establishment of the League. That expresses an interest in the matter. Though it was normal for Powers such as Japan to attend such conferences. It is moreover thought that at such times Tokyo was indifferent and sought to preserve its strategic alliance with Britain through participation. Albeit it is possible that Tokyo withheld its humanitarian opinion in said conferences for the sake of the alliance. That opinion would specifically regard the supply of raw opium which was an economic interest for Britain in India: it would not apply to others. The fact that concern for foreign pressure regarding illicit trafficking became a factor in policy illustrates not only that international influence is effective but also the humanitarian spirit of the League was beginning to enthuse Tokyo to the extent it would modify its indifference.

Returning to the correspondence of ideas, it is interesting that Tokyo regarded drugs as a social hygiene rather than purely social matter. It is thought the attachment of the word hygiene reflects the importance of hygiene to Japanese at the time. It was during the Meiji era that the European notion that syphilis contracted from prostitutes by soldiers threatened national security, and the thought that mental health issues

indicated biological degeneration which accelerated in the next generation were introduced⁴⁰⁹. Campaigns for the establishment of asylums as well as health screening of and popular indignation towards prostitutes ensued. It is thought such acts impressed that: a) hygiene is important for national security; and b) races can degenerate unless they are fit through purifying the unfit from the race. Such an impression was undoubtedly intensified considering Japan was recovering from the trauma of Western encroachment at the time. The effect being that maintaining good hygiene would be associated with national and racial safety which was of utmost importance. Seeing that good hygiene was good in practice is thought to have bolstered the inclusion of good hygiene in Japanese culture, where it would affect how society was viewed at the time. In other words, it should become a source for memes such as social hygiene.

Lastly, the matter of indifference is interesting. Indifference affected the extent to which moral concern was adopted. As previously mentioned the Japanese government did not receive pressure to reform its position on drugs because opium addiction was not an issue for the public. This is because Japan did not have an addict population unlike America or was noticeably involved in the opium business on an international level unlike Britain. Such a view was held prior to the establishment of the League. However, once the League was created Tokyo became morally concerned regarding all issues apart from the matter of illicit morphine traffic. It was stated in a foreign ministry document that such traffic was a private act. That implies that the government was hesitant to interfere in private business irrespective of the emergence of its moral concern. In other words private business was paramount in Japanese culture. An explanation to this attitude should be that during the Meiji era the highly respected feudal lords that ruled fiefs under the authority of the Tokugawa Shogunate had their authority removed and replaced by bonds for investment in businesses in 1876⁴¹⁰. They created the first successful, renown and enduring conglomerates (*zaibatsu*). It was by this development that private business and authority became associated in Japanese culture. Undermining business interests would therefore mean offending authority. That would foster the sentiment undermining business is dislikeable in Japanese culture. What is more, as previously stated there was a blurring of boundaries among government, business and the army. That suggests vested interest in the government. It further serves to strengthen the culture regarding

the relationship between business interest and authority. Another explanation to such indifference should be the aforementioned concepts of economic warfare and biological principles. Both ideas involved the notion of the Japanese nation or race, and economic warfare drawing from Social Darwinism placed the Japanese in a struggle for survival. It is thought the effect of such thinking was that foreigners were deemed rivals rather than novel oddities or potential friends. In this sense helping foreign citizens meant helping potential future threats. It would moreover reinforce the sentiment that aliens are dislikeable in Japanese culture in the sense they pose a threat. With reference to the above two explanations, it must be mentioned that whilst Tokyo expressed moral concern from 1924 onwards, it only had a vested interest as per private business in selling morphine to foreign citizens. The Taiwan Government-General had already implemented opium control measures for effective and gradual suppression before the first conference, and the Taiwanese were native citizens in law. This suggests regarding foreigners as threats for the sake of national survival had an impact on its view regarding the treatment of foreign citizens. But crucially it was the attitude that undermining business meant offending authority which legitimised the continuation of private acts of morphine smuggling without governmental correction.

In conclusion regarding the above there was a relationship between the League and Tokyo's policy. That was moral concern. Tokyo did not actively express moral concern for international narcotics control prior to the League: it was indifferent. Albeit it was morally concerned for its colonies. However, after the League was established under the zeitgeist of betterment of mankind, Tokyo indicated moral concern. Akin to the rationale for the conferences on opium that moral concern was defined by humanitarianism. It was also defined by social concern. Tokyo presented a similar concern. That was social hygiene. It too regarded the social sphere but it was unique in the sense it related social to hygiene. Hygiene became an important aspect of Japanese culture owing to three reasons; namely: a) poor hygiene threatened national security; b) it also could provoke racial degeneration that undermined national survival; and c) good hygienic practice was noticeably advantageous. The degree to which Japan was morally concerned with international narcotics control was limited by its indifference. Originally Japanese delegates were indifferent because the government was not under pressure to adopt a policy. This is due to the fact Japan did not have an opium problem; hence the public was uninterested in it. Such an attitude

was modified to be humanitarian as illustrated from Tokyo's policy for the 1924-25 Geneva Conferences. Yet the private acts of businessmen smuggling narcotics into China whilst Japan expressed moral concern in Geneva signals remaining indifference. The private acts were indifferently approved owing to four reasons; viz: a) business had influence in government; b) undermining business meant offending authority; c) such a trade enhanced national survival as per biological principles and economic warfare; and d) it was not an electoral issue. Nevertheless, continued international pressure influenced the foreign ministry to consider evaluating its position were such pressure to increase. In all it is thought the establishment of the League as an influential institution advanced Tokyo's moral concern for international narcotics control but its advancement was restrained by indifference as per absence of public interest, private companies (government connection, the illicit morphine traffic and unwillingness to offend authority) and national survival.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

6.0. Conclusion Outline

The conclusion to the thesis will be divided into four sections in accordance to the aims outlined in the introduction; namely: a) the relationship between international conferences on opium under the League of Nations and narcotics control on Taiwan under Japanese rule; b) a practical comparison on development in terms of administration, culture and economy for the late Qing, early Japanese and late Japanese periods; c) an abstract comparison on the ideas that defined those three periods; and d) final thoughts as per the above. This way all relevant and influential factors shall be identified.

6.1. International Conferences and Narcotics Control on Taiwan

The relationship between the international conferences and narcotics control on Taiwan was mutual. The international conferences influenced narcotics policy there

and vice-versa. The influence was exerted both directly and indirectly. Incidentally, international influence unconnected to the conferences on opium also had an impact on narcotics control on the island.

To begin with, one international convention is observed to have influenced the Government-General's narcotics policy. That convention is commonly referred to as the Geneva Agreement. It is composed of the various final acts, protocols, and agreement that was reached at the two conferences on opium and narcotics held there during the winter between 1924-25. This agreement had two forms of influence; *viz*: a) introduction of new ideas; and b) a stimulus for reform. In the agreement it was stipulated that the number of opium divans be limited and opium dross be prohibited. The convention containing those articles was ratified by Japan in 1928. Before that year reforms related to those stipulations were not implemented. The ideas regarding dross and divans was not expressed in Tokyo or the administration's policy then. However, after the ratification in December 1928 the Taiwan Opium Ordinance was revised. In that ordinance provisions were prepared for the immediate prohibition of opium divans and opium dross. This suggests that international conferences succeeded in not only introducing new ideas regarding narcotics control but also serving as a trigger for prompting reform.

Next, the international conferences also played a role in indirectly influencing narcotics policy on the island. As previously stated, the League was a phenomenal propaganda machine. It was the first and only platform for diplomacy in the world. Literature related to meetings convened under its auspices was publicised. Its goals as per the aversion of war through international cooperation for the betterment of mankind were noble. The League was thus admirable, accessible and appealing. Understandably news media, interest groups, and governments paid attention to and were thereby influenced by it. The result was that they should influence their respective societies. In effect this was happening globally. That meant a zeitgeist regarding certain norms should develop. It is thought that such an atmosphere hostile to opium and narcotics manifested more fully after the conclusion of the two 1924-25 Geneva Conferences. It so happened that in Taiwan the attitude towards opium held by local intellectuals and professionals swayed from one of ambivalence to contempt in the late 1920s. When the administration promulgated the 1928 Taiwan Opium

Ordinance these notables began to seethe in outrage at the ordinance that was perceived to be favouring opium. They responded to it by: a) calling for the League to dispatch an opium investigatory committee to the island; b) decrying it on the basis of international justice and credibility; and c) vociferating discontent in the so-called opium dispute. Confronted with the first appearance of a united and widespread protest against its narcotics policy, the Government-General conceded to expedite its rehabilitation programme. This example indicates the League indirectly influenced reform via a zeitgeist.

There is another instance of the League obliquely impacting on narcotics policy on the island. That was in 1930 when a bureaucrat working in the Japanese foreign ministry opined that the indifferent approval of the illicit narcotics traffic conducted by private companies should be evaluated if international condemnation of it increases. Such condemnation was typical for the time. Taiwan was most likely involved in the illicit narcotics traffic at the time, though it must be stated irrefutable evidence is not in the author's possession. The evaluation of the policy of indifferent approval could therefore result in reforms that affect narcotics control on the island. The fact Tokyo's policy could have been reconsidered illustrates that the zeitgeist fostered by the League had an effect.

On the reverse side, the administration influenced international conferences indirectly. In 1897 the administration set up a government monopoly over opium. It was the first opium control system of its kind in the world. At the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission the Japanese delegation introduced it as their means for controlling opium consumption on Taiwan. The idea was later adopted as a requirement for League members in possession of territories in the Far East in the 1924-25 Geneva Agreement. The idea was not stipulated in the 1912 Hague Conference because necessitating such a specific system of control over opium had not been envisaged at the time. Rather the articles in the 1912 Hague Convention tended to be general and vaguely worded. In addition by the early 1920s the deterioration of the drug situation in China and its colonised territories despite the 1912 convention's provisions highlighted that more specific measures were needed to improve the situation. Thinking this way the example of the Japanese colony which had successfully managed opium addiction through a government monopoly should have been instrumental in arguments for the establishment of government monopolies in

discussions at the conferences. This suggests that Taiwan Government-General narcotics policy indirectly influenced international conferences.

Next, adhering to the same logic as above, the creation of a rehabilitation programme for addicts by the administration should also have served as an instrumental example in such arguments. The programme was implemented on Taiwan in 1930. The Bangkok Conference was held in 1931. In its convention it was stipulated that rehabilitation programmes should be set up. Regrettably the minutes for the 1931 Bangkok Conference were unavailable to the author to confirm that the example was employed and persuasive. Nevertheless it is likely that it was utilised and persuasive. This is because Kaku Sagatarō, who was a Japanese delegate to the 1924-25 and 1931 conferences introduced and argued for the programme at the 1924-25 Second International Conference on Opium in Geneva. What is more, his proposal for it at that conference was not adopted then but was included in the 1931 Bangkok Convention. This change in consensus is explicable by a delegate evidencing the programmes efficacy. That point suggests that the administration also exerted influence on international conferences indirectly as per rehabilitation.

In conclusion here the mutual relationship between international conferences and narcotics control on Taiwan had impact on drugs policy on both sides. The 1924-25 Geneva Agreement directly caused reforms on opium dross and opium divans to be implemented. It indirectly caused the implementation of the rehabilitation programme to be accelerated, and Tokyo to consider evaluating its indifferent approval of drugs smuggling. The Government-General's narcotics policy produced results that were utilised in examples that assisted in persuading League members to adopt government monopoly and rehabilitation as measures to be included in the aforementioned agreement and the 1931 Bangkok Convention. It is undeniable that both sides had a significant effect on opium control. It is moreover thought that the 1924-25 Geneva Agreement was of fundamental importance to the reforms enacted on Taiwan. Without its existence the administration would not have implemented the series of aforementioned reforms. The rationale behind this assertion is complex and requires reference to other parts of the conclusion. An understanding will unfold and explanation be revealed below.

6.2.0. Practical Comparison

Here the three periods covered by the thesis will be compared in accordance with the division of research into sections on administration, culture and the economy. Unlike the abstract comparison that is solely concerned with the ideas which inspired and defined narcotics policy, culture and economy, this comparison shall focus on the practical side. That is to say regulations, systems, attitudes, business interests and so on that affected narcotics control will be investigated.

