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Title:	探討自願性會計政策變更與分析師跟進之關聯性研究 The Association between Voluntary Accounting Changes and Analyst Following
Authors:	黃子齡 Huang, Tzu Ling
Contributors:	諶家蘭 Seng, Jia Lang 黃子齡 Huang, Tzu Ling
Keywords:	分析師跟進自願性會計政策變更收入增加會計變更收入減少會計變更會計政策異質性公司規模盈餘波動性 Analyst following Voluntary accounting changes Income-increasing accounting changes Income-decreasing accounting changes Accounting choice heterogeneity Firm size Earnings volatility
Date:	2012
Issue Date:	2013-11-01 11:42:58 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本研究主要探討當公司管理階層選擇自願性變更其會計政策時，是否會影響分析師對於公司未來表現的預測，進而影響分析師跟進之決策。本研究以自願性會計政策變更之美國上市公司為研究對象，樣本期間為1994年至2008年，並將研究對象之競爭對手或產業領導者納入比較樣本。大量文獻指出自願性會計政策會扮演重要的角色，因其會影響公司的合約遵循、財務報導及股價(Bradshaw, Miller and Serafeim 2008)，且管理階層其主要變更目的往往並非為良好反映公司的營運現況，而與盈餘變動較為相關(Linck, Lopez and Rees 2007)。此時，分析師為證券市場之主要資訊傳遞者，為維護良好聲譽及績效應會審慎評估該自願性會計政策變更之適切性，而決定是否跟進該公司(Stickle 1992)。故本研究檢視自願性會計政策變更是否會影響分析師跟進數目、具有盈餘增減或會計政策異質性之自願性會計政策變更是否亦影響分析師跟進，以及公司規模、盈餘波動是否會影響其間之關聯性，以探討自願性會計政策是否確實存在其目的或隱含警示訊息，引起市場反應(Harrison 1977)。本研究實證結果顯示：公司管理階層選擇自願性會計政策變動會降低後續分析師跟進之意願，尤以該變動會增加公司未來盈餘、採用和競爭對手或產業領導者不同會計政策之情況更為顯著，而當公司規模小或盈餘波動大時，願意跟進該公司的分析師數目減少更多。因此，本研究推論大多數分析師認為自願性會計政策變動存在其目的或隱含訊息，以致願意跟進該公司的分析師數目減少，且該公司規模愈小或盈餘波動愈大，更多分析師會考量資訊取得成本較高而減少跟進。也因本研究考量多種型態的自願性會計政策變更及公司特性，相對於以前的文獻提供較多結論性的證據來支持自願性會計政策變更對於分析師決策的影響。 This study investigates whether managers choose voluntary accounting changes (VACs) affect analysts’ forecast of future performance for a firm and analyst following. Data collected for U.S. listed companies that had VACs from 1994 to 2008 as the research sample and for these companies’ competitors and industry leaders into the comparison sample. Plenty literatures state the important role of on VACs and indicate that VACs will influence contracts, reported performance and stock prices of firms (Bradshaw, Miller and Serafeim 2008). In addition, the major motivations for VACs seems to be more related to the earnings effect of VACs, instead of being relevant with better operating performance in reality (Linck, Lopez and Rees 2007). Besides, analysts are major information intermediaries in securities market. In order to maintain their reputation and performance, they will carefully assess if VACs are suitable and make decision to follow the firms or not (Stickle 1992). Therefore, this study examines whether VACs affect analyst following and whether the influence to earnings and accounting choice heterogeneity of VACs will influence analyst following as well. Besides, the study also discuss whether firm size and earnings volatility will changes the association between VACs and analyst following. Hence, this study can evaluate whether VACs are viewed as purposes or signaling information and create market reaction (Harrison 1977). The empirical results show that firms with VACs will decrease the number of analyst following, especially decreasing more quickly if VACs will lead to the firms’ income to increase and firms without atypical VAC. Moreover, when VAC firms with larger size and higher earnings volatility, analysts will believe the effect of VAC is much greater, thereby reducing analysts’ willing to follow the firms quickly. In a word, the study infers that most analysts believe there are specific intents or signaling information in VACs and choose not to follow VAC firms. Besides, if the firms with larger size or higher earnings volatility, analysts will consider the higher information acquisition costs and the number of analyst following will decreases more. In a word, this paper is more conclusive than previous research to discuss the influence of VACs to analysts’ decision because considering many types VACs and firm characteristics.
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Description:	碩士國立政治大學會計研究所 100353009 101
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353009
Data Type:	thesis
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Accounting] Theses

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