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Globalization, Sustainable Development, and Cross-Straits Relations: Shanghai and Taipei Compared

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Introduction

This paper explores three major forces of local state development in Shanghai and Taipei: economic globalization, sustainable development, and cross-Taiwan Straits relations. Shanghai has endeavored to "create" and "rebuild" its global city status since the early 1990s. The rebuilding process is different from the Western experience of service-oriented global city formation. Strong state intervention is generally rooted in the historical path of China's Socialist system and uniquely focused in Shanghai's role in China's development since 1949. Now, in order to deepen globalization and promote sustainable development in the next stage, integrating mechanisms of collaborative local governance have become an urgent task for Shanghai.

Taipei has joined the international division of labor since the 1960s, decades ahead of Shanghai's "rebirth" process. From the quantitative aspects, Taipei is not tantamount to Shanghai as a mega-city in the region. Both Taipei and Shanghai tried to embrace globalization, but with different paths and approaches. Due to the change of general political environment in Taiwan, Taipei has less support from above. Instead of command and control style of management, Taipei has endeavored to develop new mechanisms of collaborative governance. The capacities and autonomy of local Taipei state are obviously weaker compared to traditional developmental state standards. The ultimate goal of transferring Taipei, however, is to develop new drives to balance global as well as local interests. The case of Taipei demonstrates different paths of service-centered global city paradigms.

The first part of this paper introduces the impact of the transitional dynamics of globalization on the role of local government and local

governance, followed by a discussion of the "developmental state" model of state intervention of national development. The case of Shanghai demonstrates that the developmental trajectory is produced collectively by both globalization and strong state intervention. For the case of Taipei, this paper focuses more on the strength of the civil society in accommodating a balanced path of development. The cases of environmental protection and sustainable development are selected to emphasize the ecological aspects of global city formation. The last section introduces the case of cross-Straits direct air links to demonstrate the tug-of-war between the central and local government to grasp the opportunity of globalization. The concluding part pinpoints the future research agenda for comparison and generalization.

Dynamics in the era of Globalization

Globalization signifies a transitional process of sovereignty and state power. Literature on globalization and global change emphasizes that global networks boosted by capitalist agencies will coexist with the sovereign state for a long period. In other words, the sovereign state will not "demise" but transform. The transformation process will create new actors in both the state and society. The top-down method of state control will be replaced by "global governance," which focuses on the accommodation of competing interests.

The other side of the coin on global governance is the rise of local government and local governance. Local government and local governance play crucial roles in the process of globalization and state transformation. As Saskia Sassen notes, missing from the abstract model of "retreat of the state" arguments about globalization are the actual processes, activities, and infrastructures crucial to the implementation of globalization. Overlooking the

spatial dimension of economic globalization and overemphasizing the information dimensions have both served to distort the role played by major cities in the current phase of economic globalization. Including local governments in the analysis adds three important dimensions to the study of economic globalization.

First, this approach breaks down the nation-state into a variety of components that may be significant in understanding international economic activities.

Second, it shifts our attention from the power of large corporations over governments and economies to the range of activities and organizational arrangements necessary for the implementation and maintenance of a global network of factories, service operations, and markets.

Third, it contributes to a new focus on place and on the urban social and political order associated with these global network activities. Focusing on localities and cities allows us to specify geography of "strategic places" on a global scale, as well as micro-geographies and the politics unfolding within these places.

The importance of local authorities and cities in the process of globalization is demonstrated in Monica Varsanyi's argument that, in the era of globalization, we have to understand how various social forces within cities create trans-state flows. Studying local momentum allows us to get at the place-based processes; that is, the ways in which social, political, cultural and economic processes at the local level connected with global dynamics.[1] In essence, this approach is an attempt to understand the dynamics of

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[1] Monica W. Varsanyi, "Global Cities from the Ground up," *Political Geography.* (Nov. 19, 2000).

globalization from a "bottom-up" perspective in which we are more concerned with how various political and economic interests within a city are captured by the allure of globalization.

Cities then emerge as "agents" of globalization. In reality, a city occupies a position that reflects its relative importance in the spatial articulation of economic and financial activities, its relative economic power. Hence, the process of globalization is a significant reallocation of economic coordination and steering functions away from the sovereign state, up to the international and down to the regional levels.

The status of cities as agents of globalization is changing. The following factors affect cities' futures and statuses in the era of globalization: (1) the changes in exogenous political circumstances; (2) the economic restructuring under global competitive conditions, coupled with a city's ability creatively to respond to exogenous changes; (3) the intercity competition and cooperation; and (4) the socially and environmentally unsustainable growth.[2]

However, the ascendance of sub-national governments in the global economy does not mean the total retreat of the state. The globalization of finance and corporate services is embedded in a grid of strategic sites, which are partly embedded in national territories. Firms that operate globally still require the guarantee of rights of property and contract they expect within national territories. The new geography of global economic processes and the strategic territories for economic globalization had to be produced, in terms of corporate actors' practices and requisite infrastructure and in terms of the state's work in producing or legitimating new legal regimes. Characterizing the

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[2] John Friedmann, "World City Futures," paper presented in the Mega-city Workshop held at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, (Hong Kong), (14-20 October 1996).

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national state as simply losing significance fails to capture this very important dimension, and reduces what is happening to a function of the global national duality—what one wins when the other loses. Deregulation of economic activities should be viewed not simply as a loss of control by the state. Deregulation is also a crucial mechanism to negotiate the juxtaposition of 1) the inter-state consensus to pursue globalization and 2) national legal systems remaining the major or crucial instantiation through which guarantees of contract and property rights are enforced.[3]

The Rise of "Local Developmental State"

In recent years, foreign as well as Chinese academics attempted to borrow models of East Asian NICs development to analyze the post 1978 China. Considering the differences in size as well as economic systems, scholars have tried to put the "developmental state" model within the local Chinese context. Terms like "local developmental state "have emerged in academic work to compare similarities and differences between China's local state and East Asian developmental states.

The original developmental state thesis could be characterized by the following aspects:

(1) A coherent, effective bureaucratic system. The system is led by "technocrats" and "pilot organizations." Rational bureaucrats initiate policies pertinent to the export-led growth of development, and avoid "rent-seeking" behaviors;

(2) An authoritarian political system to suppress political as well as economic

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[3] Saskia Sassen, "Losing Control? The State and the New Geography of Power," paper presented at the Global Forum on Regional Development Policy, (Nagoya, Japan), (1-4 December 1998), p. 15

demands from the society. The authoritarian system protects the state's autonomy from social penetration;

(3) Direct intervention into economic life. The state picks the "winner" and reorganizes domestic business structures to implement economic goals initiated by the bureaucracies; and

(4) Embedded in a Confucian political culture emphasizing "public" instead of "private" interests. This cultural background fosters the emergence of a strong state.

