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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/50824


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    題名: 公司治理對信用風險與董監薪酬影響之研究
    The effect of corporate governance on firm`s credit risk and directors` salary
    作者: 錢珮瑩
    貢獻者: 屠美亞
    錢珮瑩
    關鍵詞: 公司治理
    信用風險
    信用評等
    董監薪酬
    日期: 2010
    上傳時間: 2011-09-29 16:47:47 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 　　債權人在考量借款給公司所面臨的風險時，不只應考慮公司過去信用狀況，更須了解一家公司之公司治理對於未來現金流量穩定性有相當的影響力，故本研究探討公司治理對信用風險之影響，檢視良好的公司治理是否比較差的公司治理擁有較佳之信用風險評等。
    　　研究發現，在控制公司特性之後，信用風險評等和十大股東持股比例、集團企業與否呈現負相關，顯示十大股東持股比例高與公司為集團企業時信用風險評等表現較差；與法人持股比例、經理人持股比例、資訊揭露透明度、獨立監察人比例、董事會持股比例呈現正相關，顯示法人持股、經理人持股、資訊揭露透明度、獨立監察人與董事會持股等比例的提高時有助於信用風險評等提升。
    　　公司若提升公司治理，將擁有較良好的信用風險評等，債權人會因不確定性的減少而要求較低之必要報酬率，同樣減輕了企業的債務負擔，但有許多公司並未因此而加強其公司治理制度。研究中發現，當獨立董事比例低與董事會持股比例低時，平均董監薪酬水準顯著較高，可見在公司治理較差時，董監反而得到較高之薪酬，解釋了公司治理機制無法完善的原因。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    98357020
    99
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098357020
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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