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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/67992


    Title: 民主治理與環境保護─從中埔慈濟案例檢視我國資源回收的政策體系
    Authors: 湯京平
    Tang, Ching-Ping
    Contributors: 政治系
    Keywords: 合產;公私協營增效;公共財貨;集體行動;制度性誘因;市場機制;社會資產
    Coproduction;Public-Private Synergy;Collective Action;Institutional Incentives;Public Goods;Market Mechanism;Social Capital
    Date: 2001
    Issue Date: 2014-07-29 18:05:28 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 我國民主化之後，政府不再絕緣於來自社會的影響，因此其施政的細緻程度需要大幅強化，以因應政治對行政的衝擊。在垃圾公害危機的處理上，因為地方民眾抗爭的可能性大增，政府政策已由強調興建垃圾場或焚化爐，轉而尋求垃圾減量與資源回收等低政治性但行政難度較高的解決方案。本文以慈濟在嘉義中埔鄉的資源回收活動為例，討論施政細緻化的重要方式，乃設立制度以鼓勵民眾參與公共財貨的生產，而謀求公私協營增效（public-private synergy）的理想狀況。鑑於參與此類提供公共財貨的集體行動，個別民眾必須付出一定的成本，故可能有搭便車的動機。因此，政府不應假設民眾會主動參與，而應瞭解民眾可能參與的動機，並在制度中提供民眾足夠的行動誘因。本文同時強調，物質性、社群性、以及理想性誘因都可能成為行動者的驅力，而市場機制的運用－如寶特瓶回收獎勵金，不但提供物質性誘因，也與其他誘因產生複雜的互動，是許多誘因能夠發揮效果的重要基礎，故不宜應業界之要求而輕易變更。
    Democratization in Taiwan has demanded a more delicate governance system. Traditionally isolated administrative body is now encountered pluralistic interference that usually politicizes the policy process essentially. Public administrators, rather than simply rule the public, are now required to design institutions to work with the public in offering public goods. In this paper, I argue that traditional supply-side policies of waste management—mainly governmental provision of incinerators and landfill--have encountered considerable challenges of NIMBY (not in my back yard) syndrome. The governments eventually recognized that demand-side policies, thought administratively sophisticate and costly, are politically more feasible. Different levels of governments have therefore engaged in designing germane institutions to change citizens’ behaviors in consumption and disposal of wastes. After I a briefly discussion on the possible public-private synergy in such recycling policies, this paper examines citizens’ incentives of participating in such collective action in co-producing public goods (of managing the wastes), and explains why some townships might have performed better in recycling materials than others. In conclusion, this paper suggests that the government should remain such market mechanisms as deposit system even under energetic rent-seeking pressure from the business, because these mechanisms contribute to a successful application of all major incentives for public goods coproduction.
    Relation: 台灣政治學刊, 5, 149-181
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[政治學系] 期刊論文

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