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    题名: 台灣上市櫃公司股權募資方式之決定因素 - 公司治理機制的影響
    The determinants of public offerings v.s. private placements: corporate governance perspective
    作者: 黃必松
    贡献者: 徐燕山
    黃必松
    关键词: 私募股權
    公募股權
    公司治理
    監督效果假說
    管理者自我鞏固假說
    日期: 2011
    上传时间: 2012-10-24 16:34:02 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 過去文獻對於私募股權增資主要有三種論點，分別是資訊不對稱假說、監督效果假說以及管理者自我鞏固假說，過去研究基本上對於私募股權具有可以減輕資訊不對稱問題的效果有一致的結論，然而對於監督效果與管理者自我鞏固效果仍沒有一致的定論。因此本文控制了資訊不對稱、增資前的營運績效、公司股價表現以及發行規模等因素的影響後，從公司治理的角度去探討究竟國內的私募股權增資是符合監督效果假說，還是管理者自我鞏固假說。
    實證結果顯示，董事會獨立性愈高、機構法人持股比率愈高時，愈傾向使用私募股權增資，隱含私募股權增資的確有提升對企業經理人之監督進而有助於公司價值之提升，符合(Wruck,1989)提出的監督效果假說。此外與過去研究發現一致，本研究的實證結果亦顯示，資訊不對稱愈高的公司使用私募股權增資的機率愈高，顯示企業可以透過私募股權增資來減輕資訊不對稱之問題。同時，若公司的股價在增資前異常攀升時，企業會傾向選擇公開募集增資，顯示出相較於私募股權增資，公募股權增資比較會有擇時之考量。當公司於增資前營運績效表現較差時會傾向選擇使用私募股權增資。而發行規模較小時，為了降低直接發行成本，企業會傾向選擇以私募的方式辦理增資。
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    呂季蓉， 2005，台灣上市櫃公司私募之研究-論私募對象之影響，國立中山大學財務管理學係碩士論文。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    99357038
    100
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    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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