In the era of globalization, the developmental state framework was revised to emphasize the impacts of global forces on the state-business relationship. Among the strong "statist" contributors to this revision, Linda Weiss points to a new role of state in the process of globalization. She indicates four key dimensions as disciplined support, public risk absorption, private sector governance, and public-private innovation alliance.[4] In addition, Sean O'Rian adopts a different approach to revise the developmental state model of economic policy-making. O'Rian's "flexible developmental state" (FDS) adopts different strategies in the era of globalization. To cope with challenges of globalization, and to accommodate the new state-business relations, the FDS developed new strategies of building local networks of production and innovation, and encourage indigenous firms to globalize. According to O'Rian, the FDS plays a key role in fostering "better" connections between the state and the global economy.[5] Both Weiss and O'Rian

[4] Linda Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 70-80.
[5] Sean O'Rian, "The Flexible Developmental State: Globalization, Information Technology, and the Celtic Tiger", *Politics and Society,* (Vol. 28, No.2, June 2000), pp. 163-165.

emphasize the transformation toward "selective intervention" of state power in the era of globalization. The whole process of globalization is a kind of "organized irresponsibility." Corporations with the advantages of mobility and a global network are able to weaken individual states by playing one against the other.[6] Instead of total retreat, states need to restructure capacities to cope with the rising demands from the business community. In principal, individual countries respond similarly to the forces of globalization, and they are therefore forced to compete with each other by offering attractive packages of legislation to corporate citizens.[7]

On the other hand, globalization will be "embedded" in specific places. As Saskia Sassen points out, global processes are structured by local constraints, including the composition of the local workforce, its work culture, and its prevailing political culture and processes. Processes of economic globalization are constituted as concrete production complexes situated in specific places. This has the effect of adding to the focus of corporations over governments and economies, to a focus on the range of corporate activities, and to organizational arrangements that implement and maintain a global network.[8]

Globalizing Shanghai and Enhancing Local Governance

The preceding analyses demonstrate the literature of global city formation and the role of the state in accommodating global development and global change. Since East Asian cities, like Tokyo and Seoul, are embedded in a

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[6] Ulrich Beck, "Redefining Power in the Global Age: Eight Theses", *Dissent*, (Fall, 2001), p. 86.

[7] Ronen Palan, "Recasting Political Authority: Globalization and the State" in Randall Germain ed., *Globalization and its Critics* (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000), p. 158.

[8] Saskia Sassen, "Cities and Communities in the Global Economy," *American Behavioral Scientis,* (Vol. 39, No. 5, March/April, 1996), pp. 631 & 636.

political environmental with strong state intervention, scholars argue that the growth paths of East Asian cities are closely linked with the nature of central government. They argue that the "global city paradigm" is not suitable for East Asian cases.[9] Incorporating many key features of the central governments in East Asian is pertinent to understand the local policies and dynamics of major cities.

Whether the "global city" model could be applied to Shanghai is a fresh academic topic for elaboration. The academic community in Shanghai has expressed strong research interests in applying similar models to analyze the rise of Shanghai in the global marketplace. Many research institutes developed various indicators to measure the global competitiveness of Shanghai. Shanghainese scholars also provide policy recommendations based on these indicators. For instance, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences has emphasized the following points as major steps toward the global city status:

(1) to speed up the construction of financial center and attract the multi-national corporations (MNCs) to set up the global and regional headquarters;

(2) to promote innovative spirits by high-tech developments;

(3) to improve Shanghai's basic infrastructure;

(4) to enhance economic cooperation with neighboring regions;

(5) to invest more on the development of human resources and human capital;

(6) to solve the problems of "floating population;" and

(7) To re-adjust the role of city authorities in governing social changes and

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[9] Richard Hill and June Woo Kim, "Global Cities and Developmental States: New York, Tokyo and Seoul", Urban Studies, (No. 12, 2000), pp. 2167-2195.

developments.[10]

Like Tokyo and Seoul, the major difference between "Western" global cities and Shanghai is the strong hand of state intervention. In other words, the emergence of global cities in London and New York is the natural result of capitalist development. Shanghai clearly demonstrates the intentions and capacities of state intervention from both urban and central levels. Shanghai also challenges the optimistic views about "the retreat of the state" in the era of globalization. As the path of Shanghai's post 1992 development shows, the "new Shanghai" was not created by multi-national corporations. Even for the western global cities like London, the rise of a financial center in the city region is promoted by state deregulation and privatization policies.[11] Deregulation efforts could not be undertaken solely by the local government. The central government plays a key role in laying the legal and regulatory foundations of a global city, especially in the service sector.

The reemergence of Shanghai in the last decade of the 20th century is closely linked to political changes in the central government and to the political will of the paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping. During Mao's era, Shanghai was transformed from "Paris in the East" to a manufacturing center for consumer goods and to a center for light industries. Shanghai was the most important source of China's tax revenues for more than four decades after the Communist took over in 1949. During the ten years of Cultural Revolution, the

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[10] Yin Jizuo ed., *Jianshe Shijie Chengshi* (Building a World City), (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 2003); Wang Ronghua ed., *Goujian Hexie Fazhan de Shijie Chengshi* (Building a Harmonious World City), (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 2005). Zuo Xuejin and Chen Wei ed., Shanghai Jingji Fazhan Baogao, 2006-2007 (Report on Shanghai's Economic Development, 2006-2007) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2007)

[11] Anthony King, *Global Cities: Post-Imperialism and the Internationalization of London* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 87.

"Gang of Four" had close relationships with political and economic forces in the Shanghai region. When Deng launched reforms in 1978, Shanghai was a highly politicized city with shady infrastructure supporting a huge population. Even during the first decade of Deng's reform in the 1980s, Shanghai was financially squeezed to serve as a stabilizing factor supporting the reform acts and experiments in the southern province of Guangdong. When Deng launched the Pudong Project to "rebuild" Shanghai in 1992, policy-makers and city planners faced the following severe challenges:

(1) Over-concentration of population and industry clusters in the urban center;

(2) Mixed usages of industrial and residential spaces in the downtown area;

(3) Serious shortage of urban housing;

(4) Outdated urban infrastructure; and

(5) Environmental deterioration in the urban region.[12]

These five challenges are intertwined, and need a strong hand to solve all the related issues. Relocation of urban industries and provision of housing are cornerstones of the rebuilding process. Various estimations from 1993 to 1997 indicate that the Shanghai Municipal government relocated more than 700 state-owned enterprises and created three square kilometers of space in the city center known as the Central Business District.[13] Relocation of residential areas in the city center was also a process of social and cultural re-engineering.

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[12] Shahid Yusuf and Weiping Wu, *The Dynamics of Urban Growth in Three Chinese Cities* (Oxford: Oxford Univresity Press, 1997).

[13] Fulong Wu, "The Global and Local Dimensions of Place Making: Remaking Shanghai as a Global City," *Urban Studies*, (Vol. 37, No. 8, 2000), pp. 1367-1371; Sun Sheng Han, "Shanghai between state and market in urban transformation," *Urban Studies,* (Vol. 37, No. 11, 2000).

The author's personal interviews demonstrate that the relocation program created new problems of social accommodation and adaptation, especially among senior citizens. The relocation programs created "losers" and "winners" in the transitional period. The strong leading role of the city authorities facilitated the reconstruction process of the Puxi area and built up the Pudong region from scratch.   This was a "top down" revolution of social redistribution in Shanghai in the mid until late 1990s.

