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https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/96727
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| Title: | 董事忠誠義務與司法審查標準之研究——以美國德拉瓦州公司法為主要範圍 |
| Other Titles: | Fiduciary Duties and Judicial Review Standards — A Case Study on Delaware Cases |
| Authors: | 林國彬
Lin, Kuo-Bin |
| Keywords: | 忠實義務;忠誠義務;注意義務;善意義務;狹義忠誠義務;利害關係人交易;奪取公司機會;經營判斷原則;德拉瓦州公司法;加強司法審查;整體公平性 |
| Date: | 2007-12 |
| Issue Date: | 2016-05-20 10:42:25 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 我國公司法於民國九十年修法時，擴大董事會之職權縮小股東會之權限， 惟在此同時， 修法者亦同時希冀藉由忠誠義務(fiduciary duty)概念之引進，作為加強對董事會行為標準之要求。本文擬主要以美國德拉瓦州公司法及相關判例為研究對象，探討忠誠義務作為董事會行為標準之功能與其內涵，並研究違反該行為標準時之司法審查標準及其法律效果，以為我國司法未來引用忠誠義務為個案判斷標準時之參考。經由案例類型及學者論述之分析可知，德拉瓦州公司法對於忠誠義務之內涵原有二元論與三元論之爭，惟二○○六年六月，德拉瓦州最高法院於In re the Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation股東訴訟中，確立善意義務係忠誠義務之一獨立內涵，而非作為注意義務或狹義忠誠義務之下位概念，並藉由該州公司法之解釋支持上述論點，學者間或許對此仍有不同見解，但於該州之司法審判實例則自此善意義務將扮演一獨立行為標準，作為董事會經營公司業務及作成決定時，必須依循之要件。自此而後，德拉瓦州公司法中關於董事之忠誠義務之行為標準成為一個等邊三角形，由注意義務、善意義務及狹義忠誠義務各據一角，彼此無位階上下之分；而司法對於上述忠誠義務之審查標準，則構成另一個具有高低密度上下位階之三角形，由下而上分別為：經營判斷原則(BJR)、加強司法審查(Enhanced Scrutiny)及整體公平(Entire Fairness)各據一角，分別作為對不同行為類型之審查標準，以充分的保障股東及公司之權利。
In 2001, when the Company Code of Taiwan was amended, the Board of Directors was granted a wider scope of authority to run the businesses of the corporation than was previously the case. Meanwhile, the drafters of the amendment also adopted the concept of fiduciary duties into the code for the purpose of maintaining the balance of power of the Board and protecting the interests of the shareholders of the corporation. However, there are no such theories or cases of fiduciary duties in Taiwan, especially in areas pertaining to Corporation Laws. In this article, the author has attempted to introduce the Delaware Corporation Laws and cases as a model for Taiwan. In 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court, in The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, held that the duty of good faith is an independent standard of the fiduciary duties, and is not a duty subordinated to care or loyalty. The Delaware Supreme Court then created a triangle of conduct standards with respect to fiduciary duties, i.e., care, good faith, and loyalty, each of which shall be applied to different categories of conduct of the directors. The judicial system shall review such different conduct standards by different standards. For the breach of duty of care and good faith, the court will use the Business Judgment Rule, the loosest standard, to give the most deferential review to the director. For the assertion of breach of duty of loyalty, the court will use the strictest standard, the entire fairness, to review the alleged conduct. Besides, with regard to the defense mechanisms adopted for hostile takeover activities, the court will use the intermediate standard, the modified Business Judgment Rule or enhanced scrutiny, to shift the burden of proof to the defendant (s). This twotriangle system is a very complicated theory built on a tremendous number of cases. It will be a long time before Taiwan is able to adopt or model such a theory, and this paper is one of the steps in the process to attain such a goal. |
| Relation: | 法學評論, 100, 135-214 |
| Data Type: | article |
| Appears in Collections: | [政大法學評論 TSSCI] 期刊論文
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Files in This Item:
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Description |
Size | Format | |
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| 100(135-214).pdf | | 1221Kb | Adobe PDF2 | 1967 | View/Open |
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