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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/50789


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    題名: 高階經理人薪酬與自願性盈餘預測之關聯性
    On the association between CEO’s compensation and voluntary disclosure
    作者: 吳元婷
    貢獻者: 梁嘉紋
    吳元婷
    關鍵詞: 高階經理人薪酬
    自願性財務預測
    代理問題
    日期: 2010
    上傳時間: 2011-09-29 16:39:09 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 自願性財務預測對公司來說，是傳遞內部資訊給外部使用者之方法之一，透過自願性財務預測，藉以消弭因資訊不對稱所產生之代理問題。公司為了減輕代理問題，透過薪酬之設計，使經營者與股東之目標趨於一致，因此，本研究欲探討高階經理人之薪酬，是否會受到其自願性財務預測之影響。
    本研究針對2000年至2009年標準普爾前五百(S&P 500)之公司，進行高階經理人薪酬及自願性財務預測關聯性之探討。以是否發佈自願性財務預測、是否未達成自願性財務預測，以及自願性財務預測之準確性，分別探討其與高階經理人薪酬之關聯。實證結果發現，公司當年度有發佈自願性年盈餘預測，高階經理人薪酬變動會增加；本研究亦發現當未達到自願性年盈餘預測時，高階經理人薪酬有負向變動，而未達到季盈餘預測的情況下並未發現同樣結果；而預測之準確性，不論是年樣本或季樣本，皆未發現與高階經理人薪酬有顯著之關聯性。
    關鍵
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    98353045
    99
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098353045
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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