To begin with, both the Qing dynasty and the Taiwan Government-General aimed to prohibit opium consumption. The former called for immediate and effective prohibition. This is evidenced in Qianlong Emperor's 1729 and Daoguang Emperor's 1836 edicts. But the latter sought gradual and effective prohibition. This is illustrated in the 1895 and 1928 Taiwan Opium Ordinances. The two governments' approaches to narcotics control was consequently different. In order for the former's policy to be efficacious it had to pass measures for the prohibition of importing and cultivating opium as well as appropriation and destruction of opium. But the latter required measures for exercising its authority over opium that entailed limitations on trade and consumption in order to be effective. Both governments implemented such measures accordingly. It would be expected that they should succeed. However in analysis the former's policy measures were a failure whilst the latter's policy measures were extremely successful though they were not perfect. The explanation for such a conclusion will be provided below.

On the Qing side there are seven factors that precluded the policy's efficacy on Taiwan; namely: a) international influence; b) prevalence; c) differing enthusiasm of rulers; d) fashionable culture; e) useful culture; f) weak administration; and g) frontier region.

First of all, international influence undermined the effect of the policy. In the nineteenth century Britain in accompaniment with other Powers had an economic interest in the opium trade to China. When Commissioner Lin Zexu threatened that trade in 1839, it precipitated the First Opium War (1839-1842). Empowered by the industrial revolution Britain defeated the Qing dynasty and extracted trade concessions. Those concessions included the opening of ports and provision of

extraterritoriality. The former meant foreign merchants had greater access to the Chinese market. Extraterritoriality enabled such merchants to be beyond prosecution in Qing law. These two factors resulted in a dramatic increase in the prevalence of opium in the country. Its ubiquity ensured that more Qing subjects could indulge in it than in the past. Taiwan was affected by those trade concessions in 1858 after the Second Opium War (1856-1860). The opening of Danshui and Dagou in fact enabled the balance of trade to grow in Taiwan's favour, so that the newly affluent Chinese could afford opium and thereby sustain its prevalence. Britain and prevalence therefore offer an explanation regarding the failure of the immediate prohibition policy of 1836. However, these two factors do not explain why the 1729 policy failed too.

China was ruled by emperors. As an emperor you were not accountable to anybody. As an individual each emperor held their own opinion and asserted their will on their empire. The implication being that one emperor's enthusiasm for implementing a certain policy would not necessarily match the enthusiasm of another emperor for it. What is more, such zeal might proliferate on one year but wane on the following year. In other words, the extent to which an imperial edict was enforced differed from ruler to ruler and from time to time. Another factor related to this is whether or not imperial advisors would raise the issue of opium smoking. If they or their friends were opium smokers, then it should not have been in their interest to address the problem. The effect being the emperor may not notice a matter and issue an proclamation regarding it. These factors would certainly impact upon the efficacy of the policy of prohibiting opium smoking in Taiwan.

Next, Qing administration was weak and Taiwan was a frontier region. The administration of the empire can be divided into formal and informal administration. Formal administration refers to the officials who were appointed by the state to manage the empire. There were military and civil bureaucrats of various ranks which accorded their degree of influence. Informal administration refers to the gentry who lived on land that was managed by the officials. In law it was solely the officials who administered the empire, but in praxis the gentry held great influence regarding whether policies were implemented or not. That influence originated from the privileged socio-legal position that the aristocrats occupied. Such a position had impact on bureaucrats' freedom to implement and enforce policy. First of all, officials

feared gentry influence in court. Next, they relied upon local gentry to implement policy. Thirdly, aristocrats were not easily prosecuted. Fourthly, the gentry had to be treated as paragons. Lastly, local gentry would devise their own policy as unappointed administrators. The effect was that officials should have found it difficult to implement any policy that was not in the concerned aristocrats' interest lest their position be inconvenienced. The result was that formal administration was attenuated. This is particularly true for Taiwan. This island was a frontier region. Although the Qing dynasty mostly prohibited immigration and hence land reclamation on it, many settlers from Fujian province emigrated there and reclaimed land en masse. Such an occurrence suggests not only that the government could not enforce the law, but also that the pioneers did not respect the government. On the frontier settlers developed their own sense of authority which superseded administrative authority. The consequence was that without adequate enforcement and strict adherence to the law opium prohibition would be unlikely.

Lastly, Chinese culture promoted opium consumption. The Qing dynasty maintained rule over China with a meritocratic examination system and Confucianism. The examination system provided for social mobility. Passing an official examination meant one could obtain an academic title which signalled one's status as gentry. Only the best students were appointed as officials. Committing a crime or failing to pay taxes caused one to lose such status. Confucianism emphasised four moral precepts; namely: humanity (*ren*); ritual propriety (*li*); superior person (*junzi*); and virtuous governance (*de*). The intention is that a superior person will conduct virtuous governance through humanity and ritual propriety. Such a person was to emerge through studying (*xue*). The effect was that people were subordinated into a hierarchy wherein literati were regarded with awe and respect. In other words, the gentry and officials were paragons for the people over whom they presided. It so happened that the literati smoked opium. The fact that the gentry were in a sense above the law and officials were posted far from home and without supervision should not have assisted in the enforcement of the opium prohibition. In smoking opium they legitimised the practice from the commoners perspective. They did more than make it acceptable though. They also made it fashionable in much the same way as celebrities glamorised cocaine use in the United Kingdom in the 1980s. With this mindset opium freely became an aspect of social life. Opium was treated to guests at the

dinner table, smoked when discussing business, and offered to friends for conversation. It was typically smoked occasionally in urban areas by men of all occupations. The drug was not only for leisure: it also had utility. In brothels it was consumed as an aphrodisiac in the sense it prolonged sex and was associated with it. Exhausted labourers took it for invigoration in the sense it numbed pain. Bored gentry smoked it to pass away the time. Above all, it served as a prophylactic and tranquiliser in medicine. Disease and aging were unavoidable problems on Taiwan from which relief was sought through consuming the drug. Opium proliferated so much so that it was called “black rice”, which suggests its prevalence and importance, and featured in Daoist ritual in the late Qing dynasty on the island. Considering such an acceptable, fashionable, and useful culture of opium existed at the time, it is evident that prohibition should have been difficult to enforce.

In light of the above, it is thought that Britain, culture and the administration were instrumental in the inefficacy of the opium prohibition. If Britain did not defeat the Qing dynasty then the Qing dynasty could prevent the import of opium by naval supremacy. That would decrease the prevalence of opium, but it should have been too late to eliminate demand for the drug. Jiaqing Emperor’s neglect enabled the Chinese to have acquired a taste for opium by that time. The fact such a demand existed meant that after emerging victorious over Britain the Qing dynasty would still have to confront the issue of the increasing cultivation of opium in the interior. That matter would be solved by the administration in theory, but the problem was that in practice the administration was too ineffective to enforce prohibition. This is demonstrated by the fact measures were not taken to suppress opium smoking internally while opium was imported, and in the case of Taiwan the administration failing to prevent immigration and land reclamation through enforcing the law. What is more, the aforementioned acceptable, fashionable and useful culture of opium which pervaded at the time should have undermined the efforts of concerned officials to prohibit opium. In conclusion the Qing dynasty would never have developed an opium problem if foreign merchants did not sell opium to Chinese consumers, but the opium problem would never have deteriorated so severely if the Qing administration was efficacious. If the administration was effective then literati smoking opium would not have been tolerated, and the aforementioned opium culture that arose from the literati’s tacit assent should not have manifested.

In contrast to the Qing period, the early and late Japanese periods did not encounter the deleterious issues of foreign merchants from without and an attenuated administration from within in Taiwan. In addition, although the culture of opium was already embedded in Chinese culture, first Japanese culture and later international culture challenged the status quo regarding opium culture on the island.

To begin with, Japan had established itself as a Power by recovering from the encroachment of other Powers. Its territory including recently annexed Taiwan was not in dispute. What is more, it engaged in diplomacy with other Powers, and set up a trade system that was acceptable to both it and other Powers. Lastly, unlike China it did not have an opium problem. In other words, Japan was in a favourable position vis-à-vis other Powers in that it had asserted its strength, was not in a trade or territorial dispute, and was willing to enter into diplomatic negotiation in order to manage such disputes. The country was therefore bereft of a threat from the outside. That meant the Government-General only had to contend with the matters of effective administration and opium culture.

Next, the administration of the Government-General was not undermined by the aristocracy. Having annexed the island, the administration attained political control by proceeding to pacify resistance. The aborigines and Chinese were subjugated to possess unequal status by unassailable military force. The Chinese gentry were therefore powerless. On the Japanese side, the former feudal lord families which operated conglomerates can be equated to the aristocracy in a modern nation. They certainly possessed influence in government, but should not have obstructed administration on Taiwan. This is because the feudal system had been toppled and replaced with a nation state system wherein power was centralised. Without an obstruction such as a feudal lord or member of the gentry to the exercise of its power, the Government-General's administration was therefore strong.

As previously mentioned, the administration adopted a different approach to prohibition: gradual and effective rather than immediate and effective. Electing for a policy of gradual prohibition entailed the Government-General asserting control over society. It would assert control through legal powers granted to it from Law 63 which empowered it to issue ordinances. The touchstone of social control was the *hokō* system. In the *hokō* system families were grouped into tens to form a *kō* and *kō* were

grouped into tens to constitute a *ho*. A trustworthy and popular local notable would be elected as either a *kōchō* or *hosei* for each respective unit. They were responsible for disseminating government information and handling issues related to the unit. Each unit was located in a police district where a police inspector would maintain order. Policing was bulwarked by the Able-Bodied Corps of approximately ten men which was selected by the head of a unit and served as an auxiliary police force. This meant that a significant number of men in each *kō* was working for the police. It also illustrates that Government-General's apparatus for enforcing its policy extended from the Government-General into the homes of many families in each unit. The administration's hold over society was crystallised by the principle of collective responsibility. It provided for responsibility of a crime to be attributed to not only the offender but also every person in the offender's *kō*. Evidence suggests that in practice the principle was not applied regarding opium in either Japanese period. The *hokō* system therefore not only invoked sufficient fear in the Taiwanese to obey the law but also was sufficiently fair in its application that the Chinese did not in fact live in terror. It moreover diminished aspirations for subversion and inculcated the adoption of the administration's view by having local notables and the men of many families participate in executing or enforcing policy. The effect was the Chinese should be contented with a sense of power over their lives and hence no longer detest their oppressors so fiercely by limiting interference in their lives. Indeed, participation would bolster confidence in the Government-General through setting perceivably beneficial policy on the agenda of the Taiwanese and working for it. Albeit it is worth remembering that, without visible improvement in the material conditions of their lives as directed by the Japanese, it is doubtful the Formosans should have been so cooperative. With respect to the above, the *hokō* system ensured the administration was extremely effective because: a) it was pervasive meaning all colonised were subject to it; b) applied collective responsibility meaning the law would not be violated; and c) involved local notables and a significant percentage of able-bodied men in each unit in actively implementing and enforcing policy, which simultaneously reduced subversion and promoted cooperation.

Unlike the Qing dynasty, the Japanese set up a government monopoly over raw and prepared opium. The monopoly covered import, manufacture, wholesale, retail and consumption. Cultivation was not monopolised but rather criminalised because the

opium poppy would not grow well on the island. There should not have been exports considering the Government-General would purchase raw opium for domestic consumption, but the fact the illegalisation of exports was added in the 1928 Taiwan Opium Ordinance suggests it occurred. The business of the monopoly was not nationalised but instead privatised excepting the opium factory. Firms and agents would be permitted to engage in business through a licence system.

Purchasing was conducted by Japanese and foreign companies. The manufacture of prepared opium was handled by the administration and employed Chinese. Wholesaling and retailing was exclusively by Chinese. One factor for that was Japan feared its nationals would succumb to the opium “evil” so Japanese were intentionally prevented from contact with prepared opium. Another factor was that commission earned from sales was so profitable that it would incentivise the *kōchō* and *hosei* who were frequently granted licences for it to cooperate with the administration and thereby advance social stability. Only Chinese and aborigines were permitted to consume opium.

Permission for consumption was obtained through registering as an addict through the police. In the early period many addicts were unwilling to register. The administration thus held registration campaigns in a series of drives from 1897 until 1908. The originally strict requirements for granting licences were revoked. In the late period on the contrary many addicts were willing to apply for permission to smoke opium and only the most severely addicted were offered licences.

The pivotal factor in the gradual prohibition policy was to not issue licences to the next generation of smokers. That way the number of addicts would diminish over time. This process was accelerated by the administration by rationing opium through price rises. The licensing and rationing system was on the whole effective, but it was not entirely efficacious as evidenced by the resurgence of illicit smokers. Such smokers could purchase opium on the black market or from corrupt retailers.

