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    题名: Stock-Based Compensation in a Concentrated Ownership Setting: An Empirical Investigation
    作者: Liang, Jia-Wen;Chin, Chen Lung
    梁嘉紋;金成隆
    贡献者: 會計系
    关键词: stock-based compensation;concentrated ownership;controlling owners and minority shareholders;cash flow rights and voting rights
    日期: 2015-12
    上传时间: 2016-03-25 17:37:29 (UTC+8)
    摘要: Stock-based compensation has been viewed as an important mechanism for tying managers’ wealth to firm performance, and thus alleviating the agency conflict between the shareholders and the managers when ownership is diffused. However, in a concentrated ownership structure, controlling owners are usually the management of the firm; they can engage in self-dealing activities to the detriment of minority shareholders’ interests. Yet, outside investors may anticipate the problem and discount the share price for the entrenchment behaviors they observe. In this study, we investigate how controlling owners trade off the benefits and the costs of using stock-based compensation. Based on a sample of Taiwanese firms, our evidence shows that stock-based compensation is negatively related to the agency problem embedded in a concentrated ownership structure. This relationship is evident among firms with more frequent equity offerings. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that controlling owners consider the negative price effects of stock-based compensation and trade off these costs with the benefits of expropriating minority shareholders’ interests, particularly when firms seek more external equity capital. Our results hold after controlling for selection bias and share collateral by controlling owners.
    關聯: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Volume 43, Issue 1-2, pages 131–157
    数据类型: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12167
    DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12167
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 期刊論文

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