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    Title: 薪酬委員會的特性與參與程度對薪酬績效敏感度之影響
    Authors: 黃韻如
    Huang, Yun Ru
    Contributors: 梁嘉紋
    黃韻如
    Huang, Yun Ru
    Keywords: 薪酬委員會
    薪酬績效敏感度
    參與程度
    代理問題
    Date: 2013
    Issue Date: 2014-07-21 15:36:00 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 金融海嘯爆發，薪酬契約的設計及公司薪酬績效間聯結程度之議題又再次受到關注，企業績效不彰，高階主管卻坐領高薪，因而引發肥貓之爭議。我國亦於2010年增訂證券交易法第14-6條，強制上市櫃公司應設置薪資報酬委員會。本研究旨在探討薪酬委員會的特性與參與程度對薪酬績效敏感度之影響，在薪酬委員會的特性方面著重在薪酬委員之財務專業背景及社會網絡，參與程度則以開會次數及出席率來衡量。以美國S&P500公司為樣本，在薪酬委員會特性方面，未發現財務專業背景及社會網絡與薪酬績效敏感度有顯著關聯，參與程度方面，開會次數與薪酬績效敏感度為正的顯著相關，而出席率則無顯著關聯。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    101353043
    102
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101353043
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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