Loading...
|
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/58723
|
Title: | 中國大陸行政事業性收費的租稅排擠之實證研究 The Empirical Study of Crowding-out Effects on Tax Revenue by Administrative Fees in China |
Authors: | 劉訓嘉 Liu, Syun Chia |
Contributors: | 吳文傑 Wu, Wen Chieh 劉訓嘉 Liu, Syun Chia |
Keywords: | 行政事業性收費 增值稅 營業稅 Administrative fees VAT Business tax |
Date: | 2012 |
Issue Date: | 2013-07-01 17:49:15 (UTC+8) |
Abstract: | 中國自從1978年實施經濟改革後,經濟快速成長,至今已經發展成了僅次於美國的第二大經濟體系,由於1994年分稅制的實行,中央政府下放財政的管理權和收入,使得地方政府擁有較多的權力可以做管理和運用,因此造就了行政事業性收費的出現。在中國的賦稅收入當中,「增值稅」和「營業稅」是主要的流轉稅,這兩種稅在總體賦稅收入中占據了相當大的比例,所以我們好奇究竟行政事業性收費的出現會不會對增值稅和營業稅帶來影響。
本篇文章的研究目的為中國地方行政事業性收費對於增值稅和營業稅影響的效果為何,因此利用中國12個年份的省市追蹤資料 (panel data)來進行分析,並將時間效果以及區域效果分別估計出來。最後,本研究發現行政事業性收費對於增值稅有反向的效果,因為中國的增值稅是屬於中央與地方共享的稅,中央享有75%,地方享有25%,因此地方政府會致力於行政事業性收費的部分,造成增值稅占總預算的比例減少;行政事業性收費對營業稅有反向的影響,營業稅也是屬於共享稅,地方政府擁有大部分的支配權,但是營業稅的稅收還是需要透過提供勞務或服務、轉讓無形資產以及銷售不動產等方式才會被課徵,因此地方政府還是有誘因去增加行政事業性收費地徵收,進而造成營業稅占總預算的比例降低。 Because of the tax reform in 1994, the central government decentralized the management of finances and revenues which allowed local governments to have more power to manage and use them. That was the reason why administrative fees played an important role in government revenues. It is known that the "Value-Added Tax" and "Business Tax" are major turnover taxes in China. Therefore, these two tax revenues account for a considerable proportion in the overall revenues, so we wonder whether the administrative fees will impact on VAT and business tax.
The purpose of this study is to discuss how Chinese local administrative charges impacted the VAT and business tax. This study makes use of China`s provinces and cities tracking data (panel data) in 12 years, and we will take time effects and regional effects into consideration. According to the results, we found that administrative charges for VAT have a negative effect, because China`s VAT is the tax which the central and the local government can share with the proportion 75% and 25% respectively. The local government will be committed to charge administrative fees, resulting in the reducing proportion of VAT of the total budget. Administrative fees have the negative effect on business tax. China`s business tax is the tax which the central and the local government can share with the proportion respectively, but the collection of business tax is by providing labor or service, transferring the intangible assets and selling real estate. Therefore local governments still have an incentive to increase the administrative charges to levy business tax and reduce proportion of the total budget. |
Reference: | 一、中文文獻
中國國家統計局(2000 - 2011),《中國統計年鑑》。
王志剛,龔六堂 (2009),「財政分權和地方政府非稅收入-基於省級財政數據」,《世界經濟文匯(上海)》,5,17-38。
江克忠、夏策敏(2012),「財政分權背景下的地方政府預算外收入擴張-基於中國省級面板數據」,《浙江社會科學》,8。
李林軍 (2005),「稅制改革後的營業稅」,《企業管理》, 155 , 35-36。
李長春 (2006),「增值稅轉型對企業籌資和投資活動的影響」,《會計之友》, 7 , 62-64。
李婉 (2010),「中國式財政分權與地方政府預算外收入膨脹研究」,《財經論叢(浙江)》,3,24-30。
林柏兆 (2002),「分稅制下中央與省級的財政互動:委託-代理體制的轉變」
馬元燕 (2005),「稅制改革後省及預算外收入膨脹的原因分析」,《公共管理學報(哈爾濱)》,1,49-55。
姜愛林 (2009),「增值稅轉型改革對經濟發展的若干影響-基於東北等地區的實證分析」,《湖南工業大學學報》, 5。
黃智聰、歐陽宏(2005),「世界各國對中國直接投資決定因素之研究」,《遠景季刊》,7(2),139-178。
劉正芳 (1998),《中國大陸流轉稅之研究》,淡江大學大陸研究所碩士論文
宋雨河、尹迎龍、朱玥 (2009),「淺西增值稅改革及其對企業發展的影響」,《財會學習月刊》,60-63。
郭豔茹 (2008),「中央與地方財政競爭下的土地問題:基於經濟學文獻的分析」,《經濟社會體制比較》,63。
薛萬娟 (2005),「政策法規」,《農電》,2。
二、英文文獻
Auriol, E. and Warlters, M.(2005),“Taxation base in developing countries, ” Journal of Public Economics, 89(4), 625-646.
Breusch, T. S. and A. R. Pagan (1980), The Lagrange Multiplier Test and Its Applications to Model Specification in Econometrics.
Christine, P. W. (2000), “Central-Local Relations Revisited: The 1994 Tax Sharing Reform and Public Expenditure Management in China,” China Perspectives, 31, 52-63.
Go, D., Kearney, M., Robinson, S., and Thierfelder, K. (2005) , “An analysis of South Africa`s value added tax, ” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 3671.
H. Greene William (2003), Econometric Analysis, 287-291.
Hausman, Jerry A. (1978), “Specification Tests in Econometrics.” Econometrica, 46(6), 1251-1271.
Hsiao, Cheng (1986), Analysis of panel data, Econometric Society Monographs, no. 11 Cambridge; New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Lin, S.(2005), “Excessive government fee collection in China,” Contemporary Economic Policy, 23(1), 91-106.
Lin, S.(2008), “China`s value-added tax reform, capital accumulation, and welfare implications,” China Economic Review, 19(2), 197-214.
Profeta, P. and S. Scabrosetti (2010), “The political economy of taxation: Lessons for developing countries,” Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Piancastelli, M. (2001), “Measuring the tax effort of developed and developing countries. Cross country panel data -1985/1995,” IPEA Working Paper, No. 818.
Shuanglin Lin (2005), “Excessive Government Fee Collection in China,” Contemporary Economic Policy, 23, 91-106.
Sen Gupta, A. (2007), “Determinants of tax revenue efforts in developing countries,” IMF Working Papers, 1-39. |
Description: | 碩士 國立政治大學 財政研究所 100255025 101 |
Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1002550251 |
Data Type: | thesis |
Appears in Collections: | [財政學系] 學位論文
|
Files in This Item:
File |
Size | Format | |
index.html | 0Kb | HTML2 | 591 | View/Open |
|
All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|