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| Title: | 風電產業在中國西部： 一種新的地方政府行為模式
Wind Power Industry in China`s Western Region: A New Behavior Pattern of Local Government |
| Authors: | 林凱源
Kaiyuan, Lin |
| Contributors: | 王振寰
Jenn-Hwan Wang
林凱源
Lin Kaiyuan |
| Keywords: | 風電產業
地方政府
挖坑等樹
矛盾捆綁
地方撐傘
Wind power
Local government
Digging hole and waiting trees
Contradictions bundling
Local Umbrella |
| Date: | 2014 |
| Issue Date: | 2015-07-01 14:57:03 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本文探討中國大陸在調整發展模式，強調生態文明和永續發展的目標下，通過政府的積極介入，提高環境標準，并推出一系列的激勵政策，調動包括地方政府和央企在內的各方行動者積極投入風電產業，在風力發電和風電設備製造方面取得了長足的進步。藉此，中國的風電裝機容在短短數年內躍居世界第一，在國內則成為僅次於火電和水電第三大電力來源。同時，中國通過巨大的國內市場，培植自身的風電設備製造能力，已經改變以往單純依靠進口的局面。不過，風電產業在快速發展的同時，也面臨棄風、資源浪費和虧損的問題。
本文將地方政府置於分析的核心，選取酒泉進行田野調查，結合次級資料進行分析，發現：地方政府將環境要求和地方經濟發展的利益「捆綁」，在中央調整發展模式之時，「挖坑等樹」，為將發電企業的電力來源配額要求和具有政策導向的財政轉移支付提供落足點，吸引大量的資金和項目進駐，再爭取中央政府「千萬千瓦級風電基地」的認證。當風電發展過熱，造成「棄風」時，地方政府撐起綠色的「保護傘」，加上中央項目的合法性支持，能夠避免招致懲罰，反而能以解決棄風問題為由，爭取更多的資源和政策優惠，引入其他投資。地方政府通過「資源化」了的風能，積極引進資金和技術，推動本地經濟和社會的發展，風電產業不僅僅侷限於將西部打造成能源和原材料產地，而且將裝備製造能力、就業崗位和更多的收益留在當地。但在環境維度上，風電產業對於中國整體的貢獻突出，但是對於酒泉當地，風電產業非但沒有帶來環境效益，反而加劇了當地的環境污染和生態破壞。
This paper illustrates China`s adjustment of development model. It has strengthened the goals of ecological progressing and sustainable development, and has motivated investors to invest in wind power industry(WPI) by raising environmental requirements and implementing a lot of incentive measures. By these measures, needs of environment improvement and advances of technology converts wind from disaster to be a resource in great demand. Thus wind power generation of China has been ranked 1st over the world; it also ranked third by energy type. China also develops domestic wind power equipment manufacturing sector by taking advantage of huge domestic market. However, China`s WPI has trapped in troubles including disorderly competition, over-construction, low efficiency and so on.
To access the role of wind power in China`s industry upgrading and environmental improvement projects and its implications for governance patterns, this paper adopts a neo-institutional analysis of the principal-agent relationship between the Chinese central state and local government. As SOEs are the major investors in WPI, this article also concerns on the interaction among central government, local government and SOEs in WPI. In the context of Chinese regime, I will highlight how local governments take advantages of WPI to meet the various requirements of cadre management system and fiscal system at the same time.A case study on Jiuquan(JQ) City, Gansu Province can be used for understanding the politic economical logic of Chinese WPI
I find that local government plays a key role in development of wind power as well as causing of problems. This article finds out that local government utilizes a new behavior pattern to develop WPI. "Digging hole and waiting trees" to get funds and policy resources from central government, building interests to meet economical and environmental needs at the same time(Contradictions bundling) and raising environmental and western umbrella to avoid penalty on irregularities and gain fault-tolerant (Local Umbrella). Wind power policies has been alienated by this pattern at local level, it transform from ends to be means. In sum, WPI makes contribution to balance eastern and western areas` development level on economic perspective, but has only environmental contribution at country-level. It increases environmental pressures in JQ. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
國家發展研究所
101261024
103 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1012610241 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [國家發展研究所] 學位論文
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