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    Title: 控制股東之代理問題與企業價值之關聯性
    The Relationship of Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value －Evidence from Taiwan
    Authors: 簡子翔
    Chien, Tzu Hsiang
    Contributors: 吳啟銘
    簡子翔
    Chien, Tzu Hsiang
    Keywords: 企業價值
    控制股東
    代理問題
    機構投資人
    家族企業
    corporate value
    controlling shareholders
    agency problem
    institutional investors
    family owned business
    Date: 2013
    Issue Date: 2014-07-21 15:33:06 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究目的為以實證模型，研究台灣2009年至2013年上市櫃公司控制股東的代理問題與企業價值的關聯性。為了同時考量控制權力高低與利益一致程度兩因素共同對代理問題產生的影響，本研究以可代表控制股東控制權程度高低的「股份控制權」與「席次控制權」兩衡量方法，分別除以「盈餘分配權」以得到「股份盈餘」與「席次盈餘」兩個偏離倍數，並以此二偏離倍數當作控制股東的道德風險指標，探討此二指標與企業價值的關聯性。最後，本研究再進一步深入了解在公司規模、機構投資人持股、家族企業等三者狀況不同的情況下，是否影響控制股東之道德風險指標與企業價值的關係，並驗證以股份或席次來衡量控制權時，在不同情況下的適用性。
    本研究實證結果發現，若以席次盈餘偏離倍數當作控制股東的道德風險指標，則其與企業價值的關係達到顯著的負相關，而以股份盈餘偏離倍數作為道德風險指標時則為負相關但不顯著。此外，在交互作用方面，高公司規模者之控制股東的兩種道德風險指標皆對企業價值的負面影響效果更大，顯示公司規模愈大，股權愈分散的結果使控制股東所受的監管程度較少。而機構投資人持股比例低者之控制股東的兩種道德風險指標亦對企業價值的負面影響效果更大，代表其持股較低的狀況會使監督效果薄弱，負向加強控制股東道德風險對企業價值的影響。最後，家族企業者之控制股東的兩個道德風險指標有不同的顯著結果，僅席次盈餘偏離倍數與家族企業的交乘項與企業價值的關係達顯著負相關，推論家族企業的目標一致之特性可能會負面加強控制股東的道德風險。
    台灣企業經營是以董事會為權力核心，在衡量控制股東之代理問題時，以席次盈餘偏離倍數作為其道德風險指標是更為合適的。控制股東過多的席次控制權力或過少的盈餘分配權，可能向市場傳達出負面訊息，尤其規模愈大或屬家族企業的公司，其負面效果愈大。控制股東可以增加實質持股或策略性提高機構投資人持股，以降低道德風險指標的負面訊息與市場顧慮。
    The purpose of this research is to use an empirical approach to analyze the correlation between controlling shareholders’ agency problem and corporate value. In order to consider the influence both the level of controlling power and consistency of benefits brings to agency problem, this research uses voting rights and ratio of board members controlled by the ultimate owners, which are representative of shareholder rights, to divide by cash flow rights to derive at the earnings per share and profit per seat deviations. These two deviations serve as indicators of moral risk, and the relationship between these two deviations and corporate value is analyzed. Finally, this research dives deeper into understanding whether the relationship between the controlling shareholders’ moral risk indicator and corporate value is influenced under three different situations: company size, institutional investors holding stock, and family owned business, and to validate the suitability of using stock or seats to evaluate controlling rights under different situations.

    The results of the empirical research shows that if the ratio of board members controlled by the ultimate owners is used as the representative of controlling power, the moral risk indicator for controlling shareholders would has a negative correlation with corporate value. In review, controlling shareholders of bigger companies show a greater negative influence the two moral risk indicators have on corporate value, demonstrating that the bigger the company size, the more disperse the stock rights, resulting in a decreased level of supervision for controlling shareholders. If the ratio of institutional investors holding stock is low, the two moral risk factors show a greater negative influence on corporate value. The controlling shareholder’s excessive seating control rights or insufficient profit appropriation rights may send a negative signal to the market, especially the bigger the size of the company or if it is a family owned business, which has an even more negative impact. Controlling shareholders can increase actual stock held or strategically increase institutional shareholder stock to lower the negative message the moral risk factor sends and to soothe market anxiety.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    企業管理研究所
    101355001
    102
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101355001
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Business Administation] Theses

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