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| Title: | 俄羅斯公司治理模式之研究
A Study on Corporate Governance of Russia |
| Authors: | 賴俊榮
Lai, Chun Jung |
| Contributors: | 王定士
賴俊榮
Lai, Chun Jung |
| Keywords: | 俄羅斯
公司治理
民營化
Russia
Corporate Governance
Privatization |
| Date: | 2011 |
| Issue Date: | 2014-10-01 13:49:42 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 俄羅斯大民營化從1992年7月起經歷了證券民營化、現金民營化及個案民營化等階段。此ㄧ漫長過程的開端也正是俄羅斯公司治理改革的濫觴。以俄羅斯公司治理改革歷程而言，內部公司治理呈現：「內部人控制」及「委託-代理」問題。俄羅斯公司所有權與經營權之分離，進而產生所謂委託人及代理人間之代理關係，衍生出一連串代理問題及代理成本相關議題，隨著經濟改革開放，代理問題更加明顯。至於外部公司治理部份，最重要因素是資本市場、銀行和政府。
本研究藉由分析比較英、美、德、日及俄羅斯之公司治理結構，歸納如下：英美模式的內部公司治理主要由股東大會、董事會和經理階層組成；外部公司治理為「用手投票」機制和「用腳投票」機制並存。德日模式的內部公司治理採取監事會、董事上下隸屬的雙層結構；外部公司治理為企業「交叉持股」。目前俄羅斯公司治理結構的情況，以公司內部的組織結構來看，符合英美模式的「股東大會-董事會-經理委員會」結構。但就其內容而言，股份集中程度高，內部人控制、員工持股比例高，具有濃厚的德日模式的色彩。以外部公司治理來看，市場化程度低，產品市場、資本市場、勞動市場及技術不發達，股份的流動性差；政府的行為對企業的影響巨大；銀行掌握大企業的大量股份等等，表現出德日模式的特徵。從公司治理的整體發展水平來看，俄羅斯的公司治理水準較低，尚不成熟，兼具英美模式及德日模式某些特徵的綜合型治理結構。
俄羅斯統一電力公司的公司治理改革符合俄羅斯公司治理法規轉變的歷程。俄羅斯統一電力公司內部及外部公司治理分析的八個項目，除「委託及代理」呈現經理委員會權力過大；「股東權利及投資風險」呈現小股東權利受威脅及與國家參與相關的風險，上述兩項目尚未發展成熟，其餘六個項目已符合俄羅斯公司法現行規範並逐漸朝向OECD公司治理制度的目標發展。
Since July, 1992, the privatization of Russia has gone through several processes such as security privatization, cash privatization and cases of privatization. And these long processes are exactly the ones initiating the revolution of corporate governance. Regarding the process of revolution of corporate governance, the problems of insider control and principal-agent exist in internal corporate governance. The isolation of ownership and management of Russian enterprise has further resulted in the so-called agency relationship between principal and agent from which appeared a series of relative issues regarding agent problem and agent cost. The more open the economic revolution, the more obvious the agent problem. As for external corporate governance, the most important key point is capital market, bank and government.
By analysis this research compares the corporate governances of United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Japan and Russia and concludes in the following: The Internal corporate governance of the Anglo-Saxon Model mainly consists of general meeting of stockholders, board of directors and the main officers of class; while vote with their hand and vote with their feet coexist in external corporate governance. The internal corporate governance of the German-Japanese Model adopts the double layer structure of board of inspector and board of directors; while the external corporate governance adopts cross-shareholding. The current status of corporate governance of Russia, observed from the inner structure of corporation, conforms to the structure of general meeting of stockholders-board of directors-the main officers of class of the Anglo-Saxon Model. However, one will realize that in this status, the centralization of stock is high, and the proportion of insider control and the proportion of employees holding stock are high and hence the corporate governance of Russia contains the obvious style of the German-Japanese Model. From the external corporate governance, one can observe low degree of marketization, the unprosperous of product market, capital market, labor market and technology, and low liquidity of stock, as well as great impact of government policy on enterprises and banks holding massive stocks of big enterprises. All of these reveal the characteristics of the German-Japanese Model. Observed from the development of corporate governance, the level of Russian enterprise, which contains both the Anglo-Saxon Model and the German-Japanese Model, is still premature.
The revolution of the corporate governance of Unified Energy System of Russia (UES of Russia) conforms to the relative regulations. Six out of eight items analyzed from the internal corporate governance and external corporate governance of UES of Russia have conformed to the current regulations and are progressing toward the system of corporate governance of OECD company, except for the two which are still premature: 1. the overwhelming power of principal-agent and the main officers of class; 2. shareholder’s rights and investment risk revealing the rights of minor shareholders being threatened and the risks of national participation. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
俄羅斯研究所
94263010
100 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0942630101 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [俄羅斯研究所] 學位論文
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