The local state in Shanghai also intervened actively to promote the emergence of the service sector. The rise of Shenzhen and other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) were characterized by the concentration of manufacturing-oriented, labor-intensive industries. In contrast, planners in Shanghai explored a new role that of a service-oriented global city, to lead Shanghai into the rank of global cities in two decades. The rebirth of Shanghai in the 1990s was not the outcome implicit in "crossing the river by touching the stone". The Shanghai government postulated substantial plans before large-scale city construction, and aimed at transforming Shanghai into a financial, trade, and service center. The "new high tech" or "Silicon Valley in the East" became the major goal of Shanghai's efforts in attracting foreign direct investment. Pudong thus added more than 100 square Kilometer of urban space in ten years.[14] The development of Shanghai in general and Pudong in particular benefited from preferential policies by the central government. In 1995, the central government allowed Pudong to enjoy the same preferential treatment of tax exemptions on imported equipments and resources, as shared by Shenzhen. Shanghai also enjoyed more autonomy in approving foreign

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[14] Xitang Yao, "Pudong Kiafa Kaifang Shinien de Huigu" (The Ten Year Review of the Opening Policy of Pudong), *Shehui Kexue*, (No. 5, 2000), p. 3.

direct investments and branch offices of multinational corporations.

Contrary to the original design, "big government, small society" has become the reality of governing Shanghai. The city government plays the role of regulator and arbitrator of market operations. In addition, the city government participates and invests directly in the market and, more or less, distorts the market mechanism, intervening directly in practically all aspects of community construction. For instance, special incentives were created to attract more foreign direct investments. These incentives are implemented by different branches of the urban administration, and can be regarded as the local state linkage between localized forces and global interests.

Enterprises managed directly by the city government are also still active in the market place. In addition, the city government is the biggest owner of the real estate in Shanghai. As the biggest "landlord," the city government posses a unique power to redistribute economic interests and manipulate the market mechanism. The real estate is also one major source of revenue to the city government. This financial source enhances the distribution capacity of the city government and thus strengthens the autonomy of the local administration.

A global city needs a local base for market development to create grass-root momentum for capitalist developments. In other words, to buttress their sustainability in the domestic soil, foreign investment and foreign capital have to be embedded and allied with local market forces. The heritage of the state-owned enterprises from the Maoist era and the impact of strong intervention have deterred the development of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in Shanghai. However, a strong base of small and medium-sized enterprises could lay a solid foundation for bottom-up dynamics,

creating the capitalist spirit from below. The SMEs could also form localized business networks to absorb labor and the younger generations of business talents. The emergence of private-owned local SMEs could promote also localized practices of corporate governance in Shanghai. The lack of SMEs may be a side effect of strong city government actions to intervene and even create the market in Shanghai.

Governing Environmental Issues in a Global City

Efforts of Shanghai in the rebuilding a global city also demonstrate the characteristic of a "dual city" as Eugene McCann argues.[15] The first driving force of Shanghai is led by the "growth machine," as discussed in the preceding pages. The growth machine model of development is dominated by a strong "pro-growth coalition." The main actors of this coalition include the Chinese central government, local authorities in Shanghai, and the global capitalists.

The second driving force of the "dual city" is the "green growth machine" or "urban livability coalition." This coalition provides alternative paths of development which are different from the economy-dominated model of development. Through the mechanism of "collaborative governance" between the state and society, the urban authorities form various alliances with non-governmental sectors and quasi-governmental bodies to achieve a balanced goal of economic development, environmental protection, and social justice. In other words, the second path of development in a global city focuses on the "governance" aspect of state-society interaction. Interactions between

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[15] McCann, Eugene. "Urban Political Economy beyond the Global City," *Urban Studies*, (Vol. 41, Issue 10, Nov, 2004).

state sectors and major activists in the civil society such as the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) create a dynamic driving force for the emergence of a sustainable global city.

The interaction between the state and society in Shanghai is embedded in the special political environment of China. The collaborative governance of sustainable development in Shanghai is influenced by the institutional environment in China as a whole. Given the problem of registering as a social organization, many NGOs dress in camouflage in China. There are several ways of doing this: register as an enterprise or as a subsidiary organization under a façade institution; establish an informal "club" or "salon;" or avoid registration altogether. Social associations that formally registered are generally organized by those with strong connections to the government. Many government institutions in Shanghai have set up "Government Organized Non Governmental Organizations," (GONGOs) partly to devolve certain government functions to the market because of budgetary pressures, and partly with the purpose of attracting foreign funding.[16]

As compared to the mushrooming of ENGOs in Beijing, Shanghainess ENGOs are less active in setting the agenda and pressing further policy changes. The Chinese central regulations do not allow nation-wide coalitions of environmental organizations. Many active ENGOs in Beijing, such as Friend of Nature (FON) and Beijing Global Village, do not have formal branches in Shanghai. However, these Beijing-based ENGOs still maintain some "informal" activities in Shanghai. Environmental volunteers from Shanghai also

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[16] Peter Ho, "Greening without Conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs and Civil Society in China," *Development and Change*, (Vol. 32, 2001), p. 904.

participate in many activities organized by other cities and regions in China.[17]

Given that bottom-up pressures to improve the environmental situations are relatively weak in Shanghai, the command and control methods of environmental management play the dominant role in promoting sustainable development. The top-down style of environmental management has achieved some significant improvement in Shanghai's environmental situation, such as the Suzhou River project. Recently, city authorities in Shanghai began to put more energy into developing collaborative mechanisms with social actors in environmental management, including international as well as domestic enterprises. The annual reports of Shanghai's development released by the Shanghai Academy of Social Science include special volumes on the sustainable development of Shanghai. The "management" aspects of environmental protection occupy most of the discussions. The responsibilities of enterprises are widely discussed in the annual reports. Nonetheless, the roles of ENGOs in environmental governance are practically neglected in the reports.[18]

However, some GONGOs in Shanghai have gradually developed positive interactions with the governmental branches and enterprises. For instance, Chinese Real Estate Alliance, Shanghai Landscape Association, and Shanghai Ecological Association have cooperated with the private sector and governmental branches to promote wetland protection in Qingpu and Songjiang regions in suburban Shanghai. The Shanghai Home Lovers'

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[17] Interview with a retired official of Shanghai's Environmental Protection Bureau, July 10, 2007, Shanghai.

[18] For instance, Jizuo Yin ed., *An Environment and Resource Bluebook of Shanghai*, 2003: *Making Great Efforts to Realize Environment's Sustainable Development* (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 2004); Lingyi Wang, ed., An Environmental and Resource Bluebook of Shanghai, 2005: Limited Resources, Unlimited Vigor (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 2006).

Association (SHLA) has become the most important grass-root ENGO in recent years. Instead of large-scale protest campaigns to press for policy changes, the SHLA tries to develop cooperative mechanisms with local communities, especially the Street Bureau (Jiedao Ban) and Residents' Committee (Juwei Hui) level. Like many other ENGOs around the world, the SHLA lacks financial resources and personnel supports.