The black market was extensive because the administration’s coastguard and policing system was insufficiently rigorous. The recording system of opium once it was delivered to wholesalers and retailers was poor. Only retailers had to record the quantity of opium purchased from wholesalers. That meant the police did not possess a record of to whom the wholesalers and retailers sold opium. Being on commission

and not being on record meant it was in their interest to sell as much opium as possible. The Government-General was intransigent on the implementation of a sound recording system and a salary rather than commission based sales system after the ideas were respectively raised in the 1912 Hague and 1924-25 Geneva Conferences. The administration was partly satisfied with its progress on opium control, and partly required income from the monopoly to pay for its debt. Incidentally economic necessity in accompaniment with fear or unrest and humaneness were the original factors that compelled the administration under Gotō Shinpei to adopt the gradual prohibition policy and set up the profitable monopoly under Iwai Tatsumi. Nevertheless, like the Qing dynasty, the Government-General also experienced enforcement problems. They could be due to either police corruption for profit or administrative corruption for profit and social stability.

The primary problem was policing the licence system. Only addicts who possessed a licence were permitted to purchase and smoke opium by law. However as previously stated the assurgent illicit smokers indicate that the police system was inadequate. Nevertheless in the late Japanese period the administration had exerted effort that surmounted such inadequacies. A new addict registration campaign was held between 1929 and 1930. It was undesirable to suffer the risk of punishment for illicit smoking, so many formerly illicit smokers applied for a licence. Not all of them received a licence, however. Unlike in the early period, this time the Government-General policy was that the registration process should be strict: only heavy smokers were granted licences. In addition, a compulsory programme for the rehabilitation of persons classified as moderate addicts was established under the recommendation of Du Congming, a Taiwanese doctor. Light addicts were denied both licences and treatment. All of the applicants were monitored by the police. Du Congming invented a technique to identify opium users from a urine test in 1933. Such technology assisted police inspectors in identifying and thereby limiting and reducing illicit opium and later morphine consumption. On a cultural note in connection with the rehabilitation programme, it indicates a change in the administration's attitude towards opium smokers. Previously they were regarded with animosity as expressed in "wretched" and "opium ghosts" but the fact addicts were viewed as curable from their medicalisation in culture meant that addiction should no longer be feared by the Japanese and hence addicts were not detested.

Next, opium occupied a significant part of the island's economy. In the late Qing dynasty it constituted 70 percent of imports on average. Persian opium was the most popular, but Indian Benares was also appreciated. There was a trade surplus at the time. Under Japanese rule opium was an important source of revenue. It was most likely Iwai Tatsumi who had the opium revenue directed from the hygiene bureau which was Gotō Shinpei's intention to the administration's funds. It was worth 32.4, 11.3, 9.5, 4.4, and 0.9 percent of the total revenue in 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930 and 1940 respectively. The price of opium increased as part of a rationing system. The most revenue earned from it peaked at 8,105,278 yen in 1918 but thereafter declined in significance. In the late Japanese period it cost 4,000,000 yen per year to operate the opium monopoly. By 1930 the profits from the monopoly were extremely marginal. It was in the Government-General's economic interest to maintain the monopoly because it overspent between five and twenty percent each year. What is more, keeping the monopoly system would provide cover for the purchase of excessive quantities of opium on the international market for processing into narcotics.

Last of all, negative ideas regarding opium smoking increased in terms of dissemination and impact under Japanese rule. During the late Qing dynasty it was not unknown to the wise that smoking opium habitually incurred financial and health problems that augured ill for you and your family; and hence was immoral. But in much the same way as people in the United Kingdom continue to overeat or smoke tobacco irrespective of such problems, opium was largely acceptable in culture so the Chinese continued to consume it. The habit was not yet rendered monstrous in public opinion. However this was to change owing to five developments; namely: a) the Japanese attitude; b) the 1905 Provisional Household Survey; c) newspapers; d) education; and e) the 1930 Opium Dispute.

Firstly as indicated above the Japanese government was afraid that it would be deluged with opium addiction and suffer the same fate as China. Being so scared it is understandable that opium was viewed as a threat and thereby it, in accompaniment with its associations, were inclined to be loathed. Opium was regarded as an "evil habit". Interestingly, Chinese representative to the 1895 Shimonoseki negotiations Li Hongzhang described opium as one of the four "evils" harming the island.

Next, new complaints related to opium were introduced. Originally under the Qing dynasty negativity was directed solely to opium and its consumption in culture. But in the early Japanese period negativity was extended to include opium smokers in culture. The 1905 Provisional Household Survey homogenised opium users by conflating occasional and habitual smokers in its results. This enabled opium smokers to be viewed as a uniform group which possessed specific characteristics. Being produced by the administration the survey would be trusted as authoritative by those who read it. The survey would not have been read by the Chinese, rather its results would have been published in the Taiwan Daily newspaper, which was in circulation across Japanese territory on the island from 1898. This way the newly produced category of thought should be disseminated among the populace. It so happened that opium smokers were classified as purely negative in accord with the Japanese dislike of opium. The survey results concluded that opium smokers were likely to become unhealthy, commit a crime, be unable to work, and ruin their families. The effect was that occasional smokers became equated with habitual smokers and thereby subject to public opinion. Such opinion was indubitably influenced by the negative conclusions reached by the survey.

Third Taiwanese children were instructed to dislike opium smoking. This is evidenced by the fact that in school textbooks belonging to the early Japanese period opium smokers were called “opium ghosts”. The negative image of opium smokers in combination with warnings as per the dangers of smoking opium meant that children would be discouraged from adopting the habit. Albeit like the news reports, the effect of the anti-opium message was contingent upon personal experience. The fact is children who belonged to families in which opium was smoked were in a position to experience opium smoking positively. What is more, opium users who had a pleasant experience could challenge the statements regarding opium presented in newspapers and classrooms. Both such children and adults would serve as disseminators of information that countered the negative statements and homogenised view of smokers. This is exemplified by an opinion expressed in a poem titled “Stopping Opium Smoking” by Chang Lijun who recognised the harm of opium but simultaneously appreciated and longed for it in the 1920s. Such a conflicting attitude reflects that at least one negative idea associated with opium had embedded itself in culture but poor

health alone was insufficient to inspire abstinence or prevent illicit smokers from emerging for some citizens.

Fourthly, the 1930 Opium Dispute represented the first time that reputable members of Chinese society introduced negative attitudes regarding opium smokers. The dispute was triggered by the Government-General's call for an addict registration campaign to be conducted from December 1929. This act contravened the administration's policy to gradually prohibit opium smoking by not issuing licences to new generations of smokers because the campaign allowed the new generations of smokers to apply. The effect was that the opium monopoly system was not viewed as an instrument to achieve prohibition but rather as a business to profit the regime from addiction. Two background factors exacerbated the situation; namely: a) political associations; and b) the international zeitgeist on opium. Firstly, political associations increasingly appeared in the late period of Japanese rule. The emergence of this new culture meant that the Chinese were increasingly organised and informed regarding issues that affected their lives. Secondly, a zeitgeist that regarded opium as a humanitarian and social issue began to manifest. It was based on the fact that the League's Covenant was concerned with opium, and the OAC and 1924-25 Geneva Conferences on opium were held for the purpose of advancing its suppression on humanitarian and social grounds. The consequence was that to not suppress opium was to be inhumane and hence unacceptable in public opinion. Influenced by such ideas and organised, the Taiwan People's Party caused a dispute that redefined opium smoking in Chinese culture. The party propagandised that opium smokers were shameless, un-awakened and worthless persons in need of correction". They furthermore maintained that opium smokers sustained the administration. Disseminated into public opinion, these ideas meant that opium smokers were no longer socially acceptable from the perspective of reputable members of Chinese society. In other words, a person of high social status should lose their status owing to opium consumption. At last the literati, who once made opium smoking fashionable during the Qing dynasty, rendered opium smokers to be unfashionable in 1930.

With respect to the above it is thought that Japanese rule succeeded in suppressing opium because of four factors; *viz*: a) effective administration; b) government monopoly; c) licensing; and d) rationing. However, such success was marred by two factors: e) recording; and f) opium culture. Amongst the former factors the most

important was effective administration. If the administration was not strong it would be unable to implement and enforce the government monopoly and its concomitant parts. In other words, the opium monopoly system should fail. As for the latter factors the most significant was opium culture. If a sound recording system was installed it should assist police in arresting illicit smokers who purchased government monopoly opium through a licensee. However it should not be effective in identifying such smokers who bought opium on the black market. The only way to suppress opium consumption is to eliminate demand for opium. If smoking opium was deemed unacceptable, unfashionable and useless, then people would be disinclined to want it. The Government-General produced propaganda against opium and opium smokers throughout the early period but it was ineffective because evidence suggests in as late as the 1920s literati considered smoking opium as acceptable even though it was recognised as deleterious to health. However the Taiwan People's Party changed attitudes by judging opium smokers to be unacceptable, unfashionable, useless, and furthermore traitorous as an influential political party. The political party was inspired by the international zeitgeist against opium. This suggests that effective attitudes regarding opium culture could only be set by Chinese in Taiwan, and only international public opinion could exert influence on the Chinese.

In conclusion the Qing dynasty failed in suppressing opium because merchants operating under the protection of Britain among other Powers sold opium in great quantities to China, where the administration was ineffective in enforcing the prohibition on opium and an acceptable, fashionable and useful culture of opium existed. However, the Government-General succeeded in suppressing opium because its administration was effective in enforcing the opium monopoly system. Nevertheless, it failed because it could not eliminate the aforementioned culture of opium. As it happened Chinese inspired by an international zeitgeist against opium that was promoted by America, Britain and other Powers succeeded in undermining the aforementioned culture. In essence, the Chinese and the foreign Powers created and surmounted the opium problem. Firm Japanese administration and the gradual prohibition policy ensured that conditions were suitable for the anti-opium culture to manifest among Chinese.

6.2.1. Abstract Comparison

In this section the ideas that defined attitudes, policies and conditions related to opium as discussed in the preceding section shall be analysed through comparison. The comparison will cover the three periods of rule and focus on instrumental ideas that emerged within the Qing and Japanese empires and were drawn from international influence without.

To begin with the Qing dynasty's 1836 policy of immediate and effective prohibition was defined by the idea of imperial recovery. It originated from Zhu Zun who was an advisor in court. He thought that opium was deleterious to the empire because it: a) sapped the strength of the army; and b) stupefied the intelligentsia. His opinion was accepted by Daoguang Emperor. Prohibition would remove harmful opium and thereby restore the empire to its former power. Unlike ideas utilised by the Japanese such as economic warfare and biological principles, imperial recovery did not imply a threat to national security or survival. Rather it is inferable opium was viewed as an issue that undermined the efficacy of the Qing dynasty rule. That view suggests the Qing dynasty was confident insofar as it was hitherto unthreatened by an outside Power. In addition, the fact that the view was solely concerned with the military and literati suggests it was not morally concerned with commoners unlike biological principles and assimilation espoused by the Government-General and humanitarianism advocated by the League of Nations.

Next the Government-General's policy of gradual prohibition was created from two ideas; namely: a) biological principles; and b) economic warfare.

