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    题名: 美國加盟者貸款倒帳因素之實證分析
    Empirical Analysis of Franchisee Loan Default in the U.S. Market
    作者: 盧冠伶
    Lu, Kuan Ling
    贡献者: 張元晨
    Chang, Yuan Chen
    盧冠伶
    Lu, Kuan Ling
    关键词: 連鎖加盟
    美國中小企業發展部門
    貸款壞帳
    代理問題
    資源匱乏理論
    議價能力
    franchising
    small business administration
    loan default
    agency theory
    bargain power
    resource scarcity theory
    日期: 2013
    上传时间: 2014-07-01 12:05:38 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 不同於過去文獻多使用訪查加盟總部獲得之加盟者失敗率資料，本研究採用美國中小企業發展部門（Small Business Administration，簡稱SBA）官方所公布連鎖加盟品牌加盟者申請由政府擔保之優惠貸款統計數據，探討加盟者經營失敗的關鍵因素。實證資料包含2000年至2007年、2000年至2008年間累計的加盟者的失敗率，以及推算2007年貸款壞帳金額。實證結果發現，貸款壞帳金額迴歸模型整體解釋能力優於以失敗率迴歸模型。加盟總部基於資源匱乏動機而收取高額加盟投資資本，將導致加盟者貸款壞帳金額增加。此外，連鎖加盟契約期間愈長，加盟者有充裕時間回收投入成本，將使貸款壞帳金額愈少。加盟者本身若具有相關產業背景，有助於減少談判過程中與加盟總部之間資訊不對稱問題，因而增加議價能力、降低經營失敗風險，並造成貸款壞帳金額的降低。
    This thesis examines the causes of franchisees’ failure using loan performance data collected by the U.S. Small Business Administration, from 2000 to 2007 and 2000 to 2008. By extracting the loan default amount in 2007, I found that loan default model is more successful than the failure rate model at explaining franchisees’ failure. Empirical results support the notion that franchising capital is negatively related to loan default amount. Franchise contract term is also negatively and significantly related to the franchisees’ loan default amount. Results show that when franchisee owns relevant industry experience, which helps solve asymmetric information problem and enhance franchisees’ bargain power, both the default rate and default amount decrease.
    參考文獻: 1.陳盈儒（2013）。連鎖便利商店聯合行為 重罰！公平交易通訊，43，6-7。
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    22.Glennon, D., Nigro, P., 2005. Measuring the default risk of small business loans: A survival analysis approach. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 923-947
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    31.Rubin, P.H., 1978. Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, The. JL & Econ. 21, 223
    32.Shane, S., Foo, M.-D., 1999. New firm survival: Institutional explanations for new franchisor mortality. Management Science 45, 142-159
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    34.Windsperger, J., Dant, R.P., 2006. Contractibility and ownership redirection in franchising: A property rights view. Journal of Retailing 82, 259-272
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    101357026
    102
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101357026
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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