While not formally affiliated with any governmental branches, the operation has the permission of city government of Shanghai. In 2004 to 2005, the SHLA organized workshops in the Pudong district to train volunteers for environmental knowledge and expertise. However, the declining number of registered volunteers to participate in the workshops has frustrated the leadership of the SHLA.[19] The SHLA is endeavoring to expand its influence from the local residential communities to the local elementary schools through various educational schemes. SHLA is now trying to cooperate with the elementary schools to help train teachers and spread knowledge about sustainable development. SHLA is also planning to ally with other grass-root ENGOs in the adjacent Jiangsu province to form a pan-Yangtze Delta environmental organization.

There is still a long way to go in the formation of a collaborative governance mechanism for sustainable development in Shanghai. The root cause of the lack of governance mechanism is the weakness of civil society in Shanghai. As Peng Bo argues, the cooperation between the state and society in China is a product of the inability to rely exclusively on administrative bodies, rather than a search for efficiency. In Shanghai, the constituent parts of the transversal networks are mostly organs of the central administration, even

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[19] The author's personal interview in Janauray, 2006.

though non-governmental organizations play their parts. These networks can only provide a framework that is part of the structure of governance. Social participation in Shanghai lacks substantial independent status.[20] The gradual emergence of Shanghai's civil society needs leading organizations to guide the direction and tempo of local governance. At the current stage, such mediation organizations still lack substantial capacities and autonomy in Shanghai.

Local state and environmental Governance in Taipei

As the preceding analyses demonstrate, the "livable" aspect of a globalizing city has become one of the major focuses for examining the essence of globalization. Different from the top-down style of strong administrative intervention, the case of Taipei reflects the political change in Taiwan in general and the rise of Environmental Non-Governmental Organization (ENGO) in particular. The capacities of the local state of Taipei city is constrained by the political environment in Taiwan and political change in Taipei. The rise of local political interests and ENGOs in local environmental governance in the greater Taipei area impose two significant impacts to local governance in a global city like Taipei. First, cooperative instead of confrontational mechanism between the state and society could be established after the maturation of the environmental movement. On the other hand, electoral politics and local community concerns may still contradict with goals of sustainable development. The following analyses will demonstrate the

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[20] Peng Bo, "State Control and Governance of Residential Communities: Community mediation in Shanghai", *China Perspectives*, (No. 57, January-February, 2005), pp. 21-22.

double-edged sword of political liberalization in promoting sustainable development in the greater Taipei region.

From the late 1990s to the present, Taiwanese ENGOs have mastered more complex skills in addressing governmental bureaucracies and accommodating domestic demands. Mass demonstrations are less raucous, and ENGOs have developed greater expertise in monitoring governmental policies. ENGOs have used results of opinion surveys and field research to expose Taiwan's environmental situation. ENGOs also have linked Taiwan's environmental issues to international environmental concerns. Environmentalists and local politicians have cultivated a special relationship of "struggle and co-existence." For instance, ENGOs and some local politicians promote use of the referendum to decide on major construction projects. In addition to focusing on community pollution and NIMBY effects, ENGOs have raised new environmental concerns such as wetlands protection and the conservation of biodiversity. This is reflected in passage of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) law in 1994 and revision of the wildlife protection laws in the mid-1990s.[21]

Environmental governance in Taipei reflects the general tendencies of sustainable development in Taiwan mentioned above. Past experiences showed that environmental amenity was always sacrificed by development concerns in Taipei.   Located in suburban Taipei metropolitan area, Guandu is a big piece of wetland and agriculture areas close to the mouth of Danshui River. Guandu is also rich in wildlife resources including wild bird and some

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[21] For a more comprehensive account on Taiwan's environmental movements , please refer to Gerald McBeath and Tse-Kang Leng, Governance of Biodiversity Conservation in China and Taiwan (London: Edward Elgar, 2006).

aboriginal plants. However, before the 1980s, Guandu was proposed by the Taipei City government as an ideal place of a satellite township to relieve the over-crowded city center. Other proposals of service-oriented programs to boost Taipei's global city status, such as establishing conference and exhibition centers, Super Dome, shopping malls, were under consideration. Most of these construction projects would hurt the biodiversity and environmental situation of the region in various degrees.

In 1984, the "Taipei Bird Association" (TBA), an environmental NGO originally organized by domestic scholars, was established to promote eco-tourism in the Guandu region. The major purpose was to promote wildlife preservation and sustainable development in the wetland area of Guandu. In the early 1980s, wild bird preservation in Guandu had become the major focus of activities of TBA such as "Wild Bird Festival of Guandu" in October, 1985. TBA successfully formed an alliance with Taipei City administration to persuade the Taipei City Council to approve the budget of Guandu Natural Park (GNP). However, the subsequent development in the second half of 1980s was not encouraging. The GNP proposal was incorporated into the General Guandu Construction Project, which was strongly opposed by the local residents due to environmental concerns. The delay of the GNP and lack of appropriate management led to disastrous outcomes in the region. . The wetland area became the garbage dumpster. Species of birds decreased from 139 to 47, according to various reports.

The turning point for the revival of GNP was the political change of Taipei in 1994. The first direct election of Taipei mayor was scheduled to be held in the end of 1994. The TBA grasped the chance to call public attention on the worsening situation of the Guandu area. A large-scale petition movement and

Wild Bird Festival were organized by TBA. These activities led to substantial media exposure and of course the attention of the major candidates. All the three mayor candidates promised the separation the GNP with Guandu Construction Plan. In order to build up an image of pro-ecological development, GNP was included in the future policy agenda once elected. TBA thus successfully pressed the new Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian to keep the campaign promise. A special budge of 1.5 billion NT was also approved by the Taipei City Council to establish the GNP in 1996. In reality, the ex-Mayor Huang Tachou had promised the TBA for the construction of Guandu Natural Park. The new mayor Chen Shui-bian honored the promise made by his predecessor.

The case of GNP demonstrates the cooperative mechanism developed by the Taipei city government and the ENGO. After the passage of the budget and confirmation of the project, the Taipei city government spent four years to construct the GNP. Instead of top-down style of management, the new GNP was entrusted to TBA for daily operation. Different units within the Taipei city bureaucracies also developed various cooperative relationship with TBA to organize activities and launch educational campaigns. TBA also formed alliances with local as well as international business communities to sponsor educational schemes of GNP. For instance, the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC) singed an agreement of four years with TBA to sponsor educational activities of wetland protection in 2004. These activities aimed at students of remote areas in Taiwan to teach them the importance of wetland protection. Bureau of Transportation of Taipei incorporated the GNP as part of "The Journey of a globalizing Taipei" in their annual promotion plans.

The case of the construction of Pinglin intersection of the Taipei-Ilan

Express provides another good example of the entangles between economic interests, environmental conservation, and political struggles in pursuing sustainable development in a major metropolitan area. .

