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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/58917
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/58917


    Title: 法人說明會資訊內涵與資金成本-以高科技產業為對象
    The Content of Conference Call and Cost of Capital: Evidence from High-Technology Firms 指導教授:詹凌菁 博士 研 究 生:林珮華 撰 中 華
    Authors: 林珮華
    Lin, Pei Hua
    Contributors: 詹凌菁
    Chan, Ling Ching
    林珮華
    Lin, Pei Hua
    Keywords: 法人說明會
    資金成本
    智慧資本
    Conference calls
    Cost of capital
    Intellectual capital
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2013-07-22 10:19:02 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 法人說明會為企業揭露資訊的管道,不僅提供投資者最新的資訊,更能降低雙方資訊不對稱的情況。而高科技產業較注重其創新活動之發展,其所自願揭露的資訊內涵都較其他產業更為豐富。故本研究以臺灣高科技產業上市(櫃)公司為研究對象,欲探討其在資訊揭露之豐富程度與揭露特定資訊對資金成本造成之影響。研究結果發現當企業揭露越多越完整之資訊給投資人時,將增加投資人之信心並降低權益資金成本,但卻提升其債權資金成本。若僅研究揭露特定資訊的部分,可發現企業揭露其創新策略與人力資本皆有助降低其權益資金成本,且當這些資訊於法人說明會揭露之頻率越高,越有助其降低權益資金成本。然而揭露創新策略與擴廠、融資之資訊將提升其債權資金成本。
    Firms often voluntary disclose company-specific information by holding conference calls, which could alleviate information asymmetry between management and investors. High-technology firms focus on innovation activities, and they tend to provide more information than firms in other industry sectors. Using a sample of publicly listed firms in Taiwan, we explore the extent to which the richness of the content and the type of information disclosed affects the cost of capital. We find that when high-technology firms disclose more company-specific information to the public, they enjoy lower costs of equity capital while incur higher costs of debt. Specifically, we find that information related to innovation strategy and human capital is negatively associated with costs of equity capital. This result is more evident if firms disclose such information more frequently in conference calls. However, the disclosures of information on innovation strategy, expansion and financing are positively associated with costs of debt capital.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    100353003
    101
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353003
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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