| Reference: | 參考文獻
中文部分:
1、丘駿飛，道德危險最適尖峰訂價之研究，國立中山大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十五年。
2、丘毅與孫克難，"資訊不對稱下公用事業與管制法則"七十六年能源經濟學術研討會論文集，民國七十六年十二月，(台北:中華民國能源經濟學會),pp~191-203。
3、連文杰，最適尖峰定價與誘因問題之研究，國立中山大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十五年。
4、張四立，"兼顧效率與公平的能源訂價法則─福利經濟取向”，七十五年能源經濟學術研討會論文集，民國七十五年十二月(台北:中華民國能游說經濟學會),pp.91-104。
5、陳澤義，獨佔管制廠商行為分析─台灣電力事業實證研究。私立東吳大學經濟學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十二年七月。
6、劉維琪著，資訊不對稱情況下公用事業訂價模式，七十五年三月初版，中國經濟企業研究所出版。
7、劉維琪，"中華民國電力事業訂價也之商榷"，七t十六年能源經濟學術研討會論文集，民國七十六年十二月(台北：中華民國能源話經濟學會),PP.174-184。
8、;鄭瓊英，成本遞減產業訂價問題之研究，國立政治大學財政學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十三年七月。
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英文部分:
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