The Taipei-Ilan Expressway is a 55-km long highway which cuts through the rugged Snow Mountain Range, Traverses River valleys, bypasses the idyllic Pinglin Township, and finally runs into Ilan County. Pinglin is located on the existing Taipei-Ilan highway, 38 km east of Taipei and 42 km west of Ilan. It takes around 3 hours of driving time using the current Taipei-Ilan highway. After the completion of the Taipei-Ilan Expressway, the driving time will be shortened to no more than 45 minutes.

The Pinglin Township is situated in rural southern Taipei County. The population is steady at about 6000-7000. In 1979, the Urban Development Law placed the Pinglin area under controls pertaining to Taipei's water catchments areas, and since then it has been extremely difficult to cultivate Pinglin's agricultural land and tourism. Nor can more buildings be put up to cater to any increase in population. However, Pinglin is an ideal location for tea cultivation. After Pinglin started winning first prizes in the provincial government's tea competitions, the Taiwanese government began to pay serious attention to Pinglin tea. Moreover, seeing the profitability of tea, almost all the local farmers began specializing in tea.[22]

Pinglin villagers have mixed feelings about the new Expressway, however, it might have been an three-hour crawl along the old Taipei-Ilan Highway between the two cities but at least the road went through Pinglin itself, bringing the tea growing village revenues. But the new US. $ 2 billion Expressway bypasses the village and residents worry about a loss of earnings. In order to

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[22] Lin I-hsien, "Pinglin, Tea Capital of Taipei County", *Sinorama,* http://www.sinorama.com.tw/ch/.

boost up the local economy, Pinglin residents have been agitating for an exit at their town. At first they said they needed it for emergency access, so the Taiwan Area National Expressway Engineering Bureau (TANEEB) of the Ministry of Transportation obliged them with an exit ramp. They then said that the emergency access ramp needed to be changed into a full-fledged interchange lest Pinglin lost its tourists to Ilan.[23]

The Pinglin area is environmentally sensitive for the biodiversity conservation and water supplies for the capital city of Taipei. The environmental groups are concerned with considerable justification that increased traffic in the area will increase emissions and ruin some habitats of the wildlife. However, local economic concerns put more pressures on the EPA for opening the "emergency control center" in Pinglin out of reasons for disasters alleviation for the Taipei-Ilan Expressway. In 1992, the EIA Committee passed the resolution to set up the Control Center but for only emergency usage. The emergency control center is open only for Pinglin residents and vehicles on public duties.

In 2003, the Pinglin Township passed the referendum to construct a formal Pinglin interchange of the Taipei-Ilan Expressway. The EPA lost the decade-long battle to resist pressures from local politicians. The passage of the referendum led to the resign of the Director of EPA Hau Long-pin. The referendum issue was soon escalated into a political controversy. President Chen Shui-bian tried to hold another nation-wide referendum on key issues on arms sales, national security and cross-Straits relations.[24] The national referendum was scheduled to be held together with the 2004 Presidential

[23] *Taipei Times*, February 21, 2005; Michael Fahey, "High Stakes at the Pinglin Interchange", http://publish.pots.com.tw/english/commentary/2005/09/29/379_18_commentary/
[24] *Zhongguo Shibao*, September 19, 2005

Election to increase Chen's popular votes. Hau, a member of the opposition New Pary, was accused of political manipulation on the Pinglin referendum case. The ruling DPP argued that Hau's opposition on the Pinglin referendum was not out of environmental concerns, but for the opposition toward the nation-wide referendum.[25]

The resign of Hau did not stop the controversy on the Pinglin case. The referendum was not carried out due to the delay of the completion of the Expressway. The issue reemerged on the eve of Taiwan's local election in the end of 2005. After a series of protested led by legislators and candidates for local office in Ilan, the TANEBB caved in and released an environmental impact assessment report on the Pinglin Interchange. The report was approved by the Task Force of EIA of EPA. Except for some restrictions, the EPA agrees to allow everybody could drive through Pinglin as long as the number of vehicles entering and staying in the Pinglin area was limited to 4,000 vehicles per day.

The decision jointly made by EPA and Ministry of Transportation (MOT) was under attack by ENGOs and many opposition politicians. From the legal perspective, the 2005 decision made by the Task Force of EIA is not consistent with the formal EIA resolution on the Taipei-Ilan Expressway in 1992, which allows only emergency usage instead of a formal interchange. According to the official procedure, resolution of the Task Force must be approved by the General Committee of EIA. Before the final approval, the 1992 resolution is still effective. Many ENGOs filed their protests and disappointment on the EPA Director Chang Kuo-long, a formal head of Taiwan's paramount environmental NGO Taiwan Environmental Protection Union.

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[25] *Taiwan Ribao*, September 15, 2003.

Even though the Task Force resolution set up many "precondition" of opening the Pinglin interchange to decrease the environmental impacts, people are skeptical about the implementation capacities of these treatments. For instance, the resolution requests the establishment of a supervision commission to control the entries of the vehicles, to prohibit new construction works, and to carry out sewage controls in the Pinglin area. The supervision commission is consisted of members from the EPA, MOT, Pinglin township representatives, and scholars. However, as former EPA Director Hau Long-pin argued, the real implementation units would be county and township administrations. Since the Commission lacks real power and authority for implementation, the county and township officers will certainly side with development and tourism projects and neglect real environmental issues.[26]

The issue of whether the Pinglin interchange would be opened has been at the heart of a political-tug-of-war which has escalated from local to national level of the past decade, as opening the interchange would obviously boost Pinglin's tourist numbers and consequently promote commercial development there, inevitably lead to pollution of the water resources and biodiversity in the region. Ironically, the pro-environment EPA became the partner instead of opponent of the development branches of the government. Political concerns of the 2005 local election distorted environmental rationality of the ruling DPP. In addition to the pro-development behavior of EPA direct Chang, many DPP politicians expressed their economic concerns to attract more votes. Chen Ding-nan, a DPP candidate of Ilan County magistrate and famous for rebuilding a environment-friendly Ilan some ten years ago, wrote to the Minister of MOT and EPA director , asking them to open the interchange to

[26] *Lien Ho Pao*, June 29, 2005, p. A15.

facilitate the development of Ilan and Pinglin. [27] In the case of Pinglin interchange, political manipulation prevails environmental concerns.

Political Constraints on Global City Formation: the Case of Cross-Strait Transportation Links

The proceeding analyses demonstrate different roles and style of governance of local state in Taipei and Shanghai. This section will discuss the impact of domestic politics on the international connections in the process of global city formation. For the impact of domestic politics on global cities, Kevin Ward and Andrew Jonas outline the framework of an alternative and complementary approach in which causal emphasis is placed on the shaping of sub-national state geographies by actually existing struggles and strategies developed around particular geographies of public and private investment and collective consumption, and their associated state fiscal, electoral, and regulatory arrangements. Ward and Jonas argue that the city-region continues to constitute a strategically vital arena for managing conflict and struggle in contemporary capitalism. [28] As Elvin Wyly argues, every city is the product of intersecting and cross-cutting networks. Understanding contemporary global city-system is both important and daunting, because we may pay careful attention to the nature and extent of networks in a variety of economic, cultural, and political domains. We must also study these networks as they appear in context, in a particular city, as well as the distant places to which that city is tied. [29]

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[27] *Taipei Times*, October 4, 2005, p. 3.
[28] Kevin Ward and Andrew Jonas, "Competitive City-regionalism as a politics of space: a Critical reinterpretation of the new regionalism ", *Environment and Planning A* (Vo.36, #12, 2004) pp.2119-2139.
[29] Elvin K. Wyly, "Contemporary Urbanization and Global City-Systems", Manuscript, 2006.

