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| Title: | 董監持股質押對公司現金增資資訊內涵及財務結構關係之研究 |
| Authors: | 趙玉清 |
| Contributors: | 鄭丁旺
趙玉清 |
| Date: | 2002 |
| Issue Date: | 2016-05-09 16:21:25 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 近年來，爆發一連串上市公司的財務風暴，也進而揭發企業主不當經營策略與不法炒作股票之情事。有市場人士指出，會導致此波財務風暴主要係因上市公司董監事與大股東「不尊重股市的市場機制」，當公司基本面表現不佳時，股價原應向下修正，但是，公司董監事、大股東為牟利，卻要以質借股票來擴充信用進入股市炒作，使得市場逆向而為，以致演變成無法彌補愈來愈大的財務黑洞。上述諸多情況，導致「地雷股」連連，最後最無辜的受害者還是投資大眾。
本論文針對1998年及1999年辦理現金增資之公司，探討其董監持股質押與公司股價變動及公司財務結構之關係進行研究，主要目的係希望透過對董監持股質押比率（或質押金額）是否可視為一個訊號因子之探討，提供給投資人一個選擇的依據，以避免其財產遭受損失。
本研究之結果發現：
一、公司現金增資時，董監在繳款截止日前之一個月內股權質押行為與公司股價變動成正向相關，在高科技產業較為顯著。此與訊息傳遞理論的觀點相符，投資者在選擇投資標的時，因其所獲得資訊較公司內部管理者不足，常需透過公司內部管理者傳遞出來的訊號加以研判是否值得投資，故董監持股質押比率變動（或質押金額變動）可視為一個訊號因子。在本研究中，購買高科技產業股時，更為明顯。
二、在股市冷、熱不同的年度，董監持股質押變動對公司股價變動確有差異，在多頭市場（熱市）時期比空頭市場（冷市）時期明顯。在股市多頭時期，股價易漲難跌，公司大股東有很多的投資機會，卻願意將原持股質押增加個人的財務風險而購置更多公司發行之新股，對投資人而言，係大股東看好公司未來發展的訊號。
三、董監質押金額與公司財務結構惡化具正向關係，在傳統產業顯著。此與代理理論的觀點相符。當公司內部管理人因經濟環境劇變產生融資危機時，即可能將公司財產視為自有財產，進行掏空舞弊等行為，導致公司財務結構惡化。
These years, there are a lot of finance crush was happened in the listed companies, more and more news showing that the enterpriser did the wrong business strategies and illegal stock deals. Some persons point out that the reason of the finance crush is that the listed companies` directors and supervisors and the main shareholders are not respect the stock market mechanism, when the performance of stock market is not good, the stock price should be corrected downward. However, in order to earn more money, the directors, supervisors, and the main shareholders are borrowing the stocks in order to expand the credit limit to make the stock price upward. Finally, the action leads the stock market and finance environment crush. According to the mention above, in the recession, the investors will be the victims of finance crush.
The main theme of this essay is about the company`s second equity issuing in 1998 and 1999. The study is refer to the relationship of pledged shareholdings of directors and supervisors, the alteration of company stock, and company`s financial structure. The objective of this paper is discussing that can the pledged share ratio (or pledged amount) be a signal for the investors to avoid the lost of property.
The discovery of this paper:
A. When the second equity issuing, the relationship is upward which between the behavior of directors and supervisors pledged stock before the payment deadline in one month and company stock price, the situation will be more outstanding in the high-tech industry. This relationship conforms to the theory of message passing. When the investors select the investing target, the information he or she got is not enough than the internal management; therefore, the investors need to base on the information sent from the internal to judge the worthy of investment. Thus, the pledged ratio of directors` and supervisors` shareholdings (or currency amount) can be a signal of investment. In this study, it is discovered that the situation is more outstanding when investing in the high-tech industry.
B. In the bear or bull market, the difference of stock price is obvious when the pledged ratio is changed. The difference will be more apparent in the bull market than the bear market. In the bull market, the stock price is easy to rise and hard to fall. The stockholders of company should have a lot of investing chance, but he or she is prefer to buy more new issuing stock of the company than disperse the investment risk, from the vision the investors, the meaning of this action is that the shareholders have confidence the future development.
C. The relationship of pledged cash amount ratio and company financial structure is upward, especially in the traditional industry. This relationship conforms to the theory of agency. When the happening of cash merging crisis because of the big change of economic environment, the internal management may take the company`s property as privacy property. Because of the embezzling behavior makes the finance structure deterioratly. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#A2010000315 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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