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    題名: 影響新創公司長期表現之因素 - 以教育網絡為例
    What factors affect new ventures` long-term performance? A case of educational network
    作者: 項柏維
    貢獻者: 王信實
    李文傑
    Wang, Shinn Shyr
    Lee, Wen Chieh
    項柏維
    關鍵詞: 教育連結
    新創
    創業投資
    國發基金
    Educational Link
    New Venture
    Venture Capital
    National Development Fund
    日期: 2015
    上傳時間: 2015-07-27 11:33:26 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究提出了影響新創公司長期表現的架構，並以教育網絡連結作為衡量
    社群網絡連結的依據，探討其解決資訊不對稱問題的效果。本論文透過建構台灣的新創公司、創業投資基金和國家發展基金三個群體的經理人資料，計算出各教育網絡間的連結關係；依此可衡量各教育網絡關係對新創公司長期表現的影響。
    實證結果顯示，新創公司和創業投資基金間的雙向教育網絡連結對新創公
    司的長期表現有正向影響；然而當教育網絡連結和政府部門(本研究定義為國發基金)有關係時，其效果則延伸出許多議題，其一為政府部門與被投資公司產生教育連結時，其對被投資公司的長期績效表現效果為負向，顯示出產生政治連結時政府部門的投資行為會受到影響。另一方面，當創業投資基金和政府部門產生教育連結時，其對被投資公司的長期績效表現為正，解釋了政府單位在選擇創業投資基金時是以長期績效表現作為選擇依據。
    In this research, educational links are hypothesized as the key factors for solving
    the information asymmetry problem. By using the uniquely constructed dataset with
    key information of invested companies, venture capital firms and National
    Development Fund (NDF) in Taiwan, we quantify the effect of network linkages on
    invested companies’ long-term performance. Our empirical results show that a linkage
    between invested companies and VCs positively affects invested companies’ long-term
    performance. However, the political linkage formed with NDF has non-trivial two-fold
    effects. While an educational link formed between invested companies and NDF impact
    long-term performance adversely, the educational link between venture capital firms
    and NDF in turn has positive effects on the long-term performance. We thus confirm
    the existence of inappropriate investment decisions frequently taken because of the
    political link between invested companies and National Development Fund.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟學系
    102258001
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102258001
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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