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| Title: | 何種Clawback條款之Trigger最能發揮其有效性?
Which Trigger can Better Enhance the Effectiveness of Clawback Provisions? |
| Authors: | 黃唯真
Huang, Wei Chen |
| Contributors: | 俞洪昭
Yu, Hung Chao
黃唯真
Huang, Wei Chen |
| Keywords: | Clawback條款
盈餘管理
重編
Clawback provisions
Earnings management
Restatement |
| Date: | 2014 |
| Issue Date: | 2014-11-03 10:08:08 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究探討不同啟動要件在公司自願性採用Clawback條款下，對公司財務報表重編及盈餘品質之影響。以2007至2010年間列於 Russel 3000指數之公司(不含金融服務與保險業)為樣本，本研究發現 Clawback條款之啟動要件選擇與公司有無發生財務報表重編間並無明顯連結；然而，公司通用性狀況之啟動要件與調整前裁決性應計數、調整後裁決性應計數及應計項目品質呈顯著負相關。可藉以作Clawback條款之啟動要件抑止公司從事應計項目盈餘管理。此外財務報表重編，無論導因於錯誤或舞弊之啟動要件與公司實際活動盈餘管理亦呈顯著負相關。當公司盈餘管理從應計項目盈餘管理轉為實際盈餘管理時，可採以此啟動要件來起動Clawback條款以減少此實際活動盈餘管理行為。綜上結果隱含以下推論：盈餘管理將可能導致公司財務報表重編。當公司選用適當啟動要件啟動Clawback條款能有效降低公司盈餘管理之行為，盈餘品質將因此提升並進一步降低財務報表可能發生重編之機率。換句話說，Clawback條款之啟動要件所產生之嚇阻效果並非直接反應在事後之重編結果上，反而提前反映在使公司發生財務報表重編之可能原因上。故並無發現Clawback條款之啟動要件選擇與公司有無發生財務報表重編間之明顯關聯性。
This study examines which trigger can better enhance the effectiveness of clawback provisions. Based on a sample of Russel 3000 companies with and without voluntary adoption of the clawbacks from 2007 to 2011, I find no association between companies voluntary adoption of clawback provisons and restatement likelihood. However, I find that voluntary adoption of clawback is negatively associated with earnings management measures (e.g., absolute value of DA, performance-based DA, and accrual quality.) when companies adopt general catch-all (i.e., a general situation to adopt clawback provison such as an executive who leaves without appropriate notice.) as the clawback trigger. In addition, I find a negative association between voluntary adoption of clawbacks and real earnings management when companies adopt performance- based (i.e., companies can reclaim compensation when any executive who received incentive compensation based on incorrect financials.) as the trigger. These results suggest that general catch-all and performance- based seem to effectively mitigate companies’ earnings management. Taken together, the empirical findings indicate that selecting appropriate clawback triggers can mitigate firms’ earnings management, leading to lower restatement likelihood. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
101353002
103 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101353002 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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