The former was advocated by Gotō Shinpei. He was dispatched to Germany for study as a young man. It is assumed he was introduced to the ideas that would influence biological principles there because, like social darwinism and degeneration theory that were European in origin, it was concerned with race and evolution. "Biology" as Gotō referred to it regarded the capabilities of races over time. At that time a race was equivalent to a nation in terms of physical appearance and territory. Certain "races" were more advanced than others owing to their cultural accomplishments and power. Broadly speaking the more militarily powerful your race was, the better your cultural accomplishments were. Races also had peculiar characteristics and customs owing to

their physical appearance, territorial and linguistic origins. Rather than think advances in technology and organisation were due to the curiosity of individuals, the entire race took credit owing to its superior innate characteristics. What is more, rather than adopt the scientific view that evolution occurred due to mutation in an individual in accordance with Darwinian evolution, it was believed that entire races evolved in unity. This misunderstanding enabled the lowest classes of a “superior” race to discriminate against the highest classes of an “inferior” race. The status of races was not static. Races were evolving by natural selection; hence their status could both improve and deteriorate. Racial evolution was a gradual process in which successful adaptation to the environment meant survival. With these thoughts in mind Gotō applied biological principles to the opium problem in Taiwan. He regarded the Chinese as a “Flounder” which were inferior to the Japanese who were “Sea Bream”. He thought that the unique customs of the Chinese ought to be cherished. That included opium which was viewed as a threat to not only the individual and family but also the whole nation. He prescribed a policy of gradual prohibition where it should take up to fifty years for the Chinese to adapt to an environment without opium under Japanese supervision. This way unnecessary and inhumane deaths would be precluded from immediate and absolute prohibition. In a sense the policy was bastardised humanitarianism that sought to rescue the Chinese from “living in agony” by having them live in agony for half a century. Unlike imperial recovery, biological principles were based on scientific ideas. That scientific basis served to promote belief in the efficacy of biological principles. Additionally, unlike the Qing dynasty, Gotō expressed moral concern for all of the Chinese who smoked opium on the island because biological principles encouraged him to view the Chinese as a single race rather than view addicts in terms of their utility for the administration. Owing to their annexation of the island through military force, the Japanese had demonstrated their racial superiority. That meant the Japanese would feel confident of the security of their rule over the Chinese and the opium problem, even though opium represented a threat to national security. With respect to that, confidence was shared by both proponents of imperial recovery and biological principles.

As for the latter, its tenet was war was fought for economic gains. It was enunciated by Kodama Gentarō. The rationale was that the duration of war had extended so much so that a country necessitated sufficient resources in order to defeat the enemy. The

goal of war was to extract special privileges related to the economy through eliciting concessions from the government of the capitulating country. As a consequence obtaining and securing resources became paramount. The effect was the view further incentivised governments to enter into a culture of constantly preparing and planning for war in that its resources and capabilities had to equal or surpass its potential enemies' resources and capabilities or make war exceedingly costly in order to ensure national survival. The reason being resources took a long time to gather, so governments had to plan long-term to ensure a sufficient supply of resources. Planning long-term meant it had to constantly consider threats and risks in order to devise action to mitigate them. Lacking sufficient resources and a believable strategy would generate anxiety. Relief could only be attained through confidence in security by having sufficient resources and capabilities. The origin of economic warfare can be traced to the Japan's experience with the Powers in the nineteenth century where its government was subjected to unequal treaties that granted economic privileges. With this in mind, the gradual opium prohibition policy would serve to simultaneously remove the threat of opium from Taiwan and earn a profit for the Government-General. In this sense, it was prudent for gradual or immediate prohibition to be implemented from the perspective of economic warfare. Nevertheless, revenue earned from the monopoly was vital for securing sustainable rule for the early administration which was dependent on subsidies from Tokyo. That meant that gradual prohibition would offer a desirable middle ground between immediate prohibition and legalisation because it would not only provide revenue in the short and middle term but also eradicated opium from the island. In fact the revenue earned from the opium monopoly was so crucial to the administration that it suppressed the "Soaring Phoenix Descends to Write Society" which promoted abstinence of opium in order to force the Japanese to withdraw from the island by denying the opium revenue in 1901.

The late Japanese period was marked by five ideas that redefined the administration's gradual prohibition and narcotics control policy; namely: a) self-determination; b) accelerated assimilation; c) indifference; d) humanitarianism; and e) social hygiene.

The principle of self-determination forced the administration to make humanitarian concessions through revising its policy on opium. Self-determination was conceived by Woodrow Wilson during the First World War. It gained prominence owing to Wilson's importance. It articulated principles that affected peoples' attitudes towards

governance; namely: a) identifiable peoples should have their own state; b) borders in dispute should be settled by referendum; and c) ethnic minorities that were unable to create their own state and settle border disputes should be supervised under the protection of the League. These tenets meant: a) the nation rather than the state is sovereign; b) legitimacy to rule was obtained through national consent; and c) the League served to defend the weakest of peoples. The effect was that colonised ethnic groups were inspired to determine their own futures by abolishing colonial government and establishing their own government. Disseminated into public opinion through media, it fostered the “Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwan Assembly” on Taiwan in the 1920s. It caused Chinese to think regarding their political destiny.

In order to avert a costly rebellion and maintain control, the Government-General had to placate the Chinese. That meant making independence appear unattractive or unnecessary from the Taiwanese perspective. The solution was to promote accelerated assimilation. Its effect should be to remove the ability for the Formosans to seek autonomy on the basis of nationality because the Chinese would become Japanese through assimilation: the Chinese nationality should cease to exist on the island. Under Den Kenjirō the policy was proclaimed in 1920. In addition the “extension of the home territory” was declared as an aspect of the intended integration of assimilation. This had a profound impact on the policy of gradual opium prohibition. It was predicated upon the biological principles that enabled the Taiwanese to be treated differently on the grounds of inferior race. However, accelerated assimilation challenged biological principles because it entailed that the Chinese and aborigines be treated as Japanese. It so happened that in Japan opium consumption was prohibited whilst the “evil habit” was legal under licence in Taiwan. Once the discrepancy was noticed by Formosans it would discredit assimilation. That meant the administration’s ideational means for placating the Chinese would be rendered useless. Adopting accelerated assimilation therefore meant that the Government-General had to concede to legitimate demands of the Chinese on the basis of assimilation. Conceding to demands would cause the administration to appear attenuated, however. That would encourage further demands. It was therefore in the administration’s best interest to seize the initiative to implement reforms in order to maintain stability in rule. The effect was that the Government-General could no longer ignore legitimate demands,

and should actively formulate revisions to policy as necessary. This is evidenced in its tolerance of political associations and the expedition of the rehabilitation programme during the 1930 Opium Dispute. Such a situation is incomparable with the Qing dynasty. Nevertheless, regarding the impact on sentiment, confidence should diminish as anxiety proliferated from the increased threat of rebellion.

An attitude that pervaded the Japanese foreign ministry regarding the illicit narcotics traffic to China was indifference. It appeared in all four of the major international conferences on opium and narcotics control. Originally it was evidenced in the absence of a policy for drugs controls at the 1909 Shanghai International Commission on Opium and the 1912 Hague Conference. Once the illicit traffic from Japan became salient having begun during the First World War, indifference was expressed by Tokyo failing to take measures to suppress it whilst its delegates were excoriated at meetings of the Opium Advisory Committee. This was at a time when foreign office reports published in 1924 and 1930 acknowledged the matter. The rationale behind the indifference is twofold. Prior to the First World War the attitude was possible because the Japanese public was uninterested in opium addiction. After all, Japan did not have an opium problem, so its public should be disinclined to pressure its government to adopt a humanitarian attitude. After the First World War smuggling morphine to China was deemed a “private act”. It was so considered partly because the interests of private business were highly valued. One cause for it was that in Japanese society the boundaries between the government and business were blurred. Such a culture would have enabled greater corruption that incentivised bureaucrats to cooperate with business for economic gain. Another cause for it was that the conglomerates which dominated Japanese society were owned by former feudal lord families which were held in esteem for their authority. In other words, private business and authority were associated. This fostered a culture where undermining business meant offending authority. The indifference towards the narcotics traffic affected narcotics control on Taiwan. It affected narcotics control because it rendered acceptable the cultivation and export of enormous quantities of cocaine exceeding 56 tonnes per year. It furthermore should have permitted bureaucrats and businessmen and companies to engage in the clandestine export of morphine to China from Taiwan. Identified figures possibly involved in the alleged traffic on the Taiwan side before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War were: Kaku Sagatarō (Director of the

Monopoly Bureau), Uchida Kakitsu (Governor-General), Shimomura Hiroshi (Civil Administrator), Hoshi Hajime (narcotics entrepreneur), Taiwan Shoyaku (cocaine producer), Mitsui (cocaine producer), and Nippon Yusen Kaishi (Mitsubishi subsidiary and steamship line). Such indifference regarding the illicit export of drugs contrasts the humanitarianism of biological principles and accelerated assimilation regarding the suppression of opium smoking amongst Chinese on Taiwan. This contrast is explicable by national interest. In the case of Taiwan it was agreed that the gradual prohibition policy be implemented. Opium was considered a threat to national survival at the time. It was therefore in the interest of the Japanese to eradicate it. However, in the case of the illicit traffic of narcotics from Japan, under firm control such exports did not constitute a threat to national survival whatsoever. It was therefore not in governmental interest to eliminate it. Rather it was seen indifferently as a private act.

Next, humanitarianism as per the suppression of opium and narcotics was advocated by the League. It provided the justification for international action regarding the problems of opium and narcotics. Addiction was therefore viewed as an issue of moral concern. Such concern as first expressed in the 1912 Hague Conference originated from an American missionary named Charles Brent. The international conference which impacted on narcotics control on Taiwan was the 1924-25 Geneva Conference. Its convention was ratified by Tokyo in 1928. It served as a framework for reform to be conducted on Taiwan by the Government-General. Held under the admirable auspices of the League the conference furthermore introduced the association between humanitarianism and opium suppression into public opinion on the island as per the previously mentioned anti-opium zeitgeist. It provided intellectual material which was utilised in objections by the Taiwan People's Party against the administration's 1929 addict registration campaign. The effect was that any extension of the gradual prohibition policy should be perceived as inhumane and hence bad from the Chinese point of view. It moreover implanted a desire for suppression to be expedited because it was humane and hence good from the Taiwanese standpoint. Already only able to concede to demands owing to self-determination and accelerated assimilation in order to maintain control, the Government-General was therefore enslaved to public opinion regarding the matter of opium which was formed by international influence. The result was that the

administration could only retain the gradual prohibition policy at its contemporary pace or accelerate it. It meant that self-determination and humanitarianism from the outside had surmounted the morality of biological principles. What is more, in a foreign office document it was stated that the policy of indifference as per the illicit trafficking of narcotics from Japan would be evaluated if international pressure as per humanitarianism for the suppression of opium increased. This illustrates that international influence can affect government policy through challenging its ideational basis. In comparison, like biological principles, humanitarianism concerned itself with suppressing opium. Yet, unlike biological principles, it was not obstructed by the idea that change as in evolution could only occur gradually. Humanitarianism was therefore quicker than biological principles. What is more, unlike biological principles, it was more appealing because it was not dependent on the notion of race for its applicability. In it humanity was whole rather than fragmented races in a struggle for survival. The ideology of humanitarianism was therefore more attractive to those maltreated by biological principles. In this sense, humanitarianism was more popular in public opinion because it did not entail discrimination.

Lastly social hygiene appeared as a reason for eradicating opium consumption in the 1920s. Its definition is unavailable. Nevertheless its meaning is inferable predicated upon the rationale for opium suppression as expressed in the League and Japan's history. In the 1924-25 Geneva Conferences not only humanitarianism but also a term called social was utilised in justifying the elimination of opium smoking. The fact social was employed suggests it was an idea that was prevalent in the minds of those concerned with the opium matter. The fact the Japanese used a similar term suggests social or social hygiene was a response to the existence of the other. Such a reaction should have been interpreted according to cultural norms. It is thought that hygiene was included in the Japanese thought because hygiene held an important and salient part of Meiji history. It was important and salient because of its effect. Hygiene was related to national security and racial degeneration. Japan was threatened by the risk of further encroachment by the Powers . It thus had an interest in ensuring its nation was secure and in optimal condition. One way for attaining such security and optimality was through practising hygiene. Hygiene was therefore important. The Meiji government implemented reforms that challenged the traditional way of Japanese life. Prostitution was disdained. Certain states of mind were regarded as a

mental illness that had to be treated in a hospital. Challenging social norms would have been highly noticeable. Hygiene was also salient then. Being important for national survival and salient in confronting traditional behaviour, hygiene should have occupied an elevated position in the minds of the Japanese related to national survival and appraising traditional culture. Opium threatened national survival and was an aspect of culture that was preceded modernity and was hence traditional for Chinese. Understood in this way, opium suppression was therefore a matter of hygiene for the Japanese. Without being an economic or political issue for Japan or the Powers at the time of the 1924-25 Geneva Conferences, opium should have been regarded as a social problem. In this way, social hygiene is explicable as a response to the opium problem as per its constituent threat to society and hygiene as a means to ensure national survival. The effect of the idea on narcotics control in Taiwan is unknown but it can be ascribed to the reforms conducted in 1928 and 1930.

