| Abstract: | 本計畫探討一財政競爭模型,在此模型中地方公共財具有水平差異化(Horizontal differentiation)的特性。本模型與d`Aspremont,Gabszewicz,and Thisse (1979)相似之處在於若地方政府所提供的公共財的型態與個人所最偏好的型態不同時,則個人須負擔一交通成本,此交通成本為個人所最偏好的型態與地方政府所實際提供型態之間距離的平方的函數。在一Subgame的架構中,兩地方政府在第一階段同時選擇公共財的型態,然後在第二階段同時選擇勞動稅稅率,個人在觀察到兩地方政府所提供公共財的型態及稅率後,用以足投票的方式選擇居住在最能滿足他們偏好的地區。此模型考慮兩種地方政府的目標函數:一為中間投票人的效用,另一為一地方政府所有住民效用的總和。本文發現在兩種目標函數下公共財的數量都達到最佳的水準,而這也是當地方公共財為同質,所有選民都有相同偏好及所得時的結果。因此引入差異化地方公共財並不會扭曲地方政府選擇最有效率的勞動稅稅率。此外,本文亦發現若地方政府可以選擇區隔彼此,他們一定會提供不同型態的地方公共財,但所提供的型態卻不是柏拉圖最有效率的型態。原因是無論是中間投票人還是追求全體住民效用總和最大的地方政府,即使是犧牲對公共財型態的偏好,都有動機去操縱公共財的型態,以追求一較有利的人口量,進而達到一較適量的公共財水準及所得。<
This paper examines a model of tax competition in which local public goods are horizontally differentiated. The model is similar to d`Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) in the sense that individuals incur a quadratic transportation cost if their most preferred types of local public goods do not coincide with the actual type provided. In a subgame framework, jurisdictions choose the type of local public goods in the first stage, then choose tax rates on labor in the second stage. After observing the tax rates and types of local public goods, individuals choose with their feet the jurisdiction that best satisfies their preferences. Two objective functions are discussed: the median voter`s utility and the total utility within the jurisdiction. I find that the quantities of local public goods reach the first-best level under both objective functions. This is also the result found in models of homogeneous public goods and individuals. Therefore, introducing the heterogeneity of local public goods does not distort the selection of the efficient labor tax rates. At the Nash equilibrium jurisdictions differentiate themselves from each other, but the equilibrium types are inefficient, however. Median voters and the benevolent local governments both have incentives to sacrifice the preference on types in exchange for a more favorable size of population, and thereby more favorable quantities of local public goods and income.< |