In addition to Sassen/Friedman tradition of studying internal social and political structure of global cities, scholars such as Professor Peter Taylor focuses on the external connections of these cities and utilizes quantitative data to analyze dynamics of such interaction.[30] Taylor argues that the world city network formation is modeled as an interlocking network wherein global service firms "interlock" cities through their everyday business. Thus the firms are the agents of the process whose outcome is the world city network. Taylor collects data of 80 global service firms and their offices across 315 cities worldwide. Data were collected in 2000 and 2004 enabling two cross-sectional analyses plus 2000 to 2004 change analyses. From these data the network connections are derived for individual cities; these measures indicate the degree of a city's integration into the word city network. According to Taylor's report, Taipei has the highest negative change from 2000 to 2004 in global connectivity. Shanghai gains the highest score in globalist orientation among four Chinese cities of Shanghai, Hong Kong, Beijing, and Taipei, while Taipei is in the bottom of the list.[31]

According to another survey about economic competitiveness in Chinese cities conducted by the China Academy of Social Sciences, Taipei is ranked number 2, one place after Hong Kong. Shanghai is ranked number 3. Taipei's advantages, as indicated in the report, include high-tech development, infrastructure, human resources and amenity. Hong Kong continues to demonstrate its strength in global financial management and other service-oriented industries. Shanghai's potential as a big consumer market

[30] Peter J. Taylor, *World City Network—A Global Urban Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2004).
[31] Peter J. Taylor, "Shanghai , Hong Kong, Taipei and Beijing within the World City Network: Positions, Trends and Prospects", paper presented at the Second World Forum for China Studies, September 2, 2006, Shanghai.

and strategic location put its position in the third place. [32]

These two surveys imply that in order to maintain its international competitiveness in global capital and human resources, enhancing Taipei's global reach and connectivity are crucial to dynamics of development in the future. One of the reasons why Taipei's position of international connectivity is declining in the past decade is the lack of direct air links with the other side of Taiwan Straits. According to various estimations, the lift of the ban on direct air links will save the transportation and related cost for over 3.8 billion NT dollars of the Taiwanese firms annually.[33] An engineer in a major Taiwanese IT company is Shanghai also indicated that without the direct air links, Taiwanese up-stream IT raw material and semi-finished producers have no choices but to move to China. The major concern for these firms is to provide major IT finished product manufacturers, such as notebook computer ODM companies, "fast" and "in time" services to meet the requirement from international Brand-holders. The realization of direct air inks may encourage the semi-finished product manufacturers to "leave the roots in Taiwan" and take advantages of direct air links to transport high value-added goods to China.[34] This is contrary to the official policies that opening the direct air links will expedite the "hollowing out" effect of the Taiwanese high-tech industries.

By contrast, the Taipei city administration, since KMT's Ma Ying-jiou became the mayor in 1998, has continued to push for the idea of direct air links with mainland Chinese cities.   Ma argued that the core idea of the direct links is to make Taipei a "regional springboard" for international capital and human

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[32] For a detailed analysis of the ranking, see Ni Pengfei ed., *Zhongguo Chengshi Jingzhengli Baogao* (Report on the Competitiveness of Chinese Cities), (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2007)
[33] *Gongshang Shibao*, June 17, 2006, A2
[34] Interview in Songjiang Township, Shanghai, July 12, 2007.

resources toward the global market. Otherwise, Taipei could only be oriented toward a "regional market" for domestic consumption.[35] Ma also argued that the direct links should not be linked with other sensitive political issues in Taiwan such as Taiwanese independence or reunification with China. What concerns most for the Taipei city administration is to make Taipei "the basis of Taiwanese business people for global expansion".[36] Under such grand plan, ex-Mayor Ma propose direct air routes between Songshan Airport in Taipei and Hongqiao Airport in Shanghai. This direct route connects two "domestic" airports in the downtown areas. The Songshan-Hongqiao route will shorten the time of air traffic from 7 to 2 hours. Under this proposal, Songshan Airport could also add more international connections to destinations in neighborhood areas such as Hong Kong and Macau. Taoyuan Airport, the existing international airport in Taiwan, could serve as the major hub for long-distance flights over two hours of traffic time, such as flights to Beijing and other mainland Chinese cities.

Ma's successor Hau Long-pin continues to push the Songshan project and plan to make Taipei as the center of "two-hour economic circle of greater China region". The new administration in Taipei emphasizes Taipei's advantages in high-quality human resources, advanced research institutions and universities, as well as major scientific-based clusters such as Neihu Science Park and Nangang Software Park. Hau also stresses on Taipei's strategic air-traffic positions in Asia-Pacific economies.   In order to globalize Taipei' reach to international supply chain and service sectors, realization of the direct air links play the key role.[37] According to Hau, Taipei's drives for

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[35] Taipei City Administration Press Release, September 26, 2004.
[36] Taipei City Administration Press Release, February 11, 2004.
[37] Hau Long-ping, *Message to the Taipei City Council,* March 27, 2007.

direct air links have to expand beyond the cross-Straits, city-to-city connections. The upgrading and re-orientation of Songshan airport will enhance Taipei's role as the pivotal hub of major economic powerhouses in China's Southeastern coastal areas, including the booming Yangtze River Delta area and Pearl River Delta Area.

However, the issue of direct links has been highly politicized in the Central level in Taiwan. During a interview with Financial Times, President Chen Shui-bian indicated that:

"Taiwan is absolutely not China's tributary or border region. This point is very important, this is absolutely basic. We must not for the sake of commercial profit or the convenience of contact give up Taiwan's separate identity. We must insist on Taiwan's own identity, Taiwan first………China's unite front tactics attempt to marginalize us, localize us, take away our sovereignty, and bypass our government. These are all changing the status quo, destroying the status quo."[38]

Chen's talks demonstrate that the direct air links issue is a "central" instead of a "local "concern. Refusing China's proposal of direct air links is to insist on Taiwan's sovereign, pride, and integrity. Beijing's position on the "three links" and direct air links issues were released by former Vice Premier Qian Qichen in 2003. Qian indicated that the Three Links is a "domestic affair" in nature; negotiations about Three Links are not the same as state-to-state talks on international air route agreement. However, since the Three Links is about economic cooperation between Taiwan and China, cross-Straits talks on related matters are technical and business in nature. It is not necessary to refer to the concrete political connotation of the "one China principle" during