In conclusion, ideas defining narcotics control developed in terms of expanding moral concern for addicts from the military and bureaucracy to cover all of humanity, altering the pace of suppression from immediate to gradual, and transferring the origins of the ideas from within to without Taiwan. Both the Qing dynasty and the Government-General of the early Japanese era understood opium as a threat and were anxious. Both were confident of success owing to their perceived supremacy as per Qing regional dominance and Japanese biological principles. Albeit, unlike the Qing dynasty, the Japanese were acutely aware of the danger of the modern world as noted in economic warfare. Both immediate and gradual prohibition can be interpreted as humanitarian. Once opium no longer represented a threat and narcotics were manageable, the Japanese gained sufficient confidence to be indifferent regarding exports of illicit narcotics and the status of the opium monopoly. However, the introduction of self-determination and humanitarianism from abroad challenged such indifference. Self-determination threatened civil order and hence educated assimilation as an anxious response. Assimilation meant the administration became conciliatory towards public opinion. Biological principles which underpinned the gradualist approach were rendered increasingly irrelevant. Unlike biological principles, humanitarianism was appealing to the public. Such appeal caused the administration to reform its gradual prohibition policy so as to satisfy public opinion. Albeit social hygiene could have played a role in such reforms too. Humanitarianism began to

influence Tokyo policy regarding the illicit drugs traffic. Nevertheless public opinion was largely uninterested in such traffic, so neither Tokyo nor the Government-General took measures to suppress it. In all, anxiety prompted action to suppress opium as a threat to government interest, but once confidence was restored having gained control over it, indifference ensued until anxiety elicited from public opinion forced better control measures to be implemented. Ultimately anxiety felt by the Qing dynasty and the Government-General caused them to react to the threat posed by opium, but it was moral concern inspired by America and other League members that mobilised the public to ensure opium would be further suppressed even though it was no longer a threat.

Such a conclusion suggests the importance of anxiety and confidence in governments undertaking measures to solve a problem. Japanese anxiety regarding the spread of opium to Japan prompted them to establish the opium monopoly system on Taiwan. Their confidence over narcotics control in both Japan and Taiwan permitted them to “indifferently approve” of the narcotics traffic to China. Nevertheless the international conferences on opium set the agenda to be on drug control and influenced how the confident Japanese government felt and hence formulated policy by rendering narcotics control an issue of international concern. This suggests the importance of international conferences in prompting governments to undertake action to address international issues. In all, the Japanese were confident and the international conferences invoked anxiety.

6.3. Final Thoughts

Here the author will discuss several thoughts based on the research which are deemed to be of significance.

Firstly, the exploration of the relationship between international conferences on opium under the League and narcotics control on Taiwan under Japan has suggested the significance of international pressure in not only defining but also triggering political reform by governments through influencing public and governmental opinion.

Next, inferring ideas from policies for analysis and comparison can assist in understanding a situation more clearly. That includes apprehension of which ideas should be definitive in an ideational conflict that will impact on everyday life.

Thirdly, it is noted that ideas affect how a situation or matter is viewed, and how a situation or matter is viewed affects how a situation or matter is treated. What is more, the way in which a situation is viewed affects whether one is confident or anxious regarding the situation or matter. Such confidence and anxiety can result in undertaking measures that could be unsuitable, deleterious or unnecessary. In other words, ideas result in viewpoints which determine the extent to which the viewer is confident or anxious regarding the situation or matter; and hence the extent to which expedient or suitable measures are taken. In light of this, it is thought it is crucial to evaluate the ideas from which the viewpoint originates in terms of its effect on the viewpoint, as well as to assess the effect of the viewpoint on the thinker's anxiety and confidence. This way the thinker can enquire whether such anxiety and confidence is justified, and ultimately whether the proposed measures are suitable or necessary to the same degree, if at all. In other words, thinking about your thinking and its impact on your feelings is advantageous.

Fourth, it is observed that negative propaganda regarding culture disseminated to people who are ruled by alien invaders should not suppress the culture. Only the colonised people are capable of rendering the culture unacceptable. Albeit they can be influenced from the outside.

Fifthly, it was a surprise to the author that not only merchants supplying opium from India, Persia and Turkey along with the British empire's war, but also Chinese literati and commoners who created an acceptable, fashionable and useful culture of opium as well as the weakness of administration in the Qing dynasty were responsible for the opium crisis in China. It was moreover interesting to discover that mainly the American and British governments were instrumental in suppressing opium through international conferences and fostering an international zeitgeist against opium that inspired Chinese to eliminate the acceptable and fashionable culture of opium on Taiwan.

Next, it is thought that the Taiwan Government-General's contradictory narcotics policy on Taiwan is best understood in terms of threats, culture and economy. The

gradual prohibition policy was implemented because opium posed a threat to Japan's national survival. It was gradual because of economic necessity and racist belief which presented the policy as humanitarian. The alleged morphine and cocaine illicit narcotics traffic to China which emerged on the island during the First World War did not constitute a threat to Japan or the Government-General. It involved corrupt officials and businessmen. Their action was accepted because on the whole the Japanese government was indifferent to it and such action was regarded as a private act. What is more, the Japanese were confident in their ability to manage narcotics without threatening their nation. Without having an opium problem the public was not interested in pressuring the government to reform policy. Private business dominated Japanese society, and it was not in the interest of bureaucrats to offend their authority; rather rewarding cooperation with them would be in their interest. Lastly, the remunerative sale of narcotics constituted an economic interest for the involved parties for the continuation of the opium monopoly system and clandestine export of narcotics.

Seventhly, control of both supply and consumption is vital for narcotics control. Firm administration and an anti-drugs culture are the two most important factors in effecting such control. The former was mostly realised in the opium monopoly system over Taiwanese demand, but it was not in place over the supply of opium from Turkey, India and Persia. Before 1930 opium culture was acceptable, fashionable and useful but after 1930 it was rendered unacceptable and traitorous in Taiwan. Prior to the change in culture the absence of firm administration over supplier countries that were competing against one another meant that the illicit demand for opium would also be satisfied through smuggling. It is thought cooperation between Turkey, Persia and India regarding the reduction of opium poppy cultivation would have prevented the black market from being supplied.

Penultimately, the accuracy of the statistics on opium consumption in Taiwan utilised by the author in this dissertation are cast into doubt. The oldest source for the secondary sources was published in 1928. It was authored by Kikuchi Toraji and titled "Research on the Opium Problem". The source was a chapter appearing in that book. It was written by Kaku Sagatarō. This official allegedly presided over the illicit narcotics traffic from Taiwan. What is more he did not acknowledge Tokyo indifferently approved of the traffic at OAC meetings. Such points suggests the

statistics he presented in the chapter on which the author is reliant are questionable. Nevertheless, the accusations regard his alleged involvement in the narcotics traffic and not the opium monopoly. Additionally he was the first to advocate rehabilitation for addicts in the world at the 1924-25 Geneva Conferences. The author recommends further research on the statistics on opium.

Lastly, it is thought that the opium monopoly system established in the early Japanese period was the most advanced and most considerate to the cravings of the addicts in the entire world at the time. Only the government monopoly, licensing and rationing system would so surely and effectively reduced the number of addicts. Albeit implementing a sound recording system, changing wholesalers and retailers to receive a salary rather than a commission, and offering voluntary rehabilitation to addicts would have improved its efficacy and maintained its considerate approach.

Bibliography

ALLEE, Mark A. 1997 (ed). *Law and Local Society in Late Imperial China*. SMC Publishing Inc.: Taiwan ROC.

BEASLEY, William G. 2000. *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change Since 1850*. St. Martin's Press: UK.

BOOTH, Martin. 1998 (ed). *Opium: A History*. St. Martin's Press: US.

British Library. 27/10/2010 . *China Trade and the East India Company*.
<http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpregion/asia/china/guidesources/chinatrade/index.html>

BROOK, Timothy & SCHMID, André. 2000. *Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities*. University of Michigan Press: US.

BROOK, Timothy & WAKABAYASHI, T. Bob. 2000. *Opium Regimes: China, Britain and Japan, 1839-1952*. University of California Press: US.

BROWN, Melissa J. 1997. *We Savages Didn't Bind Feet: The Implications of Cultural Contact and Change in Southwestern Taiwan for an Evolutionary Anthropology*. UMI Dissertation Services: US.

BUELL, Raymond L. 1993. *The League of Nations: A Summary of its Organization and Accomplishments during Ten Years*. UMI: A Bell & Howell Co.: US.

CHANG, Chung Li. 1970 (ed). *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society*. University of Washington Press: US.

CHANG, Hanyu & MYERS, Ramon H. "Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship"; in: *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Aug, 1963).

CHEN, Ching-Chih. "The Japanese Adaptation of the Pao-Chia System in Taiwan, 1895-1945"; in: *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Feb., 1975).

CHEN, Edward I-Te. "Japan's Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Itō-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894-95"; in: *Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol XXXVII, No. 1. November 1977

CHUANG, Yih-chyi. 2010. "Economic Development of Taiwan" class notes taken by author. International Masters in Asia-Pacific Studies, National Chengchi University: Taiwan ROC.

DAVIDSON, James W. F.R.G.S, 1903. *The Island of Formosa: Historical View from 1430 to 1900. History, People Resources and Commercial Prospects*. Consul of the United States for Formosa

DIKÖTTER, Frank, LARS Laamann & ZHOU, Xun. 2004. *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*. Hurst & Company: UK.

Encyclopaedia of Taiwan. 2010-11. <http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw>

FOLEY, Hamilton. 1969 (first published: 1923). *Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations: Compiled with his Approval by Hamilton Foley*. Princeton University Press: US.

GOODMAN, Jordan *et. al.* 2007 (ed.). *Consuming Habits: Global and Historical Perspectives on How Cultures Define Drugs*. Taylor & Francis: UK.

HAO, Yen-p'ing. 1986. *The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China: The Rise of Sino-Western Mercantile Capitalism*. SMC Publishing Inc. Taiwan, ROC.

HO, Samuel P.S. "The Economic Development of Colonial Taiwan: Evidence and Interpretation"; in: *The Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol. 34, No. 2 (Feb., 1975).

HUANG, Zhaotang. 2002. *Taiwan Zongdufu (Taiwan Government-General)*. Qianwei Publishing: Taiwan ROC.

HSU, Hungbin. 2008. *From Smokers to Addicts: A History of Opium and Its Users in Taiwan*. University of London Thesis: UK.

HSU, Immanuel C.Y. 1995. *The Rise of Modern China: Fifth Edition*. Oxford University Press: UK.

International Opium Commission. 1909. *Report of the International Opium Commission, Shanghai, China, February 1 February 26, 1909. Vol. 1. Report of the Proceedings* P.S. King & Son. Publishers, Parliamentary and General Booksellers: UK.

Japanese Foreign Ministry. 1925. *Kokusai Ahen Kaigi (International Opium Conferences)*.

Japanese Foreign Ministry. 1930. *Mayaku Seizō Seigen Kaigi (Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Morphine)*.

Japanese Foreign Ministry. 1930. *Bankokku Kokusai Ahen Kaigai (Bangkok International Opium Conference)*.

JARMAN, Robert L. 1997. *Taiwan: Political and Economic Reports, 1861-1960*. Archive Editions Limited: UK.

JENNINGS, John M. 1997. *The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895-1945*. Praeger Publishers: US.

KARCH, Steven B. 2006 (ed). *A Brief History of Cocaine*. Taylor & Francis: UK.

KERR, George H. 1974. *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895-1945*. University Press of Hawaii Honolulu: US.

KŌ, Bunyū. 2005. *Taiwan ha Nihonjin ga Tsukutta: Yamato-damashii he no On; Chūkashisō he no Urami (Taiwan was made by the Japanese: Toward the Kindness of the Great Japanese Spirit and the Cruelty of Chinese Thought)*. Tokuma Shoten.

KUHN, Cynthia et al. 2008 (ed). *Buzzed: The Straight Facts about the most used and abused Drugs from Alcohol to Ecstasy*. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.: US.

LAMLEY, Harry Jerome. 1964. *The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895-1915. A Study of their Reactions to the Japanese Occupation and Subsequent Responses to Colonial Rule and Modernization*. University of Washington. UMI Dissertation Services: US.

League of Nations. 1923. *International Opium Convention – Signed at The Hague, January 23rd, 1912; Protocols of Cloture – Signed at The Hague on January 23rd, 1912; July 9th, 1913; and June 25th 1914*.

League of Nations. 1925. *First Opium Conference, Geneva, November 3rd 1924 – February 11th 1925: Minutes and Annexes*.

League of Nations. 1925. *Records of the Second Opium Conference, Geneva, November 17th 1924 – February 19th 1925: Volume I: Plenary Meetings, Texts of The Debates*.

