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| Title: | 銀行往來家數與企業績效及舉債成本之研究
The study of bank numbers, perfomance and cost of debt of enterprises |
| Authors: | 郭恆瑄 |
| Contributors: | 屠美亞
郭恆瑄 |
| Keywords: | 銀行往來家數
企業績效
Panel data
舉債成本 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| Issue Date: | 2016-08-02 15:58:28 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究旨在探討銀行往來家數對企業績效及舉債成本之影響。根據過去研究，銀行往來家數對企業績效及舉債成本的影響無定論，因此本研究以46家國內一般銀行(包含本國銀行及外商銀行)承做台灣上市上櫃公司的借款作為研究對象，研究樣本自2005年至2014年共計10年的借款資料進行實證分析，依據三個模型，分成兩部分來說明實證結果:成長機會高及借款額度大之企業，採用Panel Data進行迴歸分析，來檢驗銀行往來家數對企業績效與舉債成本之關聯。
本研究假說認為成長機會高之企業與多家銀行往來，會有資訊洩漏之風險，但實證結果顯示，成長機會高之企業，銀行往來家數越多績效表現越好，推測原因為成長機會高之企業資金需求大，因而在企業機密資訊揭露與補足資金缺口兩者中，選擇與多家銀行往來以獲取足夠之資金;但在同樣成長機會高之企業樣本中，銀行往來家數對舉債成本無顯著影響。
另一方面，借款金額越大之企業樣本中，本研究實證結果顯示其績效表現沒有比較差，並且與多家銀行往來對績效表現沒有幫助; 一般來說，借款金額越大舉債成本越高，然而，本研究實證結果顯示借款金額大之企業與越多家銀行往來，會使得舉債成本下降，過去也有研究指出與越多家銀行往來，可以透過多家銀行協商，取得較佳的借款條件，與本研究實證結果相符。 |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
103357015 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103357015 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財務管理學系] 學位論文
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