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[38] "Exclusive Interview: Chen Shui-bian", *Financial Times*, Nov2, 2006. p.1

the negotiations.[39] China also suggested that before the realization of real direct air links, both sides have to expand the existing charter flight packages between assigned Chinese and Taiwanese cities into more comprehensive plans to cover major Chinese festivals into weekends. Flight destinations should be expanded to more coastal cities on the mainland. Based on past practices, the realization of direct air links could be negotiated by air industry associations in the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. From China's perspective, the "association-to-association" model is the best way to solve the current deadlock without involving too many political controversies.[40]

The official policy from the central level in Taiwan on the direct air links issues is to insist on the precondition of "international routes" to reopen talks with China. The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) argues that China has put forward many political obstacles for negotiation, such as "one China principle" and "1992 consensus". China also defined cross-Straits route as "domestic routes", which is unacceptable to Taiwan. From the MAC perspective, China has transformed the economic issue into a political one, causing difficulties in resuming cross-Straits negotiations. China's political attitude will not be acceptable to whoever is MAC Chairman.[41]

By contrast, Ma's solution about the nature of direct lines is to put it as "Cross-Straits Lines". It is neither international nor domestic route. The spirit to evade the sensitive sovereignty issue is to return to the 1992 consensus with "one China with separate interpretations".[42] China's proposal to reopen the

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[39] *Renmin Ribao,* July 1, 2004.
[40] Jia Qinglin, *Message to the Third Cross-Straits Economic and Cultural Forum*, April 28, 2007. Jia is the head of   Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.   *Xinhua Net*, April 28, 2007. From website of Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn.
[41] MAC Regular Press Briefing, October 20, 2006.
http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/macnews/enews/enews951020.htm
[42] *CAN News*, August 10, 2007.

talks through civilian associations from the two sides is rejected by the central

government of Taiwan. The ruing DPP argued that negotiations on air links

should be conducted by two sovereign states. Civilian organizations could not

replace formal governmental bodies to negotiate issues related to state

sovereignty. China's proposal is just a smoke screen to localize Taiwan's

sovereignty. So the main obstacle for air "de-link" is on the Chinese side, not

Taiwan. The proposal to use Taipei's Songshan airport to connect directly with

Chinese cities was also rejected by Frank Hsieh , the DPP presidential

candidate for 2008. During his campaign of Taipei Mayor in 2006, Hsieh

suggested to rebuild Songshan airport into a green space and public park after

the completion of Rapid Transit System between Taoyuan International Airport

and downtown Taipei.[43] Under this proposal, Songshan's role in direct air links

has been totally ruled out.

In addition to the interaction of local states and central authorities, other

non-state actors with global reach also lobby and put pressure on the issues of

direct air links. For example, the issue of direct air links is also promoted by

foreign business communities in Taipei. The American Chamber of Commerce

has been compiling an annual Taiwan White Paper since 1996. Each one has

pointed out the importance of regularizing the flow of people, goods and

services, and investment across the Taiwan Straits, with special emphasis on

the value of direct transportation links for domestic and multinational business

efficiency and effectiveness. By the same token, a former member of the

Canadian business community, now stationed in Shanghai, also indicated the

importance of direct transportation links to the international business activities

in Taipei. From the aspect of foreign business community, the Three Links in

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[43] *Ziyou Shibao*, June 30, 2006.

general and direct air links in particular should not be put in the framework of

bilateral, cross-Strait context. The breakthrough of direct air links will upgrade

and enhance the capacities of global circulation of Taipei. Foreign business

communities will take advantages of direct air routes and promote Taipei as a

commercial and human resource hub in the Asia Pacific region.[44]   Due to the

fact that the Am Cham statement never got positive feedback from the

Taiwanese government, the Am Cham argued in its 2007 White Paper that

"Nothing can be said hat hasn't been said repeatedly before about how

the failure to act on this issue has isolated, constrained and damaged Taiwan's

economy. So on cross-Strait links, the AmCham message to the Taiwanese

government remains clear and unequivocal: Just do it!"[45]

Conclusion

The development path of Shanghai demonstrates that the influence of

state intervention plays a key role in the dynamic transition to an era of

globalization. The influence of the state could be understood from various

aspects. The regulatory capacity of the central state established the general

scope of Shanghai's drives toward globalization in the 1990s. The local state

intervened directly to create the market and form alliances with multinational

corporations. The rise of new global capitalism in Shanghai is the outcome of

top-down efforts of reconstruction and rejuvenation. Special preferences and

treatments were given to global-oriented factors within the society. The strong

local state in Shanghai resembles in many aspects the traditional and revised

forms of the developmental state.   Looking toward the future, the bottom-up

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[44] Interview with a Canadian business representative , July 13, 2007, Shanghai.
[45] American Chamber of Commerce, *Taiwan White Paper 2007* (Taipei: American Chamber of Commerce, May, 2007), p. 9.

dynamics of social initiatives will play a key role in promoting a "harmonious society" as suggested by China's 11th Five Year Plan. In order to deepen Shanghai's globalization in the next round and create a sustainable city, the collaborative mechanism between the state and society must be established.

The case of Taipei demonstrates a different path of governance. During Taiwan's authoritarian past, the state power penetrated into all aspects of social life. The governance of Taipei reflected the general trend of Taiwan's political environment. The mayors, who were regarded as rising stars in the political arena, were hand-picked by the paramount leader. The major task of the Taipei city administration was to carry out missions directed from above. Waves of democratization since the early 1990s have changed the nature of local developmental state of Taipei. Democracy shifted the top-down style into more accommodative ways of governance. Local interests, instead of central incentives, play more important role in policy planning and implementation. Furthermore, the party affiliation of the Taipei mayor has always been different from the central government since the first direct election in 1994. Under such unfavorable political situation, Taipei struggles to resist pressures from above and explore various opportunities of financial independence. This is quite different from the case of Shanghai. Mechanism of collaborative governance has to be established to guarantee smooth transition from command and control style of management to civilian governance. The cases of pursuing sustainable development in the process of globalization provide examples of closer state-society interaction.

The case of Shanghai and Taipei also demonstrate the importance of politics in the formation of a global city. As the preceding analyses show, reform acts and tempos in China impose significant impacts on Shanghai's

development since the 1980s. Drives of globalization are created collectively by the central and local government in China. In other words, Shanghai is not an independent actor in the grand political environment of China. Without strong central supports, Shanghai would encounter more constraints in the process of globalization. In contrast, the general political environment in Taiwan constrains Taipei's momentum for deep globalization. Due to political concerns, Taipei misses the opportunity of becoming an Asia-Pacific Operation Center. Without direct air links with the other side of the Taiwan Straits, Taipei's goals to become a service hub will be remote. The case of cross-Straits air links support Friedman's argument that the changes in exogenous political circumstances may have positive or negative impacts on the process of global city formation.

