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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59142
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Title: | Positive- versus Zero-Sum Majoritarian Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study |
Authors: | Hsu, Li-Chen;Yang, C.C;Yang, Chun-Lei |
Contributors: | 政大財政系 |
Keywords: | Majoritarian bargaining;Minimum winning coalition;Experiment |
Date: | 2008-12 |
Issue Date: | 2013-08-26 16:10:36 (UTC+8) |
Abstract: | Politics can involve a movement from a position off the Pareto frontier to a point on it (a positive-sum game as exemplified in the classic [Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G., 1962. The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor] work), or a movement along the Pareto frontier (a zero-sum game as exemplified in the classic [Riker, W., 1962. The theory of political coalitions. Yale University Press, New Haven] work). In this paper we shed light on their differentiation experimentally by making a comparison between a positive-sum and a zero-sum majoritarian ultimatum game. Our main findings include (i) the fraction of subjects who adopted minimum winning rather than oversized coalitions increases significantly as the game form varies from positive-sum to zero-sum, (ii) oversized coalitions are attributable to non-strategic considerations, and (iii) subjects who choose to adopt the minimum winning coalition have a tendency to seek cheaper responders as their partners in the zero-sum game, but there is no evidence of such a tendency in the positive-sum game. Overall, the weight of the evidence revealed by our experimental data indicates that relative scarcity (embodied in the zero-sum game) promotes behavior more in line with the predictions of economics. |
Relation: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 68(3-4), 498-510 |
Data Type: | article |
DOI 連結: | http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.01.004 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.01.004 |
Appears in Collections: | [財政學系] 期刊論文
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