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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/96810


    Title: 逐出少數股東 ——以資訊揭露義務與受託人義務為中心之美國法比較
    Authors: 張心悌
    Chang, Hsin-Ti
    Keywords: 逐出少數股東;資訊揭露義務;受託人義務;合併逐出少數股東;公開收購逐出少數股東;現金逐出合併;企業併購
    Freezeout;Duty to Disclosure;Fiduciary Duty;Merger Freezeout;Tender Offer Freezeout;Cash out Merger;Merger and Acquisition
    Date: 2011-10
    Issue Date: 2016-05-20 16:39:09 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 控制股東對少數股東之逐出交易多係以合併逐出少數股東或公開收購逐出少數股東之方式完成，於該等交易中少數股東權益之保護在我國亦日漸受到重視。本文即以「逐出少數股東交易」為研究對象，先建立對逐出少數股東交易之正確評價與規範目的，進而參考美國立法、實務與學說見解，並對我國逐出少數股東交易之規範提出檢討與建議。\\r在資訊揭露義務方面，本文建議我國應可考慮針對逐出少數股東交易之資訊揭露作特別之立法，而非僅以公開收購說明書準則支應之。在受託人義務方面，本文建議在資訊充分揭露之前提下，倘於逐出少數股東交易中，公司已設有具交易否決權之特別委員會，經該特別委員會通過之交易，在董事會與股東會表決時，具利害關係之董事或法人股東無需迴避；惟若公司就該逐出少數股東交易，並未設有具交易否決權之特別委員會，或特別委員會拒絕該交易，則在董事會與股東會表決時，具利害關係之董事或法人股東則必須迴避，以回歸自我交易保護少數股東之設計。如此，應可達成平衡\\r保護少數股東與鼓勵企業進行價值增加逐出交易之規範目標。
    Controlling shareholders can usually freeze out minority shareholders through merger freezeout or tender offer freezeout. In such transactions, how to protect minority shareholders becomes an important issue. This paper analyzes the fair valuation on freezeout as well as its regulatory purposes and offers some proposals to the freezeout mechanism in Taiwan by making reference to U.S. legislation, court opinions and scholarship. With respect to the duty of disclosure, this paper suggests the promulgation of a special rule governing the duty of disclosure in freezeout transactions. As for the fiduciary duty, this paper suggests that on the premise of full disclosure, if a company has established a special committee with veto power to consider the freezeout transaction and such committee has approved such a freezeout, the controlling shareholders can still vote at the board and shareholders’ meeting; however, if a company has not established such special committee or such committee has rejected the freezeout, the controlling shareholder shall refrain from voting at the board and shareholders’ meeting to avoid the problem of conflict of interests. This proposal can reach the regulatory goal of protecting minority shareholders and at the same time encourage value-increasing freezeout transactions.
    Relation: 法學評論, 123, 253-304
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[政大法學評論 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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