政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/88305

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/88305

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政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 國際經營與貿易學系 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/88305

請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/88305

題名:	訊息不對稱下企業薪資結構之探討 The study about enterprise`s wage structure in the asymmetric information
作者:	鄧英華 Teng, Ying Hung
貢獻者:	胡聯國 Hu, Len Kuo 鄧英華 Teng, Ying Hung
關鍵詞:	薪資談判訊息不對稱承諾均衡非承諾均衡(完全貝氏均衡) wage bargaining asymmetric information commitment equilibrium nocommitment equilibrium
日期:	1994 1993
上傳時間:	2016-04-29 15:17:29 (UTC+8)
摘要:	過去處理勞資雙方工資談判的文獻，多數假設勞資雙方的訊息是對稱的，或採合作談判解，或採非合作談判解，他們得到結果多為工資協議往往非常順利，不會有不合議的事件發生。但事實上勞資雙方談判時，公司的經營能力或策略、工人之生產力往往是談判雙方互不了解的，也就是現實工資談判中普遍存有訊息不對稱的情況。本文擬在訊息不對稱的情形下，假設談判的一方訊息不完全--工會不了解公司的經營能力，設定一個兩期工資談判模型，僅由工會提議工資，公司之反提議僅為接受或拒絕工會之提議工資。探討模型之承諾均衡與完全貝氏均衡，並對影響完全貝氏均衡之因素做進一步之探討。
參考文獻:	[1] Alpern Steve and Snower Dennis J. : "High-low search in product aod labor markets." AEA Pappers and Proceedings,1988 ,356-362 [2] Ausubel Lawrence M. and Deneckere Raymond J. : "A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information." Journal of Economic Theory, 1989,18-46 [3] Brander, James A. and Tracy R. Lewis : "Oligopoly and financial structure: The limited liability effect." American EcCJ"nomic Review, 1986,76,956-970 [4] Cheung Francis K. and Davidson Carl: «Bargaining structure and strike activity." Canadian Journal of Economics,1991,345- 371 [5] Fernandez Raquel and Glazer Jacob: «(Striking for a bargain between two completely information agents." American Economic Review,1991,240-252 [6] Fundenberg Drew and Tirole Jean : "Sequential bargaining with incomplete information."Review of Economic St udies ,1983,221-247 [7]Gibbons, Robert: “Game Theory for Applied Economists.” Princeton University Press. [8]Grossman Sanford J. and Perry Motty: Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information “ Journal of Economic Theory, 1986, 120-154. [9]Haller Hans and Holden Steinar: “A letter on the Editor on wage Bargaining” Journal of Economic Theory, 1990,232-236 [10]Horn Henrick and Wolinsky Asher:”Bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger.”Rand Journal of Economics, 1989, 408-419. [11]Mercuro Nicholas and Sourbis Haralambos and Whitney Gerald:”Ownership Structure value of the firm , and the bargaining power of the manager.” [12]Nash, J.F. : The bargaining problem.” Econometrica, 1950, 155-162 [13]Reyniers Diane J.:”Information and rationality asymmetries in a simple high-low search wage modle.” Economic Letters, 1992, 38, 479-486 [14]Rubinsten Ariel:”Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. “Econometrica, 1982,97-109. [15]Sobel Joel and Takahashi Ichiro: “A multistage model of bargaining.” Review of Economics Studies, 1983, 411-426.
描述:	碩士國立政治大學國際經營與貿易學系 81351013
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002003780
資料類型:	thesis
顯示於類別:	[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文

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