Obviously, some major elements of the service-oriented global city paradigm could not be applied to the case of Shanghai and Taipei. The effectiveness of local state intervention is closely connected with the cultural and institutional heritage of the city. Shanghai's capitalist spirit was suppressed by communist egalitarianism for more than forty years before the launch of Pudong Project in early 1990s. Surprisingly, under the challenges of globalization, less than a decade was needed to rejuvenate and renew the "Shanghai style capitalism. " Scholars began to trace the roots of Shanghainess capitalist culture and institutions in the "Golden Age" of 1920s and 1930s. The similar research agenda could be applied to Taipei. The development of Taipei reflects the historical path of Japanese colonial rule, the heritage of the Cold War and authoritarian regime, and finally democratic transition since the 1990s. Through the eyes of historical institutionalism, students of Shanghai and Taipei's global development may try to find the

implications of institutional stickiness, lock-in mechanism, and self-reinforcing effects of developmental paths in the past eighty years. The case of cross-Strait direct links challenges the thesis that sub-national actors could evade the central level to establish globalization links. However, changes of external political environment may also influence new alliance formation between global capital and sub-national administration. Further research shall focus on the continuity and change of the drive of cities to establish different global and domestic alliances, and thus restart new round of inter-governmental tug-of-war in the era of globalization.

國外差旅心得報告
冷則剛

訪談行程

2007 年 7 月 8 日（日）至 7 月 15 日（日）上海訪談行程			
日期	時間	地點與行程安排	備註
7 月 8 日（日）		台北—香港—上海	
7 月 9 日（一）	11：00	上海復旦大學：與彭勃教授會面。	中午彭教授邀請用餐。
	14：00	華東師範大學：與寧越敏教授會面。	
7 月 10 日（二）	10：00	上海社會科學院：與屠啓宇教授會面。	中午屠教授邀請用餐。
7 月 11 日（三）	09：30	同濟大學：與孫榮教授會面。	中午孫教授邀請用餐。
7 月 12 日（四）	09：30	上海交通大學：與林岡教授會面。	
	11：30	與 J. Michell 領事會面，並用餐。	
	12：50	上海城市規劃設計研究院：與金忠民主任會面。	
	15：30	廣達上海松江廠：與陶一瑋博士會面。	
7 月 13 日（五）	10：00	上海當代藝術館：與陸蓉之教授會面。	
7 月 14 日（六）		上海—蘇州—上海	
7 月 15 日（日）		上海—香港—台北	

訪談時間：2007 年 7 月 9 日（一）14：00 至 16：30

訪談地點：上海　華東師範大學　文科大樓 13 樓

訪談對象：寧越敏 教授（華東師範大學　中國現代城市研究中心　主任）

　　　　　楊　凱 教授（華東師範大學　資源與環境科學學院　教授）

此次訪談係針對上海所推動的「環保行動計畫」、環境影響評估法的公眾參與、上海周邊環境與城市發展等議題，與兩位教授交換意見。其中，寧教授指出了上海近年來周邊環境的變化與城市發展時所面臨到的問題，而楊教授則詳述了環境影響評估工作目前在上海的執行情況。

座談時間：2007 年 7 月 10 日（二）10：00 至 12：00

座談地點：上海　上海社會科學院

座談與會成員：屠啟宇 教授

　　　　　　　（上海社會科學院 院長助理、城市與區域研究中心 研究員）

　　　　　　　沈開豔 教授（上海社會科學院 經濟研究所 研究員）

　　　　　　　沈永林 先生

　　　　　　　（原上海市環保局處長、上海社科院生態經濟與可持續發展研究

　　　　　　　　中心顧問）

　　　　　　　及其他與會者

此次訪談係透過簡報的說明，希望從比較發展的面向，針對上海的城市發展地方治理等議題，和與會者交換意見。屠教授指出了近年來上海在環保與交通建設方面的表現，沈教授則是以太湖的治理為例，指出了上海環境問題的治理模式。而沈先生以個人豐富的行政經驗，從社會文化的角度切入，不斷強調市民社會對於環境問題的態度與影響。此外，其他的與會者也提供了寶貴的意見。

座談時間：2007 年 7 月 11 日（三）10：00 至 12：00

座談地點：上海　同濟大學

座談與會成員：孫榮 教授（同濟大學 法政學院 政治學系主任）

　　　　　　諸大建 教授

　　　　　　（同濟大學 經濟與管理學院 管理科學與工程系主任）

　　　　　　徐紅 博士（同濟大學 經濟與管理學院 公共管理系 副教授）

　　　　　　鄒珊珊 博士

　　　　　　（同濟大學 經濟與管理學院 政府管理與社會事務研究所）

此次訪談，是希望就上海的地方治理與可持續發展等議題，與四位教授進行意見交流。諸教授在分析上海社會文化的特色之後，指出了上海市政府在地方治理與處理環境問題上的強勢地位；孫教授也從市民社會的層面，說明了上海市民對於環保與交通建設等問題的態度。此外，徐博士特別強調了上海市議會應該更加強化對民眾負責的精神，而鄒博士則是以實際的事例，闡述了上海環保團體日後可以採取的行動模式。

訪談時間：2007 年 7 月 12 日（四）9：30 至 10：50

訪談地點：上海　交通大學

訪談成員：林岡 教授（上海 交通大學 國際與公共事務學院）

訪談時間：2007 年 7 月 12 日（四）11：30 至 12：30

訪談地點：Portman-Ritz 旁的鹿港小鎮餐廳（午餐）

訪談成員：J. Michell（米杰敏，加拿大駐滬總領事館 領事）

在與林岡教授的會談中，討論了上海的政經關係與兩岸情勢的發展等議題。而 J. Michell 領事除了表達對台灣政治情勢的關心，同時也說明了環保團體在上海不易發展的情況。

訪談時間：2007 年 7 月 12 日（四）12：50 至 13：40

訪談地點：上海　上海城市規劃設計研究院

訪談對象：金忠民　主任

　　　　　　（上海市城市規劃設計研究院　副總工程師、科研中心主任）

此次訪談的重點，在了解上海的城市總體規劃以及日後發展的方向與目標等。會談中，金忠民主任詳細地說明了上海的城市規劃、規劃中的公眾參與、城市發展與交通建設等問題，同時，也介紹了上海市因應即將舉辦的世博會在目前所進行的相關規劃。

訪談時間：2007 年 7 月 12 日（四）15：30 至 17：00

訪談地點：上海　松江加工出口區　廣達電子（達業電腦）

訪談對象：陶一瑋　博士

　　　　　　（達業（上海）電腦　無線通訊事業部產品開發組軟體四處　副處長）

此次訪談的焦點，是台灣高科技產業在上海的現況，以及未來可能的發展趨勢。陶博士針對廣達電子（達業）的發展歷程、人力資源的培養、以及企業與社會文化間的互動關係都做了詳細的說明，同時也提到台商在中國的居住與教育等問題。

訪談時間：2007 年 7 月 13 日（五）10：00 至 11：30

訪談地點：上海　上海當代藝術館

訪談對象：陸蓉之　教授　（上海當代藝術館　創意總監）

陸教授分析了上海市政府目前對於文化產業的態度，並強調在上海經營所謂的創意產業所必須面臨的環境因素；同時，也以不同性質的藝術產業發展為例，說明創意人才、資金和政治關係對於上海藝術或創意產業發展的重要性。