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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/94421


    Title: 偷竊、逃漏稅與租稅赦免
    Authors: 楊怡雯
    Contributors: 曾巨威
    楊怡雯
    Keywords: 租稅赦免
    逃漏稅
    Date: 2006
    Issue Date: 2016-05-06 16:36:38 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 租稅赦免(Tax amnesty)乃指租稅當局在一定時間內提供逃漏稅者或未申報納稅者，補辦申報及納稅的機會而予以減輕或免除其處罰的一種特殊作為。對於國家應否實施租稅赦免，迄今仍是一個爭議頗大的問題。研究租稅赦免的文獻從早期的預期效用理論、適應效用架構、理性最適架構、到近期的動態模型，大體上皆是以逃漏稅模型為基礎，來探討實施租稅赦免的效果。本文嘗試將小偷竊盜行為理論中，對小偷與物主間關係的分析，擴大衍生並應用至逃漏稅者與政府間之微妙關係，並據以建構一租稅赦免的理論模型。

    本文的主要發現有以下幾點：
    (一)在租稅赦免的模型中，不論是基本模型或是考慮誠實機率的赦免情況，吾人可求得社會福利最大下之最適處罰值。相較於小偷偷竊行為模型中，最適處罰值的存在並不確定。

    (二)即使在考量參與租稅赦免計畫者可能不完全誠實申報的情況，吾人仍然可以找到一符合社會福利最大的處罰值。只是這個最適處罰值與未考量誠實機率下的處罰值不一定會相同。

    (三)稅捐稽徵法第48條之1規定，「納稅義務人自動向稅捐稽徵機關補報並補繳所漏稅款者，凡屬未經檢舉、未經稽徵機關或財政部指定之調查人員進行調查之案件，左列之處罰一律免除，其涉及刑事責任者，並得免除其刑：一、本法第四十一條至第四十五條之處罰；二、各稅法所定關於逃漏稅之處罰。」由此可知，我國針對逃漏稅者自動補稅加息的赦免作法乃相當於本文中的處罰值為零，但由文中模型推導可知，最適處罰為零並不一定是社會最適下所應採取的政策。

    (四)當政府將租稅赦免計畫的最適處罰訂為零的情況下，對逃漏稅者而言，因為只需補繳稅額給政府即可，無須顧慮任何處罰加諸其身，故其一旦決定參加租稅赦免計畫，則必會誠實申報。但處罰值為零並不一定是社會福利最大應有的處罰值，是故政府採行租稅赦免時，一方面為鼓勵參與者能誠實參與赦免，從而須把處罰值訂為零(亦即完全免罰)，但另一方面此一作法又違背了最適處罰值，這種現象增加了政府制訂租稅赦免計畫時的矛盾與與困擾。
    Reference: (1)Alm, James and William Beck (1990), “Tax Amnesties and Tax Revenues,” Public Finance Quarterly, 18(4): 433-453.

    (2)Alm, James and William Beck (1991), “Wiping the Slate Clean:Individual Response to State Tax Amnesties,” Southern Economic Journal, 57(4): 1043-1053.

    (3)Alm, James and William Beck (1993), “Tax Amnesties and Compliance in t he Long Run: A Time Series Analysis,” National Tax Journal, 46(1): 53-60.

    (4)Alm, James , Michael Mckee ,and William Beck (1990), “Amazing Grace: Tax Amnesties and Compliance,” National Tax Journal, 43: 23-37.

    (5)Christian, Charles W., Sanjay Gupta, and James C. Young (2002), “Evidence on Subsequent Filing From the State of Michigan`s Income Tax Amnesty,” National Tax Journal, 55(4): 703-721.

    (6)Crane, Steven E. and Farrokh Nourzad (1988), “Amnesty for State Tax Evaders: Lessons from the California Experience,” National Tax Association Tax Institute of America, 133-139.

    (7)Fisher, Ronald C., John H. Goddeeris and James C. Young (1989), “Participation in Tax Amnesties:the Individual Income Tax,” National Tax Journal, 42(1): 15-27.

    (8)Katz, Eliakim and Jacob Rosenberg (2003), “Property Rights, Theft, Amnesty, and Efficiency,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 15(3): 219-232.

    (9)Leonard, Herman B. and Richard J. Zeckhauser (1987), “Amnesty, Enforcement, and Tax Policy,”in Lawrence H. Summers (Ed.), Tax Policy and Economy, Vol.1, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

    (10)Lopez-Laborda, Julio and Fernando Rodrigo (2003), “Tax Amnesties and Income Tax Compliance:The Case of Spain,” Fiscal Studies, 24(1): 73-96.

    (11)Macho-Stadler, Ines, Pau Olivella and David Perez-Castrillo (1999) “Tax Amnesties in a Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1(4), 439-463.

    (12)Malik, Arun S. and Robert M. Schwab (1991), “The Economics of Tax Amnesties,” Journal of Public Economics, 46: 29-49.

    (13)Marchese, Carla and Fabio Privileggi (1997), “Taxpayer`s Attitudes Toward Risk and Amnesty Participation: Economic Analysis and Evidence for the Italian Case,” Public Finance, 52(3-4):394-410.

    (14)Marceau, Nicolas and Steeve Mongrain (2000), “Amnesties and Co-operation,” International Tax and Public Finance, 7(3): 259-273.

    (15)Marchese, Carla and Alberto Cassone (2000), “Tax Amnesty as Price-Discriminating Behavior by a Monopolistic Government,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 9(1):21-32.

    (16)Marchese, Carla and Fabio Privileggi (2004), “Tax Amnesties and the Self-Selection of Risk-Averse Taxpayers,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 18(3): 319-341.

    (17)Parle, William M. and Mike W. Hirlinger (1986), “Evaluating the Use of Tax Amnesty By State Government,” Public Administration Review, 246-255.

    (18)Pogue, Thomas F. (1988), “Discussion: Why Do Taxpayers Participate in Tax Amnesties?” National Tax Association Tax Institute of America, 148-149.

    (19)Pommerehne, Werner W. (1991), “Success of a Tax Amnesty: At the polls, for the Fisc?” Public Choice, 72(2-3): 131-165.

    (20)Stella, Peter (1991), “An Economic Analysis of Tax Amnesties,” Journal of Public Economics, 46(3): 383-400.

    (21)Torgler, Benno and Christoph A. Schaltegger (2005), “Tax Amnesties in Switzerland and Around The World,” Tax Notes International, 38(13): 1193-1203.

    (22)Torgler, Benno and Christoph A. Schaltegger (2005), “Tax Amnesties and Political Participation,” Public Finance Review, 33(3): 403-431.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    93255004
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093255004
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Finance] Theses

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