League of Nations. 1931. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Vol. 1-3*.

League of Nations. 1932. *Conference on The Suppression of Opium-Smoking convened under Article XII of The Geneva Opium Agreement, 1925; Bangkok, November 9th to 27th, 1931; Minutes of The Meetings and Documents submitted to The Conference*.

LEE, Peter. 2006. *Opium Culture: The Art & Ritual of The Chinese Tradition*. Park Street Press: U.S.

LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. *Taiwan Tongzhi yu Yapien Wenti: Apian (Taiwan Rule and the Opium Issue: Opium)*. Qianwei Chuban: Taiwan ROC.

McALLISTER, William B. 2000. *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History*. Routledge: US.

MYERS, Ramon H. & PEATTIE, Mark R. 1984. *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*. Princeton University Press: US.

NORTHEGE, F.S. 1986. *The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946*. Holmes & Meier Publishers: US.

Oxford English Dictionaries. <http://oxforddictionaries.com>

PARROTT, Andrew *et. al.* 2004. *Understanding Drugs and Behaviour*. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.: UK

RENBORG, Bertil A. 1944. *International Drug Control: A Study of International Administration By and Through the League of Nations*. Kraus Reprint Co.: US.

ROY, Denny. 2003. *Taiwan: A Political History*. Cornell University Press: UK & US.

RUBINSTEIN, Murray A. 2007 (ed). *Taiwan: A New History*. An East Gate Book: US.

SCHENCHKING, J. Charles. "The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed Consciousness of a South Seas Destiny, 1872-1921"; in: *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 4. October 1999.

SHEPHERD, John Robert. "The Island Frontier of the Ch'ing, 1684-1780"; in: RUBINSTEIN, Murray A. 2007 (ed). *Taiwan: A New History*. An East Gate Book: US.

SHIMAZU, Naoko. 1998. *Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919*. Routledge: US & Canada.

TAKEKOSHI, Yosaburō. 1978 (ed). *Japanese Rule in Formosa*. SMC Publishing Inc. Taiwan, ROC.

The Philippine Commission. 1906. *Report of The Committee Appointed by The Philippine Commission to Investigate The Use of Opium and The Traffic Therein and The Rules, Ordinances and Laws Regulating Such Use and Traffic in Japan, Formosa,*

Shanghai, HongKong, Saigon, Singapore, Burma, Java and The Philippine Islands.
Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department: US.

The Royal Commission on Opium. 2003 (ed). *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Vol. 1-6.* Ganesha Publishing: UK; Edition Synapse: Japan.

TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. *Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering.* Routledge: Academia Sinica on East Asia: US & UK.

TSURUMI, Yūsuke. 1965 (ed). (first published: 1944). *Gotō Shinpei-den (Biography of Goto Shimpei).* Keisō Shobō: Japan.

RUBINSTEIN, Murray A. 2007. *Taiwan: A New History. Expanded Edition.* M.E. Sharpe: US & UK.

WHELAN, Anthony. "Wilsonian Self-Determination and The Versailles Settlement"; in: *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan., 1994),

WU, Micha. 2007. *Taiwan-shi Shōjiten (Small Dictionary on Taiwanese History).* Chūgoku Shoten: Japan.

YUANLIU TAIWAN SHIJI HUIWEI BIANJI-ZU. 2005. *Renshi Taiwan: Huiwei 1895-2000 (Know Taiwan: A Panorama 1895-2000).* Yuanliu: Taiwan ROC.

ZHENG, Yangwen. 2001. *The Social Life of Opium in China.* Cambridge University Press: UK.

ZHOU, Huimin. 2011. Personal Communication from Academic Advisor to the Author.

References

¹ BOOTH, Martin. 1998 (ed.). *Opium: A History.* St. Martin's Press: US. pp1-9.

² Ibid. 1998. p15.

³ PARROTT, Andrew et. al. 2004. *Understanding Drugs and Behaviour.* John Wiley & Sons Ltd.: UK. p104.

⁴ BOOTH, Martin. 1998. pp15-16.

⁵ Ibid. 1998. p19 & p25.

-
- ⁶ ZHENG, Yangwen. 2001. *The Social Life of Opium in China*. Cambridge University Press: UK. p49 & pp171-172.
- ⁷ HAO, Yen-p'ing. 1986. *The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China: The Rise of Sino-Western Mercantile Capitalism*. SMC Publishing Inc. Taiwan, ROC. p35.
- ⁸ ZHENG, Yangwen. 2001. p147. & BOOTH, Martin. 1998. pp56-57.
- ⁹ DAVIDSON, James W. F.R.G.S. 1903. *The Island of Formosa: Historical View from 1430 to 1900. History, People Resources and Commercial Prospects*. Consul of the United States for Formosa. p98.
- ¹⁰ ZHENG, Yangwen. 2001. p22.
- ¹¹ KUHN, Cynthia et al. 2008 (ed). *Buzzed: The Straight Facts about the most used and abused Drugs from Alcohol to Ecstasy*. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.: US. pp187-190. & PARROTT, Andrew et al. 2007 (ed). *Understanding Drugs and Behaviour*. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.: UK. pp108-111.
- ¹² KUHN, Cynthia et al. 2008. p193.
- ¹³ PARROTT, Andrew et al. 2007. p113.
- ¹⁴ Ibid. 2007. p114.
- ¹⁵ Ibid. 2007. p108.
- ¹⁶ Ibid. 2007. p108.
- ¹⁷ KUHN, Cynthia et al. 2008. pp198-199.
- ¹⁸ Ibid. 2008. p196. & PARROTT, Andrew et al. 2007. p114.
- ¹⁹ Ibid. 2008. p196. & PARROTT, Andrew et al. 2007. p114.
- ²⁰ Ibid. 2008. p197.
- ²¹ PARROTT, Andrew et al. 2007 (ed). p105. & Dr. EDKINS. "Historical Note on Opium and the Poppy in China"; in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 6*. 2003. Ganesha Publishing: UK; Edition Synapse: Japan. pp146-158.
- ²² Dr. EDKINS. "Historical Note on Opium and the Poppy in China"; in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 6*. 2003. Ganesha Publishing: UK; Edition Synapse: Japan. pp146-158.
- ²³ BROOK, Timothy & WAKABAYASHI, T. Bob. 2000. *Opium Regimes: China, Britain and Japan, 1839-1952*. University of California Press: US. p128.
- ²⁴ Ibid. 2000. p203.
- ²⁵ Oxford Dictionaries. 11/10/2010.
http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0548240#m_en_gb0548240
- ²⁶ KARCH, Steven B. 2006 (ed). *A Brief History of Cocaine*. Taylor & Francis: UK. p2.
- ²⁷ Ibid. 2006. p23.
- ²⁸ KUHN, Cynthia et al. 2008. p224.
- ²⁹ KARCH, Steven B. 2006. pp3-5.
- ³⁰ PARROTT, Andrew et al. 2007. p42.
- ³¹ Ibid. 2007. pp44-48. & KUHN, Cynthia et al. 2008. pp231-232.
- ³² KUHN, Cynthia et al. 2008. pp238-239.
- ³³ SHEPHERD, John Robert. "The Island Frontier of the Ch'ing, 1684-1780"; in: RUBINSTEIN, Murray A. 2007 (ed). *Taiwan: A New History*. An East Gate Book: US. p126.
- ³⁴ ROY, Denny. 2003. *Taiwan: A Political History*. Cornell University Press: US. p21.
- ³⁵ Ibid. p21.
- ³⁶ SHEPHERD, John Robert. 1995. *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800*. SMC Publishing Inc.: Taiwan ROC. p178.
- ³⁷ ALLEE, Mark A. 1997 (ed). *Law and Local Society in Late Imperial China*. SMC Publishing Inc.: Taiwan ROC. p3.
- ³⁸ CHANG, Chung Li. 1970 (ed). *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society*. University of Washington Press: US. pp53-54.
- ³⁹ Oxford English Dictionaries. 27/10/2010.
http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0008990#m_en_gb0008990
- ⁴⁰ CHANG, Chung Li. 1970 (ed). p54.
- ⁴¹ Ibid. p32.
- ⁴² Ibid. p33.
- ⁴³ Ibid. p55.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid. pp43-51.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid. p54.
- ⁴⁶ ALLEE, Mark A. 1997 (ed). p229.

-
- ⁴⁷ Ibid. p230.
- ⁴⁸ LEE, Peter. 2006. *Opium Culture: The Art & Ritual of The Chinese Tradition*. Park Street Press: U.S. p9.
- ⁴⁹ ZHENG, Yangwen. 2001. p54.
- ⁵⁰ British Library. 27/10/2010 . *China Trade and the East India Company*.
<http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelppregion/asia/china/guidesources/chinatrade/index.html>
- ⁵¹ BAUMLER, Alan (ed). 2001. p66.
- ⁵² TAKEKOSHI, Yosaburō. 1978 (ed). *Japanese Rule in Formosa*. SMC Publishing Inc. Taiwan, ROC. p74.
- ⁵³ ZHENG, Yangwen. 2001. p88.
- ⁵⁴ Dr. MAXWELL. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p19.
- ⁵⁵ JENNINGS, John M. 1997. *The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895-1945*. Praeger Publishers: US. p18.
- ⁵⁶ Dr. EDKINS. "Historical Note on Opium and the Poppy in China"; in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 6*. 2003. p155.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid. 2003. p155.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid. 2003. p156.
- ⁵⁹ Dr. MAXWELL. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p17.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid. 2003. p18.
- ⁶¹ Ibid. 2003. p23.
- ⁶² Dr. RENNIE. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p216.
- ⁶³ Consul HOPKINS. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p320.
- ⁶⁴ Dr. RENNIE. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p216.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid. 2003. p217.
- ⁶⁶ Consul HOPKINS. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p320.
- ⁶⁷ Dr. RENNIE. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p217.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid. 2003. p217.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid. 2003. p217.
- ⁷⁰ Consul HOPKINS. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p321.
- ⁷¹ Dr. RENNIE. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p217.
- ⁷² Consul HOPKINS. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p321.
- ⁷³ Ibid. p321.
- ⁷⁴ Dr. RENNIE. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p218.
- ⁷⁵ ASHTON, Francis. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p322.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid. 2003. p322.
- ⁷⁷ Dr. MYERS. in: *The Royal Commission on Opium, 1893-1895. Volume 5*. 2003. p327.
- ⁷⁸ YUANLIU TAIWAN SHIJI HUIWEI BIANJI-ZU. 2005. *Renshi Taiwan: Huiwei 1895-2000*. Yuanliu: Taiwan ROC. p22.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid. 2005. p14.
- ⁸⁰ TAKEKOSHI, Yosaburō. 1978 (ed). p156.
- ⁸¹ Ibid. 2005. p156.
- ⁸² BAUMLER, Alan (ed). 2001. p36.
- ⁸³ Ibid. 2001. p38.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid. 2001. p33.
- ⁸⁵ ZHENG, Yangwen. 2001. pp171-172.
- ⁸⁶ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p19.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid. 1997. p18.
- ⁸⁸ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. *Taiwan Tongzhi yu Yapien Wenti: Apian*. Qianwei Chuban: Taiwan ROC. p17.
- ⁸⁹ JARMAN, Robert L. 1997. *Taiwan: Political and Economic Reports, 1861-1960*. Archive Editions Limited: UK. Vol. 2., p127.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid. 1997. Vol. 4., pp245-246.
- ⁹¹ Ibid. 1997. Vol. 2., p127.
- ⁹² Ibid. 1997. Vol. 4., pp245-246.
- ⁹³ BAUMLER, Alan (ed). 2001. p7.
- ⁹⁴ WU, Micha. 2007. *Taiwan-shi Shōjiten (Small Dictionary on Taiwanese History)*. Chūgoku Shoten: Japan. p135.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid. 2007. p137.

