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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/50006


    Title: 最適查稅獎金制度之理論分析
    Authors: 吳昱瑩
    Contributors: 曾巨威
    吳昱瑩
    Keywords: 租稅逃漏、賄賂鏈、最適機制、層級查核
    Date: 2007
    Issue Date: 2010-12-09 16:02:15 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 為探討稅務員最適查稅獎金，以減少其相互勾結，使租稅稽徵更具效率，本文從理論角度出發，以Sanyal模型為基礎，進一步修正其模型，使其更具一般化，並代入數值，分析查核率與舉發率對查稅獎金的影響，最後經由我國數據資料，間接推算適用之獎金制度。
    本文的發現主要有以下幾點：
    （一）查稅獎金是否可簡化為一單純之表示方式，和其是否需賄賂上層稅務員有關。當其所需賄賂的上層稅務員增加，數學推導將越複雜。換言之，實際的稅務員層級眾多，查稅獎金制度很難達到理論上最適條件的要求。
    （二）代入數值運算後，可得一確定且收斂之查稅獎金比例值。此數值受舉發率和查核率交互影響。在舉發率小時，第三階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而上升；第二階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而下降；第一階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而下降。但在舉發率高時，第一階查稅獎金反而隨查核率上升而上升，第三階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而下降，只有第二階查稅獎金不受舉發率之影響，仍隨查核率上升而下降。
    （三）導入我國實際數據資料可知，欲使我國稅務員誠實舉發不收賄之查稅獎金，應讓第一階稅務員獲得最多之獎金最高，第二階次之，第三階則給予最少之獎金，且第三階之獎金可隨查核率提昇而微幅下降。
    Reference: Alm, J., B. Jackson, M. McKee (1992), “Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance”, American Economic Review, 82(4): 1018-1026.
    Alm, J. and M. Mckee (2006), “ Audit Certainty, Audit Productivity, and Taxpayer Compliance.” National Tax Journal 59, 801-16.
    Bac, M. (2007), “Optimal Supervision Intensity, Collusion, and the Organization of Work” Canadian Journal of Economics, 40(1): 313-339.
    Bag, P.K. (1997), “ Controlling Corruption in Hierarchies.” Journal of Comparative Economics, 25: 322-344.
    Caballé, J. and J. Panadés (2005), “Cost Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance.” International Tax and Public Finance, 12: 239-263.
    Congleton, R.D. (2002). “ Risk-Averse Taxpayers and the Allocation of Tax Enforcement Effort: Law Enforcement or Leviathan? Some Empirical Evidence,” Public Finance Review, 30(5): 456-476.
    Finkle, A. and D. Shin (2007), “ Conducting Inaccurate Audits to Commit to the Audit Policy.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25: 379-389.
    Kaplow, L. (1992), “ The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines far Acts that Definitely are Undesirable” International Review of Law and Economics, 12: 3-11.
    Kessler, A.S. (2004), “ Optimal Auditing in Hierarchical Relationships.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160: 210-231.
    Macho-Stadler, I. and J.D. Pérez-Castrillo (1997), “ Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Incomes Sources.” International Economic Review, 38 (4): 951-986.
    Macho-Stadler, I. and J.D. Pérez-Castrillo (2002), “ Auditing with Signals.” Economica, 69: 1-20.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    94255001
    96
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0942550012
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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