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    Title: 從亞里斯多德範疇論的觀點談幾種不同的「中」
    Other Titles: An Analysis of Various Meanings of ";Jung";(中) in Chinese Philosophy and ";Moderation";(το μεσóν) in Aristotle`s ";Nichomachean Ethics";Based upon the Theory of Categories
    Authors: 彭文林
    Peng, Wen-Lin
    Contributors: 哲學系
    Keywords: 中;亞理斯多德;範疇;尼可馬克倫理學;中庸;中;人心;道心;尚書
    moderation;Aristotle;category;Nichomachean Ethics;Jung-Yung;Jung;Ren-shin;Dao-shin;Shangshu
    Date: 2012-06
    Issue Date: 2015-12-01 14:56:02 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 無論在漢語哲學裏或者在歐洲哲學裏，「中」這詞語各自有其重要的意義；但是在不同的文化脈絡裏，「中」的指涉意義和內容各不相同。在本文裏，筆者試圖藉著亞里斯多德《範疇論》（也就是根據述詞的分類），分辨「中」在不同文化脈絡中的意義。本文分成以下的四個部分：一、亞里斯多德《範疇論》中的何種範疇可以用來談「中」？二、亞里斯多德倫理學裡的「中」的意涵為何？三、《尚書》裡的「中」和《中庸》裡的「中」各有何意涵？四、結論。在第一個部分裡，根據我的分析，「中」必然存在在一組互斥且對立的相反者之間，因而「中」絕不可能屬於「本質、量」的範疇，而「地點、時間、放置、有」這四個範疇，如果不以關係範疇來考慮，那麼將既不擁有相反者而且也不具有程度上的差異。在第二個部分裡，我分析了亞里斯多德《尼可馬克倫理學》的若干段落，得到四點：1. 只有擁有實踐智者（φρονιμος）能夠以語言定義何謂「中」。2.「中」介乎以其過度之惡和以其不足之惡。3.「中」乃存乎感受和實踐中之當為者。4. 品德就是「中」，可以依據三種不同的尺度：a. 本質、b. 定義、c. 形式的本質。從而「中」作為品德的選擇之習性，必然首要地關連到做和受這兩個範疇，而這兩個範疇一方面擁有相反者，另一方面擁有多少或程度上的差別。此外，「中」也可以屬於質的範疇或者關係範疇。在第三部分裡，從對《尚書》十六字心傳的分析，可以確定：「中」既然是人心與道心相合為一，因而「中」是一種本質，這個意義似乎比關係的意義更重要，因為心作為主宰的意義，決定了做和受之間的恰當的關係。在對《中庸》的「中」的意義分析裡，可以確定：「中」只是喜怒哀樂之情未發，因而在這個意義下，既不關乎做，也不關乎受，也不是質；若「中」是天命之性，是本質，而已發和未發是一組對立的關係。在最後的結論裡，我認為亞里斯多德的「中」和《尚書》與《中庸》的「中」都有屬於關係範疇的意義，但是其意義並不相同，亞里斯多德的「中」接近一種量的關係，而《尚書》與《中庸》的「中」意謂人心和道心相合而為性之理。此外，這三者的「中」也有本質、質、作和受等範疇的意義，但是其所指涉的意義並不相同。
    The word ”Jung” (中) in Chinese and ”το μεσóν” in Greek are very important philosophical terms in the Ethics which reflect that Chinese philosophy and Greek philosophy coincidentally take ”the Golden Middle Way” as the best measure of ethical values, although their referential meanings and contents exist in a different cultural context. In this article, the author attempts to analyze the various meanings of ”Jung” and ”το μεσóν” in the viewpoint of Aristotle`s theory of category (i.e. according to the classification of the predicates) and compare them in the context of their own traditions.It is divided into four parts: 1. According to Aristotle`s theory of category, what kinds of predicates can be applied to discuss the meanings of ”Jung” and ””το μεσóν”? 2. The various meanings of ”το μεσóν” in Aristotle`s Nichomachean Ethics. 3. The various meanings of ”Jung” in ”Jung- Yung” (《中庸》). IV Conclusion. In the first part of my analysis, ”το μεσóν” must exist between a set of contraries (αντικειμενον), thus it neither belongs to the essence (ουσια) nor to the quantity, because these have no contraries. And the other 4 categories - place, time, being in a position and having - have neither the contraries nor differences in the extent, if we do not take the category of relation into consideration. In the second part, I analyze some texts of in Aristotle`s ”Nichomachean Ethics” and acquire four points: 1. Only the one who has practical wisdom (φρονιμος) can make a precise definition of what is ”το μεσóν”. 2. ”το μεσóν” exists between the excessive and the deficiency. 3. ”το μεσóν” is only rightly done in the action and the affection. 4. Virtue is ”το μεσóν” and can be based on three different scales: a. the essence, b. the definition, c. the form of the essence. Consequently ”το μεσóν” as the habit to select the right virtue must primarily refers to the category of action and affection and these two categories not only can have the contraries, but also permit the differences in the quantity or extent. In addition, ”το μεσóν” can also be applied to the categories of quality and relation.In the third part I analyze the meaning of ”Jung” in the so-called ”16 - characters-cordial-convey”(十六字心傳) in the text of the Book Shang-Shu (尚書) and conclude that ”Jung” can be a predicate of essence since ”Jung” means the unification of ”Ren-shin” (人心) with ”Dao-shin”. And in this sense the meaning of ”Jung” is more important than the relative one because ”Shin”(心) is the ruler and determine the right relation between action and affection. In the analysis of the meaning of ”Jung” in Jung-Yung I find that ”Jung” is just a mental state which is still without affections. i.e. Happiness, anger, sadness and joy. So, in this sense, ”Jung” is neither an action nor an affection nor an essence. If ”Jung” is the innate nature and the essence, then the affecting (Yi-Fa, 已發) and the originally none-affected (未發) are contraries in relation.In the conclusion, it`s clearly certain that both ”Jung” and ”το μεσóν” belong to the category of relation in some sense, but they have different meanings; ”το μεσóν” by Aristotle refers to the quantitative relation and ”Jung” in Shang-Shu means the unification of ”Ren-shin” (人心) with ”Daoshin” and the principle of human nature.
    Relation: 鵝湖學誌, 48, 169-192
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Philosophy] Periodical Articles

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