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    题名: 我國地方財政赤字之理論與實證分析
    其它题名: The Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Local Fiscal Deficits in Taiwan
    作者: 姚名鴻
    Yao, Ming-Hung
    关键词: 地方財政赤字;府際財政關係;官僚決策模型;追蹤資料迴歸模型;政治經濟
    local fiscal deficit;intergovernmental fiscal relation;bureaucratic decision model;panel data regression model;political economy
    日期: 2011-06
    上传时间: 2016-05-11 16:18:51 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究首先利用Bird與Tarasov（2004）的定義，將補助款收入及補助款支出分別從歲入總額及歲出總額中扣除，以自主性收入及自主性支出計算我國直轄市及縣（市）政府從一九九八年至二〇〇九年度的修正財政統計量。其次，本研究修正Martinez-Vazquez與Yao（2009）的賽局模型，藉由中央與地方政府首長追求預期得票率極大的決策行為，探討地方財政赤字的起因。以「五都」行政區改制前我國原有的2個直轄市及台灣省轄下21個縣（市）政府自一九九八至二〇〇九年度資料為實證分析對象，依據固定效果模型的估計結果，本研究發現若地方首長與中央執政黨屬於同一政黨，則該地方政府的財政赤字問題愈嚴重，但效果並不顯著。其次，歲入的中央集權比例愈高，地方財政赤字問題愈惡化。第三，一地方政府轄區居民可支配所得水準愈高，該地方政府的財政狀況愈良好。第四，一地方政府轄區居民低收入戶人口比例愈高，則該地方政府的財政狀況愈窘困。第五，地方財政赤字的政治景氣循環現象並不顯著。第六，實質景氣循環顯著地影響一地方政府財政狀況，失業率愈高的地方政府，財政赤字問題愈嚴重。第七，現行的「財政收支劃分法」無法有效解決地方財政困境。最後，在控制了可能影響地方財政赤字的政治面、經濟面及制度面因素後，本文的實證研究發現我國直轄市的財政狀況較為舒緩，其次為省轄市政府，原台灣省轄下的縣政府財政缺口問題較嚴峻。
    Based on Bird and Tarasov (2004), this study calculated the fiscal statistics of the 2 municipality and 21 county (city) governments in Taiwan from 1998 to 2009. Then we revised the model of a two-player-two-stage game by Martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) to investigate the determinants of local government deficits. We further conducted a panel data analysis to verify the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model. Our empirical results show that the fiscal deficit of a local government is severe when the party affiliation between central and local governors is similar. The residents’ income level is positively correlated with the adjusted fiscal statistics; on the other hand, the revenue centralization ratio, the ratio of poverty population, and the unemployment rate are negatively correlated with the adjusted fiscal statistics. We fail to find the evidence supporting the political business cycle in local deficit. The empirical results also show that the revision of the Law Governing Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures in 1999 did not significantly improve to the local government deficit problem in Taiwan. Finally, controlling for the political, economic and institutional factors, the fiscal condition of the municipality government is better than other local governments in Taiwan; meanwhile, the fiscal deficit problems of the county governments are much more severe.
    關聯: 公共行政學報, 39,37-70
    Journal of Public Administration National Chengchi University
    数据类型: article
    显示于类别:[公共行政學報 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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