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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/90511


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/90511


    Title: 投資抵減與其他經濟誘因污染防治政策之比較
    Authors: 徐麗振
    Contributors: 林全
    徐麗振
    Date: 1989
    Issue Date: 2016-05-04 14:25:11 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 摘要
    控制生產性汚染行為之政策主要有四種:課稅、補貼、管制(含懲罰)，與可轉讓汚染權等。其中補貼被認為是控制汚染的有效手段，原因在於廠商會將補貼視為一種機會成本，與課稅一樣使邊際成本提高，因而減少汚染。但此種說法受到許多經濟學家質疑，其原因有二:1.由於以廠商目前的汚染水準作為計算補貼之汙染基準，補貼會使廠商提高它目前的污染水準,以獲取更多的補貼;2.對接受補貼的產業而言，補貼將形成超額利潤，誘使其他廠商加入該行業，結果產業總污染增加。一般理論研究，多假設補貼金額大小係按生產者汙染量之減少程度而定;但實務上，各國對污染控制之補貼方式，卻未必與上述理論假設一致。例如，對防治污染機器設備給予投資抵減，便是我國與許多國家常採用的一種補貼政策。由於補貼方式不同，故對污染量之控制效果也就不同。而本文之目的，即在比較採行投資抵減政策，與採行其他主要污染控制政策，對污染性生產行為的不同影響。
    本文除第一章為緒論外，第二章旨在整理及說明過去學者們討論過的不同補貼方法，對個別廠商，以及整體社會之汙染水準的影響效果。第三章利用個別廠商之極大化行為假設，建立有關模型，並比較投資抵減與一般性補貼政策，以及投資抵減與課稅政策，對個別廠商產出及汙染水準的不同影響。第四章則就總體產業面，分析前述不同汙染控制政策的影響效果。第五章為結論。
    Reference: 參考文獻
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    侯繼明等，鼓勵污染防治，獎勵投資條例之經濟效益評估分項報告(6)，經濟部工業局委託研究計劃，中華經濟研究院，民國76年8月。

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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005672
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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