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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/66465


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/66465


    Title: 家族企業與主併公司績效之關聯: 以台灣併購案為例
    The relation between family firms and acquiring firm performance_ The cases of M&A in Taiwan
    Authors: 許韶耘
    Contributors: 湛可南
    許韶耘
    Keywords: 家族企業
    併購績效
    Family firm
    Acquiring firm performance
    Date: 2013
    Issue Date: 2014-06-04 14:41:20 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This study investigates the relation between family firms and acquiring firm performance for our sample of Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions between 1999 and 2013. We find that cumulative abnormal returns of family acquirers on average outperform those of nonfamily acquirers by 2.17% three days around the announcement. Family acquirers obtain greater abnormal returns even after controlling for both firm characteristics such as firm size, book to market, prior return, public target and deal characteristics such as year dummy and mode of payment. Furthermore, we explore the potential impact of the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights on family acquiring performance. In the sample of Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions, the deviation is not the significant factor to cause a negative influence. As a result, family acquirers with the advantage of eliminating agency problems may generate more benefits than nonfamily acquirers.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    101357009
    102
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101357009
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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