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| Title: | 集團企業綜效之管理--子公司間交易情境之探討
Synergy Management in Business Groups -- The Contexts of Transactions between Subsidiaries |
| Authors: | 李雨師 |
| Contributors: | 司徒達賢
于卓民
李雨師 |
| Keywords: | 集團企業
綜效
交易情境
綜效管理機制
business group
synergy
contexts of transactions
synergy mechanism |
| Date: | 2008 |
| Issue Date: | 2016-05-09 11:25:28 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 集團企業是多個子公司的組合，在追求集團整體利益極大化的過程中，可能爲了追求內部資源市場配置，因而犧牲某些子公司的個別利益，或是彼此子公司之間出現交叉補貼的現象。在交叉補貼的動機下，雙方子公司進行交易時，將可能有一方犧牲，而另一方受惠；或是一方受惠較多，一方受惠較少的情形。在此情形下，集團企業爲追求長期利益，應採取何種管理作為以促使子公司間進行交易，是本研究的核心問題。
本研究以集團企業之子公司間交易為主題，嘗試探索影響子公司間交易發生的因素(本研究將影響子公司間交易發生的因素命名為「交易情境」)，且以「交易情境」的觀點，進一步探討集團企業中子公司間交易之管理方式。為此，本研究以台灣集團企業作為研究對象，結合集團企業之綜效管理相關理論及文獻，針對實務現象進行分析。
本研究採質性研究方法，以集團企業中子公司間的「交易」為分析單位，進行資料蒐集與個案分析。本研究分二階段進行。第一階段為前導個案研究，依個案分析歸納發現，子公司間交易發生的情境因素包括：「投入可衡量程度」、「投入成本程度」、「市場失靈程度」以及「產出互惠程度」。子公司間交易的管理作為包括：「目標一體化」、「轉撥計價」和「市場機制(市價)」。並且建構子公司間「交易情境」與「管理作為」之配適模式，發展出初步的研究架構、研究發現與研究命題，作為後續個案研究之原樣複現基礎。第二階段為後續個案研究，目的在修正並驗證前一階段建立的研究架構與研究命題，使其內容更為豐富。
本研究整合前導個案與後續個案，歸納出下列研究發現：
一、 公司間交易情境與管理作為之配適模式
集團企業進行子公司間交易管理時，應考量「交易」的本質，也就是交易情境，針對「市場失靈程度」、「投入可衡量程度」、「投入成本程度」以及「產出互惠程度」之不同，選擇較能發揮綜效之管理作為。子公司間交易的管理作為包括「目標一體化」、「轉撥計價」和「市場機制(市價)」，因應不同的交易情境組合，管理作為的搭配組合也有所不同，藉由此配適模式，以追求集團企業之綜效。
二、 「目標一體化」程度之提升，有助於「轉撥計價」、「市場機制(市價)」方式的發揮
集團企業在追求綜效過程中，若需要犧牲某一家子公司，成全另一家子公司利益時，「目標一體化」將扮演重要的角色。透過提升「目標一體化」程度，使「轉撥計價」、「市場機制(市價)」方式更能發揮。換言之，集團企業的綜效是源自於「目標一體化」，「目標一體化」有助於子公司之間交易成本的降低。
三、 「目標一體化」、「轉撥計價」和「市場機制(市價)」的使用有其搭配的強弱程度
「目標一體化」對於「轉撥計價」和「市場機制(市價)」具有調節作用，當子公司間交易依賴「高轉撥計價」時，則使用「目標一體化」的程度較低。當子公司間交易依賴「低轉撥計價」時，則使用「目標一體化」的程度較高。當子公司間交易依賴「市場機制(市價)」時，則使用「目標一體化」的程度較低。
A business group is composed of several subsidiary companies. To increase group-level profits, the profits of subsidiaries may be scarified and one subsidiary may cross-subsidize others. In cross-subsidization between two subsidiaries, one may benefit more than the other or one may benefit and the other may suffer.
Giving this understanding, two-stage study is conducted to observe the phenomena by studying business groups in Taiwan. In the first stage, ten pilot cases are conducted and eight more cases are examined in the second stage. Taking the view of “the contexts of transactions”, this study aims to examine how headquarters manages inter-subsidiaries transactions to create group synergy.
As part of the methodology, a qualitative research method is adopted and the unit of analysis is inter-subsidiaries transaction. The research process includes two stages. In the first stage, it is found that the contexts affecting inter-subsidiaries transactions consist of “level of input measurability”, “level of input cost”, “level of market failure” and “level of outcome reciprocity”. The mechanisms for managing inter-subsidiaries transactions include “goal alignment”, “transfer-pricing” and “market mechanism (market price)”. Further, a fitting model between “the context of transactions” and “mechanisms” is proposed as a prior research framework for the second stage.
In terms of integrating two-stage case analysis, three main research findings include:
1. A fitting model between “the contexts of transactions” and “mechanisms”
Headquarters should take into account the essence of transaction when managing inter-subsidiaries transactions. The essence of transaction means “level of input measurability”, “level of input cost”, “level of market failure” and “level of outcome reciprocity”. In other words, different mechanisms should be adopted in different contexts of transactions to achieve group synergy.
2. The increase of the level of “goal alignment” is conducive to “transfer-pricing” and “market mechanism (market price)”
“Goal alignment” plays an important role in a business group, especially when the profits of subsidiaries may be scarified and one subsidiary may cross-subsidize others. The increase of the level of “goal alignment” is conducive to “transfer-pricing” and “market mechanism (market price)”. In other words, synergy in a business group results from “goal alignment”, and “goal alignment” decreases the transaction cost between subsidiaries.
3. The combination of three mechanisms with different level
“Goal alignment” has mediating effect for “transfer-pricing” and “market mechanism (market price)”. If headquarters depends on high level of “transfer-pricing”, then the level of “goal alignment” is low. If headquarters depends on low level of “transfer-pricing”, then the level of “goal alignment” is high. If headquarters depends on “market mechanism (market price)”, then the level of “goal alignment” is low. |
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| Description: | 博士
國立政治大學
企業管理學系
92355501 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0923555011 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [企業管理學系] 學位論文
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