-
- ⁹⁶ KŌ, Bunyū. 2005. *Taiwan was made by the Japanese: Toward the Kindness of the Great Japanese Spirit and the Cruelty of Chinese Thought*. Tokuma Shoten. pp151-152.
- ⁹⁷ RUBINSTEIN, Murray A. 2007. *Taiwan: A New History. Expanded Edition*. M.E. Sharpe: US & UK. p203.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid. 2007. pp203-204.
- ⁹⁹ KERR, George H. 1974. *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895-1945*. University Press of Hawaii Honolulu: US. p13.
- ¹⁰⁰ DAVIDSON, James W. F.R.G.S. 1903. p279.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid. 1903. p279.
- ¹⁰² TAKEKOSHI, Yosaburō. 1978 (ed). pv.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid. 1978 (ed). pvii.
- ¹⁰⁴ Ibid. 1978 (ed). pvii.
- ¹⁰⁵ PEATTIE, Mark R. "Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism"; in: MYERS, Ramon H. & PEATTIE, Mark R. 1984. *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*. Princeton University Press: US. p85.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid. 1978 (ed). pp87-91.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 1978 (ed). p75.
- ¹⁰⁸ ROY, Denny. 2003. *Taiwan: A Political History*. Cornell University Press: UK & US. p50.
- ¹⁰⁹ LAMLEY, Harry Jerome. 1964. *The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895-1915. A Study of their Reactions to the Japanese Occupation and Subsequent Responses to Colonial Rule and Modernization*. University of Washington. UMI Dissertation Services: US. pp270-271.
- ¹¹⁰ BROWN, Melissa J. 1997. *We Savages Didn't Bind Feet: The Implications of Cultural Contact and Change in Southwestern Taiwan for an Evolutionary Anthropology*. UMI Dissertation Services: US. p117.
- ¹¹¹ JENNINGS, John. M. 1997. p19.
- ¹¹² TSURUMI, Yūsuke. 1965 (ed). (first published: 1944). *Gotō Shinpei-den*. Keisō Shobō: Japan. p37.
- ¹¹³ TAKEKOSHI, Yosaburō. 1978 (ed). p134.
- ¹¹⁴ CHEN, Edward I-Te. "Japan's Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Itō-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894-95"; in: *Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol XXXVII, No. 1. November 1977. p61.
- ¹¹⁵ Ibid. 1977. p70.
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid. 1997. p62.
- ¹¹⁷ SCHENCHKING, J. Charles. "The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed Consciousness of a South Seas Destiny, 1872-1921"; in: *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 4. October 1999. p779.
- ¹¹⁸ Ibid. 1999. p779.
- ¹¹⁹ CHANG, Hanyu & MYERS, Ramon H. "Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship"; in: *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Aug, 1963). p436.
- ¹²⁰ Ibid. 1963. p436.
- ¹²¹ Ibid. 1963. p436.
- ¹²² Ibid. 1963. p438.
- ¹²³ TSURUMI, Yūsuke. 1965 (ed). pp25-26.
- ¹²⁴ CHANG, Hanyu & MYERS, Ramon H. 1963. p438.
- ¹²⁵ Ibid. 1963. p438.
- ¹²⁶ TSURUMI, Yūsuke. 1965 (ed). p27.
- ¹²⁷ Ibid. 1965 (ed). pp37-43.
- ¹²⁸ Ibid. 1965 (ed). p37.
- ¹²⁹ WU, Micha. 2007. p145.
- ¹³⁰ Ibid. 2007. p145.
- ¹³¹ Ibid. 2007. p145.
- ¹³² Ibid. 2007. p145.
- ¹³³ Ibid. 2007. p183.
- ¹³⁴ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. pp8-9.
- ¹³⁵ Ibid. 1997. p19.
- ¹³⁶ TAKEKOSHI, Yosaburō. 1978 (ed). pp155-156.
- ¹³⁷ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. *Taiwan Tongzhi yu Apian Wenti*. Qianwei Publishing: Taiwan ROC. pp63-64.
- ¹³⁸ Ibid. 2008. p71.
- ¹³⁹ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p22.

-
- ¹⁴⁰ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p66.
- ¹⁴¹ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. *Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering*. Routledge: Academia Sinica on East Asia: US & UK. p113.
- ¹⁴² LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. *Taiwan Tongzhi yu Apian Wenti*. Qianwei Publishing: Taiwan ROC. p124.
- ¹⁴³ Ibid. 2008. p72.
- ¹⁴⁴ TSURUMI, Yūsuke. 1965 (ed). p262.
- ¹⁴⁵ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p90.
- ¹⁴⁶ Ibid. 2008. p90.
- ¹⁴⁷ Ibid. 2008. p91.
- ¹⁴⁸ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p116.
- ¹⁴⁹ Ibid. 1997. p27.
- ¹⁵⁰ Ibid. 1997. p116.
- ¹⁵¹ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. p113.
- ¹⁵² TAKEKOSHI, Yosaburō. 1978 (ed). p157.
- ¹⁵³ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. p117.
- ¹⁵⁴ Ibid. 2009. p117.
- ¹⁵⁵ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p8.
- ¹⁵⁶ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p104
- ¹⁵⁷ Ibid. 2008. p104.
- ¹⁵⁸ Ibid. 2008. pp98-99.
- ¹⁵⁹ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p26.
- ¹⁶⁰ Ibid. 1997. p115.
- ¹⁶¹ Ibid. 1997. p23.
- ¹⁶² Ibid. 1997. p23.
- ¹⁶³ Ibid. 1997. pp23-24.
- ¹⁶⁴ TAKEKOSHI, Yosaburō. 1978 (ed). p163.
- ¹⁶⁵ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p109.
- ¹⁶⁶ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. pp150-151.
- ¹⁶⁷ TSURUMI, Yūsuke. 1965 (ed). p158.
- ¹⁶⁸ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. pp98-99. & CHEN, Ching-Chih. "The Japanese Adaptation of the Pao-Chia System in Taiwan, 1895-1945"; in: *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Feb., 1975). pp395-397.
- ¹⁶⁹ CHEN, Ching-Chih. 1975. p397.
- ¹⁷⁰ TSURUMI, Yūsuke. 1965 (ed). p157.
- ¹⁷¹ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. pp102-103.
- ¹⁷² CHEN, Ching-Chih. 1975. p397. & TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. pp99-105.
- ¹⁷³ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. pp99-105.
- ¹⁷⁴ Ibid. 2009. p106.
- ¹⁷⁵ TSURUMI, Yūsuke. 1965 (ed). pp156-157.
- ¹⁷⁶ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. pp105-109.
- ¹⁷⁷ CHEN, Ching-Chih. 1975. p393.
- ¹⁷⁸ WU, Mi-Zha. 2007. *Taiwan-shi Shō Jiten*. Chūgoku Shoten: Japan. pp152-153.
- ¹⁷⁹ TSURUMI, Yūsuke. 1965 (ed). p159.
- ¹⁸⁰ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. p104.
- ¹⁸¹ CHEN, Ching-Chih. 1975. pp404-405.
- ¹⁸² TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. p117.
- ¹⁸³ CHEN, Ching-Chih. 1975. p399.
- ¹⁸⁴ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. p105.
- ¹⁸⁵ CHEN, Ching-Chih. 1975. p406.
- ¹⁸⁶ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. p137.
- ¹⁸⁷ Ibid. 2009. p117.
- ¹⁸⁸ CHANG, Hanyu & MYERS, Ramon H. 1963. p439.
- ¹⁸⁹ Ibid. 1963. p440.
- ¹⁹⁰ ZHOU, Huimin. 2010. Professor Zhou is my academic advisor. He told me this.
- ¹⁹¹ Ibid. 2011.

- ¹⁹² HSU, Hungbin. 2008. *From Smokers to Addicts: A History of Opium and Its Users in Taiwan*. University of London Thesis: UK. pp273-274.
- ¹⁹³ Ibid. 2008. p269.
- ¹⁹⁴ Ibid. 2008. p279.
- ¹⁹⁵ Ibid. 2008. p272.
- ¹⁹⁶ Ibid. 2008. p270.
- ¹⁹⁷ Ibid. 2008. p283.
- ¹⁹⁸ Ibid. 2008. p284.
- ¹⁹⁹ Ibid. 2008. p285.
- ²⁰⁰ TSURUMI, Patricia E. 1977. *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945*. Harvard University Press: UK & US. p148.
- ²⁰¹ Ibid. 1977. p24.
- ²⁰² Ibid. 1997. p24.
- ²⁰³ Ibid. 1997. p24.
- ²⁰⁴ HSU, Hungbin. 2008. p269.
- ²⁰⁵ The Philippine Commission. 1906. *Report of The Committee Appointed by The Philippine Commission to Investigate The Use of Opium and The Traffic Therein and The Rules, Ordinances and Laws Regulating Such Use and Traffic in Japan, Formosa, Shanghai, HongKong, Saigon, Singapore, Burma, Java and The Philippine Islands*. Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department: US. p63.
- ²⁰⁶ Ibid. 1906. p64.
- ²⁰⁷ Ibid. 1906. pp64-65.
- ²⁰⁸ Ibid. 1906. p68.
- ²⁰⁹ Ibid. 1906. p70.
- ²¹⁰ Ibid. 1906. p70.
- ²¹¹ Ibid. 1906. p70.
- ²¹² HSU, Hungbin. 2008. p302.
- ²¹³ Ibid. 2008. p305.
- ²¹⁴ Ibid. 2008. p304.
- ²¹⁵ The Philippine Commission. 1906. p185.
- ²¹⁶ Ibid. 1906. p70.
- ²¹⁷ WU, Micha. 2007. p154.
- ²¹⁸ The Philippine Commission. 1906. p69.
- ²¹⁹ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. p137.
- ²²⁰ The Philippine Commission. 1906. p235.
- ²²¹ TS'AI, Caroline Huiyu. 2009. p113.
- ²²² Ibid. 2009. p115.
- ²²³ The Philippine Commission. 1906. p70.
- ²²⁴ CHUANG, Yih-chyi. 2010. "Economic Development of Taiwan" class notes taken by author. International Masters in Asia-Pacific Studies, National Chengchi University: Taiwan ROC.
- ²²⁵ HO, Samuel P.S. "The Economic Development of Colonial Taiwan: Evidence and Interpretation"; in: *The Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol. 34, No. 2 (Feb., 1975). p421.
- ²²⁶ Ibid. 1975. p420.
- ²²⁷ Ibid. 1975. p436.
- ²²⁸ Taiwanpedia. 2010-12-04. "Iwai Tatsumi".
<http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=19966&Keyword=%E7%A5%9D%E8%BE%B0%E5%B7%B3>
- ²²⁹ CHUANG, Yih-chyi. 2010.
- ²³⁰ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p54.
- ²³¹ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p97.
- ²³² Ibid. 2008. p101.
- ²³³ Ibid. 2008. pp128-129.
- ²³⁴ Ibid. 2008. pp128-129.
- ²³⁵ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p109.
- ²³⁶ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p24 & p29.

- ²³⁷ League of Nations. 1931. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume II: Detailed Memoranda on Each Territory visited by the Commission.* pp416-417.
- ²³⁸ Ibid. 1997. p29.
- ²³⁹ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p126.
- ²⁴⁰ Ibid. 2008. pp115-116.
- ²⁴¹ ZHOU, Huimin. 2011. Personal communication.
- ²⁴² SHIMAZU, Naoko. 1998. *Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919.* Routledge: US & Canada. p181.
- ²⁴³ Ibid. 1998. p186.
- ²⁴⁴ FOLEY, Hamilton. 1969 (first published: 1923). *Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations: Compiled with his Approval by Hamilton Foley.* Princeton University Press: US. pp214-215.
- ²⁴⁵ WHELAN, Anthony. "Wilsonian Self-Determination and The Versailles Settlement"; in: *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan., 1994). pp100-101.
- ²⁴⁶ Ibid. 1994. p100.
- ²⁴⁷ WU, Micha. 2007. p178.
- ²⁴⁸ League of Nations. 1932. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume III: Collection of Laws and Regulations governing the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Territories visited by the Commission of Enquiry.* p10.
- ²⁴⁹ League of Nations. 1931. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume II: Detailed Memoranda on Each Territory visited by the Commission.* p410.
- ²⁵⁰ League of Nations. 1932. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume III.* pp289-298. & The Philippine Commission. X. pp251-256.
- ²⁵¹ League of Nations. 1932. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume III.* pp289-290.
- ²⁵² League of Nations. 1930. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume I: Report with comparative Tables, Maps and Illustrations.* p142.
- ²⁵³ HSU, Hungbin. 2008. p315.
- ²⁵⁴ Ibid. 2008. p340.
- ²⁵⁵ JENNINGS, John. M. 1997. p25.
- ²⁵⁶ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p228.
- ²⁵⁷ JENNINGS, John. M. 1997. p115.
- ²⁵⁸ Encyclopedia of Taiwan. 28/12/2010. *Du Congming.*
<http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=5398&Keyword=%E6%9D%9C%E8%81%B0%E6%98%8E>
- ²⁵⁹ Danshui. 28/12/2010. *Du Congming Chronology.* <http://tamsui.yam.org.tw/tspe/t-c-m/tcm1.htm>
- ²⁶⁰ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. pp225-226.
- ²⁶¹ JENNINGS, John. M. 1997. p25.
- ²⁶² HSU, Hungbin. 2008. p315.
- ²⁶³ League of Nations. 1931. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume II: Detailed Memoranda on Each Territory visited by the Commission.* p101.
- ²⁶⁴ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p221.
- ²⁶⁵ Ibid. 2008. p223.
- ²⁶⁶ Ibid. 2008. p222.
- ²⁶⁷ Ibid. 2008. p223.
- ²⁶⁸ Encyclopedia of Taiwan. 23/12/2010. *Ishikawa Eizō.*
<http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=5310&Keyword=%E7%9F%B3%E5%A1%9A%E8%8B%B1%E8%97%8F>
- ²⁶⁹ HSU, Hungbin. 2008. p343.
- ²⁷⁰ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p231.
- ²⁷¹ HSU, Hungbin. 2008. p344.
- ²⁷² Ibid. 2008. pp358-359.
- ²⁷³ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p221.
- ²⁷⁴ Ibid. 2008. p206.

