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    Title: 法人說明會與董監事連結之關聯
    Conference Calls and Board Interlocks
    Authors: 譚寧
    Contributors: 詹凌菁
    譚寧
    Keywords: 董監事連結
    法人說明會
    社會網絡
    自願性揭露
    Board interlock
    Conference call
    Social network
    Voluntary disclosure
    Date: 2013
    Issue Date: 2014-03-03 15:30:18 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 董監事連結為社交網絡的一種型態,扮演董監事相互溝通與交流的管道。兼職於不同公司的董監事有許多機會獲取企業內部的可靠資訊,透過彼此互相交流與溝通,企業的資訊可藉由此種社交網絡傳遞散播於公司之間並影響各公司的企業行為與策略,本研究主要在探討此種溝通平台是否會影響公司自願性的召開法人說明會。本研究選取了2000年至2009年間的上市櫃公司作為樣本,研究結果顯示公司的董監事連結和法人說明會之召開有正向的關係,顯示當公司透過董監事的兼職而與其他有召開法說會的公司建立連結時,該公司更傾向召開法人說明會,且召開之次數更為頻繁。此外,當公司透過獨立董事和其他有召開法說會的公司建立連結時,此現象更為顯著。透過本文之額外測試,我們亦發現董監事連結的影響很可能公司在法說會揭露的資訊。
    In the field of social network, board interlock is a reliable communication channel for board of directors to transfer corporate information, which further influences the strategies or practices adopted by the firms. Conference calls have become a widely used medium for Taiwanese managers to communicate corporate information to the public in the past two decades. This study investigates whether board interlock as a social network affects corporate disclosure policies in terms of their decision to hold conference calls. By using the data from listed companies in Taiwan during 2000 to 2009, the results indicate that firms tied to other call firms through interlocked directors are more likely to hold conference calls. Moreover, I find that interlocking independent directors are positively associated with the decision of holding conference calls by the focal company. These findings are robust to changes in the measures of board interlocks and conference calls. Our additional analysis also indicates that the information disclosed in conference calls may be influenced by board interlocks. The findings in this study generally support the argument that board interlocks are associated with the spread of corporate practices.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    100353044
    102
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353044
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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