Reference: | 中文部分
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哭窮還狂燒錢?全台16縣市跨年晚會1夜花掉1億元 (http://www.ettoday.net/news/20131202/302934.htm)
喊窮有理?跨年晚會一夜燒掉1500萬!預算爆增700萬,郝市長搶當燒錢領頭羊 (http://blog.udn.com/wenchiehl/7102049)
財政收支劃分法 - 全國法規資料庫 - 法務部 (http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=G0320015)
MBA智庫百科 (http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/%E9%A6%96%E9%A1%B5)
全台燈會燒掉4億 約一間小學40年之經費 (http://davidli.pixnet.net/blog/post/42888190-%E5%85%A8%E5%8F%B0%E7%87%88%E6%9C%83%E7%87%924%E5%84%84%EF%BC%8C1%E5%B0%8F%E5%AD%B840%E5%B9%B4%E7%B6%93%E8%B2%BB(%E8%B7%A8%E5%B9%B415%E5%B9%B4)(%E5%A4%A2%E6%83%B3 )
劉政鴻滿意度高?你應該要知道的調查真相 (http://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=5067422)
天下雜誌505期 (http://www.cw.com.tw/ppt/powerpoint.action?id=432)
天下雜誌531期 (http://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=5052286)
天下雜誌555期 (http://www.cw.com.tw/ppt/powerpoint.action?id=534)
負債409億/國慶煙火秀 苗縣要燒1.8億 (http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/589917)
地方稅開徵的爭議 (http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/CL/095/CL-C-095-093.htm)
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