-
- ²⁷⁵ Ibid. 2008. p187.
- ²⁷⁶ Ibid. 2008. p195.
- ²⁷⁷ HSU, Hungbin. 2008. p307.
- ²⁷⁸ Ibid. 2008. p308.
- ²⁷⁹ Ibid. 2008. p308.
- ²⁸⁰ Ibid. 2008. pp307-308.
- ²⁸¹ HUANG, Zhaotang. 2002. *Taiwan Zongdufu*. Qianwei Publishing: Taiwan ROC. pp138-139.
- ²⁸² LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. pp184-185.
- ²⁸³ Ibid. 2008. pp184-185.
- ²⁸⁴ Ibid. 2008. pp185-186.
- ²⁸⁵ Ibid. 2008. p188.
- ²⁸⁶ KERR, George H. 1974. p149.
- ²⁸⁷ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p186.
- ²⁸⁸ HSU, Hungbin. 2008. p336.
- ²⁸⁹ Ibid. 2008. p335.
- ²⁹⁰ Ibid. 2008. p335.
- ²⁹¹ Ibid. 2008. p307.
- ²⁹² Ibid. 2008. p362.
- ²⁹³ League of Nations. 1931. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume II: Detailed Memoranda on Each Territory visited by the Commission.* p419.
- ²⁹⁴ Ibid. 1931. p422.
- ²⁹⁵ Ibid. 1931. p421.
- ²⁹⁶ Ibid. 1931. p421.
- ²⁹⁷ Ibid. 1931. p422.
- ²⁹⁸ Ibid. 1931. p427.
- ²⁹⁹ Ibid. 1931. p434.
- ³⁰⁰ Ibid. 1931. p435.
- ³⁰¹ JENNINGS, John. M. 1997. p23.
- ³⁰² Ibid. 1997. p23.
- ³⁰³ ³⁰³ League of Nations. 1931. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume II: Detailed Memoranda on Each Territory visited by the Commission.* p434.
- ³⁰⁴ JENNINGS, John. M. 1997. p23.
- ³⁰⁵ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. p223.
- ³⁰⁶ League of Nations. 1931. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume II: Detailed Memoranda on Each Territory visited by the Commission.* p424.
- ³⁰⁷ LIU, Mingxiu. 2008. pp115-116.
- ³⁰⁸ League of Nations. 1931. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume II: Detailed Memoranda on Each Territory visited by the Commission.* p226.
- ³⁰⁹ Ibid. 1931. *Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East: Report to the Council. Volume II: Detailed Memoranda on Each Territory visited by the Commission.* p226.
- ³¹⁰ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p55 & p71.
- ³¹¹ Ibid. 1997. p71.
- ³¹² Ibid. 1997. p55.
- ³¹³ Ibid. 1997. p126.
- ³¹⁴ KARCH, Steven B. 2006. p154.
- ³¹⁵ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997 p45.
- ³¹⁶ Ibid. 1997. p45.
- ³¹⁷ Ibid. 1997. pp54-57.
- ³¹⁸ MEYER, Kathryn. "Japan and the World Narcotics Traffic"; in: GOODMAN, Jordan *et. al.* 2007 (ed.). *Consuming Habits: Global and Historical Perspectives on How Cultures Define Drugs*. Taylor & Francis: UK.
- ³¹⁹ KERR, George H. 1974. p149.

-
- ³²⁰ Ibid. 1974. p148.
- ³²¹ DIKÓTTER, Frank, LARS Laamann & ZHOU, Xun. 2004. *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*. Hurst & Company: UK. p168.
- ³²² KARCH, Steven B. 2006. p146.
- ³²³ Ibid. 2006. pp152-153.
- ³²⁴ Ibid. 2006. p147.
- ³²⁵ Ibid. 2006. p149.
- ³²⁶ Ibid. 2006. p150.
- ³²⁷ Ibid. 2006. p149.
- ³²⁸ Ibid. 2006. p148.
- ³²⁹ Ibid. 2006. p148 & p155.
- ³³⁰ Ibid. 2006. p160.
- ³³¹ Ibid. 2006. pp150-151.
- ³³² JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. pp49-57.
- ³³³ BUELL, Raymond L. 1993. *The League of Nations: A Summary of its Organization and Accomplishments during Ten Years*. UMI: A Bell & Howell Co.: US. p3.
- ³³⁴ FOLEY, Hamilton. 1969 (first published: 1923). p213 & p217.
- ³³⁵ Ibid. 1969. pp217-218.
- ³³⁶ Ibid. 1969. p214.
- ³³⁷ NORTHEGE, F.S. 1986. *The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946*. Holmes & Meier Publishers: US. p2.
- ³³⁸ FOLEY, Hamilton. 1969 (first published: 1923). p217.
- ³³⁹ Ibid. 1969. p216.
- ³⁴⁰ Ibid. 1969. p216.
- ³⁴¹ Ibid. 1969. p215.
- ³⁴² Ibid. 1969. p214.
- ³⁴³ Ibid. 1969. p219.
- ³⁴⁴ Ibid. 1969. p227.
- ³⁴⁵ Ibid. 1969. p232.
- ³⁴⁶ Ibid. 1969. pp267-268.
- ³⁴⁷ International Opium Commission. 1909. *Report of the International Opium Commission, Shanghai, China, February 1 February 26, 1909. Vol. 1. Report of the Proceedings* P.S. King & Son. Publishers, Parliamentary and General Booksellers: UK. pp3-6.
- ³⁴⁸ Ibid. 1909. p12.
- ³⁴⁹ Ibid. 1909. p10.
- ³⁵⁰ Ibid. 1909. p10.
- ³⁵¹ Ibid. 1909. p10.
- ³⁵² Ibid. 1909. p9. & JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p63. &
- ³⁵³ McALLISTER, William B. 2000. *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History*. Routledge: US. pp28-29.
- ³⁵⁴ Ibid. 2000. pp28-29.
- ³⁵⁵ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p62.
- ³⁵⁶ International Opium Commission. 1909. p84.
- ³⁵⁷ McALLISTER, William B. 2000. pp28-29.
- ³⁵⁸ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p62.
- ³⁵⁹ Ibid. 1997. p62.
- ³⁶⁰ League of Nations. 1923. *International Opium Convention – Signed at The Hague, January 23rd, 1912: Protocols of Cloture – Signed at The Hague on January 23rd, 1912; July 9th, 1913; and June 25th 1914*.
- ³⁶¹ McALLISTER, William B. 2000. p33.
- ³⁶² League of Nations. 1923. p3.
- ³⁶³ Ibid. 1923. p3.
- ³⁶⁴ Ibid. 1923. p3.
- ³⁶⁵ Ibid. 1923. pp5-10.
- ³⁶⁶ Ibid. 1923. p5.
- ³⁶⁷ McALLISTER, William B. 2000. pp33-34.

-
- ³⁶⁸ League of Nations. 1923. p6.
- ³⁶⁹ TAKEKOSHI, Yosaburō. 1978 (ed). pp155-156.
- ³⁷⁰ League of Nations. 1923. p9.
- ³⁷¹ RENBORG, Bertil A. 1944. *International Drug Control: A Study of International Administration By and Through the League of Nations*. Kraus Reprint Co.: US. p15.
- ³⁷² League of Nations. 1923. pp18-23.
- ³⁷³ JENNINGS, John, M. 1997. p64.
- ³⁷⁴ Ibid. 1997. p64.
- ³⁷⁵ Ibid. 1997. p129.
- ³⁷⁶ Ibid. 1997. p45.
- ³⁷⁷ McALLISTER, William B. 2000. pp57-59.
- ³⁷⁸ League of Nations. 1925. *First Opium Conference, Geneva, November 3rd 1924 – February 11th 1925: Minutes and Annexes*. p3 & pp7-8.
- ³⁷⁹ League of Nations. 1925. *Records of the Second Opium Conference, Geneva, November 17th 1924 – February 19th 1925: Volume I: Plenary Meetings, Texts of The Debates*. pp7-10.
- ³⁸⁰ FOLEY, Hamilton. 1969 (first published: 1923). pp267-268.
- ³⁸¹ League of Nations. 1925. *Records of the Second Opium Conference, Geneva, November 17th 1924 – February 19th 1925: Volume I: Plenary Meetings, Texts of The Debates*. pp13-14.
- ³⁸² Ibid. 1925. pp13-14.
- ³⁸³ McALLISTER, William B. 2000. p47.
- ³⁸⁴ Ibid. 2000. pp57-59.
- ³⁸⁵ Ibid. 2000. pp57-58.
- ³⁸⁶ League of Nations. 1925. *First Opium Conference, Geneva, November 3rd 1924 – February 11th 1925: Minutes and Annexes*. p9.
- ³⁸⁷ League of Nations. 1925. *Records of the Second Opium Conference, Geneva, November 17th 1924 – February 19th 1925: Volume I: Plenary Meetings, Texts of The Debates*. pp14-15.
- ³⁸⁸ Ibid. 1925. pp14-15.
- ³⁸⁹ Ibid. 1925. pp14-15.
- ³⁹⁰ League of Nations. 1925. *First Opium Conference: Agreement, Protocol, Final Act*. Geneva, February 11th, 1925. pp3-12.
- ³⁹¹ Ibid. 1925. p3.
- ³⁹² League of Nations. 1925. *Records of the Second Opium Conference, Geneva, November 17th 1924 – February 19th 1925: Volume I: Plenary Meetings, Texts of The Debates*. pp503-539.
- ³⁹³ Japanese Foreign Ministry. 1925. *International Opium Conferences*. p160.
- ³⁹⁴ Ibid. 1925. p160.
- ³⁹⁵ League of Nations. 1932. *Conference on The Suppression of Opium-Smoking convened under Article XII of The Geneva Opium Agreement, 1925; Bangkok, November 9th to 27th, 1931; Minutes of The Meetings and Documents submitted to The Conference*.
- ³⁹⁶ League of Nations. 1925. *First Opium Conference: Agreement, Protocol, Final Act*. Geneva, February 11th, 1925. p4.
- ³⁹⁷ League of Nations. 1932. p6.
- ³⁹⁸ League of Nations. 1932. pp105-106.
- ³⁹⁹ McALLISTER, William B. 2000. pp88-89.
- ⁴⁰⁰ Ibid. 2000. p88.
- ⁴⁰¹ Ibid. 2000. p86 & p92.
- ⁴⁰² Ibid. 2000. p87.
- ⁴⁰³ League of Nations. 1932. p5.
- ⁴⁰⁴ Ibid. 1932. pp105-106. & RENBORG, Bertil A. 1944. pp21-23.
- ⁴⁰⁵ RENBORG, Bertil A. 1944. p22.
- ⁴⁰⁶ Ibid. 1944. p22.
- ⁴⁰⁷ Japanese Foreign Ministry. 1930. *Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Morphine*. p525.
- ⁴⁰⁸ Japanese Foreign Ministry. 1930. *Bangkok International Opium Conference*.
- ⁴⁰⁹ BURNS, Susan. "Constructing the National Body: Public Health and the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Japan"; in: BROOK, Timothy & SCHMID, André. 2000. *Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities*. University of Michigan Press: US.

⁴¹⁰ BEASLEY, William G. 2000. *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change Since 1850*. St. Martin's Press: UK. pp62-63.

